

**JOHN L. DUBE, HIS ILANGA LASE NATALI
AND THE NATAL AFRICAN ADMINISTRATION,
1903-1910**

by

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ABSTRACT

J.L. Dube is one of the Zulu Natalians who, being an African nationalist, involved himself in the affairs of his kith and kin. He is the founder of the first African established school in Natal, viz. Ohlange. He also succeeded to establish and publish ILANGA LASE NATAL as a medium of contact among the Africans who were economically, politically and socially acute.

Dube set himself the task of revealing the failures of Shepstonism. He pointed out how it could have been utilised to promote acceptable administration of Africans. He even pinpointed the type of reforms that the Africans yearned for. When this was not heeded, he involved himself unflinchingly in politics. He organised fellow-Christian Africans with success. Dube was, however, an exponent of non-violent political change. He wished that in its dealings with the Africans, the government would be fair, objective and humane.

Dube remonstrated against the subjugation of the Africans by the colonial government. He preferred that the Africans should be consulted, and elevated in the scale of civilization. For this to happen, he pressed that the attitudes of the whites towards blacks would have to change. The unwieldy officialdom, obscenely abusive party politics, and unequal treatment of whites and blacks at law would also have to be remedied or replaced.

He advocated that land should be equitably distributed and Africans introduced to a new mode of land ownership. The whites would have to reduce their excessive demands for land and African labour. He also demanded a worthwhile education system for the blacks that would promote all their human aspects. The government was urged to adequately financially provide for and control African education. It should not leave this to the lot of missionary societies.

Dube also pressed for the enfranchisement and representation of Africans in the Natal legislature. It was only then that the government would quickly apprehend, comprehend, and redress problems that related to Africans.

Subsequent to the 1906 rebellion, Dube was hopeful that there would be an end to maladministration of African affairs. He was highly expectant that the recommendations of NNAC, the drive of the new governor, the new direction of policy, though late, would put the colony on a new course. However, then the movement towards Union was afoot. It remained to be seen what would transpire.

IQHAWWE LE AFRIKA

Mafukuzela weAfrika
 Mafukuzel' onjengezulu
 Nyoni emnyama yangeneno
 Eye yawelela phesheya
 Ezweni lezihlakaniphi,
 Zona zasenthonalanga.
 Wafika phesheya kolwandle,
 Bakucobelela ulwazi,
 Ulwazi lwabo lokubhula.
 Bakucobelela wabhula,
 Wafana noSiwaluwalu,
 Obakhe khon' eBhiyafu.
 Kodwa wena wehluka kuye
 Ngoba ubhula kwezengqondo.
 Ubufana nas' isangoma
 Esibhula ngabalozi.
 Ngikuthandile mfo kaDube
 Laph' usuthwasis' izinsizwa,
 Ngisho izinsizwa zakini,
 Kulona loMhlabuhlangene;
 Wazilol' izinsizwa zakini
 Zaze zaciya njengenungu,
 Mafukuzela weAfrika.
 Uyibekil' induk' ebandla,
 Ngoba waqamba isikole
 Nasi sisibona oHlange;
 Zonke izizwe nezizwana,
 Zaqonda kulona uHlange
 Ngenhloso yokuthwasa khona,
 Nazo zize zifane nabo
 Lab' abanwele zimashoba
 Okwemiyeko yezangoma.
 Walol' izinsizwa zakini
 Ukuba zime zibhekane
 Nezokufika ezimbili,
 Enye iphum' entshonalanga,
 Enye iphuma empumalanga.
 Zithe nxa lezinsizwa zifika
 Kwelakini lenkaba yakho,
 Wabona ukuth' umasiza
 Ukubane nawe uwele
 Ukuze uhlome njengazo.
 Nebala waluwel' ulwandle,

Uqonde khon' entshonalanga,
 Uyokwethwes' inhlakanipho,
 Ukuze nawe uhlonishwe.
 Zinsizw' ezinkulu zeAfrika,
 Bongan' iqhawe lakithi,
 Kithi lifana noAggrey,
 Naye engum Afrika
 Kuyof' izinsizwa kuphela
 Kusal' imisebenzi yazo,
 Yona isal' ishumayela
 Ezinhliziyweni zabasele,
 Ize ishumayeke futhi
 Nakuzo izizukulwane,
 Izizukulwan' ezizayo
 Ezizalwa ngama-Afrika.
 Sekuyoba ngumthwalo wazo
 Izizukulwan' ezizayo,
 Ukuba zidumis' amaqhawe
 Elamana nomfo kaDube
 Esiwabon' eseyithatha
 Leyonduk' eyashiyw' ebandla
 Yilo iDube elimthende.
 Sesinawo kwelakithi
 Aseludumo lweNatali,
 Imisebenzi yaw' ekhanya
 Njengelanga emini,
 Nanjengenyanga nezinkanyezi.
 Uyohlala uphila Mafukuzela
 Kubo bonk' abendlu yakwenu.

Ibhalwe nguMnu. A. Nzimande

HERO OF AFRICA

Mafukuzela of Africa
Mafukuzela the like of the heavens
Black bird of this land
That went across seas
In the land of the wise,
The wise of the West.
Arriving overseas,
You were apportioned wisdom,
The wisdom to prophesy.
The equipped you and you prophesied,
You became like Siwaluwalu,
Whose home was at the Bluff.
But from him you differed
Because you prophesied intellectually.
You were like a diviner
Who divined with whistling spirits.
I loved you Dube
As you helped lads season in divining,
I mean men of your own folk,
In Southern Africa,
Your men you did train
Like a porcupine's quill they did sharpen.
Mafukuzela of Africa.
You made contributions to mankind,
You founded a school
We see it at Ohlange;
All big and small nations,
Went to Ohlange College
Arriving at acquiring wisdom,
There you see them emulating
Those whose hair curls
Like the diviner's fringes of hair.
To be bold and face
Those two groups of men,
Who from the West had arrived,
and from the East had arrived.
Which men when they arrived
in your land of birth
You realized your salvation
Lay in your going overseas
So as to be similarly equipped.

Indeed the sea you did cross.
To the West you went,
To gain all wisdom,
So that you also could be honoured.
Men of stature in Africa,
Praise the hero of our land,
To us he is like Aggrey,
Who was also African
Men only shall die
Their work shall outlive them,
In the hearts of survivors,
It will also preach
to the generations,
Generations still to come
Who will be born of Africans
It will now be the task
of the future generations,
to extol our heroes
Who will come after Dube
We see them continuing
The good work started
By Dube the striped.
We have them in our land
They are of fame in Natal,
Their work is illustrious
Like the sun at midday,
Like the moon and the stars.
You will live long Mafukuzela
To all those of your kith and kin.

Translated by : Prof. O.E.H.M. Nxumalo.

AN INTRODUCTION

JOHN LANGALIBALELE DUBE, UMAFUKUZELA : THE MAN AND HIS TIMES

John Langalibalele Dube, popularly and affectionately known among the Zulus as

"Mafukuzela we Afrika

Mafukuzela onjengezulu

Nyoni emnyama yanganeno

Eye wawelela phesheya..."¹

was born at the Inanda Mission Station on 11 February 1871². Dube's father was Rev. James Dube, a pastor in the American Board Mission, who had been converted by veteran missionary, Rev. Daniel Lindley, and was one of the first ordained pastors of the American Zulu Mission. Rev. James Dube died while his son was still in his infancy, so that it fell to his mother's lot to bring John up³.

Dube received his primary education at Inanda. He then proceeded to the Amanzimtoti Theological School which was then the most advanced of the

¹ S. Nyembezi, Iqoda : Ibanga 5, pp. 64 - 66. Praise Song by A.M. Nzimande. See the frontispiece for the whole praise song and its translation by the friend of the author of the thesis, O.E.H.M. Nxumalo, himself a poet, novelist and educationist.

² J.L. Dube, A Talk upon my Native Land, p. 17.

³ Ilanga Lase Natal, 29 November 1907.

schools which the American Board of Missions operated. It was at Adams Mission that Dube first appreciated what he later referred to as "the superiority of the American Missionaries⁴." He was greatly impressed by the type of education that was offered which included academic education, agricultural and industrial training. The educational programme also stressed self-help, manual labour and character training that were supposedly designed to make the recipient economically self-reliant⁵. Dube was seized with an intense desire to go to America so that he could receive training as a missionary enabling him on his return to "...become the humble instrument... for doing something toward the enlightenment of a benighted people⁶."

It was in 1887 that Dube was able to realize his ambition when Rev. W.C. Wilcox, a pastor and Dube's teacher at Amanzimtoti, agreed that Dube would accompany him on his return to the United States of America. Dube used £30 which had been left to him by his father to pay for his passage. After passing through London and Boston in both of which he formed lasting impression of

⁴ J.L. Dube, "Need of Industrial Education in Africa" in Southern Workman, July, 1897, p. 142. R. Hunt Davis Jr, "John L. Dube : A South African Exponent of Booker T. Washington" in Journal of African Studies, Vol. II, 1975 - 1976, pp. 503 - 505. W.C. Wilcox, "John L. Dube : The Booker Washington of the Zulus" in Missionary Review of the World, N5 32, 1909, pp. 915 - 916.

⁵ R. Hunt Davis Jr, "John L. Dube : A South African Exponent of Booker T. Washington" in Journal of African Studies, Vol. II, 1975-1976, p. 505.

⁶ J.L. Dube, A Talk upon my Native Land, p. 19. See also H.C. Lugg, Historical Natal and Zululand, p. 78. A.J. Luthuli, Let my People Go, p. 75. S.V.H. Mdhluli, The Development of the African, pp. 52 - 55.

the cultural achievement of the whites, he arrived at his destination, the Oberlin College in Ohio, where Wilcox had studied, with only 2s in his pocket. To pay for his tuition and to support himself at Oberlin, he undertook a variety of jobs which included building and printing; all of which were to stand him in good stead when he launched his projects on his return to Natal⁷. He also augmented his income by accompanying Wilcox on lecturing tours, during which he spoke on the African's need of industrial training and on the concept of self-help⁸. Not much should however be made of the fact that Dube had to combine hard study with exhaustive work as many students at Oberlin similarly had to work in order to earn to pay part of their college expenses. It had been the policy of the founders of the college that manual labour should play a prominent part in its students' lives⁹. Dube's problem was that he had to work even during vacations without rest and that he constantly changed jobs¹⁰.

Dube was at Oberlin for the academic years of 1887 to 1890 and seems to

⁷ Ilanga Lase Natal, 29 November 1907. Dube's own account of himself in very interesting and informative.

⁸ R. Hunt Davis Jr, op. cit, p. 505.

⁹ Oberlin Papers, Historical Sketch of Oberlin College, in the Library of Congress. The College was founded in 1833 by Rev. John J. Shipherd and Philo Stewart and was named after John Frederick Oberlin, a renowned pastor, educator and philanthropist from Alsace - Lorraine.

¹⁰ W.C. Wilcox, op cit, p. 916.

have lived in the United States of America a period of five years¹¹. In 1892, his health had so deteriorated as a result of hard work and strenuous study that he was forced to return to South Africa. On his arrival in Natal, he was employed by the American Zulu Mission as a teacher at Amanzimtoti. He was married in 1894 to Nokutela Mdimba who had studied at Inanda Girls' Seminary and was then teaching at the American Board Mission school at Groutville. With his wife and brother-in-law, John Mdimba, Dube then proceeded to the interior, where they established two churches and three preaching stations at Incwadi in the valley of the Umkomazi river¹².

Dube's craving for further training caused him to travel once more to the United States in 1897, where he enrolled at the Union Missionary Seminary in Brooklyn in New York¹³. This time he was accompanied by his wife, Nokutela, who wanted to study housework¹⁴. She played an important role by singing on the occasions when Dube addressed meetings to raise money for the establishment of a Zulu industrial school on their return home. Dube was always to place great emphasis upon the role of women in the upliftment and

¹¹ This is open to speculation as Wilcox fixes the period at six years while Dube himself gives it as four or five years. W.C. Wilcox, *op cit.*, p. 916. J.L. Dube, "Need of Industrial Education in Africa" in Southern Workman, July, 1897, p. 142. Ilanga Lase Natal, 29 November 1907.

¹² J.L. Dube, "Need of Industrial Education in Africa" in Southern Workman, July, 1897, p. 142. Ilanga Lase Natal, 29 November 1907.

¹³ R. Hunt Davis Jr, *op. cit.*, p. 506.

¹⁴ Ilanga Lase Natal, 29 November 1907.

advancement of the nation and his wife was thus more than the loyal supporter of his endeavour. She was an example to others¹⁵. After three years of study, Dube was ordained as a priest by the Congregational Church in March 1899¹⁶.

It was in 1897 while in Brooklyn that Dube first heard about and became interested in the work of Booker T. Washington at Tuskegee in Alabama. He expressed a desire to interview the Tuskegan more especially as he wanted to visit both Hampton and Tuskegee institutes before returning to South Africa¹⁷.

Dube informed Washington of his intention to establish a school of an industrial character among his people in Natal¹⁸. He regarded it as his lot

¹⁵ W.M. Marable, "South African Nationalism in Brooklyn : J.L. Dube's Activities in New York State, 1887 - 1899" in Afro - Americans in New York Life and History, January 1979, p. 31 - 32. R. Hunt Davis jr, op. cit., p. 507. J.L. Dube, "Practical Christianity amongst the Zulu." in Missionary Review of the World, Ns 20, May 1907, p. 372.

¹⁶ W.M. Marable, op. cit., p. 34.

¹⁷ It is not clear whether the request was acceded to or whether the two ever met face to face before Dube returned to Natal. By all accounts, it is unlikely, though Dube visited Tuskegee and its sister institution at Hampton in Virginia. W.M. Marable, op. cit., p. 31. He himself further clouded the issue when wrote after his third visit to the United State in 1904 - 1905 that he had met Washington for the second time and had dined with him in his house at Tuskegee. Ilanga Lase Natal, 19 May 1905.

¹⁸ Dube was to write to Washington later in 1897 writing "Can I use your name as endorsing my work?. I have recently visited your establishment. I shall be pleased to hear favourably." B.T.W. Papers No 346/19007, Dube to Washington, Brooklyn, 10 September 1897.

in life, he explained, "to further the cause of my people, to labour for their enlightenment and advancement, both in temporal and in spiritual matters." He could serve the Africans even though the contribution he could make might only be small¹⁹.

Dube's experience and contacts in New York exercised a great influence on his subsequent activities. For the most part, his ideas on how African society could be transformed were based on what he had observed in Brooklyn²⁰. He also relied on his contacts in New York for financial support for the many projects that he wanted to launch or launched in Natal²¹.

Dube, accompanied by his wife and P.L. Scott, a West-Indian, whom he had recruited at Tuskegee, arrived in Natal on the eve of the Anglo-Boer War²². As a recent study of his life acknowledges, he was now "the intellectual and spiritual spokesman for his social class"²³. He was determined to involve himself in the upliftment and advancement of his people²⁴.

¹⁹ A.W. Lee and J.L. Dube, "The Clash of Colour" in Natal Missionary Conference Papers, Durban, 1926, p. 8. See also J.L. Dube, The Zulu's Appeal for Light, p. 7.

²⁰ W.M. Marable, op. cit., p. 24.

²¹ Ilanga Lase Natal, 29 November 1907. W.M. Marable, op. cit., p. 24.

²² R. Hunt Davis Jr, op. cit., p. 507. W.M. Marable, op. cit., p. 34.

²³ W.M. Marable, "African Nationalist : The Life of John Langalibalele Dube" (Ph. D., Maryland, 1976), p. 114.

²⁴ R. Hunt Davis, op. cit., p. 509 - 511. W.M. Marable, op. cit., p. 34.

No sooner had he arrived in Natal then Dube joined Stephen Mini, Saul Msane, J.T. Gumede and Martin Lutuli and other educated Africans in forming the Natal Native Congress in 1900. The chief objective of this organization was to enable the Africans to express their feelings and bring grievances to the attention of the government. The establishment of the Congress was probably based on the example of the Natal Indian Congress which was founded by Mahatma K. Gandhi in 1894 as a forum for the expression of Indians' feelings and grievances against the government's policies²⁵. The congress somehow eclipsed the Funamalungelo Society which was started by Johannes Kumalo in 1888 in order to fight for civil rights of Africans. However, the two bodies existed side by side until well into 1908 when the Funamalungelo Society was replaced by the Iliso Lesizwe Esimnyama²⁶. The Congress was the main political organ of the African people throughout the whole period of the separate existence of the colony of Natal. Significantly, the Congress initially represented educated, Christian and exempted Africans²⁷.

After more than two years of preparation, Dube succeeded in 1901 in establishing a school at Inanda, viz. Ohlange, on the Tuskegee model on land

²⁵ W.M. Marable, op. cit., p. 26. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 69.

²⁶ D. Welsh, The Roots of Segregation, p.,, 243 "Funamalungelo" means "fight for civic rights" and "Iliso Lesizwe Esimnyama" means "Eye of the Black Nation"

²⁷ S. Marks, op. cit., pp. 69 - 73.

that was donated for this purpose by Chief Mqhawe of the AmaQadi²⁸. Dube intended to use Ohlange "to train my people"²⁹ and to offer industrial training to "heathen" and Christian youths so that they might be formed into good and useful citizens and become "true leaders of the masses of our people who are sitting in darkness."³⁰ Dube thus put into practice the "self help" programme, an ideal he had long cherished. In time, black industrial education was to contribute to Africans' demand for self-determination.³¹

Dube was also the founder and publisher of the newspaper called Ilanga Lase Natal which was first published on 10 April 1903. The paper was originally printed by International Printing Press in Durban but as from the edition of 25 October 1903 it was printed at Ohlange. Dube controlled the newspaper until 1935 when Bantu Press bought 50% of the subsidiary called Ilanga Lase Natal (Proprietary) Limited which was especially formed for the purpose.³²

²⁸ BTW 177/1901, Dube to Washington, Phoenix, 9 May 1901. Ilanga Lase Natal, 29 November 1907. H.C. Lugg, Historic Natal and Zululand, pp. 78 - 79.

²⁹ K.C.L. 20444, Newspaper Book 9, Interview in Natal Advertisal, 21 September 1936.

³⁰ J.L. Dube, The Zulu's Appeal for Light, p. 5.

³¹ W.M. Marable, "Booker T. Washington and African Nationalism" in Phylon, December 1974, p. 398. W.M. Marable "South African Nationalism in Brooklyn: John L. Dube's Activities in New York State, 1887 - 1899" in Afro - Americans in New York Life and History, January 1979, p. 23. P. Walshe, The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa, pp. 12 - 13.

³² Ilanga Lase Natal, 10 April 1903. L. Switzer and D. Switzer, The Black Press in South Africa and Lesotho, p. 39.

On 12 February 1904 Dube and his wife once more left for the United States for purposes of collecting funds for Ohlange. Until Dube's return on 5 May 1905, J.S. Mdimba was in charge of the school and the Ilanga Lase Natal.³³ After his return, Dube played a very active role in the events that shaped the history of Natal. Amongst such issues of the moment are the land and labour matters, the reports of commissions on African affairs, the Bambatha rebellion and the trial of Dinuzulu. In all these activities he regarded himself as the spokesman of the Africans. He advocated racial equality, an enlightened policy of administration of Africans, demanded justice and strove for African unity.³⁴ He also sought to improve the relations and bridge "the widening gap between the world of the African and the European."³⁵

Dube also played a prominent role in the resistance that was staged by the Africans against closer union of the South African states from whose legislature the Africans were to be excluded.³⁶ On 1 July 1909 Dube left for England ostensibly to raise funds for his school, but more apparently as a member of a delegation that had been appointed to present a petition prepared by Africans

³³ Ilanga Lase Natal, 12 February 1904, 12 May, 2 June 1905.

³⁴ J.K. Ngubane, An African Explains Apartheid, pp. 58 - 59. S. Marks, "The Ambiguities of Dependence: John L. Dube of Natal in Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 1. No. 2, April 1975, p. 165. K.C.L. Native Teacher's Journal, XXV, No. 4, July 1946.

³⁵ A Kerr, Fort Hare, 1915 - 48 : The Evolution of an African College, p. 202. See also J.L. Dube, A Talk upon my Native Land, p. 4.

³⁶ Ilanga Lase Natal, 18 September, 16, 23 October and 20 November 1908.

to the House of Commons on the Act of Union of 1909³⁷. During his absence for a period of twenty-one months, Dube's work was in the hands of J.S. Mdimba, and Charles Dube, his brother, with the latter taking over the reins as the editor of the Ilanga Lase Natal. At Dube's request Marshall Campbell, the sugar magnate and member of the Legislative Council, was to keep a close watch over Ohlange and on "..... those who will take an opportunity to wreck it during my absence."³⁸

No sooner had he returned from his sojourn in England and the United States on 26 February 1911,³⁹ then Dube once more immersed himself in educational, social and political activities that were afoot and designed to improve the lot of the Africans. When the South African Native National Congress was established in 1912, Dube was elected in absentia to become its first president. In this capacity he, using the columns of Ilanga, bitterly opposed the practical implementation of the 1913 Native Lands Act and subsequently led the delegation to London to protest against it. In 1917 he also strenuously opposed the Native Administration Act. But he had then been ousted from the presidency of the Congress for his apparent acceptance of the

³⁷ Ilanga Lase Natal, 2 July 1909. Ms Natham 370, Marshall Campbell to Natham, Mount Edgecombe, 6 July 1909. R. Hunt Davis, *op. cit.*, p. 508. S. Marks, "The Ambiguities of Dependence : John L. Dube of Natal" in Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 1. No. 2, April 1975, pp. 163, 175.

³⁸ Ms Natham 370, Dube to Marshall Campbell, London, 29 October 1909.

³⁹ Ilanga Lase Natal, 3 March 1911.

broad principle, as opposed to the actual practice, of segregation⁴⁰. From this time till his death in 1946, Dube devoted his energies to the running of the Natal provincial branch of the Congress eventually as an independent entity⁴¹.

From 1920 to 1926, Dube was a member of the Smuts' Native Conference⁴². In 1921 and 1929 he was invited by W.E.B. Du Bois, the leader of the Pan African movement, to attend international meetings of the Pan-African Congress, but Dube was unable to attend because the Natal Native Congress of which he was the chairman was unable to raise funds to defray the expenses of his travel to the meetings.⁴³ In 1926 he represented South Africa at the international missionary conference at Le Zoute in Belgium. In 1935 he was elected a member of the All-African Convention which had been established to fight the Hertzog bills then before the South African Parliament.⁴⁴ In 1936 he became the first African to be awarded an honorary degree by the University of South Africa.⁴⁵ As from 1936 until his death, he represented

⁴⁰ R. Hunt Davis, op. cit., pp. 497, 519, 521-524. S. Marks, "The Ambiguities of Dependence : John L. Dube of Natal" in Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 1 No 2, April 1975, pp. 163, 175-176. T. Karis and G.M. Carter, From Protest to Challenge, Vol. 1, pp. 84 - 86.

⁴¹ S. Marks, op. cit., p. 163.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ W.E.B. Du Bois Papers, Dube to Du Bois, Phoenix, 23 April 1921, Du Bois to Dube, New York, 27 May 1921; Du Bois to Dube, New York, 7 October 1929.

⁴⁴ R. Hunt Davis, op. cit., pp. 508, 511. S. Marks, op. cit., p. 163.

⁴⁵ The Natal Advertiser, 19 September 1936. The Natal mercury, 22 September 1936.

Natal on the Native Representative Council⁴⁶.

Late in life, especially after 1917, Dube was criticized and eventually ostracised, for his political standpoint on the principle of segregation in land opporitionment, and was consequently been referred to as a "sell-out" as "compromiser" or "political accommodationist"⁴⁷ It is said that much of the radicalism and anti-white stand that he had displayed before 1917 gradually disappeared and he acquired the reputation of having "sold out"⁴⁸ the African nationalist movement⁴⁹. Consequently the very people who had invited him to assume the presidency of the South African Native Congress, found cause to oust him in 1917.

Dube thus remained a figure of controversy throughout his illustrious social and political career. The present study in concentrating on the years 1903 to 1910, deals with a very important period in his career as it was at this time that he involved himself in a member of political controversies with the establishment of Ohlange and the publication of the Ilanga Lase Natal.

⁴⁶ S. Marksm op. cit., p. 163.

⁴⁷ G. Shepperson and T. Price, The Independent African, p. 91.

⁴⁸ W.M. Marable, op. cit., pp. 37 - 38. See footnotes No.s 28 and 40.

⁴⁹ W.M. Marable, op. cit., p. 37 Footnote No. 28.

CHAPTER ONE

DUBE AND THE FAILURE OF SHEPSTONISM

John Langalibalele Dube was undoubtedly one of the most important and forceful African political figures in Natal before the colony joined with others in forming the Union in 1910. Influential as he was, he was the product of his times, so his personality, political views and actions were a direct outcome of what was happening around him. The events of the time determined and influenced his reaction to, and stand against, measures that were applicable to his fellow Africans. At the same time, he used his insight, political clout and influence to shape and try to change the course of events of the day. Even though he did not succeed in all instances, he found solace in that he had committed himself to and contributed much to the defence of Africans against white avarice, injustice, mismanagement, domination and subjugation, while protecting the Africans themselves against self-destruction and self-effacement.

Natal, at the time when Dube launched himself¹ into politics and rose to prominence, was in a state of flux with an amalgam of factors, forces and processes at work. The period is marked by the outbreak and conclusion of the hostilities of the Anglo-Boer War on the one hand, and the formation of the Union on the other. In between important developments, such as the war reparation and reconstruction, re-appraisal

¹. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion pp. 73 - 75, 332 - 335, 341-2, 361-2. Ilanga Lase Natal, 29 November 1907. The Natal Advertiser, 19 September 1936.

of Shepstonian policy, economic depression and imposition of taxation, the Bambatha rebellion, the arrest and trial of Dinuzulu, reform of administrative measures applicable to Africans, and the movement towards Union,² featured prominently. It was chiefly at these events or their handling by the government and the whites that Dube's comments and criticisms were directed. His activities drew the extreme ire of the whites and government officials who constantly viewed him with suspicion.³

The period under discussion can for purposes of convenience be divided into three epochs which are marked by momentous events:

- (a) Post - War Era and Review of African Administration Policy, 1903 - 1905.
- (b) The Coming of the Crunch. The Bambatha Rebellion, 1906, and Arrest and Trial of Dinuzulu.
- (c) Post - Rebellion Administration, Reforms and Movement towards Union, 1907 - 1910.

1. Post War Era and Review of African Administration Policy, 1903 - 1905.

No sooner had the dust of the Anglo-Boer War settled, than the whites were jolted by rumblings of discontent and evidence of irritation in all sections of the African population. These unseemly developments revived whites' fears, together with

². E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, pp.210 - 256. The authors give a detailed analysis of the development of the events.

³. G. Shepperson and T. Price, The Independent African, p. 92. W. Wilcox, "John L. Dube: The Booker Washington of the Zulus" in Missionary Review of the World, NS 32, 109, p. 919.

feelings of distrust and insecurity. They shook the very props on which were based whites' existence, domination and authority. It then dawned on them that the Africans were not as peaceful and contented as the Shepstonian policy had led them to assume.⁴ In the face of threats to their being, many whites pressed that even harsher and stricter measures should be introduced in order to keep the Africans in their place.⁵

The Africans' restlessness and irritability were due to a combination of factors. The economic boom which followed immediately after the war, with its effect on population growth and cost of living, lasted only for two years.⁶ It soon gave way to a devastating economic depression which raged uncontrollably for close to five years after 1904.⁷

The effect of droughts and stock disease (Rinderpest) and East Coast Fever created tremendous crises in African economy. It also gave rise to new discontent. In spite of the government's strenuous efforts to accelerate economic and industrial development, the colony was left with a debt as the result of its acceptance of the responsibility for the £700 000 of the Transvaal debt, as the colony had always overdepended on railway tariffs and custom duties for which there was cut-throat

⁴. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 15.

⁵. Ilanga Lase Natal, 10 and 17 April 1903.

⁶. E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, op. cit., pp. 212 - 213

⁷. C.E. Axelson, "The History of Taxation in Natal prior to Union" (M. Comm., Natal - Unisa, 1936) p. 144 - 149.

competition between the coastal regions, the colony could not balance its budget.⁸ For three financial years, the government operated on a deficit which ranged as high as £429,750 in 1905.⁹ The financial situation appeared to demand drastic action.

Already there were proposals in 1903 and 1904 for additional taxation. Whites themselves were intent upon evading taxes.¹⁰ Many a time tax proposals that were intended to make good the deficits were defeated in both or one of the houses of parliament and could therefore not become law. These included income tax measures that would have been levied on a sliding scale, a house tax - an equivalent of hut tax that Africans were already paying - which would have considerably augmented the government's coffers, and a proposal to tax unoccupied lands,¹¹ which, had they been timeously implemented, would have forestalled the depression. The colonial legislature only approved and enacted such measures as increased tariffs on spirits and beers and imposed succession duties on property,¹² which could not really and effectively retrieve the dwindling, if not depressed, economic situation.

⁸. Debates of the L.A., 1903, XXXII, pp. 549 - 550. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 131. E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, op. cit pp. 211, 213.

⁹. L.M. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, 1902 - 1910, p. 492.

¹⁰. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 131. Ilanga Lase Natal, 24 July 1903. L.M. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, 1902 - 1910, p. 42.

¹¹ J. Stuart, A History of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906, p. 99. Debates of the L.C., 1905, XIV, pp. 189 - 193.

¹² C.E. Axelson, "The History of Taxation in Natal prior to Union" (M Comm., Natal - Unisa, 1936), pp. 141 - 145. Debates of the L.C., 1905, XIV, pp. 150 - 153.

Instead, proposals calling for additional taxation on the African population were preferred by the legislature and the colonists. They were prompted by the desire which became more pronounced between 1903 and 1905 when there was need for the stimulation of the economy, to have the African come out in their largest numbers to work for the whites.¹³ Added to this was the notion, of which the colonists were not rid, that the Africans were not contributing their fair share to the colony's exchequer. Figures in official statistical books and financial records, however, pointed to the contrary.

According to C.W. de Kiewiet, African taxation indisputably covered the cost of administration of both blacks and whites¹⁴. Of the amount they contributed, the Africans received very little in exchange for their taxes in terms of what was allocated to and expended on them by the Department of Native Affairs.¹⁵ It is not impossible to figure out where the remainder went.

By the year 1903 the Africans were still paying the burdensome hut tax which was first introduced in 1849. Initially it was fixed at seven shillings per hut on the assumption that huts were easy to assess and the number possessed by an African was an indication of the number of his wives and therefore his wealth. When the African marriage tax of £5 was abolished in 1875, the hut tax was increased to fourteen

¹³ Debates of the L.A., 1905, XXXIX, pp. 667 - 668.

¹⁴ C.W. de Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor in South Africa, p. 194.

¹⁵ Z.A. Konczacki, Public Finance and Economic Development of Natal, pp. 27, 155 - 171.

shillings at which figure it remained until 1906.¹⁶ In addition to the hut tax, the Africans paid the dog tax of 5s to 10s, pass and licence fees and fines, while those living on mission reserves and private properties paid rents.¹⁷ The available evidence thus suggests that the Africans contributed considerable revenue to the colonial treasury in the form of direct as well as indirect contribution in the form of import duties. Few observers appear to have appreciated at the time when increased demands were being made, that their condition was deteriorating rapidly.¹⁸

The post-war years also saw a sharp increase in white and African populations. According to Brookes and Webb, the white population increase from 73 095 in 1902 to 94 307 in 1906.¹⁹ During roughly the same period, the African population is estimated to have increased from 910 727 in 1904, the first year of enumeration of the African population in Natal (which included Zululand and the Northern Districts), to 953 389 in 1910 - 1911.²⁰ These increases aggravated the land problem and whites began to complain of land hunger, while Africans suffered from acute land shortage. Even the acquisition of additional territory comprising of the northern Natal districts of Vryheid, Utrecht and Paulpietersburg covering in excess of 7 000 square miles,

¹⁶ C.W. de Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor in South Africa, p. 198.

¹⁷ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 136.

¹⁸ C.W. de Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor in South Africa, p. 199.

¹⁹ E.H. Brookes and C. de Webb, A History of Natal, p. 213. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 6.

²⁰ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 121. E.H. Brookes and C. de Webb, A History of Natal, p. 248.

which were ceded to Natal as compensation for its contribution to the war effort,²¹ failed to satisfy the whites, who were bent on economic prosperity and self development, and were casting their covetous eyes to the fertile flatlands and coastlands of Zululand. Whereas hundreds of whites, including traders, missionaries and government officials were already established, farmers in the Natal midlands and businessmen and land speculators formed pressure groups which cried for Zululand which they wanted for beef farming and sugar plantations. In 1902, the Zululand Delimitation Commission was appointed to set aside certain areas of Zululand for white occupation and to reserve certain others exclusively for the Zulus.²²

The Commission, which consisted of only white appointees, began its investigations in 1902 and reported in 1904. Obviously biased in favour of white landgrabbers, it excluded 2 613 000 acres for European occupation from the area reserved for Zulus, who were left with remaining 3 887 000 acres.²³ In terms of official instructions that were issued after the final report of the Commission in 1905, no Africans could buy land or live as rent payers in the areas assigned to the whites, unless they were labourers.²⁴ Thus were created self-contained privately-owned European properties and ranches, and vested European interests in traditional Zulu country, against which the Zulus protested to no avail.

²¹ E.H. Brooks and C. de Webb, op. cit., p. 211.

²² S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 7, 23, 127 - 128.

²³ N. Hurwitz and E.H. Brookes, Native Reserves of Natal, p. 12.

²⁴ N.G.G., 1906, No. 3558, pp. 1147 - 1149: Rules and Regulations for the Disposal of Crown Lands, other than Crown Reserves, Special Reserves and Township lands.

However, the whites' interest in land was not confined to Zululand. They also had their eyes on the 175 000 acres of land which had, as far back as 1856, been earmarked as Mission Reserves. The reserves which in 1905 had a population of about 140 000 were held in trust by South African, German, Scandinavian, British and American missionary bodies.²⁵ At the time when the reserves were set aside, the missionary societies were given to understand, and the Africans themselves were promised, that the lands would be kept in perpetuity for the exclusive occupation of the converts of the missionaries, amongst whom they would be divided when cut up in individual allotments.²⁶

In time, however, the government which had increasingly become intolerant of missionary societies, especially those whose reserves were suspected of being hotbeds of Ethiopianism, wanted to extend its control over these lands. The action of the government might also have been prompted by hostility to the Christian Africans, the "Kholwas" who, it was thought, had acquired independence for which they were not fitted.²⁷ Under Act No. 25 of 1895, the Governor and Governor-in-Council were given wide powers over Mission Reserve lands and their inhabitants. The provisions of the act could not, however, be implemented because of the fierce opposition that was staged against the measure by the American Zulu Mission. In 1902, the Natal

²⁵ N. Hurwitz and E.H. Brookes, Native Reserves of Natal, p. 16. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 52, 54, 122.

²⁶ Ilanga Lase Natal, 10 April 1903 and 14 October 1904. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 123.

²⁷ G. Shepperson and T. Price, The Independent African, p. 91.

Lands Commission, which had been appointed to look into the land problems of the colony, recommended the opening up of the reserves for European occupation and settlement.²⁸

In terms of the Mission Reserves Act (Act 44 of 1903) which was passed in September 1903, the government re-established its control over the mission lands. With the concurrence of the majority of the missionary societies, the Reserves were transferred to the Natal Native Trust and a tax of £3 was levied on their inhabitants.²⁹ The tax which many Africans in the Reserves thought was excessively high, created a certain amount of resentment in the mind of the converts who thought that they were being got at by the government and the whites whose making appeared to be that of forcing the residents to increase the labour market. The missionaries were themselves accused of lining their pockets and feathering their nests with the tax which they became responsible for collecting.³⁰ The residents also so objected to the provisions for eviction or removal of all those who failed to pay the rent that many threatened to leave the Reserves. Others pressed for freehold, instead of leasehold, tenure and sought to annul the trusteeship of the Natal Native Trust to no avail.³¹

²⁸ L.E. Switzer, "The Problems of an African Mission in a White - dominated, multi-racial Society : The American Zulu Mission in South Africa, 1885 - 1910" (Ph.D., Natal, 1971) pp. 147 - 148.

²⁹ N.G.G., LV, 1903, No. 3371, pp. 1779 - 1780 : Mission Act No. 44, 1903. ABM A/2/24, S.O. Samuelson to Rev. J.D. Taylor, Pietermaritzburg, 23 January 1904.

³⁰ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 76 - 77.

³¹ AZM (Pretoria), Microfilm A756, F. Bridgman to Smith, 6 January 1905 as cited by L.E. Switzer, op. cit., p. 199.

Previously, Africans who had become so disaffected could either have settled or "squatted" on the unoccupied Crown lands of the colony, or buy Crown or private lands as they became available on the market. With regard to the first alternative, Africans probably because of their ignorance of British or European law, did not see anything wrong in settling on what they regarded as ancestral or tribal lands which had been forcibly taken over by the government. The overspilling of Africans from overcrowded Reserves and locations into Crown lands and private lands soon forced the hand of the government which wanted to check the menace of so-called "squattening" and the exploitation by white landlords of Africans through rack-renting. In 1903 the rent of squatters living on Crown lands was raised from £1 to £2 in terms of the Native Squatters Rent Act, No 48 of 1903.³² Veiled threats were made by the government to tax unoccupied Crown lands whose owners rack-rented their African tenants,³³ but nothing came out of this. The colonists knew that their interests were protected by the government, so that such threats could be ignored with impunity. The rents which ranged from £2 to £7 after the Anglo-Boer war depended on the whim of the owner, who kept, charged and could evict the tenants on his own terms. Worse still, from the point of view of the tenants these lands were situated in the least accessible parts of Natal, and in general their soil quality was poor, so that the rents that were charged were excessive in relation to what the Africans could expect to get from them in return for their money.³⁴

³² Debates of the L.A., XII, 1903, p. 5. N.G.G., LY, 1903, No. 3368, p. 1714: Act No. 48 of 1903. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 123.

³³ Debates of the L.A., 1905, XXXIX, pp. 732 - 746, 801-815, 820 - 821.

³⁴ Report of the South African Native Affairs Commission,

With regard to the purchase of Crown lands and privately owned properties, a sprinkling of Africans were by 1905 in possession of or were in the process of acquiring land in excess of 300 000 acres, which would be in freehold and quit-rent title. However, the acquisition of land was accompanied by grave disabilities like overbidding by white land speculators, overpriced land deals and heavy instalments which the Africans often failed to pay, with the result that ownership of such lands eventually passed to new, and invariably white, owners.³⁵ Though theoretically open for purchase by blacks, the Land Board which was established in 1904, practically put a stop to the possibility of doing so, by hemming it with such restrictions as effectively to place all such lands beyond the means of and acquisition by Africans.³⁶

The colonists also sought to make inroads upon the locations which they erroneously thought had been established merely to provide a solution to their problems of labour. However, the locations, which date from 1846, and totalled forty-two units with a population of about 300 000 in 1887, augmented also in a desire to do justice to the interests, customs, traditions and structures of the African population, while ensuring an effective British administration over them.³⁷ As a result of this policy, the

1903 - 1905, Vol. III, Evidence, pp. 147, 149. See Evidence by J.L. Hulett and J.L. Mason.

³⁵ S. Marks and A. Atmore (eds), Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa, p. 163. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 123. A.J. Christopher, "Natal: A Study in Colonial Land Settlement" (Ph.D., Natal, 1969), pp. 300 - 301. W.A. Cotton, The Race Problem in South Africa, pp. 115 - 116. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 123 - 125.

³⁶ Debates of the L.A., XLII, 1907, p. 548. N.G.G., 1907, No. 3617, pp. 601 - 621.

³⁷ D. Welsh, The Roots of Segregation, p. 39. A. Keppel-

Africans were set off distinctly from the whites, living mainly in these areas which had been established for their exclusive use, where they were subject only to the authority of the governor and his officials.³⁸

The colonists berated the locations' policy with such anger that it is not surprising that, to the Africans, it often seemed as though they intended the doom of their dark brethren. They argued that the Africans should neither be allowed to live under the immediate government of their chiefs, nor be free to preserve their own laws and customs intact, for that would be leaving them free to pass "their lives in idleness (and) at liberty to indulge in all vile habits of heathenism, without hindrance from the government."³⁹ To some extent, there were of course very valid grounds for criticising the Shepstonian system. It lacked all the essential ingredients of effective administration, like the monitoring and feedback support systems, sufficient funds for maintenance and renovation, and manpower resources. It had in time, deteriorated into such obvious "persistent and systematic neglect"⁴⁰ that by 1903-1905 it could be blamed for having "designedly left the Africans in a state of barbarism."⁴¹ Lack of

Jones, South Africa: A Short History, pp. 148 - 149, 155. South African Archival Records, Records of the Natal Executive Council, 1849 - 1852, and Annexures, Natal No. III, pp. 162 - 163.

³⁸ E.D. Gasa, "The Native Question in Natal, 1880 - 1893: An Inquiry with reference to the Struggle for Constitutional Reform in the Colony" (M.A., Unisa, 1974) p. 26.

³⁹ G.M. Theal, A History of South Africa from 1873 - 1884, Vol. I, p. 226.

⁴⁰ E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 221.

⁴¹ E.H. Brookes, White Rule in South Africa, 1830 - 1910, p. 49.

consistent and definitive policy had contributed to this as had the frequent changes in the ministries,⁴² and the absence of individuals with proven track records and experience, possessing the necessary expertise and the ability to legislate on African affairs and promote their advancement⁴³. Indeed in 1903, the tribal Africans living on the locations were in a hapless condition as consequence of such maladministration, to which must be added the evils of which they themselves were the authors like "thriftlessness and shiftlessness" in the production and sale of crops.⁴⁴ Their lot had also been seriously affected by diseases, droughts which decimated their cattle, and poor means of livelihood.⁴⁵

The colonists' call for the dismantling of the locations was, however, motivated more by self-interest than by concern for the Africans. The whites believed that the Africans held too much land, that this was an encouragement to idleness, and that this relative independence made them a military menace. In their view, a reduction was therefore needed in the amount of land held by the Africans in order to force them more freely into labour.⁴⁶ That the whites were experiencing difficulties in securing

⁴² In August 1903 the Ministry of Sir H. Hime who had been in office since June 1899 fell for reasons of personal issues, and was replaced by that of Sir G.M. Sutton, who was succeeded by C.J. Smythe in May 1905. See E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 212. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 131.

⁴³ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 19.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 129.

⁴⁵ E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 215. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 128 - 130.

⁴⁶ D. Welsh, The Roots of Segregation, pp. 39 - 40. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 15, 126, 128, 133.

labour which was needed in the farming, productive and distributive sectors of the economy, and that the boost to the economic development depended on its availability,⁴⁷ cannot be denied. In 1903 there was a strong talk of importing Chinese labour in order to alleviate the shortage of labour. The move was opposed not only by Africans but also by white skilled and semi-skilled labourers who feared that they might be replaced by the hard working, enterprising Asiatics.⁴⁸

The shortage of labour could not simply be blamed on the unwillingness and idleness of Africans. The Africans did come out to work but, because their wants were few, they did not come out in sufficient numbers as to satisfy all the labour demands of the whites.⁴⁹ They were not positively inclined to work as this involved long absences from home, irksome and hazardous employment, and the abandonment of the ease, comfort and pleasure of African village life.⁵⁰ They were also hardly attracted by the low wages and poor treatment which was meted out by white employers, who wanted the Africans to work for them on their own terms.⁵¹ It is no surprise that Transvaal mines were able to draw in 1903 and 1904 large hordes of young adult African males because they could earn there far in excess of what they could expect in Natal. "By

⁴⁷ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 134 - 135.

⁴⁸ Ilanga Lase Natal, 5 June 1903. According to Dube the Africans would not take kindly to the Chinese "taking the bread from their mouths".

⁴⁹ S.M. Molema, The Bantu Past and Present, p. 254.

⁵⁰ Report of the South African Native Affairs Commission, 1903 - 1905, pp. 80 - 81.

⁵¹ A. Werner and H.E. Colenso, "Native Affairs in South Africa" in Journal of the African Society, 1906, pp. 179, 182.

1905 the shortage of labour", in Shula Marks view, "probably meant shortage of labour at the wages offered."⁵²

The proposed reduction of the locations would have exacerbated the acute shortage of land in these areas. It would also have worsened the conflict between whites and Africans which had been engendered by the system of land-holding which favoured the whites. The extent of land occupied by the Africans was, on the basis of the proportion of African to European population, very small.⁵³ Whereas in Natal proper the whites possessed land in excess of 7,75 million acres in 1903-1905, only 2,25 million acres were set aside as trust land for the occupation of the African population.⁵⁴ The number and size of locations remained unchanged in spite of the increase in the population of these areas, with the result that they became so overcrowded and overworked that Africans complained that the lands were the most poor and unproductive and were only fit "for the habitation of the eagle and the baboon."⁵⁵

⁵² S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 133, 135 - 136 (Quotation on pp. 135 - 136).

⁵³ C.W. de Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor in South Africa, pp. 188 - 191.

⁵⁴ N. Hurwitz and E.H. Brookes, Native Reserves of Natal, p. 4. Report of the South African Native Affairs Commission, 1903 - 1905, Vol. I, p. 18 as cited by S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 121.

⁵⁵ R. Russell, Natal: The Land and its Story, p. 198. See also N. Hurwitz and E.H. Brookes, Native Reserves of Natal, p. 4.

When complaints about issues such as legislation, labour and land, were made and especially as they were made with increasing intensity and frequency, the whites awakened to the realization that they were surrounded by masses of untamed, untutored and militarist tribal Africans. Soon the locations were viewed as bases from which Africans could at any time descend upon and plunder them. As the ravages of the Anglo-Boer war were still fresh and vivid in their minds, this helped to stimulate an intense fear for and distrust of Africans. False rumours of unrest and uneasiness, and of plans for wholesale insurrection were spread throughout the breadth and length of the colony. White farmers, in particular, who were agitated by the Africans' reluctance to work for them, were suspected of fuelling and fanning the rumours of rebellion or war.⁵⁶

It may not be right to assume that the whites' feeling of insecurity was without justification. Probably as a direct outcome of the undoubtedly widespread resentment and sullen opposition of Africans to the government, a rumour that an order had been given to kill all pigs and white fowls spread rapidly early in 1903 according to Dube and persisted until 1905, indicating that things were not well amongst the Africans.⁵⁷ The alarm of the whites grew when Africans were ordered to throw away any item of European origin. It was not long before King Dinuzulu was seized as a scapegoat.⁵⁸ That his name had been implicated with the war scare as early as 1903 is revealing,

⁵⁶ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 15 - 17.

⁵⁷ Ilanga Lase Natal, 3 July and 14 August 1903, and 20 January 1905.

⁵⁸ E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 220.

and makes the subsequent actions of the whites extremely suspect. Even though the Commissioner for Native Affairs in Zululand, Charles (later Sir) Saunders, vehemently denied that Dinuzulu was behind the alleged Zulu intransigence,⁵⁹ it was clear that there was a move afoot to induce the authorities to get even with Dinuzulu.

The prevailing settler attitude on race was reflected again in the exclusion of Africans from the political life of the colony. Whites were generally convinced that Africans belonged to "a savage and inferior race," which could not attain the civilization of the white men and should, therefore, not be granted the same rights, whether political, social or economic. These feelings and attitudes sharply divided the whites and Africans into two groups between which there was little if any real contact or understanding. They also led to the birth of paternalistic philosophy of separate development. This absence of communication was made explicit in a system of discrimination which applied separate legal codes to the two population groups.⁶⁰

The code of Native law, which was first promulgated with the passing of Native Administration Law in 1875, was subsequently expanded and amended on several occasions between 1887 and 1903. It regulated every aspect of Africans' life, giving considerable power to the governor as supreme chief. He was empowered to appoint and dismiss chiefs, divide and amalgamate tribes, call upon chiefs, headmen and their men to serve when called upon to do so in defence of the colony and to supply labour

⁵⁹ S.N.A 1/4/13 C32/04, Commissioner for Native Affairs to Prime Minister, 14 June 1904.

⁶⁰ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 21 - 23, 25.

for public works.⁶¹ Until 1906 when a "minister" was appointed to the position, he was assisted by a Secretary for Native Affairs, his order being executed at the level of local government by magistrates.⁶² The code also dealt extensively with such varied matters as succession, adultery, the position of women, registration of deaths and births and the requirements of "...good manners and respect to authorities"⁶³

One of the positive features of the code was that it took into account the laws and customs of the Africans which could not, even if the prospects of acculturation were possible, be precipitately done away with. Tribal Africans in particular, could not have welcomed a sudden break with their past and culture. However, the implementation of the code with unusual rigidity, its reservation of authority to select officials, and the creation of structures and practices that were out of keeping with Zulu custom and out of touch with blacks' feelings, detracted its value.⁶⁴ The code was thus the cause of considerable hardship to Africans and of needless irritation to the whites.⁶⁵

⁶¹ E.D. Gasa, "The Native Question in Natal, 1880 - 1893: An Inquiry with reference to the Struggle for Constitutional Reform in the Colony" (M.A., Unisa, 1974), pp. 132 - 142.

⁶² S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 39 - 40.

⁶³ G.H. 161 No. 130, Minute No. G457, Encl. in Report on R7107 by Attorney-General, Pietermaritzburg, 15 April 1891 as cited by E.D. Gasa, op. cit., pp. 138 - 139.

⁶⁴ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 39 - 47.

⁶⁵ A. Werner and H.E. Colenso, "White and Black in Natal" in Contemporary Review, 1893, p. 207. See also G.H. 166 No. 129, H.E. Colenso to Knutsfood, St John Wood, 29.10.1891 as cited by E.D. Gasa, op. cit., p. 140.

The hierarchy of authority established by the code was soon challenged by the chiefs and their people. They complained that they had lost the power of control over their subjects, that they were then occupying subordinate position from which they could not enforce the measures that they were expected to implement. A measure of their powerlessness was that many of those whom they were supposed to control made their way to the towns, farms, mission reserves and mines. Among their most unpopular tasks was that of calling out labour for the roads and public works - the so called isibhalo - which was open to abuse by both chiefs and their men. The system was hated by the men because it was a system of forced labour at uncompetitive wages, so that the required number of men was not always secured.⁶⁶

The opposition of the colonists to the despotic powers that were assigned to the governor by the code, was not owing to an intention to bring relief to the Africans and have them governed under the same laws as themselves. Apart from their need of constant supply of labour, they felt that the governor could force upon the colony matters regarding African affairs of which colonial opinion might disapprove. For this reason they advocated the introduction of measures which would ensure that the governor did not exercise his powers without direct reference to his ministry. In effect, however, the governor never acted independently in handling African affairs in Natal. Whatever legislative action was taken, and whatever measures were introduced, the executive council had the final say in matters affecting the African

⁶⁶ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 38 - 44. E.D. Gasa, "The Native Question in Natal, 1880 - 1893: An Inquiry with reference to the Struggle for Constitutional Reform in the Colony" (M.A., Unisa, 1974), p. 138.

population. The governor was a mere figurehead who sanctioned whatever measures were passed or placed before him by his official and ministers.⁶⁷

Africans who wanted to be freed from the operations of native law, could apply for exemption in terms of Law No 11 of 1864 which was entitled: "The Law to provide for the Exemption of Natives from Native Law." They had to petition the governor, providing particulars of their families, properties and chiefs, furnishing proof of their ability to read and write and testimonials of good character from reputable whites.⁶⁸ Even though many Africans, mainly those who dwelt in mission reserves and those who were not content with their legal status under non-Christian, uneducated and hostile chiefs, wished to apply for exemption, only a few did so as the process was so cumbersome⁶⁹ that of those who applied, very few were successful. By 1904 there were less than two thousand exempted Africans. For the exempted Africans there was the added difficulty that there was a lack of clarity on the status of their children whose exemption was not automatic.⁷⁰

The regulations covering the enfranchisement of Africans were even more stringent. Law No 11 of 1865 provided that after seven years of exemption, and twelve years of residence in Natal, and with proof of a civilized way of life, Africans who

⁶⁷ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 37, 135.

⁶⁸ Ibid., pp. 9, 39.

⁶⁹ E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 76.

⁷⁰ C.F.J. Muller (ed.), Five Hundred Years: A History of South Africa, p. 192. E.H. Brookes, The History of Native Policy in South Africa, pp. 58 - 59.

possessed the requisite property qualifications could apply for the franchise. Here, as when applying for exemption, the governor could refuse the vote.⁷¹ Consequently, even though the franchise was theoretically open to the Africans and although many of them applied for the electoral privileges, the procedure of obtaining it was so tedious and encumbered that in the 1903 - 1905 era, only three Africans in Natal and Zululand had the vote.⁷²

Despite the hostility of the whites, the educated, exempted or Christian Africans continued to press for recognition. As a result of the teachings of the missionaries, the majority of them who lived on the Mission Reserves and exempted Africans generally, believed that education and knowledge were the keys to admission to and advancement in the developing industrial society of the colony.⁷³ While the commission on technical education of 1903 - 1905 was sitting, the Africans' cry for education was given wide publicity.⁷⁴ Not only did the Africans complain of limited chances of education and training, but they also clamoured for industrial training.⁷⁵

⁷¹ G.W. Eybers, Select Documents Illustrating South African History, 1795 - 1910, pp. 194 - 197.

⁷² E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 77.

⁷³ R. Plant, The Zulu in Three Tenses, pp. 100 - 101. Report of the South African Native Affairs Commission, 1903-1905, § 329, p. 49.

⁷⁴ Ilanga Lase Natal, 12 February 1904 and 22 October 1905.

⁷⁵ C.T. Loram, The Education of the South African Native, pp. 60 - 61.

For some time, African education in Natal had been the concern of missionary bodies. The government merely paid grants-in-aid to approved schools, there being no government schools for Africans.⁷⁶ The number of government-aided schools was 196 in 1901 with 11 057 pupils and dropped in 1904 to about 156 schools with more or less 9 000 pupils as a result of new measures that were introduced by the government.⁷⁷ The amount spent by the government on African education was small when compared to amounts that were spent on education for whites, Coloureds and Indians,⁷⁸ and also in view of the large amounts that were contributed by the Africans to the colonial treasury in the form of direct taxation.⁷⁹

A large section of the Natal white community was opposed to the offering of higher education and technical training to African because it felt the Africans would then be reluctant to be labourers for the whites.⁸⁰ Probably for the same reasons, the government did not want to provide for more schools other than those which were run

⁷⁶ E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, pp. 163, 254.

⁷⁷ C.O. 181/54 - 66, Reports of Superintendent of Education, 1903 - 1908. G.H. 251 No. 41, Elgin to Nathan, London, 25 March 1908. B. Sacks, South Africa: An Imperial Dilemma, p. 147. G.H. 1233, No. 76, McCallum to Lyttelton, 14 April 1905.

⁷⁸ Compared to the 17s 4d per head of the population for whites 5s 9d for Coloureds, 1s 1d for Indians, the Africans were allocated 2d per head of population for the 1905 - 1906 financial year. See S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 56.

⁷⁹ The Times of Natal, 28 February 1905.

⁸⁰ M.S. Evans, Black and White in South East Africa, p. 113.

by missionary societies.⁸¹ It also did not effectively promote or financially support technical education for Africans. The many industrial schools that were talked about by politicians in 1903, were never established, and the one at Zwartkop was permanently closed after only five years of operation.⁸² However, the more the whites tried to prevent the Africans from raising themselves in the scale of civilization through education, the more persistent the Africans were in their demands for better educational opportunities.

The educational issue was linked to the political rights, especially the right to vote and representation in parliament. Exempted Africans, in particular, compared themselves to their brethren in the Cape Colony.⁸³ They complained that they were denied political privileges to which they were rightfully entitled. While emphasizing that they were desirous of freedom from discriminatory laws and restrictions, they pointed out that they were not advocating "social equality".⁸⁴ They decried the attitude of the whites who were bent on putting more restrictions and barriers in the way of their advancement, and also the disposition of their heathen brethren who scorned them.⁸⁵

⁸¹ G.H. 234 No. G 502, Minute No. S.N.A. 1833/05, Samuelson to Winter, 22 August 1905.

⁸² See S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 56 - 57.

⁸³ Ilanga Lase Natal, 16 September 1904.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 2 September 1904 and 8 December 1905.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 29 May 1903, 19 June 1903, 12 February 1904, and 20 January 1905.

These Africans, the bulk of whom were residents of the mission reserves, emerged as the most vocal and articulate group in the black community. They were a product of "a new independent spirit" that was abroad - a spirit which was brought about and nurtured by the independent churches which mushroomed in the wake of general disenchantment amongst the Africans with European or white - controlled church establishments, in the early 1900's. According to a recent study, the spirit gave rise to the formation of European style political organizations which involved themselves in protest politics.⁸⁶ In Natal the Natal Native Congress was formed, for example, in 1900. Although anti - European, it interested itself in the same issues that the independent churches concentrated on, such as the land and labour issues, laws of segregation, and criticism of other aspects of white rule.⁸⁷ Unlike Ethiopianism with which the independent church movement was associated, and which was branded a "Black Peril" chiefly because of its cry of "Africa for Africans," the emergent African political organizations were not anti-white, radical or reactionary.⁸⁸ The

⁸⁶ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 59 - 60, 69 - 73. Some of these organizations were the Exempted Natives Association and the "Funamalungelo" Society which had been formed for purposes of protecting and improving the rights of exempted Africans. Unfortunately, the constitutions of these organizations could not be traced so that their objectives could be assessed or evaluated.

⁸⁷ T. Karis and G.M. Carter, From Protest to Challenge, Vol. 4, pp. 35, 63, 89. P. Walshe, The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa, pp. 16 - 17. B.G.M. Sundkler, Bantu Prophets in South Africa, pp. 32 - 36.

⁸⁸ G. Shepperson "Ethiopianism and African Nationalism" in Phylon, Vol. XIV, Spaning 1953, pp. 13 - 14. G. Shepperson and T. Price, The Independent African, pp. 74, 91, 102. A.W.Z. Kuzwayo, "History of Ethiopianism in South Africa with particular reference to the American Zulu Mission from 1835 to 1908" (M.A., Unisa, 1980), pp. 174 - 175. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion,

"is wrong and must remain wrong, until the right course is taken. The treatment of blacks by whites is likewise wrong, and must remain wrong, until the right attitude is adopted, and faithfully pursued¹¹⁰". According to Mdhuli all that the African requested was "... not to be treated as aliens in a land which is as much ours as it is anyone else's¹¹¹". Evans suggested that it is open to academic debate whether the African was no happier and more contented under the rule of Shaka and Dingane than under the colonial government¹¹²

The Ilanga protested against the rather inordinately mighty influence exercised by the Natal Farmer's Congress upon the government in matters affecting the Africans¹¹³ It advocated the improvement of spiritual relations between the Africans and the whites in order that reform measures could be introduced. It also asked that those who proclaimed themselves "purifiers of man" should of necessity appeal to the hearts of those they sought to purify. "They can never hope to win the spirit of the deprived by violence, or heated words", the newspaper observed¹¹⁴.

Quite interestingly, Dube was opposed to social equality as he did not regard it feasible or good for either the Africans or the whites, and for the reason that it would produce another race which would be despised by both races. He characteristically

¹¹⁰. Ilanga Lase Natal, 25 November 1904.

¹¹¹. Ilanga Lase Natal, 25 November 1904.

¹¹². Ilanga Lase Natal, 5 July 1907. See also 7 June 1907.

¹¹³ Ibid., 25 November 1904.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 3 December 1904.

attested to his patriotism saying "I am as jealous of the purity of the black race as Anglo-Saxon is of his". All that he would like to see was his people being treated as children "..... who will be encouraged to enjoy the blessings of fitness as soon as they are able".¹¹⁵ After the 1906 rebellion, Dube made even more truculent demands, calling upon the legislators and officials to ensure that "the liberty and manhood of all classes" were protected.¹¹⁶ At a time when the whites were sharply divided amongst themselves, Dube should have been philanthropists like Evans who advocated that in the framing and execution of African policy "we should more consider than has been always the case in the past, the legislation will affect us, but also how it will affect them."¹¹⁷ Dube pledged himself to fight faddism which sought to treat both educated and the uneducated African as a child because in his opinion the "native is not a child" but "a youth rapidly approaching manhood, very many natives have indeed become men".¹¹⁸

Dube also descended on officials of all departments who dealt with Africans and especially the magistrates whom he accused of maltreating Africans. The magistrates were not only out of touch with the Africans but also ignorant of African laws and customs and failed to speak the Zulu language. Dube observed that this resulted in convicting many Africans simply because their statements were not properly

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 8 December 1905.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 7 September 1906.

¹¹⁷ M.S. Evans, The Native Problem in Natal, p. 28.

¹¹⁸ Ilanga Lase Natal, 14 June 1907.

interpreted or construed.¹¹⁹ With the support of Ipepa Lo Hlanga, Dube advocated the appointment of educated Africans as interpreters, police and messengers at magistrates courts. In time, public opinion favoured the appointment of magistrates who were mature, experienced, uniquely gifted with sympathy and introspective powers, specially trained for the work and familiar with African laws and customs.¹²⁰

Dube thought it desirable that Africans should be consulted on the choice of magistrates as it was injurious to appoint them "on the basis of their acceptability to the white community".¹²¹ According to Anthony Ngubo, it would have been better if the magistrates understood their duty not to be just "loyal and faithful enforcement of colonial laws even against the resistance of the people" but also trustworthy interpreters of African law.¹²² "The natives knowing their own law, could not tell what to make of the white chief's decisions, which were manifestly at variance with it, but had perforce to submit" write Colenso and Werner.¹²³ It was at this

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 8 May 1903. See also The Natal Witness, 18 February 1905.

¹²⁰ Ipepa Lo Hlanga, 28 August 1903 and 4 September 1903. Ilanga Lase Natal, 8 May 1903. The Natal Mercury, 29 May 1905. The Natal Witness, 9 June 1906. M.S. Evans, The Native Problem in Natal, p.16. F.W. Bell, The South African Native Problem in Natal: A Suggested Solution, p.15. E.H. Brookes, White Rule in South Africa, 1830 - 1910, p.155, 157.

¹²¹ Ilanga Lase Natal, 21 September 1906. See also D.D.T. Jabavu, The Black Problem, p.7.

¹²² A. Ngubo, "The Development of African Political Protest in South Africa, 1882 - 1910: An Analytical Approach" (Ph.D., California, 1973), pp.46 - 47.

¹²³ A. Werner, and H.E. Colenso, "White and Black in Natal" in Contemporary Review, 1893, p.207.

point that many magistrates floundered and which, in Dube's opinion, made the Africans to have no confidence in them.¹²⁴ It was as a result of the incompetence and unsuitability of the magistrates "that the Natives do not know the laws and the regulations for the breaking of which they are punished."¹²⁵

On the matter of the treatment of the Africans by the whites even the missionaries were on the receiving end of Dube's wrath and impeachment. He found them to blame for showing, even though they claimed to be religious, "the most bitter feeling against a native simply because a native was a native, or as in some places, because the poor are the poor".¹²⁶ It is not clear why the men of the cloth earned this indictment, but it was probably related to the issue of the Mission Reserves which was a major cause of friction between Dube and the missionaries. Dube took issue with those who were "speaking of the native people as though they were a herd of cattle" and who often remarked that "if they are kept in tutelage it would be best for them."¹²⁷ This was probably an indirect reference to those missionaries who reportedly did not "expect that the Natives, just coming out from barbarism, should be equal to European nations, with a civilization some hundreds of years old".¹²⁸ If Dube, however, ever questioned the integrity of the missionaries his distrust should have been displaced as to all intents and purposes, they were as

¹²⁴ Ilanga Lase Natal, 17 April 1908.

¹²⁵ Debates of the L.A., XLIV, 1908, p.152.

¹²⁶ Ilanga Lase Natal, 25 October 1907.

¹²⁷ Ilanga Lase Natal, 6 December 1907.

¹²⁸ Natal Missionary Conference, Proceedings, July 1908, p.10. Presidential address by Reverend R. Blake.

committed to their mission as he himself often acknowledged. The combined effect of missionary work and the use of African agents was undoubtedly conducive to better character, cleaner life and more useful and industrious modes of living amongst a very large portion of the African population.¹²⁹ The missionaries succeeded in replacing the old tribal customs and restraints with "new ideals and hopes, new disciplines and a new social life".¹³⁰

As early as 1895 there had been complaints in the black press that meagre amounts were spent out of the £10 000 reserved for the advancement of Africans. The Inkanyiso complained that the parsimonious funding out of the reserved fund of the building of roads in and the erection of fences around the locations ostensibly for the benefit of Africans was "quite as much as the advantage of the white man".¹³¹ It strongly urged that more appropriations should be made out of the fund for the amelioration of blacks especially in the field of the neglected industrial education.¹³² However, the government maintained that the amount expended on Africans was far in excess of the amount contributed by them to the revenue. It therefore argued that without a large outlay industrial training could not be taken to any considerable extent.¹³³ Of the £10 000 more than half was placed annually at the disposal of the

¹²⁹ SPG Letters, 1908, Minute from Bishop of Natal, F.S. Barnes, to SPG, 21 January 1908. R. Plant, The Zulu in Three Senses. p.80.

¹³⁰ B.B. Burnett, Anglicans in Natal, p.151.

¹³¹ Inkanyiso, 5 March 1895.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ GH 234 No. 42, Lyttelton to McCallum, London, 25 May 1905 and Encl Minute from H.D. Winter to C.J. Smythe, 23 August 1905.

education authorities for furthering African education. The balance was applied to other purposes, such as industrial training, cottage hospitals, irrigation, dipping tanks, and barrack and shelter accommodation. My 1906 it was clear that with sharp rise in the African population, the reserved fund was inadequate "particularly when regard is had to the fact that the beneficiaries have contributed, on the average, about £250 000 per annum in direct taxation".¹³⁴ This viewpoint by a government official and a member of the Native Affairs Commission gives weight to Dube's plea that more money or at least an amount equal to that expended in the Cape Colony should be expended on African education in Natal and that Africans should be placed in positions where they would use their education. He observed that since the introduction of responsible government in 1893 Africans had been removed from positions of authority at the head offices with the result that in 1906 there was no educated African in these offices.¹³⁵ J. Swart, the Secretary of the Native Affairs Commission, conceded that Africans "are better able to manage their own affairs than we can do it for them, but they need our help in international matters and in matters between white and black".¹³⁶

In the period leading to the 1906 rebellion, Dube persistently challenged the Natal Government over its handling of the "Native Problem" more especially as it did not

¹³⁴ J. Stuart, A History of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906, p.35.

¹³⁵ Ilanga Lase Natal, 2 November 1906.

¹³⁶ Colenso Collection 43, J. Stuart, Secretary of Native Affairs Commission to H.E. Colenso, Pietermaritzburg, 20 November 1906.

have a fixed policy but "a policy of incongruities" which Africans could not notice".¹³⁷ The Natal Mercury similarly complained about the "policy of drift" in the administration of Africans. The colonists were accused of pursuing a policy that could be conceived as "nothing more than how to get all the labour possible out of the native at the cheapest rate" and "how to keep the Kaffir 'in his place' - what is denoted by his place being unquestioning subserviency to the superior white man".¹³⁸

One sequel of the 1906 disturbances was an increasing demand by the press and some members of the public that the erstwhile policy of 'laissez faire', of letting the Africans alone,¹³⁹ and "our weak-kneed, narrow, and short-sighted policy",¹⁴⁰ had to be replaced by a coherent and intelligent policy that would appear meaningful and sensible to the Africans. "The frequent breaks in continuity of policy irritated and perplexed them" writes Brookes.¹⁴¹ Sir Matthew Nathan, the Governor, in giving the official view of the problem thought that it would be only when the ruling class wholeheartedly "rules for the benefit of the ruled without any thought of its own

¹³⁷ Ilanga Lase Natal, 23 June 1905. See also 10 August 1906.

¹³⁸ The Natal Mercury, 11 September 1905 and 15 February 1906 respectively.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 16 February 1906. Colenso Collection 43, Franz Mayr to H.E. Colenso, Pietermaritzburg, 23 February 1906.

¹⁴⁰ R.C.A. Samuelson, Native Question, p.12.

¹⁴¹ E.H. Brookes, The History of Native Policy in South Africa, p.76.

material interests", that the dangerous situation in African policy would be eliminated.¹⁴² Dube also found fault not only with the Native Affairs Department but also with all the government officers who were responsible for the administration of African affairs.¹⁴³ He strongly favoured the introduction of policy that would be similar to the Cape's which specially provided for the interests and advancement of the Africans.¹⁴⁴ In contradistinction to the Natal Mercury which was against F.R. Moor's taking charge of the ministry of native affairs because it doubted his flair for administration,¹⁴⁵ Dube expressed complete confidence in Moor. He strongly felt that disaffection amongst Africans was greatly intensified when Moor left his position as Secretary for Native Affairs in 1904 and that if his ministry had been in offices in 1906 there would have been no rebellion.¹⁴⁶

It should have been tremendous source of satisfaction to those who execrated the policy of the Native Affairs Department when the Native Affairs Commission of 1906 reported that the government was "..... without a Native policy, because of the absence of persistent purpose, high aim, or clear principles".¹⁴⁷ Though he

¹⁴² Ms Nathan 368, Nathan to J.W. Shepstone, Pietermaritzburg, 2 January 1908. See also Ms Nathan 177, J.W. Shepstone to Nathan, Pietermaritzburg, 1 January 1908. P.W. Bell, The South African Native Problem: A Suggested Solution, p.11. Bell advocated "a settled, fixed and continuous native policy".

¹⁴³ Ilanga Lase Natal, 10 August 1906.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 24 May 1907.

¹⁴⁵ The Natal Mercury, 4 March 1907.

¹⁴⁶ Ilanga Lase Natal, 8 March 1907.

¹⁴⁷ Report and Evidence of the Natal Native Affairs Commission, 1907, Report, §§12, 16, pp.8 - 9.

disagreed with the sweeping condemnations of the Commission in formulating the Native Administration Bill, No. 2 of 1908, which sought to improve the administration of Africans,¹⁴⁸ the bill was hailed by the legislators as a measure that would stop further trouble amongst the Africans and "will lead to a better government of the Natives and to a forward movement of these people".¹⁴⁹ Dube and his associates opposed the enactment of the measure because they felt it maintained the status quo and "opened the way to arbitrary action by a host of officials and closed all doors to redress through the courts".¹⁵⁰ The bill was proceeded with and passed to become the Native Administration Act No. 1 of 1909 that was acclaimed as the "Native Charter" and a significant advance on anything that had been done previously and a genuine attempt to give the Africans a voice in their affairs.¹⁵¹ It was, however, remarked in the period leading to the Union that there were issues to be ironed out before the responsibility for the control and management of the African population was handed over to the Union government.¹⁵²

Dube also took it upon himself to allay the whites' intense fear of the spectre of Ethiopianism. In a manner that discounted all the accusations that were levelled at Dube for having Ethiopian movement in 1904. The newspaper incisively censured

¹⁴⁸ Debates of the L.A., XLIV, 1908, p.145.

¹⁴⁹ S.P. of the L.A., 1908, L.A. No. 1, p.9. Budget speech by Treasurer in moving Second Reading of the Supply Bill, 1908 - 9, No. 7 of 1908.

¹⁵⁰ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p.362.

¹⁵¹ The Natal Mercury, 24 April 1909.

¹⁵² Ibid., 19 June 1909.

the adherence of the movement for influencing the Africans' minds in a very undesirable direction. It strongly urged that steps should be taken "to stop the evil before incurable harm shall have been done".¹⁵³ In this stance, the Ilanga was supporting the Times of Natal which regarded the tactics of the movement as calculated to create distrust between the black and white races.¹⁵⁴ Contrary to the viewpoint of the Colonial Defence Commission of 1903 and government officials that the movement aimed to displace missionaries and oust whites from Africa,¹⁵⁵ Dube felt that the "Ethiopian teaching has been used as an argument to interfere with the work of missionaries".¹⁵⁶

It remains true, however, that the Ethiopian movement had some elements of political expression and that it was a deliberate search for avenues of personal advancement amongst educated and nationalistic minded Africans.¹⁵⁷ They keenly felt a sense of belonging which white Christian congregations denied them and craved political and social rights which the Natal government had deprived them.¹⁵⁸ Ethiopianism meant

¹⁵³ Ilanga Lase Natal, 15 July 1904.

¹⁵⁴ The Times of Natal, 28 May 1904 and 9 June 1904.

¹⁵⁵ P.M. 94 Confid, No 30/1903, Report of the Colonial Defence Commission, 14 January 1903, G.H. 761 W. Hely-Hutchinson to J. Chamberlain, Cape Town, 8 April 1902.

¹⁵⁶ J.L. Dube, "Zulu and Missionary Outlook in Natal" in Missionary Review of the World, Ns 20, 1907, p.205.

¹⁵⁷ S.N.A. 1/4/12 No. C12/03, Bishop J.G. Hertzell to J.G. Spring, Prime Minister of Cape Colony, 14 November 1902. G. Shepperson, "Ethiopianism and African Nationalism" in Phylon. Vol.XIV, Spring 1953, p.9. A.Z.W. Kuzwayo, op. cit., p.172.

¹⁵⁸ G. Shepperson and T. Price, The Independent African, p.73. B. Sacks, South Africa: An Imperial Dilemma, p.156. B.G.M. Sundkler, Bantu Prophets in South

"a people trying to express themselves", Dr W.M. Carter, the Archbishop of the Church of the Province of South Africa, said in 1909, "If it had a political side, why should not natives express themselves thus, even as white people do. Ecclesiastically, it was an effort to stand on their own legs and work out their own purposes".¹⁵⁹ For his part, Dube was extremely critical of the white missionaries failure to implement the "concept of self-support". According to Collins, though he was aware of the somewhat limited objectives of the independent church movement, he sympathized with it and indeed, at the time of his crossing paths with the American Zulu Mission, played a prominent role in the formation of the Zulu Congregational Church which was reportedly named by Dube himself.¹⁶⁰

Many writers blame the whites for the Africans' switch of faith and allegiance and the resultant establishment of churches of their own with ministers of their own kith and kin, the so called separatist churches.¹⁶¹ As R.C.A. Samuelson puts it "we do worse than these Ethiopians, we so act or omit to act as regards for the reception of all influences antagonistic to us and our interest".¹⁶² The Natal Government apparently

Africa, pp.302 - 303. D.P. Collins, "Origins and Formation of the Zulu Congregational Church" (M.A., Natal, 1978).

¹⁵⁹ S.P.G. Africa Reports, 1909, Church Chronicle, 3 March 1909: Speech by the Archbishop elect, Dr W.M. Carter, before Provincial Synod at Bloemfontein, 13 - 19 February 1909.

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¹⁶¹ W.H. Dawson, South Africa: Peoples, Places and Problems, p.379. B. Sacks, op. cit., p156. B.G.M. Sundkler, op. cit., pp.302 - 303

¹⁶² R.C.A. Samuelson, Native Question, p.17.

fearing the movement and suspecting every European-dressed and educated African to be an Ethiopian,¹⁶³ and also believing that most missionaries, especially of the American Zulu Mission, were agitators¹⁶⁴ acted in an altogether unwarranted nature.¹⁶⁵

It resolutely refused, for example, to allow churches to be erected and African evangelists to reside in any location unless they were placed under the personal charges of resident European male missionaries.¹⁶⁶ It also refused to issue marriage licences to African pastors who worked by themselves in the locations.¹⁶⁷ In all this the American Zulu Mission of which Dube was a pastor appears to have been singled out for particular attack by the government¹⁶⁸ most probably because, as Shula Marks observes, it was the oldest, largest and richest of the missionary societies on the land,

¹⁶³ S. Marks, "Harriette Colenso and the Zulus" in Journal of African History, Vol.4, No.3, 1963, p.409. G. Shepperson and T. Price, op. cit., p.73.

¹⁶⁴ A.B.M. A/2/24, S.O. Samuelson to Reverend F.B. Bridgman, Pietermaritzburg, 15 April 1904. G.H. 1234 No.70, McCallum to Elgin, Pietermaritzburg, 10 May 1907.

¹⁶⁵ S. Marks, "Harriette Colenso and the Zulus" in Journal of African History, Vol.4, No.3, 1963, p.409.

¹⁶⁶ S.P.G. Letters, 1904, Bishop of Natal, F.S. Barnes, to Bishop Montgomery, Pietermaritzburg, 5 January 1904. Natal Missionary Conference, Proceedings, July 1905: Report of Reverend W.J. Harker's Exigency Committee Report, 5 July 1905. A.B.M. A/2/11, Minister for Native Affairs, Geo Leuchars, to Reverend John Bruce, Secretary for Natal Missionary Conference, Pietermaritzburg, 18 February 1905.

¹⁶⁷ G.H. 1274, Encl. No.2: Notes on Proposals of Native Affairs Commission for Educating the Natives in Desp 5, Nathan to Elgin, Pietermaritzburg, 6 January 1908.

¹⁶⁸ The Natal Mercury, 11 September 1905. The Natal Witness, 22 May 1906.

it was also run on Congregationalist lines, its reserves were on excellent sugar lands, and it had established a purely African church, the African Congregational Church, which the Native Affairs Department, suspected of marked inclination towards Ethiopiansm.¹⁶⁹

At the start of the 1906 disturbances, the Ethiopians were suspected of fanning the flames of discontent and preaching sedition and rebellion.¹⁷⁰ They were accused of mischievously meddling with political and social issues and ".... their influence amongst our uneducated natives is pernicious, and even dangerous to the interest of the State."¹⁷¹ The government and especially the Governor, Sir Henry McCallum, who is caricatured as having had "the hide of a rhinoceros", inadvertently questioned the loyalty of and grossly misrepresented the missionaries especially of the American Zulu Mission.¹⁷²

As might have been expected, the measures drove a wedge between the Africans and the missionaries on the one hand, and the government on the other. The Natal Missionary Conference believed that the regulations and stipulations were repressive and that "instead of securing the objects presumably sought are actually operating

¹⁶⁹ S. Marks, "Christian African Participation in 1906 Zulu Rebellion" in the Bulletin of the Society for African Church History, Vol.2, No.1, December 1965, pp.63 - 64.

¹⁷⁰ S.N.A. 1/4/19 No.C234/07, T.E. Foxon to S.O. Samuelson, Ixopo, 14 November 1907.

¹⁷¹ The Natal Mercury, 5 March 1906.

¹⁷² A.B.M. A/2/18, E.E. Strong, Editorial Secretary to the Board, to Reverend J.D. Taylor, Boston, 1 March 1907.

to produce feelings of unrest and disaffection among the Native Christians in the locations".¹⁷³ In his evidence before the Native Affairs Commission, Dube expressed similar views. While he submitted that Ethiopianism had political and religious motives, he denied that it was wholly to blame for the disturbances and that every Christian African was an Ethiopian. In his opinion, the Ethiopian movement should not have been made the excuse for preventing African evangelists from spreading the gospel to their own people. "Those who propagated seditious teaching ought to be punished individually", he observed and added that "the whole population should not be placed under disabilities because of wrongdoing of one or two men".¹⁷⁴

Dube's sharp criticism of the government's administration of African Affairs caused the whites and the officials to view him with suspicion. Through the columns of Ilanga he influenced and lightened the political consciousness of the Africans. Dube was convinced that the complaints of the disaffected Africans could be eliminated if they were educated, and given representation in the legislature through which they could voice their demands and make their grievances known. The whites were, however, not as yet prepared to entertain ideas which when implemented would be detrimental to their position of power.

¹⁷³ S.N.A. 1/1/323 No.1885/05, Memorial from Natal Missionary Conference to Secretary for Native Affairs, 19 July 1905. See also S. Marks, "Christian African Participation in 1906 Zulu Rebellion" in the Bulletin of the Society for African Church History, Vol. 2, No.1, 1 December 1965, pp.63 - 64.

¹⁷⁴ Report and Evidence of the Natal Native Affairs Commission, Evidence, Vol. II, Section III, p.962.

Immediately, all the whites joined forces in expressing alarm at the alleged intransigence of the Africans. The government was persuaded to respond with swift action in punishing the "rebels"¹³⁵.

On 9 February martial law was declared over the whole colony and the militia was mobilized in accordance with the Militia Act of 1903.¹³⁶ Incidentally, military preparations had been going on for some time in anticipation of conflict with, as members of the government stated, a black foe. By and large, the whites believed that the superiority of rifles and cannons would enable them to quell most internal disturbances¹³⁷. No serious attention was given to the legitimacy of the Africans' grievances, cause of the Africans' unrest, or the grounds of their action or reaction.¹³⁸ The immediate concern was that of reestablishing white rule and superiority. The colony's belief in military strength was encouraged by the arrangement that it could still draw on imperial troops for its defence and other purposes.¹³⁹ It is not difficult to imagine that the military operations and movements of colonial and imperial troops themselves contributed towards the further escalation of the unrest¹⁴⁰.

¹³⁵ J. Swart, A History of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906, p. 130. The Natal Mercury, 12 February 1906.

¹³⁶ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 180. E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 223.

¹³⁷ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 185 - 187.

¹³⁸ L. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, 1902 - 1910, p. 111.

¹³⁹ Ibid., pp. 46 - 47.

¹⁴⁰ E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 223. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 188.

The declaration of martial law removed not only the "rule of law" but also the normal restraints of society, so that force and its uncontrolled use became the order of the day¹⁴¹. The militia men, who were led by farmers with often extremist views on Africans, acted without restraint in response to often, if not mostly, distorted information received from the magistrates, police spies and their own intelligence agents¹⁴². Under martial law, even the most blatantly irresponsible actions of the militia could not be challenged, conventional methods of warfare or of dealing with unrest were not followed, and culprits guilty of excesses were not brought to book. The militia thus had a free hand in dealing with their adversaries¹⁴³.

Similarly, the men under Colonel Duncan McKenzie of the Natal Carbineers, who was placed in charge of the militia and who was incidentally nicknamed "Shaka" by the Africans¹⁴⁴, swept the affected districts, not only intimidating the tribes but also inflicting drastic punishment on all Africans whom had been found guilty in summary trials. These activities were at times accompanied with wholesale wantonness and uncontrolled destruction of life and property. Some of the extremely severe punitive measures were at the time not made public because the newspapers were prevented from publishing details of them with the obvious intention of this prohibition was to

¹⁴¹ A.P.S., The Native Question in South Africa, p. 11.

¹⁴² S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 188.

¹⁴³ B. Sacks, South Africa: A Imperial Dilemma, p. 121.
E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, pp. 223 - 234.

¹⁴⁴ W. Bosman, The Natal Rebellion of 1906, p. 124.

avert the criticism of humanitarians.¹⁴⁵

The Richmond "rebels" were hunted and tracked down by Colonel Duncan McKenzie and his Natal Field Force, assisted by five hundred of Chief Mveli's men. Two were caught on 15 of February, tried by court-martial and shot in full view of Chief Mveli and his men. Several men were sentenced to twenty years imprisonment with hard labour, confiscation of their properties and lashes. Another twelve, who were subsequently caught, were sentenced to death but could not be executed immediately as a result of protests from the Colonial Office which asked for the suspension of the sentences. The intervention caused a furore as the colonists raised a cry against what they regarded as undue imperial interference in colonial affairs. C.J. Smythe, the Prime Minister, and his cabinet, resigned rather than accede to the order issued by Lord Elgin, the Secretary of State for Colonies, and the Governor, Sir Henry McCallum. Lord Elgin was forced to give way when other colonies, notably Australia, joined their forces and challenged the constitutionality of the order¹⁴⁶. Like the two earlier executions, these twelve were executed in public on 2 April "as if in defiance of humanitarian protests"¹⁴⁷. Though the action could be justified on grounds that it served as a deterrent, its severity and brutality made a mockery of the morality of the government. This was made even more so by the treatment of the three men who had been wounded in the first sweep and could not be tried with their comrades.

¹⁴⁵ J. Stuart, A History of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906, pp. 137 - 138. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 188 - 189.

¹⁴⁶ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 189 - 192.

¹⁴⁷ E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 224.

They were subsequently put to death in September after trial in the Natal Supreme Court¹⁴⁸. A less severe punishment might have been more appropriate in their case.

The disturbances spread rapidly and the military operations had to be correspondingly extended. Other chiefs and tribes, especially Chief Tilombo of the Embo (Mkhize) tribe, and Chief Nsikofeli of the Kuze tribes in the Ixopo-Richmond area in the Natal midlands were also attacked by McKenzie. He had vowed to nip in the bud what he supposed was a widespread conspiracy using the threat of force, he ordered the chiefs to hand over their rebellious subjects and to search their people for assegais. In a move intended to intimidate the tribes, troops' movements were extended and these were seen daily by Africans who could not but feel apprehensive¹⁴⁹.

When the chiefs failed, as might have been expected to meet the demands, they were fined heavily, deposed or exiled, or had their chiefdom's divided. The punitive measures fitted in well with the schemes of some land-hungry farmers who aspired to the land belonging to some of the tribes. They had some time been advocating the eviction of Africans from the land which they wanted for wattle growing. Hence the fate that befell Chiefs Tilomko and Nsikofeli, even though they did not take active part in the disturbances and readily complied with the initial orders¹⁵⁰.

¹⁴⁸ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 190.

¹⁴⁹ H.E. Colenso, The Problem of the Races in Africa, p. 17. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 192 - 194.

¹⁵⁰ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 193, 196.

The military operations were also extended to the south coast against chiefs and tribes who had in fact paid their taxes. Many Africans appeared before courts-martial at Umtwalume charged with insubordination, contempt or defiance of authorities, or of inciting insurrection. Calls for moderation and restraint from concerned sources like the Colenso, the humanitarians and the Colonial Office were not heeded and had little or no support locally. All adverse reports on the operations were either studiously ignored or emphatically refuted. Officials who were considered sympathetic to the African people, like J.Y. Gibson, the magistrate of Richmond division during Chief Tilinko's case, became very unpopular and were dealt within a manner that suggested that the authorities were over-sensitive criticism.¹⁵¹

After the execution of the twelve men at Richmond, the forces that had operated in the area were demobilized. The government then thought it could congratulate itself on the swift and preemptive military action which had brought the threatening rebellion to an early end.¹⁵² But, incidents more serious than those in the midlands had been taking place in Mapumulo and Nkandla areas and these ushered in other phases of the disturbances.

As early as 22 January, the people of Chiefs Gobizembe Swayimana, and Meseni in the Mapumulo area had refused to pay the tax when called upon to do so by the local magistrate. Attempts were made at a meeting between H.D. Winter, the Minister of Native Affairs, and the chiefs to resolve the matter. When this proved unsuccessful,

¹⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 188-189, 195-197.

¹⁵² Ibid., pp. 197 - 198.

a police force was sent to the area in February, and when more adverse and serious rumours streamed in the Umvoti Mounted Rifles were mobilized under Colonel Leuchars of the Field Forces on 16 February.¹⁵³

By all accounts, there was no opposition to the military forces which for nearly two months marched through the locations, searching for the insurgents. Yet, there was large scale burning of crops and kraals and confiscation of goats and cattle. Chief Gobizembe's kraal was bombarded on 5 March after his had failed to hand over all the offenders amongst his tribe within the stipulated time.¹⁵⁴ In addition, his lands were confiscated, his chieftom divided, was forced to pay a heavy fine and was then forcibly removed to northern Zululand.¹⁵⁵ Chief Meseni was imprisoned for six weeks for not handing over culprits while acting Chief Geveza was imprisoned for three months for failing to obey a command to report himself to Leuchars. Leuchars and the government were generally happy that they had succeeded in bringing a change in the Africans' attitude of studied insolence to white authority.¹⁵⁶

Though the first resistance was swiftly brought to an end, there was another eruption on 19 June, when the followers of Ndlovu kaTimuni in the Mapumulo division rose

¹⁵³ C.O. 179/283 No. 11281, Encl. 1 in Desp. No. 37, Minister of Defence to Commandant of Militia, 9 March 1906. Cd 2905 Desp. No. 30, McCallum to Secretary of State, 2 March 1906.

¹⁵⁴ Cd 2905 Desp. No. 37, McCallum to Secretary of State, 9 March 1906.

¹⁵⁵ J. Stuart, A History of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906, p. 149.

¹⁵⁶ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 199 - 200.

in revolt and killed two whites at Thring's Post, thereafter attacking a column of the Natal Mounted Rifles.¹⁵⁷ Resistance spread when Ndlovu kaTimuni's people were joined by ex-Chief Gobizembe's people Matshwili's people, and by Meseni's Qwabe tribe together with members of other smaller tribes. Colonel Leuchars, who again took charge of the military operations on 21 June, responded swiftly by remobilizing the Umvoti Mounted Rifles and carrying out ferocious and punitive expedition against the tribes. He was joined in June by McKenzie and his 2 500 troops, who waged a war of attrition against Africans who were no match for the trained and more disciplined armies.¹⁵⁸ The military onslaughts and the subsequent mopping up operations were again accompanied by such brutalities as flogging, large-scale burning of crops and huts, and confiscation of goats and cattle.¹⁵⁹ Many Africans had their backs lashed for petty offences because it was believed that they had information or merely because it was believed that this would impress upon them "due respect for the white man"¹⁶⁰ Chiefs whose subjects had evinced rebellions tendencies were heavily punished.

By the middle of July, when the "rebellion" was brought to an end in Mapumulo, many Africans had been killed at Insuze Drift, at Izinsimbi and in the Umvoti Valley. Africans who had for generations lived in the place which colonial

¹⁵⁷ J. Swart, A History of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906, pp. 347 - 352.

¹⁵⁸ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 227.

¹⁵⁹ J. Stuart, A History of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906, pp. 360 - 365. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 232 - 233.

¹⁶⁰ C.O. 179/235 No. 22649 Desp. 106, McCallum to Secretary of State, 1 June 1906.

government has assigned to them were alarmed at the rule had imparted callousness, cruelty and barbarity that they saw perpetrated by the militia. The operations left many Africans, even innocent ones, hungry or destitute, homeless and some dead. Families and relatives were not allowed to bury their dead, so that bodies were left to rot in the veld, thus creating unbearable and unhygienic conditions.¹⁶¹

Chiefs Meseni and Ndlovu kaTimini, who had escaped to Zululand, were captured and returned to Mapumulo. Their flight to Zululand was later used by the officials to implicate Dinuzulu in the disturbances. Although death sentences were imposed on the chiefs and some of their men, these were commuted by the Governor, Sir Henry McCallum, to terms of life imprisonment with hard labour.¹⁶²

The developments in Mapumulo were not the last flickers of resistance, as another upheaval of even more serious proportions then occurred in Zululand itself. For the first time, the military operations were extended into Zululand, which was Dinuzulu's home base. These affected a far wider area, and involved more tribes, than in Mapumulo and the midlands. It appeared as if there was a real widespread conspiracy under one unifying and powerful force to bring to an end the white rule.

As from 22 February, Bambatha, a minor chief of the Zondi tribe in the Kranskop division, had associated himself with a section of his people who resisted paying the tax. When he was asked on numerous occasions to present himself to the magistrate

¹⁶¹ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 232 - 233, 240.

¹⁶² Ibid., pp. 232, 236, 237.

of Greytown, J.W. Cross, and on 1 March to the Under-Secretary of Native Affairs, S.O. Samuelson, in Pietermaritzburg, he refused because he was afraid that he might be arrested or killed.¹⁶³ Bambatha's failure to comply with official instructions was certainly unpardonable and could not be countenanced by any authority, but in the light of punitive actions that had been taken against Africans accused of similar offences, particularly the Byrneton incident, his defiance and fear appear justified.

On the 9 March, a combined force of police and militia was sent to arrest him but he had disappeared. On the 11 March he escaped to Zululand and finally made his way to Nongoma. This again seemed to indicate Dinuzulu's complicity in the rebellion. Bambatha resurfaced in Natal on April, when he attacked and held captive Magwababa, his uncle, who had been appointed regent in his place. On 3 April, he fired on the magistrate and his police escorts, who were on a mission to rescue Magwababa. On 5 April, he ambushed a police party at Keates Drift, killing four of its members.¹⁶⁴

When it heard of the attack, the government took fright and remobilized the Umvoti Rifles under the command of Colonel Leuchars. The contingent was later joined by the police together with other active militia and field reservists, some of whom came from outside Natal. By the time the forces had surrounded the dense bush in the Mpanza valley, near Greytown, Bambatha had disappeared making his way to

¹⁶³ E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 222. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 201 - 204.

¹⁶⁴ L.M. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, 1902 - 1910, p. 43.

Momae Gorge in the Nkandla forest.¹⁶⁵

Once entrenched in the forests and mountains, Bambatha gathered a formidable army of resistance, sending messages to the chiefs of Natal and Zululand to come and join him. In all this he ingenuously used Dinuzulu's name, maintaining that Dinuzulu would come to their assistance. Chiefs Sigananda, Kula Mehlokazulu, Matshana kaMondise, and a section of Chief Mpumela's chiefdom, all whom were important chiefs in the Nkandla, Kranskop and Nqutu divisions, responded to the call. That so many chiefdoms with high population densities should have been so quick to join Bambatha, points to the existence of the deep-seated resentment and grievances which existed amongst the Africans. That Africans were prepared to take up assegais and face the white forces, indicates the extent of desperation amongst the tribes. Significantly, the king, the tribes and the chiefs were suffering from cattle losses caused by Rinderpest, while the resettlement which had taken place following the Zululand Delimitation Commission of 1902 - 5 had caused considerable overpopulation¹⁶⁶.

This turn of events took the Commissioner for Native Affairs, Sir Charles Saunders, by complete surprise. Initially, he had hoped that the chiefs could be relied upon to watch out for the rebels, which he had ordered them to do. He had even assured the government that the local chiefs and their tribesmen would arrest Bambatha. Instead,

¹⁶⁵ J. Stuart, A History of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906, pp. 179, 182 - 183.

¹⁶⁶ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 207, 211, 213, 217, 219.

they had either joined forces with Bambatha or allowed their members to filter towards the rebels¹⁶⁷.

By the beginning of May, Colonel Sir Duncan McKenzie had taken charge of the reorganized Zululand Field Forces which comprised of 4000 whites, assisted by some 3000 African levies.¹⁶⁸ When on 4 May H.M. Stainbank, the highly - unpopular magistrate of Mahlabatini, was murdered, the forces intensified their operations. They burnt crops and kraals, capturing several head of cattle and goats¹⁶⁹, ostensibly to cut off supplies to the insurgents, but more apparently to punish the Africans for giving tacit support and refuge to the rebels. Even innocent Africans were affected by the wanton and senseless destruction.

The forces started to scour the Nkandla forests at the beginning of June, in order to ferret out the insurgents. When they engaged them in combat, the rebels were no match for the forces and were completely routed.¹⁷⁰ The resistance was put to an end and Bambatha, Mehlokazulu, other chiefs in the persons of Mtele and Nondubela, together with a large number of their followers, were killed on 10 June at the battle of Momae Gorge. Chief Sigananda surrendered unconditionally on 13 June, only to

¹⁶⁷ C.O. 179/234 No. 18854, Encl. 1 in Desp. No. 79, Commissioner for Native Affairs to Prime Minister, 28 April 1906. J. Stuart, A History of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906, pp. 193 - 194.

¹⁶⁸ J. Stuart, A History of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906, pp. 225 - 228. Cd 3027 p. 37, McCallum to Secretary of State, 12 May 1906.

¹⁶⁹ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 216.

¹⁷⁰ J. Stuart, A History of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906, pp. 522 - 523.

die before being sentenced by the courts-martial that were trying him and other insurgents.¹⁷¹

The government was quick to preempt litigations for indemnity, by publishing on 12 June a bill to indemnify the Governor, Executive Council, the military and the civil authorities against any actions arising from the military acts which had been carried out against the rebels on 10 June. The bill was hurried through parliament and passed as law on 10 July.¹⁷² Surprising enough, this was done before the lifting of martial law, which took place on 2 September. In the meantime, the troops continued to ferret out rebels and harass the tribesmen, a move that kept the Africans in a constant state of unrest, fostering continued discontent and resentment. It was only on 30 July that all troops in the field were demobilized, although special squadrons were retained to hunt out rebels throughout August. Trials by courts-martials continued, with death sentences being imposed on many Africans, only to be commuted to terms of life imprisonment by the Governor¹⁷³.

It was discovered that white losses amounted to 24 soldiers and 6 civilians dead, and 37 soldiers wounded. Africans losses, on the other hand, were very high with between 3000 and 4000 killed, countless injured, 7000 were in gaol, and about 700 Africans had had their backs lashed to ribbons. Many had their huts destroyed and

¹⁷¹ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 223 - 224.

¹⁷² Ibid., p. 237.

¹⁷³ Ibid., pp. 236 - 237.

were left homeless¹⁷⁴.

The record of the number of deaths and casualties throws doubt upon the belief that there was a plan to drive the whites into the sea. The fact that only six civilians were killed shows that there was no intention to indiscriminately kill the whites and destroy their properties. Had this been so, the defenceless missionaries and their stations would have fallen victim to the rebels. The rebellion, if it were such, was directed at the government and not whites en masse. It is reasonable to assume that, if the early warnings had been heeded, the disturbances would not have assumed such serious proportions¹⁷⁵. The most important factors leading to the flare up had been the government's blundering, misunderstanding, and insensitivity in matters relating to Africans.

The Natal government was severely criticized in many quarters, especially in Britain for its handling of the rebellion. The Colonial Office accused her of waging a war of practical extermination of the Africans and of failing to deal with the rebels rationally and humanely. It strongly criticized Natal actions on the grounds that the

¹⁷⁴ L.M. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, 1902 - 1910, p. 43. J. Stuart, A History of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906, pp. 541 - 542. Cd 3027 Desp. No. 101, McCallum to Secretary of State, 17 July 1907. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 237 - 238. B. Roberts, The Zulu Kings, p. 362.

¹⁷⁵ See for example, Circular No. 188 of 1905 issued by the Principal Under Secretary for Native Affairs to magistrates wherein he dismissed the reports that were filtering through as "mischievous" and informed them that "careful investigation has proved that no real grounds for them exists." B.P.P. Cd 2905 Encl. 2 in Desp. No. 1, McCallum to Secretary of State, Durban, 5 January 1906.

situation did not warrant the executions, the punitive measures and the destruction of life and property that had been carried out or inflicted on the Africans¹⁷⁶. Considerable criticism also came from other parts of South Africa, with statesmen with either conservative or liberal views of Africans accusing Natal of dealing very harshly and hysterically with the Africans¹⁷⁷.

On 21 September 1906, the Smythe ministry appointed a commission of inquiry into the causes of the rebellion and into the Natal system of African administration¹⁷⁸. It was then under pressure to put its house in order, so that it could restore its prestige amongst its sister colonies with which it was involved in negotiations for federation or union. On the home front, the government was confronted by an outbreak of criticisms, taken up by the colonial press which was demanding an enquiry into the atrocities that had taken place¹⁷⁹.

The Natal Native Affairs Commission of 1906 consisted of men who, on the whole, held benevolently paternalistic and moderate views. They were H.C. Campbell, Judge of the Native High Court, who was the chairman, C.J. Birckenstock and T.K.

¹⁷⁶ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 243 - 246. E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 229. L.M. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, 1902 - 1910, pp. 45 - 46.

¹⁷⁷ E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 2. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 246.

¹⁷⁸ L.M. Thompson, Unification of South Africa, 1902 - 1910, p. 43. E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 228

¹⁷⁹ For views expressed in this paragraph see E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 230. R.C.A. Samuelson, Native Question, pp. 1 - 3, 4 - 6.

Murray, both of whom were members of the Legislative Council, Sir James Liege Hulett, a member of the Legislative Assembly, a very prominent tea and sugar planter and one-time Secretary for Native Affairs, M.S. Evans, a man of wide sympathies and varied interests, author of books on African administration, and a member of the Legislative Assembly, the Rev. James Scott, farmer and missionary of the United Free Church of Scotland, and Col. H.E. Rawson, who had served on the Zululand Delimitation Commission, representing the British government. Its Secretary was Captain James Stuart, a fluent linguist, who had a long career in the Natal civil service¹⁸⁰.

The Commission worked at full speed, gathering evidence from about 300 Europeans and roughly 900 Africans over a wide spectrum of issues including administration, land, labour, customary law, education, and the framework¹⁸¹. It produced a voluminous and comprehensive report which was couched in far more honest, direct and analytical language than the report of the South African Native Affairs Commission of 1903, whose findings had generally often been expressed in vague terms. In the report, which was published on 25 July 1907, the Commission exposed a number of facts regarding relations between races in Natal¹⁸².

¹⁸⁰ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 12, 14, 23 - 24, 48-49, 110, 178, 201 - 203. E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 228.

¹⁸¹ Report and Evidence of the Natal Native Affairs Commission, 1907, Report, §§7 - 9, pp. 7 - 8. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 12.

¹⁸² E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 228.

It found that the rebellion was a symptom of misgovernment. It also found that the Africans were experiencing real hardships, for which they had no constitutional means of redress because they had no right to vote and no representation in parliament. Africans were also dissatisfied with the size, and productivity of the lands that had been assigned to them. They also complained about the decision of the government to open up parts of their lands, especially in Zululand, to white settlement¹⁸³. The report also condemned the past policy of administering Africans, blaming this for the existence of malcontent¹⁸⁴. It found that there was "a wide feeling of dissatisfaction, bordering on despair...."¹⁸⁵ and "accused those in authority of not having heeded the obvious signs and words of warning before the rebellion..."¹⁸⁶

The Commissioners thus recommended a series of administrative reforms¹⁸⁷. They recommended that the powers of the Supreme Chief should be more clearly defined, that he should be free of interference from the courts, and that the office of Secretary for Native Affairs should become a permanent one. The Commission also recommended the appointment of four new district commissioners, who would act in a general supervisory capacity over the magistrates. It also recommended an increase

¹⁸³ L.M. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, 1902 - 1910, pp. 43 - 44.

¹⁸⁴ E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 228.

¹⁸⁵ L.M. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, 1902 - 1910, p. 44.

¹⁸⁶ E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 228.

¹⁸⁷ E.H. Brookes, White Rule in South Africa, 1830 - 1910, p. 66.

in the power of the chiefs in order to prevent the disintegration of family life, though stressing that they eventually would have to be supplanted by magistrates. A Council for African Affairs, consisting of four official and four non-official members with the Secretary for Native Affairs as chairman, was recommended to advise the government on all legislation affecting Africans¹⁸⁸.

The Commission also recommended the creation of some form of local self-government by means of the introduction of leasehold individual tenure and a local council system similar to that which had adopted in terms of the Cape's Glen Gry Act. In addition, Africans would be represented by four additional members, appointed by the Governor, in the Legislative Council. It also proposed that the exempted Africans should be allowed to elect one non-official member of the Council for Native Affairs or that a separate electoral roll should be established for exempted and qualified Africans, enabling them to elect up to three members for the whole country to the Legislative Council. It also suggested the provision of education for the Africans, such as was commensurate with, but not beyond, their own capacities or growing needs. It recommended the establishment of a separate board of education, representing all the different missionary bodies as well as government inspectors of African schools. Other recommendations dealt with matters such as the indebtedness of Africans to whites money-lenders and landlords, the position of children born after their parents had been exempted from the provisions of native law, the operations of African evangelists on Trust land, and the regulations for the sale

¹⁸⁸ Report and Evidence of the Natal Native Affairs Commission, 1907, Report, pp. 14-17.

of African liquor or utshwala¹⁸⁹.

In the meantime, important political changes had taken place. At the helm of the government, there was a new ministry as the Smythe government had fallen in November 1906, and had been replaced by one headed by F.R. Moor, who was also in charge of the Department of Native Affairs which had previously been controlled by H.D. Winter¹⁹⁰. Although he was generally regarded as more pro-African than his predecessors, Moor's ascendancy to power was not marked by any dramatic change in the policy of administering of Africans, except that he made moves and introduced measures that were designed to put into effect the reforms recommended by the Commission. The movement towards unification which gained increased momentum after 1907 culminating in Union in 1910, put paid to some of these reforms¹⁹¹.

In the place of Sir Henry McCallum, who left the colony in June 6, Sir Matthew Nathan became Governor in September 1907. He was chosen specifically for the position by Lord Elgin, the Secretary of State for Colonies, who hoped that he would bring a more balanced viewpoint to bear on the Natal ministry. A man of wide experience and sympathies, he immediately set about informing himself on every aspect of native policy. In no time he had visited most parts of the colony and had

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., pp. 10, 12 - 14, 19 - 28.

¹⁹⁰ E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 225. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 250 - 340.

¹⁹¹ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 250, 343 - 352. E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, pp. 228 - 229.

interviewed many chiefs. He also lost no time in pressing for the implementation of the recommendations of the Natal Native Affairs Commission¹⁹².

For a time, it seemed as if Nathan and Moor were a perfect combination and that they would make a definite attempt to reform native affairs on the basis of the recommendations of the 1906 - 1907 Native Affairs Commission. In the wake of the disturbances, the situation was favourable for the introduction of wide ranging reforms. The whites had been rid of their feelings of insecurity and the external criticism of their handling of the African affairs had brought about a more balanced view on African affairs. However, the arrest and trial of Dinuzulu marred all this and spoiled whatever good might have resulted.

B. THE ARREST AND TRIAL OF DINUZULU

Throughout the disturbances, rumours that implicated Dinuzulu as the mastermind behind the anti-white sentiments and the unrest continued to spread. The rumours were intensified when it was reported that there were chiefs who had sent messages to Dinuzulu to find out what he intended doing about the Poll tax. Dinuzulu was also said to have welcomed visits by, and had given hospitality to, rebels and especially Bambatha and his commandants in the persons of Mangati and Chakijana¹⁹³.

¹⁹² S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 250, 340 - 341.

¹⁹³ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 251 - 252.

The use of Dinuzulu's name by the malcontents might have been intended to stir up insurrection in the fertile soil of discontent or probably to gain easy credence from the rank and file of the Africans who were likely to welcome the suggestion that they had a national figure who was prepared to lead them¹⁹⁴. Significantly, however, Dinuzulu protested his loyalty, arguing that his name was being used without his permission or approval¹⁹⁵. It may be possible that Dinuzulu ingenuously pleaded innocent while deeply enmeshed in the conspiracy. In the absence of conclusive evidence, it would however, be unreasonable to apportion all the blame to Dinuzulu.¹⁹⁶

It is, however, significant that Dinuzulu offered to raise a levy to aid Natal forces. The offer was, however, refused on the grounds that it might have caused young men to flock to his kraal, where they might get out of control and fight for Dinuzulu instead of for the government¹⁹⁷. It is also significant that, despite continued rumours of Dinuzulu's dealing with the rebels, no action was taken against him by the military. What the military forces and the government might have feared was that they would have needed far higher forces to deploy against Dinuzulu than they had needed against the rebels. The action itself might have caused a general uprising of wider dimensions than before, with Dinuzulu providing the rebels with a unifying leader.

¹⁹⁴ I.M. Perret, "Dinuzulu and the Bambatha Rebellion" (M.A., Natal, 1960), pp. 33 - 38.

¹⁹⁵ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 253, 256.

¹⁹⁶ I.M. Perret, "Dinuzulu and the Bambatha Rebellion" (M.A., Natal, 1960), p. 19.

¹⁹⁷ J. Stuart, A History of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906, p. 215.

That Dinuzulu was perhaps so much the centre of the attention in the tension and unrest could be attributed to his standing and status in the eyes of the government as well as of the Zulus. The government had not dealt with him with consistency and finality, not had it made up its mind as to what his position was vis a vis the Zulus. Thus when it suited it, the government wanted Dinuzulu to exercise his royal power, especially to restore and keep the peace, and when there was unrest, it thought it was that power which was responsible for the upheavals and therefore expected him to renounce it¹⁹⁸. The somewhat ambivalent and equivocal attitude of the government towards Dinuzulu could possibly also be attributed to the existence of deep-seated white suspicion and distrust of Dinuzulu, as the son of Cetshwayo, who might aspire to his father's power¹⁹⁹. Consequently, he was generally snubbed and belittled, diminished and ignored. To many whites he was "a semi savage who had to be controlled and stripped of his authority at all costs"²⁰⁰.

On the other hand, there could be no hiding of the fact that Dinuzulu wanted to be recognised as paramount chief of the Zulus.²⁰¹ After all, he was the descendant of a line of kings, and showed the mystique of his powerful forebears²⁰². By readily paying the tax and causing his Usuthu tribe to do likewise, he might have intended

¹⁹⁸ E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 227.

¹⁹⁹ F. Troup, South Africa: A Historical Introduction, pp. 202 - 203.

²⁰⁰ T. Karis and G.M. Carter, From Protest to Challenge, Vol. I, p. 23.

²⁰¹ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 301.

²⁰² E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 227. B. Roberts, The Zulu Kings, p. 362.

to persuade the government to trust him, hoping that his previous sins or mistakes would be forgiven and forgotten, and that he would be restored to the royal throne. The government might have sensed this, and in order to frustrate his ambitions, rejected his offers and overtures lest they should add to his prestige.²⁰³

However, amongst the Zulus it would seem that Dinuzulu still had a loyal, devoted and increasing following. They still regarded him as their father to whom they could run for shelter and advice as some of the rebels did, and "it was not in him nor in Zulu tradition to refuse it."²⁰⁴ Though the Zulu monarchy was legally extinct in the eyes of the government, the majority of the Zulus, especially amongst tribesmen, did not recognize that point.²⁰⁵ They refused to accept that Dinuzulu was then ruler of the Usuthu only and not of the whole Zulu race.²⁰⁶ They would have liked him restored to kingship. According to a recent study, Dinuzulu was regarded as a symbol of unity and patriotic pride by even "Christianized and westernized Zulu such as John L. Dube"²⁰⁷

²⁰³ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 252.

²⁰⁴ E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 227.

²⁰⁵ I.M. Perret, "Dinuzulu and the Bambatha Rebellion" (M.A., Natal, 1960), p. 22. L. Swart, "Work of Harriette Emily Colenso in Relationship to Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo culminating in Treason Trial of 1908 - 9" (M.A., Natal, 1967), p. 25.

²⁰⁶ S.N.A. 1/4/15 C37/06, Governor to Minister of Native Affairs, 24 January 1906. ABM A/3/37 Bridgman to Rev. E.F. Bell, Durban, 28 December 1907.

²⁰⁷ T. Karis and G.M. Carter, From Protest to Challenge, Vol. I, p. 23.

After the disturbances were over, the distrust between Dinuzulu and the Natal government grew worse. This was further bedevilled by the personal feud between Dinuzulu and his former Secretary, A.G. Daniels, who apparently had an axe to grind as the consequence of being dismissed by Dinuzulu for dishonesty and improper conduct. Daniels' deposition, though it was initially not taken seriously by the officials, least of all by the Commissioner for Native Affairs, Sir Charles Saunders, was later used in the formulation and preferment of charges against Dinuzulu.²⁰⁸ Initially, Saunders had also protested Dinuzulu's innocence. He was convinced that Dinuzulu had taken no active role in the actual rebellion.²⁰⁹ He as well as Dinuzulu himself asked the government for an independent inquiry into the allegations that were being levelled against the chief.²¹⁰ The request was, strangely enough, not acceded to. It may be that the government had then been convinced that there was a prima facie case against him and was just biding its time in preparation for the kill. McCallum had previously thought it desirable to hold an inquiry into the matter in view of the swelling evidence at courts-martial which more or less implicated Dinuzulu in the rebellion.²¹¹ That this was not undertaken in 1906 and in 1907 at the request of the chief himself, might be due to the rejection of the proposal by the ministry.

²⁰⁸ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 254.

²⁰⁹ E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 224. B.P.P. Cd 2905, p. 7: Desp. No. 21, McCallum to Elgin, Durban, 9 February 1906.

²¹⁰ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 254. SNA 1/4/16 C259/06 Minute from Commissioner for Native Affairs, Eshowe, 31 December 1906.

²¹¹ G.H. 1234 No. 204, McCallum to Elgin, Durban, 24 August 1906.

In May 1907, Dinuzulu decided to visit Pietermaritzburg, ostensibly to bid farewell to Governor McCallum who had been transferred to Ceylon. His real intention was probably to put his case before the Governor. It is significant that he resolved to come to the capital despite the very strong fears amongst his people that he would be detained as other suspects had been.²¹² McCallum was, like Saunders, satisfied that Dinuzulu had played no part in the actual disturbances, even though he saw fit to warn the chief that it was known that he had given shelter to Bambatha's family and other rebels. He also lectured Dinuzulu on how loyal government servants were expected to behave and reminded him of the conditions of his restoration.²¹³

Dinuzulu himself seized the opportunity and used it to put his own and his peoples grievances to the governor. He emphatically denied that he had sheltered the rebels and offered to hand them over. He subsequently kept his word handing over a group of men to the magistrate at Nongoma. He informed the governor that he was deeply hurt when he had heard that it was he who instigated Bambatha to rebel against the government²¹⁴. The interview ended on an amicable note with the governor assuring Dinuzulu that the government was ".... disposed to wipe the slate and give him a new start."²¹⁵

²¹² S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 255.

²¹³ G.H. 1303 Confidential Desp. No. 2, McCallum to Elgin, Pietermaritzburg, 25 May 1907.

²¹⁴ SNA 1/4/17 No C110/07, Notes of Interviews with Chief Dinuzulu, 25 May 1907.

²¹⁵ G.H. 1303 Confidential Desp. No. 2, McCallum to Elgin, Pietermaritzburg, 25 May 1907.

No sooner had Dinuzulu returned to Zululand, than new accusations were levelled at him. The murder of a medicine man called Gence in April before the interview was followed by that of Sitshitshile, one of the loyal chiefs who was murdered in August, whereafter other attempted murders were reported in October 1907. The government was quick to suspect Dinuzulu of being behind the murders of harbouring rebels who committed these crimes.²¹⁶ Even Saunders completely swing round and changed his views about Dinuzulu's innocence²¹⁷. He was convinced that the chief had perpetrated the alleged acts of violence and murder in order to win the allegiance of previously loyal Africans, to increase his power and independence and so provoke another rebellion.²¹⁸ He adamantly insisted that Dinuzulu should be removed for the sake of peace in Zululand.²¹⁹ Obviously, Saunders' about turn was occasioned by extreme displeasure at Dinuzulu's apparent conspiracy against the government, and by his deep sense of hurt at being let down by the chief in whom he had evidently put his complete trust. he, Nathan, who was persuaded that Dinuzulu had to be removed.²²⁰

²¹⁶ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 255, 257.

²¹⁷ MS Nathan 377, C.R. Saunders to Nathan, Eshowe, 4 October 1907. L. Swart, "Work of Harriette Emily Colenso in Relationship to Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo culminating in Treason Trial of 1908-9" (M.A., Natal, 1967), pp. 47 - 49.

²¹⁸ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 258.

²¹⁹ P.M. 103, Confidential Minute by Commissioner for Native Affairs, C.R. Saunders, Eshowe, 6 September 1907.

²²⁰ MS Nathan 368, Nathan to Lucas, 17 November 1907. MS 37 Maydon to Nathan, Pietermaritzburg, 31 August 1907. MS Nathan 377, C.R. Saunders to Nathan, Eshowe, 4 October 1907.

Evidently, the governor was also susceptible to the urgings of Moor's ministry which was not convinced that the rebellion had been completely quashed for which reason it had not declared a general amnesty.²²¹ The murders provided it with the pretext to act against Dinuzulu whom it had always held suspect. As early as September 1907, Moor asked for British military support in the projected military operations against Dinuzulu. However, he had to withdraw the request when the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Elgin, indicated that Britain would insist upon having a say in the settlement of her forces were used for that purpose. When Moor's ministry decided that Natal should go it alone, Lord Elgin still reminded the governor that Dinuzulu could not be removed without his sanction.²²²

In the meantime, Dinuzulu had been alarmed by the extra police movements, and by the constant spy reports on his movements and actions at Usuthu which he heard were filtering through to Pietermaritzburg during October and November. Fearful and anxious that the government would take precipitate action against him, he had written to Nathan in October pleading his innocence and asking the governor to provide him with the opportunity to rebut the reports and charges.²²³ It is not clear how this plea was received by the governor. Most probably in the heat of the moment it was put aside as an action which may have been intentionally delayed. So also nothing came out of the offer of mediation by the Prime Minister of the Transvaal who sent his personal emissary, Coenraad Meyer, to Osuthu, a visit which was viewed with grave

²²¹ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 259.

²²² L.M. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, 1902 - 1910, pp. 46 - 47.

²²³ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 259 - 260.

misgivings by some who suspected yet another Boer-Zulu alliance against Natal. Meyer reported that he was sure Dinuzulu was loyal to the government. He felt that conditions in Zululand would speedily improve if the government came into more direct contact with Dinuzulu.²²⁴

Instead, the government sought to act on the rumours that were intensifying by the day that Dinuzulu was contacting various chieftdom, urging them to arm themselves and assist him in the event of his arrest by the government. The rumours were further strengthened and given credence when yet another loyal chief, Mpumela of the Ntuli people, was murdered on 20 November. The governor swiftly issued a proclamation on 25 November strengthening the forces for the protection of chiefs in Zululand simultaneously, the militia was mobilized, a step which was viewed with grave forebodings by Dinuzulu, as well as his tribesmen. The government's reply was an instruction that he should surrender himself to the magistrate at Nongoma. When he delayed, probably in expectation that the governor might still grant him an interview, Nathan, whose hands were probably being forced by the impatient Moor ministry, declared martial in Zululand on 7 December and on 9 December extended it to the Northern Natal districts.²²⁵ By the time Dinuzulu had given himself up without resistance.²²⁶

²²⁴ E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, pp. 229 - 230. PM 103, Confidential Report of C.F. Meyer to General Louis Botha, undated. The Trial of Dinuzulu on charges of High Treason, p. 56.

²²⁵ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 261 - 262.

²²⁶ E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 225.

The proclamation of martial law as well as its extension to Northern Natal was probably intended to preempt any military organisation amongst the Qulusi and Osuthu actions of the Zulus, who for some time had been reported to be doctoring themselves for war.²²⁷ There is however no proof that they plotted any large scale war against the government. As they were most warlike of all the groups in Zululand and also the most loyal to Dinuzulu, it was probably thought that quick action against them would pre-empt any further military action.²²⁸

Dinuzulu was brought to Pietermaritzburg where on 23 December he appeared at a preliminary examination before the magistrate of Umngeni division, T.R. Bennett, behind closed doors. The examination under an old Natal law, ordinance No. 14 of 1845, continued until 30 July 1908.²²⁹ Throughout this period martial law was maintained in Zululand and Northern Natal and chief's legal advisers were not allowed to go there to prepare the case for his defence.²³⁰ Despite Lord Elgin's previous injunction to the Natal government on the treatment of Dinuzulu and his wish that he should be given a fair trial, the government precipitately decided to suspend the chief's salary from the date of his arrest, thereby depriving him of the means of paying for his defence.²³¹ The decision was immediately followed by protests from

²²⁷ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 291.

²²⁸ See for example the view expressed by The Natal Witness, 21 December 1907.

²²⁹ L.M. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, 1902 - 1910, p. 45. E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 225.

²³⁰ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 270.

²³¹ E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 227.

all parties in Britain, several of the Natal newspapers, and the humanitarians.²³² Educated and concerned Africans joined in the protest and organized fund-raising campaigns to raise money for the defence.²³³ Although the Natal government finally yielded, its image and integrity had been immensely affected.²³⁴

When he was eventually committed for trial, Dinuzulu faced twenty-three counts of high treason, murder, incitement to sedition and rebellion, being an accessory to murder, sheltering rebels, and of being illegally in the possession of firearms and ammunition.²³⁵ Viewed in their entirety, the charges created the impression that the government wanted to make sure that he was convicted, imprisoned and consequently removed from his position.²³⁶ For that reason, the charge sheet included charges from which McCallum had exonerated him.

The chances of a fair trial were greatly diminished when the trial was removed from the Supreme Court of the Colony to a special court set up under hurriedly

²³² L.M. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, 1902 - 1910, p. 47.

²³³ See for example Ilanga Lase Natal, 24, 31 July 1908. Colenso Collection Box 46, J.R. Msimang to H.E. Colenso, Howick, 13 July 1908; P.G. Qwabe to H.E. Colenso, Eland Laagte, 21 July 1908.

²³⁴ L.M. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, 1902 - 1910, p. 47.

²³⁵ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 263.

²³⁶ PM 103 No. 142/07, Confidential Minute by W.H. Beaumont to F.R. Moor, Pietermaritzburg, 15 August 1907. Beaumont, who was a judge, was the administrator in the absence of governor, since McCallum had been transferred and had not yet been replaced.

promulgated Natal Act of 1908. It consisted of Sir William Smith, a Transvaal judge, H.G. Boshoff, a judge of the Natal Native High Court, and H.C. Shepstone, a son to Sir Theophilus Shepstone, and himself a former Secretary for Native Affairs. Humanitarians and interested parties challenged, perhaps justifiably, the appointment of the three, especially Shepstone who was suspected of being biased possibly because of his previous occupation,²³⁷ but there is nothing in the nature of the trial, the verdict and sentence that the outcome might have been difficult if the trial had been in the hands of other appointees.

Initially, Dinuzulu assisted by the Colensos, who gave the case wide publicity in England, engaged the services of an English barrister, E.G. Jellicoe to defend him, assisted by two local men, C.E. Renand and R.C.A. Samuelson. Jellicoe arrived in Natal at the beginning of 1908, only to throw up his brief within three weeks in protest against the way the preliminary examination had been conducted, the obstacles that had been put on the way of the defence team who wanted to have access to the depositions of witnesses, or the witnesses themselves. His place was taken by W.P. Schreiner, an advocate of the Cape Supreme Court, and a former Prime Minister of the Cape Colony.²³⁸ On the opposite bench sat T.F. Carter, the Natal Minister of Justice and Attorney General, who according to a recent study was "a man of

²³⁷ E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 225. L.M. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, 1902 - 1910, p. 45.

²³⁸ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 263, 272. L.M. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, 1902 - 1910, p. 45. E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, pp. 225 - 226.

extraordinary narrow-mindedness and obstinacy."²³⁹ In the opinion of the defence team, Carter was one of the officials who refused them permission to go to Zululand and when they were eventually allowed to do so, set police spies on them. At the actual trial, the defence team also complained that witnesses were frequently coerced into making untrue and invalid depositions and that legal and procedural tenets were violated.²⁴⁰

On the whole, Dinuzulu gave a good account of himself in spite of the great odds against him. for example, witnesses were not allowed to look at him during the preliminary examination. During the actual trial, he persistently stressed that he had no role in what he regarded as a hopeless uprising. He denied that he offered shelter to the rebels, or that he was responsible for the murders of the medicine men and the loyal chiefs. Though he admitted that he had seen some of the rebels, he insisted that he had ordered them out of his chieftdom because he did not want trouble with the government.²⁴¹ However, his case was weakened by the fact that he had not reported their presence nor handed them over to the authorities.

On 3 March 1909 Dinuzulu was found guilty on three of the twenty-three counts of high treason; of harbouring Bambatha's family; of sheltering Mangati and Bambatha during the disturbances, and of sheltering other rebels thereafter. He was sentenced to four years imprisonment, to take effect from the time of his arrest, and was further fined a sum of L100, with the option of twelve months imprisonment ~~and was further~~

²³⁹ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 270.

²⁴⁰ E.A. Walker, W.P. Schreiner: A South African, pp. 295 - 303. E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 227 - 128.

²⁴¹ For a detailed account of the trial see for example, S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 275 - 303 and The Trial of Dinuzulu on charges of High Treason at Greytown, Natal, 1908 - 9 (Pietermaritzburg, 1910).

charges.²⁴²

The verdict was a moral defeat for the Natal government, which had done everything in its power to secure a conviction on the more serious charges and had greatly hampered Dinuzulu's defence. It was an unpleasant reflection that some of the most formidable indictments withdrawn. The episode of Dinuzulu's trial provoked much criticism of Natal, both in Britain and in South Africa. Natal's handling of the rebellion and the arrest and trial of Dinuzulu greatly reduced her prestige in the eyes of her neighbouring states with which she at that time involved in closer union negotiations²⁴³.

²⁴² L.M. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, 1902-1910, p. 45. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 226 - 227, 229 - 230.

²⁴³ E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, pp. 226 - 227, 229 - 230.

CHAPTER TWO

DUBE'S INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS:

THE NATAL NATIVE CONGRESS AND THE OHLANGE INSTITUTION

When Dube arrived in Natal in 1892, he found the colony hotly debating the efficacy of its old - established "Shepstone System". In the opinion of many, it had been weighed and found wanting in many respects. It had failed, amongst other things, to keep Africans to their own laws and customs. Nor could the colonists be assured of a constant supply of labour and were therefore clamouring for the breaking up of the locations. To them, Shepstonism had degenerated into a system of neglect and barbarism, and maladministration¹.

There were, however, those, especially in government ranks, who set great store by it. They believed that the continuous revision and codifications of Native law would revitalize the system and make it more effective. However, the system had changed rapidly and even worsened with the departure of its architect and master, Sir Theophilus Shepstone. The host of officials who took over after him lacked his abilities, direction and vision, and possessed very little talent either to administer African affairs properly or to keep intact the edifice which was assailed from all angles².

¹. E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, pp. 212, 221. D. Welsh, The Roots of Segregation, pp. 39 - 40. E.H. Brookes, White Rule in South Africa, 1830 - 1910, p. 49.

². S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 19, 129.

In the eyes of the Africans , the "Shepstone system" was breaking down because it could not provide for the educated or Christian Africans like Dube himself. These Africans wished to extricate themselves from tribalism that the system sought to entrench. They had begun to challenge the separate system of laws or administration under which they were governed. They also abhorred their exclusion from the political life of the colony in spite of their education and advancement, and exemption from the operation of African laws³.

They were not impressed by the government's patchy tinkering with the system, as had been recently done with Law 19 of 1891, which was intended to plug loopholes in it and to apply it with greater consistency and rigidity than previously⁴. Both whites and blacks hated the code for reasons of their own. The colonist feared, in particular, that too much power had been assigned to the governor as supreme chief, and were therefore apprehensive that he might introduce matters in African administration which could be devastatingly detrimental to them⁵. The educated Africans, on the other hand, desperately wanted to free themselves from the thralldom of traditional African law. They disliked the control of all aspects of their lives by the supreme chief and his officials. They also detested the various structures that were introduced under the revised code, as they regarded them as impediments to their advancement. Exempted Africans in particular, strongly felt that they had not only

³. Ibid., pp. 59 - 77, 81.

⁴. Ibid., pp. 37, 47.

⁵. E.D. Gasa, "The Native Question in Natal, 1880 - 1893: An Inquiry with reference to the Struggle for Constitutional Reform in the Colony" (M.A., Unisa, 1974), p. 141.

been deceived but also demoralized as they were treated in a way that was not different from that in which magistrates and officials treated their tribal brethren⁶.

Dube, himself an exempted, educated and Christian African, wasted no time in throwing in his lot with his equals and launching himself into politics. He began by challenging the government officials' attitude towards and treatment of exempted Africans. Writing in Inkanyiso, he chided F.S. Tathom and G. Maydon both of whom were members of the legislative assembly, for their view that Africans "should be kept in the place the Creator had placed them." Dube accused them of "purposing to elevate themselves on the ruin of others" and of sacrificing "the Native to gratify their greed of gold and political reputation." Dube curtly dismissed the arguments in favour of a Native Code of Law and demanded the placing of both the Europeans and Africans under one system⁷.

Dube also accused some of the magistrates of gross malpractices in their dealings with educated or Christian Africans and chiefs. He reported that, when the magistrates were sent to collect the hut tax, they ordered policemen to force the Africans to go down on their hands and knees. The magistrate also demanded bribes in the form of cattle from chiefs who came to consult them⁸.

These unseemly allegations were apparently vehemently denied by the Natal Mercury

⁶. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 37, 47, 58, 76.

⁷. Inkanyiso, 11 May 1894.

⁸. Ibid.

which surprisingly hastened to defend the officials and challenged Dube to submit depositions on which the Secretary for Native Affairs could act⁹. It is not clear whether Dube responded to the call. He had, however, gained political prominence by openly and fearlessly speaking out for his people, demanding basic human rights¹⁰. Later, he continued to insist that there were instances "of magistrates who know little or nothing of the language or customs and usages of the Natives"¹¹. Thus, Dube had made a start on a career that was to make him a protest leader who defended his people against what he regarded as malpractices and injustices in Natal's African administration.

It was, however, the second trip to the United States that converted Dube into a nationalist, keenly dedicated to the advancement of his people¹². He was to observe later that "I was a pioneer in the effort to uplift my people. I had to meddle in politics and to champion the rights of my people".¹³ It was after his return from the United States that he joined forces with his contemporaries to form the Natal Native Congress in July 1900, thus committing themselves to political action. No longer

⁹. Ibid., 18 May 1894.

¹⁰. A.J. Luthuli, Let My People Go, p. 75. W.C. Wilcox, "The Story of John Dube: The Brooker Washington of South Africa" in the Congregationalist, 10 March 1927.

¹¹. A.W. Lee and J.L. Dube, "The Clash of Colour" in Natal Missionary Conference Papers, Durban, 1926, p. 11.

¹². W.M. Marable, "African Nationalist: The Life of John Langalibalele Dube" (Ph. D., Maryland, 1976), p. 93.

¹³. K.C.L. 20444 Newspaper Book 9, Interview in Natal Advertiser, 21 September 1936. See also A.W.Z. Kuzwayo, "History of Ethiopianism in South Africa with particular reference to the American Zulu Mission from 1835 to 1908" (M.A., Unisa, 1980), p. 193.

could they avoid political questions, and the circumstances of the time demanded that they should take up the cudgels for their deprived fellow-men.

In terms of its constitution, the Natal Native Congress sought to encompass all tribal and Christian Africans in the struggle for unrestricted ownership of land, education for development, direct representation in parliament, participation in free trade and freedom from enforced labour¹⁴. These issues, as well as agriculture and the position of exempted Africans were to remain the major concerns of the Congress, as well as Dube himself¹⁵. These developments were in no way fostered by anti-white sentiments or hostility towards the government, but were motivated by a genuine desire to find a way whereby Africans' feelings, aspirations, grievances could be brought to the attention of the government of the colony.

In its projects and activities, the Congress accommodated and enlisted the support of white sympathisers. It sought and used the services of man like G.H Hulett, a lawyer in Verulam, who also chaired its first meeting in July 1900. Whites might have been relied upon for purposes of gaining recognition from the government, and also of assuring whites in general that the congress had nothing to hide. The advice offered by Hulett and subsequent patrons and sympathisers like Marshall Campbell, Ralph Tatham, Nelson Palmer and Harriette Colenso might have been responsible for the moderate rather than hostile line of action of, for example, the "Ethiopian

¹⁴. Ipepa lo Hlanga, 19 July and 23 August 1901.

¹⁵. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 70, 72. T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History, p. 154.

movement", which was adopted by the Congress, at least at its inception stage¹⁶. It might also account for the view of the Congress that Africans should be represented by liberal whites in parliament, an idea which the Congress and Dube consistently advocated¹⁷.

It should be proof of its realism that the Congress did not press for assimilation into white settler society. If it did, the colonists would have absolutely rejected it. The founder members were not motivated by any desire to be integrated into the white community¹⁸. As a disciple of Washington, Dube was averse to a programme of ultimate integration with whites. He did not regard integration as good for either the Africans or the whites. All that Dube and his contemporaries yearned for was political accommodation that would foster African opportunities and rights in a colonial society¹⁹.

At its very early stages, the Congress planned to establish branches in various areas.

A branch could be formed where there were ten or more members. However, before

¹⁶. T.R.H. Davenport, op. cit., p. 154. S. Marks, op. cit., pp. 69, 70, 72, 359, 362. Ilanga lase Natal, 18 September 1908.

¹⁷. S. Mark, op. cit., p. 72.

¹⁸. W.M. Marable, "African Nationalist: The life of John Langalibalele Dube" (Ph. D., Maryland, 1976), pp. 12, 174. See also V. Dhupelia "African Labor in Natal: Attempts at Coercion and Control, 1893 - 1903" in Journal of Natal and Zulu History, Vol. V, 1982, pp. 41 - 44.

¹⁹. W.M. Marable, "South African Nationalism in Brooklyn: John L. Dube's Activities in New York State, 1887 - 1899" in Afro-Americans in New York Life and History, January 1979, p. 314.

a branch could be formed, permission had to be obtained from the president, who would inform the applicants in writing of his approval. Each branch would be called "Ligatya Le Kongolo" meaning branch of Congress²⁰.

Within a few months of its first meeting, its secretariat under H.C.L. Matiwane, who was based in Verulam, claimed to have at least more than twenty local branches spread throughout Natal, and an ability to draw up to 100 people to its meetings. In August 1900 all the existing branches sent delegates to a meeting under the chairmanship of Chief Isaac Mkhize of the Mbozane people, which was summoned with the intention of requesting the government to grant the Africans direct representation by four Whites in parliament and allotment of plots in Mission Reserves which would have permanency of tenure²¹. By mid-1901, the Congress also adopted a proposal to send forty-five delegates from all over Natal to England to submit African's complaints on compensations they were likely to receive in the Anglo-Boer War settlement²². Significantly, Dube later in his career followed similar strategies²³. Though it is not clear what became of the first moves of Congress, it had, however, successfully launched itself as an organization fighting for black political and other rights.

²⁰. Ipepa Lo Hlanga, 23 August 1901.

²¹. S. Marks, op. cit., p. 72.

²². Ipepa lo Hlanga, 19 July 1901. S. Marks, op. cit., p. 72.

²³. S. Marks, op. cit., pp. 362 - 363. Ilanga Lase Natal, 18 September and 20 November 1908, 9 April and 18 June 1909.

Throughout the period from 1900 to 1910, Dube contributed to the successes and guided the fortunes of the Natal Native Congress. In 1903 he appealed to all Africans to support the Congress which he described as "Umlomo wabantu ezintweni ezitinta bona ngasembusweni nasenhlalweni yabo emazweni." He urged Africans of all persuasions to put aside individual opinions and bickering amongst themselves and, like Indians, form themselves into a strong political force that would speak with one voice when petitioning the government for political and human rights²⁴. The Indians had, as early as 1894, established the Natal Indian Congress as their main political organ. They had not only fought against disfranchisement and discriminatory laws, but had also resisted restrictions intended to limit their economic development²⁵.

Dube persistently urged the Congress to continue and increase its activities, especially during the presidency of S. Nyongwana, who succeeded Martin Lutuli, the first president²⁶. By this time, the membership of the Congress should have swelled if the initial tempo of taking membership had been maintained. Immediately after his return from overseas in 1905, Dube attended a meeting of the Congress that was held at

²⁴. Ilanga Lase Natal, 12 June 1903. See also Ilanga Lase Natal, 4 September 1903. The quotation means "the spokesman of the blacks in matters affecting them and relating to their government and their lives on the lands."

²⁵. T.R.H. Davenport, op. cit., pp. 92 - 3. E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 183. S. Marks, op. cit., p. 69.

²⁶. P. Walshe, The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa, pp. 16 - 17. Some historians, like Benson and Bulpin, had erroneously written that Dube was the first president. A.P. Benson, The African Patriots, p. 29 and T.V. Bulpin, To the Shores of Natal, p. 257. They are probably mistaking this for Dube's presidency of the South African Native National Congress which was formed in 1912.

rg on 31 May to discuss matters affecting Africans such as levying of
 he findings and recommendations of the South African Native Affairs
 (1903 - 1905). The Commission had been appointed to gather accurate
 on affairs relating to the Africans and their administration and to
 general principles of policy of governing them. It was hoped that the
 ould produce a memorandum that would be presented to the Natal
 ent²⁷.

ally, the meeting was closely watched by government officials, who sent
 detectives to report on the proceedings. The officials wanted Mark Radebe,
 he Congress's founder-members, and Stephen Mini, a chief at Edendale, to
 fully observed. S.O. Samuelson, the Under-Secretary for Native Affairs,
 that if it could be proved that Chief Stephen Mini was involved in seditious
 , he should be removed from his position as chief as being unsuitable to hold
 on of trust under the government. The African detectives could not gain
 on as they were not ticket-holders, and Samuelson was reluctant to summon
 ephen Mini to his office to ascertain from him what transpired at the meeting
 would disclose that the officials were watching the meetings. Instead, the
 detectives were requested to adopt a low profile while continuing their
 e²⁸.

Ulanga Lase Natal, 19 May 1905.

S.N.A. 1/4/14 No C22/05, Correspondence between Senior
 Inspector of Native Police and Commissioner of Police,
 16 October 1905, and between Minister of Native
 Affairs and Under-Secretary for Native Affairs, 24
 October 1905.

Dube returned from the meeting utterly disgusted at the structure, the function and apparent failures of the Congress. Seemingly, like other organizations of its kind, the Congress was going through a bad patch and there were threatening divisions within it. As a result, Dube advocated the restructuring of the Congress, so that it became so broadly based as to compel the government to recognize it as the mouthpiece of the Africans. He proposed its transformation into a parliament for the Africans, along the same lines as the Transkeian Bunga or the Sotho Pitso with a judge or the Under Secretary for Native Affairs as chairman. The chairman would be assisted by a secretary, who would be the administrative officer. Dube was of the opinion that the chairman should be a white, so as to remove any suspicions that the government might entertain if it were not represented at the meetings of the Congress. Dube referred to an incident at the meeting in May 1905, when an official appeared on the scene to inquire about the purpose of the meeting, but when the Under-Secretary for Native Affairs, S.O. Samuelson, was invited to attend subsequent sessions of the conference, he refused²⁹.

Dube proposed further that local branches of the congress be established. These would hold meetings in their areas, submit matters and send representatives or delegates to the main body. The Congress would represent the three groups of Africans, namely the exempted, the unexempted Christians, and the ordinary or tribal

²⁹. Ilanga Lase Natal, 30 June 1905. With regard to the incident, Dube commented that "ayiko into esifanele ukuba namahloni ngayo esiyifisa emakosini etu. Asiqonde luto olubi sifuna impato enhle namalungelo" (There is nothing that we are shy at that we require from our rulers. We mean no evil, we demand good treatment and rights).

Zulus. Dube felt that the Congress could have tremendous power and a strong voice if it represented all and not just Christian Africans. It had to include the chiefs and headmen in order to lend weight to its representations. The different groups could form separate bodies which could meet individually and elect representatives to the main body which would be the only body empowered to make representations on behalf of all groups to the colonial parliament. "Nxa izindaba zetu nezifiso zetu zingafinyeleli kuPalamende wabelungu," he remarked, "asinakuze siwatole amalungelo etu"³⁰.

Dube criticized the erstwhile organization for not publicizing its opposition to laws relating to the purchase of Crown lands, delimitation of Zululand, additional taxation and Mission Reserves, and the code of African laws which the Natal government had introduced. Dube was disappointed with the Congress because "Lenhlangano ayiti ihlezi ibe ibheke izinto ezona amalungelo abantu, futi nezindaba eke izikulume aziqujwa ukuba ziye komkulu. Awusilo iso lomuzi njengoba kufanele". He also referred to those laws which empowered magistrates to convict people for two years, those which prohibited exempted Africans from buying firearms and the law which did not accord to children born of exempted Africans the status of their parents³¹. So great was Dube's displeasure at the ineffectiveness of the Congress that he at one

³⁰. Ibid. The quotation means "If our affairs and petitions are not submitted to the white parliament, we will not acquire our rights."

³¹. Ibid. This means "The organization is not constantly watching over matters that deprive the people of their rights, nor does it pass the issues it had discussed to the government. It is not a watchdog as it should be."

time, surprisingly enough, prevailed upon his fellow Africans to divert some of the subscriptions paid to the Congress and the Funamalungelo Society into the formation of business companies and farming co-operatives³².

Dube was obviously impatient with the leadership of the two bodies whom he might have thought lacked initiative and spirit of enterprise. With his American experience he was perhaps expecting too much of Africans who were constrained by many factors like pathetic poverty, lack of education, denial of civil rights and deprived backgrounds. It was, however, his knowledge of what had been achieved in the USA that made him so determined that his own people should advance rapidly "in the scale of civilization"³³.

Dube's views on a restructured Congress were generally welcomed by many Africans who went further, suggesting names of persons who could be appointed to the leading positions in the Congress. Many Africans thought Dube's scheme would succeed only if the petty differences amongst Africans in general, jealousy and feuds amongst the chiefs in particular, were eliminated³⁴. Significantly, H.C.C. Matiwane, the

³². Ibid., 22 September 1905.

³³. See for example his views J.L. Dube, "Are Negroes Better off in Africa: Conditions and Opportunities in America and Africa Compared" in Missionary Review of the World, Ns 27, August. 1904. See also J.L. Dube, The Zulu's Appeal for Light and Englands Duty.

³⁴. Ilanga Lase Natal, 28 July, 4 August, and 15 September 1905.

secretary of the Congress, had earlier remarked that the Congress was failing to attain its objectives because of the lack of co-operation between exempted and educated Christian Africans on the one hand, and the tribal Africans on the other. Matiwanne had stressed the need for "ukuhlangana sonke ndawonye notenge ubulungu ake abugaxe esipikilini eze lapo kuhlangane kona abakubo...."³⁵. Other Africans did not take kindly to the idea of the appointment of the Under-Secretary for Native Affairs to the presidency of the Congress and instead suggested names of other respectable white officials³⁶.

In the wake of the 1906 rebellion, Dube emphasized the need for strong leadership in the Congress to the extent of suggesting that S. Nyongwana, who was the headmaster of Mpolweni Institution for Boys and at one time the secretary of the Natal Native Teachers' Association³⁷, should become full-time president so that "sonke isikati sakhe asinikele ezintweni eziqondene nabantu mayelana nezinhluho zabo, kuvele-ke imibono yabelungu base Natal abati amakafula akafuni loku nalokuya"³⁸. Dube felt that the Congress needed a political leader who would speak without fear when presenting his followers' grievances to the whites. He would have to be a person "..... onomoya wokutanda abantu, ohlakaniphile, onesibindi, onomoya wokuzidela, ongenanhlengo....." He avowed himself the critic of the

³⁵. Ibid. 21 April 1905.

³⁶. Ibid., 1 September 1905.

³⁷. Ibid., 17 July 1903.

³⁸. Ibid., 14 September 1906. This means that "he can devote all his time to matters that affect the people, so as to shut the mouths of whites in Natal who often speak authoritatively saying the Kafirs do not want this and that".

Congress until its leaders became more active and "bavume nemiqondo yabantu abayivezayo, nxa iqonde ukwaka ubuncono...." He also exhorted his fellow Africans to give their leaders the spiritual and material support that they needed. Dube declared that he himself was not in a position to assume the leadership of the Congress as he wanted to devote his attention to Ohlange and Ilanga Lase Natal³⁹.

Dube was invited by the leaders of the Congress to deliver a keynote address at a meeting scheduled for October 1906 which, however, did not take place. He subsequently published his address in the Ilanga Lase Natal which he declared to be the official spokesman of the blacks. He listed practically all the grievances of the Africans, ranging from denial of the right to buy land, forced labour, hut and poll taxes, pass laws, to disenfranchisement and lack of representation in parliament. He urged that the grievances could be removed only when the Africans had the right to elect representatives in the white legislature. "Njengokuba kunje sisesandleni sabangasitandiyo kubelungu," he observed "asinakubalekela ndawo. Abako abangabhekela kahle amalungelo abo bengenampenduleli"⁴⁰.

After this, Dube took it upon himself to attempt to influence rational thought and feeling amongst Africans. He encouraged them to take a keen interest in their own

³⁹. Ibid., The two quotations mean "who has a spirit of love for people, who is intelligent, brave, who has a spirit of selflessness, who is not discriminatory..." and "accept ideas propounded by people, so long as they are intended to lead towards improvement" respectively.

⁴⁰. Ibid., 2 November 1906. This means "As it is, we are in the hands of whites who do not care for us, we have nowhere to turn to. There are no people who can attain rights if they have no representatives."

welfare and attempted to expand the Natal Native Congress into a national organization. "If it were possible to write them in all their efforts," he wrote to Booker T. Washington in 1907, "they would be irresistible both financially and politically"⁴¹. This ambition was to be realised when the African National Congress was formed and assuming its presidency, he was to urge Africans to stand up and speak with one voice against oppressive laws.

Dube's practical experience following the foundation of the Ohlange institute also influenced his attitude towards the whites and the government. His establishment of Ohlange was a formidable task and it surprised many skeptics, like Wilcox, his long standing friend, and R. Plant, the Inspector of Native Education, who gave the undertaking no chance of success⁴². He drew his inspiration and confidence from the self-sacrificing efforts of his helpers and the achievements of Booker T. Washington⁴³. Dube initially ran the school with the assistance of a local board of trustees of six in the persons of Chief Mqawe, Rev. B. Cele, George Hudson, who was the only white trustee, J.S. Mdimba, M. Cele, and Dube himself. Dube justified

⁴¹. B.T.W. 346/1907, Dube to Washington, Phoenix, 21 September 1907. See also B.T.W. 346/1907, Washington to Dube, 10 August 1907.

⁴². W.C. Wilcox, "John L. Dube: The Booker Washington of the Zulus" in Missionary Review of the World, NS 32, 1909, p. 917. Wilcox writes that he "had no faith in scheme" and had pointed out to Dube's supporters that the possession of money might turn his head, and that would be the end of the College. Plant on other hand gave "Dube just two years to run into debt and give up the enterprise."

⁴³. B.T.W. 177/1901, Dube to Washington, Phoenix, 9 May 1901. R. Hunt Davis Jr, "John L. Dube: A South African Exponent of Booker T. Washington" in Journal of African Studies, Vol. II, No. 4, 1975 - 1976, p. 507.

the inclusion of Hudson on grounds that he had done a lot of things for the school and was there to safeguard the interests of the whites who supported it⁴⁴.

Dube's advocacy of self-advancement and self-help among Africans appeared dangerously radical to suspicious whites, most of whom reacted to the spectacle of blacks extricating themselves from tribalism and becoming "westernized" with great hostility. Soon African intelligence officers reported that Dube was using his school to preach sedition and that he was encouraging pupils as well as Christian Africans and chiefs to stand up and fight for freedom and independence. Not only was his school kept under close surveillance on the orders of the Secretary for Native Affairs, F.R. Moor, but he was ordered to appear before the Inspector of Native Police, W.T. Clarke, on 6 November 1901 and cautioned⁴⁵.

In May 1902, when he again appeared before the magistrate at Inanda on similar charges, he denied the accusations which he attributed to the jealousy of a clique of missionaries who had not welcomed the independent religious movement that was gaining momentum amongst the Africans. Dube assured the magistrate that he consistently and continuously encouraged his pupils to be loyal to the British flag and succeeded in convincing the magistrate that his school was "the best conducted institution of the kind I have seen, and I am of the opinion that he is doing good

⁴⁴. Ilanga Lase Natal, 28 August 1903.

⁴⁵. S.N.A. 1/4/9 No. C31/01, Report of Native Intelligence Officer, 12 October 1901, Secretary for Native Affairs to Prime Minister, 6 November 1901, Governor to Prime Minister, 8 November 1901, and Inspector of Native Police to Minister of Lands and Works, 19 November 1901.

work⁴⁶.

The Inspector of Native Education, R. Plant, was not convinced. He believed that the school was run "on the lines of secession ideas so much in evidence just now and is avowedly run on the lines of "no European control"⁴⁷. Other government officials, especially S.O. Samuelson, the Under-Secretary for Native Affairs, wished to charge Dube with inciting Africans to rebellion and promoting anti-white race feelings⁴⁸. The police, however, failed to obtain depositions and evidence from Dube's pupils and, after it had been established that Dube was exempted from the operation of law governing tribal Africans, the charges were not pressed⁴⁹. Instead, Dube was arrested in terms of martial law by the Natal Police and taken to Pietermaritzburg for day-long questioning and examination under the supervision of S.O. Samuelson, the Under-Secretary for Native Affairs⁵⁰.

⁴⁶. S.N.A. 1/4/10 No. C36/02, Statement by Magistrate of Inanda, Division, 23 May 1902.

⁴⁷. S.N.A. 1/4/10 No C36/02, Report by Inspector of Native Education, R. Plant, on Dube's School, 1 September 1902. S.N.A. 1/4/12 Nos C7 8 C67, Report by Native Police Inspector, W.T. Clarke, 31 December 1902.

⁴⁸. S.N.A. 1/4/12 No C49/02, S.O. Samuelson to Secretary of Lands and Works, 31 December 1902. See also S.N.A. 1/4/12 No. C6/03, S.O. Samuelson to Secretary for Lands and Works, 11 February 1908.

⁴⁹. S.N.A. 1/4/12 No. C7/03 and C6/03, Report of Detective - Sergeant Poole, 29 January 1903, and Attorney - General to S.O. Samuelson, 5 February 1903 and S.O. Samuelson to Secretary of Lands and Works, 11 February 1903 respectively.

⁵⁰. S.N.A. 1/4/12, No. C6, Senior Inspector of Native Advice, W.T. Clarke, to Chief Commissioner of Native Police 20 and 23 March 1903.

For close on seven years the government turned a deaf ear to requests for funds or simply refused to give grants-in-aid to Ohlange. Dube attributed this to the fact that his school "is unjustly looked upon as fostering the Ethiopian movement, simply because the principal is a black man"⁵¹. He thus had to run the school without assistance or advice of the government. "No interest, no help, no advice, no control from those he would naturally look to for all these....", Maurice Evans remonstrated with the officials of the Department of Native Affairs at whose hands Dube suffered, "he leaves the country to get what we should have supplied"⁵².

During these seven years, Dube relied on the support of his friends in the United States, especially the members of the American Committee of the Zulu Christian Industrial School (ACZCIS) which helped him with finances and equipment and regularly provided expertise in the management of Ohlange. Not only did they have unshakable confidence in his good judgement and managerial skills, but they believed that "no fair missionary effort is going on today than that of Mr Dube's because it is meant to do an all round good job"⁵³. In support of Dube's campaign to raise funds for his school, Louis Stoiber and Rev. S.P. Cadman, both members of the ACZCIS, assured those who would support Dube, whom they likened to Moses, that they would be making "a wise and permanent investment in the future of our

⁵¹. Ilanga Lase Natal, 3 November 1905. See also W. Wilcox "John L. Dube: The Booker Washington of the Zulus" in Missionary Review of the World, Ns 32, 1909, p. 919.

⁵². M.S. Evans, The Native Problem in Natal, p. 54.

⁵³. B.T.W. 321/1906, Louis Stoiber to Washington, Broadway, 30 March 1906.

common Christianity." They were convinced that Dube was destined to deliver his people from intellectual and spiritual bondage and that "..... we may expect still greater results"⁵⁴. It was on the basis of this remarkable record of achievement that Booker T. Washington who, like many others, was impressed with Ohlange, endorsed Dube's work⁵⁵.

During the 1906 disturbances, the Department of Native Affairs awakened to the need for adopting a reformist policy that would "gain the goodwill and confidence of the black masses of the Colony." It realized that there was some good that might result from giving Ohlange a grant-in-aid. S.O. Samuelson, the Under Secretary for Native Affairs, who first mooted the idea, revived an 1895 directive that was intended for the Inkanyiso and St Albans College, but adding the special condition to the grant to the effect that none of the officers or Trustees of the school shall contribute to, or be an owner or shareholder in a political newspaper"⁵⁶. This meant that Dube would have to relinquish his position as owner and editor of the Ilanga Lase Natal, something that he would have found it very difficult to do.

Dube was pleasantly surprised when, at the instance of F.R Moor who was then

⁵⁴. B.T.W. 404/1910, Letter of Recommendation by S.P. Cadman, Brooklyn, 28 February 1910 and B.T.W. 321/1906, Louis Stoiber to Washington, Broadway, 30 March 1906 respectively.

⁵⁵. B.T.W. 905/1910, Washington to Dube, 22 March 1910.

⁵⁶. S.N.A. 1/4/10 No C36/02, S.O. Samuelson to Minister of Education, 3 January 1906. S. Marks "The Ambiguities of Dependence: John L. Dube of Natal" in Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 1 No. 2, April 1975, pp. 169 - 170.

both Prime Minister and Minister of Native Affairs, his school was officially recognized and started to receive a government grant, despite his refusal to accede to Samuelson's conditions. He was happy that he seemed at last to have won the support of the government and the confidence of the whites and he was hopeful that "the day is not far distant when we shall have all the financial support we need right here"⁵⁷. A modern comment has been that his acceptance by such whites moderates as Evans and Loram resulted from his advocacy of self-segregation of Africans which would lessen their threat to the supremacy of the whites⁵⁸.

Another factor that contributed to Dube's involvement in politics was his association with Ethiopian elements and their deteriorating relations with the American Board Mission. Since his return from the United States in 1899, he had been suspected of being inclined towards Ethiopianism, which was seen as promoting anti-white race feelings. As early as 1902, it was reported that he was interested in the so-called "Independent Native Mission", whose aim were the spread of learning and Christianity amongst the Africans, without assistance from White missionaries. Dube was reported to have asserted that white missionaries were only interested in financial matters, as a result of which they were determined to retain exclusive control over the disposal of all funds that were collected from both Africans and whites for missionary work. Significantly, Dube did not deny these allegations, but emphasized that the

⁵⁷. Ilanga Lase Natal, 29 November 1907. See also W.C. Wilcox, "John L. Dube: The Booker Washington of the Zulus" in Missionary Review of the World, Ns 32, 1909, p. 919. S. Marks, "Harriate Colenso and the Zulus" in Journal of African History, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1963, p. 410 Footnote 45.

⁵⁸. R. Hunt Davis Jr, op. cit., p. 518.

movement was entirely unconnected with politics, political propaganda or military designs of any description⁵⁹.

That Dube was suspected of cherishing the Ethiopian sentiments could probably be attributed to his study in the United States and his American connections. Another factor might have been that he was assisted at his school by people, such as his brother, Charles, and his wife, Adelaide, who had been educated at institutions in the States which were associated with the Ethiopian movement⁶⁰. It might also be due to the fact that he openly and doubtlessly advocated "the Afro- American ideals of Christian self -help, industrial cooperation and independence" which were mooted and propagated by Joseph Booth's body, "the African Christian Union," which had such followers as W.E.B. du Bois, John Chilembwe and John Tangu Jabavu, with whom Dube was on friendly terms⁶¹.

It is possible that Dube's activities encouraged the growth of Ethiopianism as the "culture nationalism" of the black man in Natal⁶², but he himself was no Ethiopian of the type that subscribed to the "expression of racially exclusive, and potentially

⁵⁹. S.N.A. 1/4/10 C36/02, Statement by Magistrate of Inanda Division, 23 May 1902.

⁶⁰. R. Hunt Davis Jr, op. cit., p. 507. Charles Dube studied at Wilberforce University, an AME College in Ohio.

⁶¹. G. Stepperson, "Ethiopianism and African Nationalism" in Phylon, Vol. XIV, Spring 1953, pp. 13 - 14.

⁶². G. Shepperson and T. Price, The Independent African, p. 102.

nationalist sentiments⁶³ and the call for "Africa for the Africans⁶⁴."

He declared without equivocation that he found it "hard to hear" the exaggerated racial feeling which were propagated by Afro- Americans of the African Methodist Episcopal Church⁶⁵. Like M.S Radebe of Ipepa Lo Hlanga and Cleopas Kunene, an influential educated and exampeted Christian African of Edendale, he was critical of the separatist Churches' extremist views.⁶⁶ It is also significant that Arthur Tappam Pierson, the editor of the Missionary Review of the World, in which Dube's articles were periodically published, avowedly supported Dube because his mission worked against the "unrest" of Ethiopianism, and because Dube served as a minister "in a native church" that did not advocate "the eventual expulsion of the whites⁶⁷".

Even though Dube rejected Ethiopianism as a militant idea, his tacit support of independent African churches and especially the Zulu Congregational Church under the leadership of Simungu Bafazini Shibe, with which Dube's name was linked, earned him the enmity of the white settler population⁶⁸. Many whites intensely

⁶³. L. Kuper, An African Beurgeosie, pp. 435, 443.

⁶⁴. G. Shepperson, op. cit., p. 14.

⁶⁵. J.L. Dube, "Are Negroes Better Off in Africa: Conditions and Opportunities in America and Africa Compared" in Missionary Review of the World, Ns 27, August 1904, p. 584.

⁶⁶. A.W. Kuzwayo, op. cit., pp. 174 - 175.

⁶⁷. W.M. Marable, "African Nationalist: The Life of John Langalibalele Dube" (Ph. D., Maryland, 1976), p. 174.

⁶⁸. D.P. Collins, "Origins and Formation of the Zulu Congregational Church" (M.A., Natal, 1978), pp. 106 - 107.

abhorred any independent activity by Africans of the type evident in the mushrooming independent indigenous separatist churches. Considerable fears were aroused and formed within the white community that sooner or later the Africans might reject white rule.⁶⁹

As a result of the suspicions of the whites, not only was Dube unable to get his school officially recognised and subsidised, he was also refused permission to hire the Afro-Americans as teachers⁷⁰. Despite these difficulties, he was not daunted. "We have within us all the elements which make for success", he wrote at this time, "and it is our firm determination, despite all difficulties, to lead our people in the noblest paths that have been trodden by the white man - the paths of knowledge and the paths of virtue".⁷¹

Dube enjoyed strong support among the educated Christian Africans. They respected him for his strong belief "that Africans must learn to stand on their own feet, that self-help was the best foundation for the freedom they sought".⁷² For some time, Dube also had the backing of the American Board of Missions whose role in the advancement and civilisation of Africans he constantly acknowledged. Dube also admitted that a consequence of the educative role of the missionaries was

⁶⁹. Christian Express, March 1908. R. Hunt Davis Jr, op. cit, p. 516.

⁷⁰. B.T.W. 346/1907, Dube to Washington, Phoenix, 21 September 1907. Christian Express, March 1908.

⁷¹ Ilanga Lase Natal, 29 November 1907.

⁷². M. Benson, The African Patriots, pp. 29 - 30.

crystallization of political opinion and the emergence of political organization amongst the Africans.⁷³ He therefore urged missionaries to add momentum to their activities, as there was a strong desire amongst the Africans for education and advancement.⁷⁴

As a result of its support for the "concepts of self- support", the American Zulu mission was severely criticized by the government. As is explained in chapter IV, there were many reasons for the A.Z.M being singled out for singular ill treatment by the government, and promulgation and implementation of various measures against it.⁷⁵ In time, these measures created a rift between Dube and the missionaries, especially when Dube suspected the American Board of Missions of colluding with the government in blocking the advancement of the Africans, especially in the acquisition of landed properties.⁷⁶

Despite his Christian training, his acknowledgement of the positive role which the missionaries had played and his lasting commitment to the Christian faith, Dube's

⁷³. Ilanga Lase Natal, 29 November 1907. J.L. Dube, "A Native View of Christianity in South Africa" in Missionary Review of the World, NS 27, August 1904, p. 425.

⁷⁴. J.L. Dube, The Zulu's Appeal for Light and England's Duty, p. 5. Natal Missionary Conference, Proceedings, July 1908, p. 9: Presidential Address by Rev. R. Blake.

⁷⁵. A.B.M. A/2/24, S.O. Samuelson to F.B. Bridgman, Pietermaritzburg, 15 April 1904. G.H. 1234 No. 70, McCallum to Elgin, Pietermaritzburg, 10 May 1907. D.P. Collins, op. cit., pp. 106 - 107. S. Marks, "Christian African Participation in 1906 Zulu Rebellion" in the Bulletin of the Society for African Church History, Vol. 2, No 1, December 1965, pp.63 - 64.

⁷⁶. Ilanga Lase Natal, 15 November 1907 and 20 March 1908.

relationship with the American Zulu Mission began to deteriorate and he was to relinquish his position as pastor in 1908. This was, as is explained in Chapter IV, probably sparked off by disagreements over the church's attitude towards the Mission Reserves.⁷⁷

After the 1906 rebellion, Dube decided to play an even more overt political role. Not only did he, after initial disinclination, give evidence before the Natal Native Affairs Commission which had been appointed to investigate the causes of the rebellion, but he used the Ilanga Lase Natal to counsel his fellow Africans on what to demand from the government as their inalienable rights, especially their representation in the colony's legislature.⁷⁸ He was also deeply involved in the opposition to the so-called "Native Bills" that were introduced in 1908 by the Minister for Native Affairs, F.R. Moor, on the basis of the recommendations of the Commission. Not only did he attack them piece by piece in the editorials and columns of his paper, but he was also a kingpin of the numerous delegations sent and petitions submitted by the educated Christian Africans to the government against the proposed legislation.⁷⁹ Though he emphatically denied it to Moor, he was one of the people for whom the Africans collected money for the purpose of going to England to present a petition to the

⁷⁷. J.K. Ngubane, An African Explains Apartheid, p. 84. S. Marks, The Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 74 - 75. A.B.M. A/3/37, Secretary of AZM to J.L. Barton, Durban, 1 January 1910.

⁷⁸. Report and Evidence of the Natal Native Affairs Commission, 1907, Evidence, Vol. II, Sect. III, p. 957. Ilanga Lase Natal, 5, 12 October 1906, 26 April 1907, and 31 August 1908.

⁷⁹. G.H. 1235 No 266, Nathan to Crewe, Durban, 6 November 1908. Encl. No 1: Petition by Eight Christian Natives. Ilanga Lase Natal, 3 July 1908.

British Government to protest against Moor's bills.⁸⁰

Credit is also due to him for conceiving of the strategy of writing to the National Convention which was meeting in Durban in October 1908, complaining about the denial to the Africans of the franchise and right of representation in the proposed Union government.⁸¹ Anticipating that the Transvaal, the Orange River Colony and Natal would oppose the extension of the Cape franchise, Dube strongly urged all black national groups and the black press to join forces and form a committee of vigilance during the session of National Convention in Durban. The committee would consist of white sympathisers who would be mandated to put the case of the Africans to the Convention as blacks had been excluded. The blacks would plead for representation in the proposed Union parliament.⁸² It is not clear whether the vigilance committee was formed and did function, but the vision that Dube had of the African national groups, i.e. the Xhosas, the Sothos, the Batswanas, the Swazis and the Zulus working together in one political organ in the struggle for political rights came to reality with the formation of the South African Native National Congress.

In the meantime, Dube had also involved himself in the affairs of the Zulu royalty. He threw in his weight in unifying the Zulus and rallying them to the support of King Dinuzulu, who was arrested and tried in connection with the rebellion. He was very

⁸⁰. S.N.A. 1/1/41 No 2812/08, Dube to F.R. Moor, Phoenix, 4 September 1908.

⁸¹. Ilanga Lase Natal, 20 November 1908. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 362 - 363.

⁸². Ilanga Lase Natal, 18 September 1908.

active in launching campaigns for raising funds for his defence.⁸³ When King Dinuzulu was finally convicted and sentenced, Dube appealed to the governor, Sir Mathew Nathan, for clemency and the reduction of the sentence.⁸⁴ Dube's political stance had so changed that, when he left for England in 1909, Sir Mathew Nathan became suspicious of the visit, and wanted him to be carefully watched because "I do not anticipate any good from his visit....."⁸⁵

Dube's growing involvement in politics was occasioned by a number of factors, chief among which were the political aspirations of the Africans, like Dube himself, the attitude of the officials and whites towards Ohlange, and the situation in the mission reserves. Although Dube initially wanted to steer clear of politics, he later became committed to political action, especially when he became one of the founder members of the Natal Native Congress.

It is significant that throughout his political career, especially in the then colony of Natal, Dube was always involved "in a continuing effort to reach a measure of accommodation with the 'progressive' and 'liberal' whites."⁸⁶ In this, he took the cue from his mentor, Booker T. Washington, and acted "not as a total accommodator who made his peace with injustice, but as a conservative who would seek for himself

⁸³. Ibid., 3 January, 24 and 31 July, 13 November and 11 December 1908.

⁸⁴. Ibid., 12 March 1909.

⁸⁵. Ms Nathan 368, Nathan to Marshall Campbell, 15 July 1909.

⁸⁶. R. Hunt Davis Jr, op. cit., p. 154.

and his people what he wanted..... with and through whites of goodwill".⁸⁷ In time, Dube achieved success and won the recognition of many whites, even those who had previously held Africans in disesteem.⁸⁸ He also enjoyed and maintained the substantial support of such leading Natal political, educational and commercial figures as H.E. Colenso, R.H. Tatham, F.R. Moor, Maurice Evans, C.T. Loram, Marshall Campbell, and many others.⁸⁹

In spite of his political convictions, Dube was deeply committed to non-violent change and enlightened, yet conservative, African nationalism.⁹⁰ In this, he was influenced by Christian principles, as he was "a devoted Christian."⁹¹ He sympathised with his fellow Africans who, as it was acknowledged by even some of the whites, had grievances for which they had no outlet or mode of expression,⁹² but he never suggested that these should be settled through forceful means. He took it to be the purpose and duty of civilised governments "to strive to right the legitimate grievances

⁸⁷. L.R. Harlam, Booker T. Washington : The Making of a Black Leader, 1856 - 1901, p. 288.

⁸⁸. W.C. Wilcox, "John L. Dube : The Booker Washington of the Zulus" in Missionary Review of the World, Ns 32, 1909, p. 919.

⁸⁹. Ilanga Lase Natal, 29 November 1907. R. Hunt Davis Jr, op. cit., p. 518. W.M. Marable, "African Nationalist : The Life of John Langalibalele Dube" (Ph. D., Maryland, 1976), pp. 181, 190.

⁹⁰. W.M. Marable, "South African Nationalism in Brooklyn : John L. Dube's Activities in New York State, 1887 - 1899" in Afro-Americans in New York Life and History, January 1979, p. 24.

⁹¹. P.G. Mlambo, "John L. Dube, First President of the SANNC (ANC) and the Natives Land Act of 1913" (B.A., Lesotho, 1980), p.19.

⁹². E. Buxton, South Africa and Its Native Problem, p. 5.

of the people whom they govern or represent."⁹³ Dube also urged the government to take the leaders of the Africans into its confidence and to have at least one such African attached to each principal office of the Department of Native Affairs.⁹⁴ One wonders what might have been the outcome had the whites in general and the government in particular taken heed of Dube's requests and suggestions.

⁹³. A.W. Lee and J.L. Dube, op. cit., p. 8. See also J.W. Shepstone, White and Black, the Racial Breach : Some Queries and a Warning, p. 6.

⁹⁴. A.W. Lee and J.L. Dube, op. cit., p. 11.

CHAPTER THREE

ILANGA LASE NATAL, 1903 - 1910

In April 1903, Dube launched the Ilanga Lase Natal. Some of his advisers among the educated Christian Africans had been urging him to found a Zulu newspaper "...ukuba bezwe izindaba zezwe, zenqubekela pambili, zempilo, nezombuso kaNkulunkulu..."¹ He acceded to their request partly because he was determined to reach and influence as many of his people as possible and to establish a mouthpiece for the black population and partly because he was convinced that "...zonke izizwe ezikanyisiwe akwenzeki ukuba zihlale ngapandle kwepepa lezindaba..."²

A modern comment has been that the publication of Ilanga was "... in large part inspired by the Southern Letter (Tuskegee), the Tuskegee Student, and the Southern Workman (Hampton), publication which functioned primarily to disseminate the philosophy of their institutions."³ However, as another researcher points out, the Ilanga was not designed essentially for educational purposes, but was from the outset "far more overtly political."⁴

¹. Ilanga Lase Natal, 17 April 1903. This means "so that they learn the news of the world, of advancement, education, head and of the Kingdom of God..."

². Ibid. The quotation means "all enlightened nations cannot afford to be without a newspaper..."

³. R. Hunt Davis Jr, "John L. Dube: A South African Exponent of Booker T. Washington" in Journal of African Studies, Vol. II, 1975 - 1976, p. 509.

⁴. S. Marks, "The Ambiguities of Dependence: John L. Dube of Natal" in Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 1, No 2, April 1975, pp. 173 - 174.

Dube used the Ilanga to give "effective and powerful backing to the idea of an African United Front"⁵ and to form African opinion using the peoples' own language.⁶ The paper also drew the attention of its African readers to the disabilities that Africans suffered and also exhorted them to follow ways of enlightenment.⁷ "We must admit", he wrote at the time, "that wherever a Native by education and Christian civilisation raises himself to a standard above his fellows, the white man respects him and treat him with courtesy and common politeness, characteristic of his race"⁸

The Ilanga also "expounded upon Washingtonian ideals of industrial education, the Calvinist ethic, Black economic self - sufficiency, and self - segregation".⁹ As Washington had done to his fellow Afro - Americans, Dube criticised the Africans for their backwardness, insisting that the educated Christian Africans, and not the American, European or English missionaries, should lead their political and socio - economic advancement. In an article entitled "Isita Esikhulu Somuntu uQobo lwake" which appeared in the Ilanga, he showed the Blacks that it was their lack of

⁵ J.K. Ngubane, An African Explains Apartheid, p. 71. L.E. Switzer, "The Problems of an African Mission in a White - dominated, multi-racial Society: The American Zulu Mission in South Africa, 1885 - 1910" (Ph.D., Natal, 1971), p. 39.

⁶ T. Karis and G.M. Carter, From Protest to Challenge, Vol. 4, p. 42. R. Oliver and J.D. Fage, A Short History of Africa, p. 232.

⁷ Ilanga Lase Natal, 10 April 1903. A.W.Z. Kuzwayo, "History of Ethiopianism in South Africa with particular reference to the American Zulu Mission from 1835 to 1908" (M.A., Unisa, 1980), p. 195. A. Ngubo, "The Development of African Political Protest in South Africa, 1882 - 1910: An Analytical Approach" (Ph.D., California, 1973), p. 105. L. Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie, p. 252.

⁸ Ilanga Lase Natal, 29 May 1903.

⁹ W.M. Marable, "The Panaficanism of Booker T. Washington: A Reappraisal," p. 9.

thrift, their attitude towards labour, their want of perseverance and even more, their lack of cooperation and unity due to petty jealousy, which were the main factors militating against their progress.¹⁰

The Ilanga Lase Natal also had articles and at times editorials written in English, which were intended for the consumption of the White settler community, the Department of Native Affairs, and the Natal Government to help them "keep in touch with native thought".¹¹ Dube also declared it to be the policy of his newspaper to expose injustices and evil deeds emanating from all quarters and to make the Africans aware of their rights and privileges.¹² In time Africans themselves used the columns of the Ilanga to criticize the government policies.¹³

The Ilanga was financed from the funds and donations which Dube regularly received from his friends and contacts in the United States, but especially in New York. In 1904 and 1909 he went overseas in order to raise funds that would augment the finances he needed for his projects. From time to time he appealed to readers to pay their subscriptions on time, or to recruit other readers to increase the circulation of

¹⁰. Ilanga Lase Natal, 17 April 1903. See also J.L. Dube, Isita Somuntu Nguye Uqobo Lwakhe, Mariannhill, 1928. Native Teachers Journal, XXV, No. 4, July 1946.

¹¹. Ilanga Lase Natal, 10 April 1903.

¹². Ibid. See also S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 74 - 77.

¹³. P.G. Mlambo, "John L. Dube, First President of the SANNC (ANC) and the Natives's Land Act of 1913" (B.A., Lesotho, 1980), p. 14.

the newspaper.¹⁴ There seems to have been very little if any connection between the newspaper and the American Zulu Mission except for irregular letters that were published which were written by W.C. Wilcox, H.D. Goodenough and James Dexter Taylor on issues of the moment.¹⁵

No sooner had the papers been published than Dube received many letters, some of which congratulated him on the project while others were critical and came from people who feared that their monies would be lost when after subscribing the newspaper would be liquidated. Dube assured his readers that "..... mina angiyiqalisi into ngingayiqondile. 'Ilanga' lizokanya njalo liye ngokubalela.... Musani ukungibandisa ngifudumele kangaka."¹⁶ Prominent and influential leaders regularly wrote to the Ilanga expressing their views on social and political issues. Letters came from as far afield as Swaziland, the Transvaal, and the then Orange River Colony, Basotoland, Rhodesia and Gazaland.¹⁷ When the stream of letters swelled and Dube could no longer publish all of them, he insisted that only full-paid subscribers should write to him.

In order to cater for varied interests Dube divided the newspaper into different

¹⁴. Ilanga Lase Natal, 29 November 1907, 2 July 1909. Dube's appeal to readers can be found in all issues of the Ilanga that were edited by him.

¹⁵. Ibid., 2 October 1903, 30 October 1903, and 17 June 1904.

¹⁶. Ibid., 17 April 1903. This means "..... I do not start a thing without a firm resolve. The 'Ilanga' will rise and continue shining.... Do not dampen me when I am so determined."

¹⁷. Ibid., 19 June, 10 July, 21 August, and 25 September 1903, 1 and 29 January 1904.

columns. There were religious articles and Sunday School lessons, and educational articles that were written by Dube himself. There were also articles on sports and social functions which were contributed by correspondents, with others written by Dube. Dube also had a column that was set aside for comments on articles and editorials appearing in the White-owned newspapers of the day, especially the Natal Mercury the Natal Witness and the Natal Advertiser. There were articles that were directed at his fellow Africans and which were intended to exhort them to aspire to great heights, to develop improved working habits, to buy land, to form companies and syndicates, and to establish schools and colleges.¹⁸ Editorials were, except for the time when he was overseas, written by Dube himself and indicated his thinking on the issues of the day.

Dube was intent on influencing as wide a spectrum of the African population as possible. Consequently, as from the issue of 1 May 1903, the Ilanga carried articles in Sotho that were initially written by Dube himself, and later by Josiah A. Molise, who was the editor of this section until it was discontinued in 1905. There was also a column that carried news from Swaziland.¹⁹ For purposes of informing the general public the newspaper also published official or government notices, new acts and legislative measures, and reports of commissions, at times accompanied by Dube's comments.

It was not long before the publication of the paper brought Dube into trouble with the

¹⁸. Ibid., 24 April 1903.

¹⁹. Ibid., 1 May, 12 June 1903, 14 April 1905.

authorities for its criticism of the government African policy and administrative measures.²⁰ This was not unexpected as the government had previously shown itself to be keenly averse to any African newspaper, especially the Ipepa Lo Hlanga, which it accused of publishing seditious material which it believed was calculated "to create considerable ill-feeling and resentment against the Government, and Europeans."²¹ As a result of the stance adopted by Dube, which was believed by the Whites and the government to be radical and militant, his editorials were translated and interpreted at times in distorted, dramatic and exaggerated terms, by the officials of the Department of Native Affairs.²²

The main issues with which the Ilanga Lase Natal concerned itself, arrange themselves conveniently around the important enactments and developments between 1903 and 1910. There was in addition, variety of administrative proposals, measures and matters. Amongst the most important ones there were the denial of civic and political rights to Africans, the status of exempted Africans and of children born of exempted parents,²³ relationships between Africans and government officials and legislators, change of offices and powers of the Secretary for Native Affairs, the Governor as

²⁰. G. Shepperson and T. Price, Independent African, p. 92.

²¹. S.N.A. 1/4/9 No C1/01, Minister for Agriculture, A.W. Winter, to Attorney-General, H. Bale, 15 January 1901. He referred in particular to "ABM preachers" in the persons of Dube, Matiwane, Zondi and others.

²². Ilanga Lase Natal, 4, 11 and 25 May 1906. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 73 - 74. The Natal Witness, 12 May 1906. "Gebuza", The Peril in Natal, p. 24.

²³. Ilanga Lase Natal, 29 May 1903.

Supreme Chief, and chiefs,²⁴ amendment and extension of the Code of Native Law, inequality at Law of Africans and Whites, provisions for the advancement of Africans in the scale of civilization, the treatment of Africans by Whites and the government policy of administering African Affairs.²⁵

The Ilanga also concentrated on land apportionment and the disadvantage at which the Africans were placed as a result thereof. It also dwelt on the land controversies between the government and the colonists as well as Africans, the Native Squatters Act No 48 of 1903 which required the payment of rent by all Africans residing on unalienated Crown Lands, and the eviction of Africans from private farms.²⁶

Equally important were the individual ownership of land by Africans, the Mission Reserves Act No 49 of 1903 which restored the complete control and management of mission lands to the government, levied increased rentals or taxes on residents and dashed to the ground the hopes of those Africans who aspired to freehold tenure, and introduced the system of leasehold.²⁷

The Ilanga Lase Natal also focused its attention on the measures that were adopted by

¹. Ibid., 17 April 1903.

². Inkanyiso, 5 March 1895. The matter was pursued by Ilanga Lase Natal, see for example the issue of 18 September 1903.

³. Ilanga Lase Natal, 19 June, 3 and 10 July, 7 August 1903.

⁴. Ibid., 3 July 1903, 15 January, 14 October 1904, and 20 October 1904.

the government to certain the rampant Ethiopianism.²⁸ One of these was the Christian marriage Law Amendment of 1904 which stipulated that all the ministers who would like to be authorized to marry Africans according to Christian rules, had to be licensed by the Secretary for Native Affairs. The Act also forbid African pastors from solemnizing marriages except under a licence from the Secretary and on condition that they worked under the supervision of White missionaries.²⁹

Another issue of the moment was Act No 47 of 1903 which was designed to amend the Code of Native Law and extend it to Zululand in 1904. The Law gave absolute powers to the governor as supreme chief to call chiefs and their men to supply labour for public works, namely the isibhalo system.³⁰ Directly linked to this were the taxation of the Africans in order to force them to work for the government and the whites, and the importation of Indian and Chinese labour. Dube also commented extensively on the treatment of African labourers by their white employers.³¹

The Ilanga also carried far-ranging commentaries on the evidence before, and the report and recommendations of the South African Native Affairs Commission of 1903 - 1905, which was appointed by Lord Milner under the chairmanship of Sir Godfrey

²⁸. Ilanga Lase Natal, 15 July 1904.

²⁹. Debates of the L.C., XXXIV, 1903, p. 255. Natal Missionary Conference, Proceedings, July 1905: Report of Rev. W.J. Harker's Exigency Committee Report, 6 July 1905.

³⁰. N.G.G., LV, 1903, No 3368, pp. 1713 - 1714: Act 47, 1903 "To amend the Code of Native Law." Ilanga Lase Natal, 15 April 1904.

³¹. Ilanga Lase Natal, 24 July 1903, 25 March, and 24 April 1904.

Lagden, and was designed to find an agreed "native policy" for all the South African colonies in order to prepare the way for their eventual unification.³²

By far the most important enactment and development on which Dube commented were the Poll Tax Act No 38 of 1905 which imposed a sum of 1 pound on all African males over the age of eighteen, and the 1906 (Bambatha) rebellion that the tax sparked off. Not only did the Ilanga cover the course of and the military operations during the rebellion, but it also reported on the findings and the recommendations of the Natal Native Affairs Commission of 1906 - 1907 which was appointed by Sir Henry McCallum, the Governor of Natal, at the conclusion of hostilities, to investigate the cause of the disturbances and to make recommendations on future policy of administering Africans.³³

In the wake of the 1906 rebellion, Dube became even more critical of the administrative measures of the Natal Government. In a series of articles, he exhorted his fellow - Africans to oppose the measures without resorting to arms against the Whites. One such article was entitled "Vukani Bantu" and was published on 4 and 11 May 1906.³⁴ As a result of the so-called "seditious" nature of the article, the Minister for Native Affairs, H.D. Winter, advocated the suspension of the newspaper

³² S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 11. Ilanga Lase Natal, 13 January, 24 March, 2 June, 14 July 1905 and 13 November 1908.

³³ Ilanga Lase Natal, 7, 21 and 28 September, 5, 12 October 1906, 7 June, 5 July 1907, and 11 December 1908.

³⁴ Ibid. Dube was not arrested as mistakenly reported by G. Shepperson and T. Price, The Independent African, p. 145 and E. Roux, Time Longer Than Rope, p. 100. Roux is also guilty of many other incorrect statements about Dube.

and the arrest of Dube under martial Law.³⁵ The Governor, Sir Henry McCallum, was however opposed to Winter's suggestion. He felt that such action might give Dube "an opportunity of posing as a Martyr, and that might possibly do more harm than good."³⁶ Instead, Dube was summoned to appear before McCallum on 17 May 1906 where he was forced to make a public retraction and apology both in his paper and in the other popular Natal newspapers. He was ordered to refrain from strong and inciteful language.³⁷ Consequently, Dube became an object of increased suspicion by the Natal Government which viewed him as a "pronounced Ethiopianist" who needed watching.³⁸ Even Marshall Campbell, his life-time friend, had to urge Dube "to be more moderate in my paper and stop taking active part in politics."³⁹

Dube however viewed his activities as intended "to harmonize the best Native aspirations with the best European opinion" and declared himself innocent of any treasonable designs against the colonists and the government. He complained of being misunderstood by male factors.⁴⁰ In refuting accusations by some Whites that the

³⁵. G.H. 1234 No 103, McCallum to Elgin, Pietermaritzburg, 30 May 1906.

³⁶. C.O. 179/235 No 22645, McCallum to Elgin, Pietermaritzburg, 30 May 1906. S. Marks, "The Ambiguities of Dependence, John L. Dube of Natal" in Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 1 No 2, April 1975, p. 614.

³⁷. C.O. 179/235 No 22645, McCallum to Elgin, Pietermaritzburg, 30 May 1906. S. Marks, "The Ambiguities of Dependence, John L. Dube of Natal" in Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 1 No 2, April 1975, p. 614.

³⁸. S.N.A. 1/1/411 No. 2812/018, Dube to F.R. Moor, Phoenix, 4 September 1908.

³⁹. APS Papers. MSS. Brit. Empire 522 G191, Dube to C.A. Wheelwright, Chief Native Commissioner for Natal, 14 June 1922.

⁴⁰. Ilanga Lase Natal, 24 March 1905.

feelings expressed in the paper were not representative of any large body of Africans but "are really an expression of opinion of one man,"⁴¹ Dube doggedly maintained that he represented the views of his fellow Africans.⁴²

Dube also insisted that he did not see his role as extending into open opposition to the Natal Government. At times, he confidentially supplied information on rumours of unrest to the Secretary for Native Affairs for which he was thanked with the assurance that his name would not be divulged.⁴³

From the day the Ilanga Lase Natal was first published Dube had to contend with challenges other than from the government that were intended to undermine or liquidate it. Even Dube's friend and fellow-missionary, Wilcox, was apprehensive of Dube overreaching himself, and counselled him to make Ilanga "a genuine, unbiassed, exponent of native thought and opinion," and to refrain from representing the worst but the best side of the Africans. He was at pains to caution Dube against manufacturing grievances or making the newspaper a channel in which anonymous contributors published scandals or vented personal spite. "You have a right to complain of anything in the government or social conditions which seems to bear hard upon your people," Wilcox wrote, "But what you want is not to make it worse but better.... all white people are not your enemies."⁴⁴ It would appear that Dube did

⁴¹. M.S. Evans, Black and White in South East Africa, p. 185.

⁴². Ilanga Lase Natal, 23 November 1906.

⁴³. S.N.A. 1/8/10 a Confid. No. 11/09, S.O. Samuelson to Dube, 8 March 1909.

⁴⁴. Ilanga Lase Natal, 10 April 1903.

not take Wilcox's advice but followed his own inclination.

The South African Native Affairs Commission of 1905 in a move which though not specifically directed at the Ilanga Lase Natal, also tried to make inroads into the independence of Black newspapers in a way that might have affected or curtailed the freedom and individual character of Dube's paper. The Commission while welcoming the existence of an African press as an index of the feelings and thoughts of Africans, was not impressed with its maturity and standards of detachment from sensationalism and emotionalism. It found the Black press to be not wholly free from mistakes and indiscretions. "It is not as yet", the Commission observed in its report, "a faithful reflex of the opinions of the more staid and experienced men who are in closer touch with the masses."⁴⁵ Dube never intentionally or designedly despised the stolid good sense of the more experienced but less lettered men. He viewed the Ilanga "as the voice of the intelligent portion of the Native People."⁴⁶ Besides, he did not appear nor was he invited to give evidence before the Commission.⁴⁷

Whereas the majority of the members of the Commission were in favour of granting the African press freedom of expression and criticism, a minority pleaded for the passing of a law that would make it an offence to publish anything in an African language. Dube was unflinchingly opposed to this view and suggested that it was

⁴⁵. Report of the South African Native Affairs Commission, 1903 - 1905, 322 & 323, pp. 47 - 48.

⁴⁶. Ilanga Lase Natal, 23 November 1906. See also D.J. Mackenzie, "Dube and the Land Issue, 1913 - 1936" (B.A. Hons., Natal, 1980), p. 7.

⁴⁷. Report of the South African Native Affairs Commission, 1903 - 1905, Annexure 6.

motivated by the belief that a "dangerous something" might find its way into the columns of African newspapers, which "would not be understood by those who sought to tamper with the liberty of the press..."⁴⁸ Dube subsequently struggled for the formation of a "Native Press Association" which would be responsible for the exchange of articles of a political nature amongst the African newspapers. He intended to forge the association into a strong front that would keep the African nations informed on political and social development and that would "fight... politically" all "the enemies of our people." He singled out and rapped the editor of the Imvo Zabantsundu for ignoring his efforts in this direction.⁴⁹

Dube also strenuously opposed a move initiated by the Natal Mercury in 1908 to publish a Zulu newspaper with a European editor. He felt that this would place white men in positions from which they would dictate to and influence the thoughts of the Africans. "Anyone who has studied the Zulu language," he remarked, "must know that the natives' modes of thought are different from the white man's." He maintained that no white man could adequately express the thoughts of the Zulu "any more than a foreigner can adequately express the thought of an Englishman although he may be able to speak the Englishman's language quite fluently."⁵⁰

Dube also used the Ilanga to focus the attention of the Zulus and the general public

⁴⁸. Ilanga Lase Natal, 24 March 1905.

⁴⁹. Colenso Collection 45, Dube to H.E. Colenso, Phoenix, 22 April 1908.

⁵⁰. Ilanga Lase Natal, 13 November 1908.

on the plight of King Dinuzulu who was arrested after the Bambatha rebellion on charges of high treason and inciting people to rebellion.⁵¹ Believing himself to be the descendant of the Zulu Royal family, his grandfather and King Shaka having been cousins,⁵² Dube appealed to his readers in general and Zulus in particular to come out strongly in support of their king.⁵³ He pleaded that Dinuzulu should be given a fair trial and regularly informed his readers about and commented on the progress made at the special court in Greytown where Dinuzulu was tried.⁵⁴

Dube continued to use the Ilanga as a vehicle for influencing black opinion and as its mouthpiece in the struggle against the unification of the South African states.⁵⁵ Dube was strongly opposed to the unification not only because "the Dutch will have the majority and run the show as they please,"⁵⁶ but also because he assumed that the Africans were to be excluded from the parliament of the proposed union. He strongly felt that the unification or federation of states would accentuate rather than resolve the "native difficulty" because "if there is no redress as at present without federation, there will be none with it for the same animosities will asset themselves whether they

⁵¹. Ibid., 3 January, 24, 31 July, 13 November and 11 December 1908.

⁵². J.L. Dube, "Need of Industrial Education in Africa" in Southern Workman, July 1897, p. 142.

⁵³. Ilanga Lase Natal, 13 November 1908.

⁵⁴. Ibid. See issues from 13 November 1908 to 12 March 1909.

⁵⁵. Ibid. 10, 24 January, 7 February, 13 March, 28 August, 18 September, 23 October, 20 November 1908, 19 February, 12 March, and 2 April 1909.

⁵⁶. Ibid., 3 July 1907.

be more or less combined."⁵⁷ The Ilanga persisted in deprecating the manner in which White legislators went about preparing for the unification until 31 May 1910.⁵⁸

The then Ilanga Lase Natal, now only Ilanga, is still in existence. Over the years it has consistently expressed the grievances of the Africans. It focused the attention of its readers on such diverse matters such as land, labour, education, administrative matters, pieces of legislation, political and social developments, and the general advancement of Africans. Interestingly, Dube also used it to serve as a medium for informing and forming the opinion of his fellow-Africans. In the following chapters we look at how he attempted to do all this during the period from 1903 to 1910.

⁵⁷. Ibid., 7 February 1908.

⁵⁸. Ibid., 17 December 1909, 3 March 1911.

CHAPTER FOUR

**DUBE AS SPOKESMAN OF HIS PEOPLE: HE CHALLENGES
THE GOVERNMENT ON ITS ADMINISTRATION OF AFRICANS**

John L. Dube took as his mission the task of drawing the attention of the government officials to aspects of administration which Africans found offensive and unbearable. He used the Ilanga to express what he believed were the grievances of the Africans of Natal, both tribal and Christian. Dube's criticism of the administration led the whites to view him with suspicion.

In 1904 Dube complained about the general condition of the tribal African which he equated with the status of ancient slaves. He considered the non-exempted African to be subjected to many inhumane and restrictive measures of which he directly mentioned forced labour, payment of taxes, corporal punishment, pass laws, denial of political rights and restrictions on freedom of trading in certain areas.¹ However, the Governor, Sir Henry McCallum, had not found the Africans to be in a state of need. Despite their suffering from severe drought and ravages of rinderpest McCallum found the Africans to be completely satisfied with their condition². This view was later affirmed by the Natal Native Affairs Commission of 1906 which reported that the tribal Africans were not as decisions of improvement as the

¹. Ilanga Lase Natal, 20 May 1904

². G.H. 1232 No 311, McCallum to Secretary of State, Pietermaritzburg, 23 October 1903.

exempted, Christian or educated Africans but only sought "to be left alone, preferably under the away of his Chief, to line his own life of sensual stagnation³". Dube continuously and consistently urged the Whites to help the Africans in their endeavours to improve their erstwhile poor discontented and pathetic condition⁴. He requested that in the framing and promulgation of laws the Whites should be guided by love, peace and goodwill". We are not asking for social equality "he observed in 1905," but we do ask earnestly for fair recognition and dealings in those matters relating to our progress ...⁵". Dube's views were shared by other people, even some Whites, to whom the condition of the tribal African had long been the object of observation and sympathy⁶.

Dube also regarded the condition of the educated or Christian Africans to be equally unenviable if not more wretched. This class felt aggrieved by the treatment they were receiving at the hands of the white rulers whom they accused of denying them full civic and political rights⁷. As the Natal Native Affairs Commission observed, the educated or Christian African wanted "more education, fixity of land tenure on mission Reserves, and suitable avenues for employment for his children ...⁸.

³. Report and Evidence of the Natal Native Affairs Commission, 1907, Report, S 14, p. 9.

⁴. Ilanga Lase Natal, 14 July 1905.

⁵. Ibid.

⁶. Report and Evidence of the Natal Native Affairs Commission, 1907, Report, S 10, p. 8. "Caveat Natalia", The Native Question, p. 5.

⁷. Ilanga Lase Natal, 20 May 1904.

⁸. Report and Evidence of the Natal Native Affairs Commission, 1907, Report, S 14, p. 9.

Their desires were however not known to the legislators or white colonists because, unlike during the Shepstonian era, neither they nor their chiefs were ever consulted on any measure or law that the government thought fit to introduce⁹. "His laws are ready-made for him by the European," Evans writes, "and his opinion thereon is never asked, his interests have degenerated into grievances¹⁰". Africans found themselves in a situation in which they were "over-administered" and ruled by laws of which they were ignorant but to which "though puzzled had perforce to submit¹¹". It was only in the aftermath of the 1906 rebellion that the Whites realized that they did not know the Africans as well as they thought they did. Dube, however, observed that even then "these very people would not think of consulting intelligent natives as to what would meet native ideas of good treatment¹²".

Even long-established colonial newspapers like the Natal Witness scathingly criticized the government's record of "long years of maladministration¹³". To blame were not only the conservative officials who had done little more than carry on the ossified

⁹. CSO 2555 Confid. No. C79/1880, Minutes by the Secretary for Native Affairs, 17 December 1880. Report and Evidence of the Natal Native Commission, 1881-1882, Evidence, p. 287. Sir Theophilus Shepstone's evidence is very informative and interesting. See also F. Mason, Native Policy in Natal: Past and Future, p. 12. E.H. Brookes, White Rule in South Africa, 1830-1910, p. 59. T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa: A modern History, p. 88.

¹⁰. M.S. Evans, Blacks and White in South East Africa, p. 107.

¹¹. A. Werner and H.E. Colenso, "Native Affairs in South Africa" in Journal of the African Society, 1905-1907, p. 184, H.E. Colenso, The Principles of Native Government in Natal, p. 13 respectively.

¹². Ilanga Lase Natal, 5 July 1907. See also 7 June 1907.

¹³. The Natal Witness, 15 August 1907.

Shepstonian system of administration, but also the legislators who ignored even the little good that has beneficial in the system¹⁴, and the Colonists who were equally guilty of an almost criminal disregard of their duty to the Africans as a subject race¹⁵. After the rebellion, it dawned on many that natal was reaping the fruits of the "policy of drift" in the execution of which the government was said to have not been "sufficiently close in touch with Native opinion as regards their aspirations and desires in regard to their advance¹⁶".

As it emerged during the travels of the Governor, Sir Matthew Nathan, and the Prime Minister and Minister of Native Affairs, F.R. Moor, in Natal and Zululand in 1908, it had for long been a grievance amongst the Africans as well as the chiefs that they were unable to get into direct contact with the government officials and legislators at Pietermaritzburg¹⁷. In the words of Jacobez Molefe, an exempted African of Edendale, who gave evidence before the 1906 Native Affairs Commission, the policy of the government sharply contrasted with the chief aspects of the policies of Theophilus Shepstone and Michael Gallwey in the pre-responsible government era. "The Native had a proverb", he pointed out, "that those who wished to know the

¹⁴. E.A. Walker, A History of Southern Africa, p. 524. E.H. Brooks, White Rule in South Africa, 1830-1910, p. 59.

¹⁵. The Natal Witness, 15 August 1907.

¹⁶. Debates of the I.C., XVIII, 1908, p. 121. The statement was made by F.R. Moor when he introduced the second reading of the Bill on Native Administration.

¹⁷. P.M. 70 No. 208/1908, C.R. Saunders to F.R. Moor, 2 March 1908. The Natal Witness, 25 April 1908. M.S. Evans, The Native Problem in Natal, p. 18.

whereabouts of the buffalo must ask those in the van¹⁸". Dube emphasized that the greatest possible good would accrue when interviews between the Africans or their leaders and chiefs, on the one hand, and their rulers on the other, were managed with dignity, tact and discretion¹⁹. The issue was however bedeviled by the whites' sad lack of knowledge of the Africans, their minds and their aspirations²⁰. They either did not know much of the Africans, or thought very little of matters affecting them, or were incapable of exercising judgement in making use of the personal knowledge acquired during many years of contact with the Africans²¹. Equally dangerous was the basing of the policy of administration on information obtained from "self-styled experts²²" who "having a very superficial acquaintance with the Natives themselves, and none at all with their language, view them with all the misgivings of ignorance"²³. Dube had remarked in 1892 that "the government of the Zulus is worthy of a people more highly civilized²⁴".

It is however the view of many researchers into this epoch of Natal history that the colony was unable to devise a more enlightened policy of administration of Africans

¹⁸. Report and Evidence of the Natal Native Affairs Commission, 1907, Evidence, Vol. II, Sect III, p. 917.

¹⁹. Ilanga Lase Natal, 5 July 1907.

²⁰. L.H. Samuelson, Some Zulu customs and Folklore. The author describes very pertinent cases where this was manifest.

²¹. 24 December 1906. Marshall Campbell commented very sharply on possible dangers of the attitude and practice of whites or legislators who fell into this category.

²². S.T. Plaatje, Native Life in South Africa, p.v.

²³. "Gebuza", The Peril in Natal, p.7.

²⁴. J.L. Dube, A talk upon my Native Land, pp. 30-31.

since it lacked capable statesman²⁵ and adult administrators²⁵. "Tactfulness and diplomacy in native affairs", Stuart observes, "was never a feature of Natal Governments²⁶...". Even the much acclaimed Shepstone apparently has much to discredit him, only having succeeded in retaining the tribal system and chieftainship²⁷, features of his administration which were retained by his successors, while he abjectly failed to civilise the Africans²⁸. Subsequently, under responsible government the rigid and strong conservatism of the officials of the Native Affairs Department, and the spirit of laissez-faire amongst legislators, prevented any new lines of policy, and the government still failed to civilize the Africans²⁹. All that it did was to create "monstrously unjust conditions" for the Africans that were bound to give "a crop of monstrously unjust results³⁰". Not only did Natal lack statesman, it was also sensitive to criticism. "It is a society", writes Calpin, "less sensitive to social problems, less aware of its social responsibilities, essentially incapable of self-

²⁵. The Natal Mercury, 15 April 1907. E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 223. E.A. Walker, A History of Southern Africa, p. 525.

²⁶. L. Stuart, "Work of Harriette Emily Colenso in Relationship to Dinuzulu ka Cetshwayo culminating in the Treason Trial of 1908-9" (M.A., Natal, 1967), p. 27.

²⁷. The Natal Advertiser, 24 May 1905. S. Marks, "Harriette Colenso and the Zulus" in Journal of African History, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1963, p. 406.

²⁸. E.H. Brooks, The History of Native Policy in South Africa, pp. 74-75.

²⁹. The Natal Witness, 12 September 1903. R. Hyam, The Failure of South African expansion, pp. 49-50. R.J.H. King, "Premiership of C.J. Smythe, 1905-1906 and the Bambata Rebellion" (M.A., Natal, 1980), p. 2. E.H. Brookes, White Rule in South Africa, 1830-1910, p. 64.

³⁰. Colenso Collection 46, G. Burgess to H.E. Colenso, Durban, 22 July 1908.

criticism; and resentful of the criticism of others³¹". The self-governing colony was "a rather opinionated one, not always easy to deal with³²".

Under the circumstances, the Africans experienced real hardships which were made the more so by the lack of constitutional means of redress and the government's lack of confidence in the Africans³³. IN the words of Stephen Mini, a prominent exempted African of Edendale, when he gave evidence before the Natal Native Affairs Commission of 1907, the Africans quite contrary to their expectation found themselves in a worse situation than before. At the time it was generally felt by Africans and interested Whites that the methods of administration in African affairs had to be radically changed if not completely pulled down and replaced by an edifice of sound government and administration³⁴.

One aspect of the administration of African Affairs against which Dube had long been firmly campaigning was the proposed change of the office of the Secretary for Native Affairs into a permanent appointment. Dube, as did the Natal Congress, saw no salutary effects for the Africans in the measure. Contrary to the argument that such

³¹. G.H. Calpin, There are no South Africans, pp. 43-44. See also Colenso Collection 40, H.R. Fox Bourne to H.E. Colenso, West-minister, 29 May 1903. G.H. 237 No. G 235, C.J. Smythe to McCallum, 24 April 1906.

³². A.B.M. A/2/18, James Bryce, British Ambassador in USA, to Dr Strong, New Haven, 5 August 1907.

³³. L.M. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, 1902-1910, p. 43.

³⁴. See, for example, Report and Evidence of the Natal Native Affairs Commission, 1907, Evidence, Vol. II, Sect III, pp. 909-910 and also p.917. The Natal Witness, 19 May 1906 and 11 April 1908.

an appointment would put the office beyond the range of party politics and solve the problem of duality of interests, Dube submitted that the office could not but be political in that it dealt with the administration of Africans. "Whosoever may be elected to that office", he pointed out, "is bound to dissatisfy either the Natives or the Colonists. When he does must there be no power under the sun to remove him³⁵?" Dube also remonstrated against the protagonists' insistence on the fact that the Africans who seemingly misunderstood the constant changes of ministries and the resultant process of displacement and succession and reportedly would welcome the appointment of permanent official "to whom they could fully confide their griefs and on whose counsels and authority they could absolutely depend³⁶". He was convinced that there could be no continuance of a bad policy. The incumbent had to be a man who understood the Africans, had accumulated wide experience on their administration and political systems and took a personal interests in them. "The Natives will not be contented or happy", he observed, "if this man's policy is one sided and against their progress³⁷".

Quite interestingly, the Africans had always felt that appeals made on their behalf by the Secretary for Native Affairs were inadequate because he was a government official

³⁵. Ilanga Lase Natal, 18 September 1903. See also A.W.Z. Kuzwayo, "History of Ethiopianism in South Africa with particular reference to the American Zulu mission from 1835 to 1908" (M.A., Unisa, 1980), p. 200. V.S. Dhupelia, "Frederick Robert Moor and Native Affairs of Natal, 1893-1903" (M.A., UD-W, 1980) pp. 83-84.

³⁶. F. Mason, Native Policy in Natal: Past and Future, pp. 10-11 Debates of the L.C., XII, 1903, p. 132. Debates of the L.C., XIII, 1904, p. 18.

³⁷. Ilanga Lase Natal, 18 September 1903.

and his duties did not give him enough time to care for their interests³⁸. F.R. Moor, who at one time occupied the office, admitted in 1905 that he was "in no real position to voice the views of the natives"³⁹. The trappings of the office prevented its holder from representing the Africans more especially as he was not fully acquainted with the disposition of the Africans⁴⁰. "The native ... is a circumlocutor, and is much so with those in authority ... and he will very rarely speak out his mind. In short, an official will be the worst man to find out his true feelings"⁴¹.

Though the proposed to make the office of the Secretary for Native Affairs a permanent appointment was finally accepted and approved by the legislature⁴², it was not effected because the ministry could not find the best means whereby the appointment could be made whilst maintaining a proper ministerial control over the department⁴³. It was revived in 1908 advancing the same arguments as before and with F.R. Moor, the Minister of Native Affairs, who was piloting the Native Administration Bill in which the measure was incorporated, explaining to the legislature that the constant change of the head of the Native Affairs Department "...

³⁸. A.W.Z. Kuzwayo, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

³⁹. *The Times of Natal*, 17 February 1905.

⁴⁰. R.C.A. Samuelson, *Long, Long Ago*, p. 188. Colenso Collection 74, Letterbook IV, H.E. Colenso to W.A. Accutt, Resident Magistrate at Pietermaritzburg, Bishopstowe, 24 October 1903.

⁴¹. R.C.A. Samuelson, *Native Question*, p. 10.

⁴². *Debates of the L.C.*, XII, 1903, p. 134.

⁴³. *Debates of the L.C.*, XIII, 1904, p. 18.

is an unsettling thing to the Native mind⁴⁴. The bill was subsequently promulgated and made law, and assented to by the Home Government and came into effect in 1909. In the place of the "wishy-washy" S.A. Samuelson who was the Under Secretary for Native Affairs, A.J. Shepstone, the son of Sir Theophilus Shepstone was appointed Secretary⁴⁵.

Dube also sharply criticized what he considered to be excessive powers exercised by the governor as supreme chief⁴⁶. In terms of Ordinance No. 3 of 1849 which was subsequently amended by Native Administration Law No. 26 of 1875, Native Administration Law No. 44 of 1887, and Native Law Legalization Act No. 19 of 1891, the governor had, amongst others, powers to call upon chiefs, headman and other Africans to supply labour for public works and for the general needs of the colony and for the suppression of disorder or rebellion within the colonial borders⁴⁷. He was empowered to punish defaulters⁴⁸. He was regarded as "above the law" and "supposed to do no wrong⁴⁹". The governors' absolute political authority and powers over the African chiefs and their tribes were invariably justified as being based on

⁴⁴. Debates of the L.C., XVIII, 1908, pp. 122-123. P.M. 70 No. 45/1908, Report of the USNA on the Report of the Native Affairs Commission, 2 January 1908.

⁴⁵. A.B.M. A/3/37 Secretary of American Zulu Mission to J.L. Barton, Durban, 31 July 1909. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 345.

⁴⁶. Ilanga Lase Natal, 17 April 1903.

⁴⁷. E.D. Gasa, "The Native Question in Natal, 1880-1893: An Inquiry with reference to the Struggle for Constitutional Reform in the Colony" (M.A., Unisa, 1974), pp. 130-153.

⁴⁸. W. Bosman, The Natal Rebellion of 1906, pp. 6-7.

⁴⁹. E.D. Gasa, op cit, p. 139. A. Werner and H.E. Colenso, "White and Black in Natal" in Contemporary Review, 1893, p. 206.

the despotic position of the Zulu Kings under tribal law⁵⁰. African policy was however not as outrightly despotic, autocratic and dictatorial so whites with a limited knowledge of the zulu social and political system commonly asserted. The will of the chief was not the sole and unquestionable law of the nation⁵¹. As Dube observed, there was "a body of man known as Izinduna who help the king in making and executing laws⁵²".

When it was stated that the Africans no longer held the governor as supreme chief in high esteem and that his image was consequently greatly tarnished, Dube emphatically refuted the assertion and maintained that the Zulus were as respectful and obedient as ever. What had happened was that the exercise of the powers of the governor by the Secretary for Native Affairs had so removed him from and made him inaccessible to the African as to make him shadowy, and unreal, and this led to the decrease of his authority⁵³. "To find the Supreme Chief under tutors and governors", observed the Natal Witness, "did not raise him in their estimation⁵⁴". Though outrightly denied by government officials, there might have been occasions "on which the powers of

⁵⁰. P.A. Barnett and G.W. Sweeney, Natal: The State and the Citizen, p. 67.

⁵¹. H.E. Colenso, The Principles of Native Government in Natal, pp. 6-7. A Werner and H.E. Colenso, op cit, pp. 206-209. L. Marquard and T.G. Standing, The Southern African Bantu, pp. 40-41. B. Roberts, The Zulu Kings, p. 357. A. Ngubo, "The Development of African Political Protest in South Africa, 1882-1910: An Analytical Approach" (Ph.D., California, 1973), 41. J.W. Shepstone, The Native Question of Today, p. 5. R.J. Mann, The Zulus and Boers of South Africa, p. 79.

⁵². J.L. Dube, A Talk upon my Nature Land, p. 30.

⁵³. Ilanga Lase Natal, 17 April 1903. F.R. Statham, Black, Boers and British: A three-Cornered Problem, p. 145.

⁵⁴. The Natal Witness, 6 October 1906.

the Supreme Chief have been abused by irresponsible action on the part of the authorities⁵⁵".

S.O. Samuelson, the Under Secretary for Native Affairs, once admitted that errors of judgement and undecided action of the authorities brought them into contempt and disrepute in the eyes of tribal Africans⁵⁶.

One aspect of administration of Africans on which Dube agreed with the government was the continuance of the institution of chiefs and vesting them with powers sufficiently strong to enforce authority and control. Dube's stance on chieftainship might have been influenced by his respect for affinity with Chief Mqhawe of Inanda. He observed in 1906 that "... uma awususanga amandla emakosini lokukudelela umbuso okukubantu ngakube akuko⁵⁷". Since the establishment of direct rule over the Africans, the British and later the Natal Government had been loathe to do away with the chieftainship and tribal system for fear of not only resultant general chaos, but also increased expenses of administration if the chiefs were replaced by white officials. Instead the government sought to increase the authority of the chiefs⁵⁸.

⁵⁵. P.M. 65 No. 635/1907, Secretary of the A.P.S., H.R. Fox Bourne to F.R. Moor, London, 13 May 1907.

⁵⁶. P.M. 70 No 45/1908, Report of the USNA on the Report of Native Affairs Commission, 2 January 1908.

⁵⁷. Ilanga Lase Natal, 14 December 1906. The quotation means "if the authority of the chiefs had not been removed, the prevalent defiant attitude of the Africans would not have been there".

⁵⁸. A. Davis, The Native Problem in South Africa, p. 17. J.W. Shepstone, The Native Question of Today, p. 4. F. Mason, Native Policy in Natal: Past and Future, p. 5. A. Ngubo, op. cit., p. 26. M. Wilson and L.M. Thompson, The Oxford History of

One of the upshots of the 1906 rebellion was however the instance by opponents of the system of chieftainship that it be abolished because it was not only ineffective but also obstructive to the material advancement of the Africans. "They are ... fermenters of inter-tribal quarrels", writes Mason "and oppose all efforts made to raise the natives to a higher standard of civilization and intelligence, as being calculated to undermine their own authority, and by their influence render all endeavours made by the magistrates for the general welfare of the people of none effect ...⁵⁹".

Like Dube, Harriette E. Colenso, who also had friendly relations with the great majority of chiefs, denied that chiefs were "stumbling blocks, but ... are stepping stones marking and helping the advance of civilization". She strongly opposed their removal or deposition which she thought might only succeed in making them "martyrs" and in "clothing with greater reverence their persons and their utterances"⁶⁰. Dube strongly advocated the retention of Chiefs "izandhla zombuso njalo, etembeka kuwo, futi nawo ayotembeka embusweni"⁶¹. Dube's view was embodied in the Native Administration Bill No. 2 of 1908 which sought to extend the

South Africa, Vol. II, p. 266. Report and Proceedings of the Native Affairs Commission, 1852-3, Report, p. 277. E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 217.

⁵⁹. F. Mason, Native Policy in Natal: Past and Future, p. 4. See also A. Davis, The Native Problem in South Africa, p. 17.

⁶⁰. H.E. Colenso, The Problem of the Races in Africa, p. 12 and Colenso Collection 75, H.E. Colenso to Nathan, Bishopstowe, 17 December 1907 respectively.

⁶¹. Ilanga Lase Natal, 14 December 1906. This means "as hands of the government, trusted by and trustworthy to it".

powers and authority of chiefs as government officers⁶².

Dube was, however, strongly opposed to the code of Native Law as set forth by the Native Administration Law No 26 of 1875 on the grounds that it introduced different legal structures for blacks and whites. Dube identified himself with those who felt it was through the Native Code that the government upheld and maintained barbarism. He would have liked to see the colony having one code of law for all its citizens⁶³. The government was however of the feeling that it owed it to the promulgation of the Code of Native Law with its recognition and preservation of tribal laws that the Africans continued to be behaved, well-mannered and law-abiding⁶⁴. Consequently a bill was introduced in 1903 not only to amend the code but also extend it to Zululand⁶⁵. It proposed to assign to the Supreme Chief and those in authority under him, from the Secretary for Native Affairs, the magistrates, down to chiefs and headmen, arbitrary powers not controlled by the procedure in courts of law to which in the official opinion the Africans had in the past looked for protection⁶⁶. The

⁶². Debates of the L.A., XLIV, 1908 PP. 147-8.

⁶³. Ilanga Lase Natal, 17 April 1903. The Natal Witness, 11 April 1903. F. Troup, South Africa: An Historical Introduction, p. 134.

⁶⁴. C.A. Wheelwright, "Native Administration in Zululand" in Journal of African Society, Vol. XXIV, No. XCIV, Jan. 1925, p. 97. L.M. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, 1902-1910, p. 42.

⁶⁵. V.P. of the L.A., XLI, 1903, pp. 19, 85, 115. V.P. of the L.C., XIII, 1903, pp. 44, 52, 69.

⁶⁶. G.H. 223 No. 223, J. Chamberlain to McCallum, London, 10 July 1903. S.N.A. 1/4/11 No. 59/02, Minute by Bird, Secretary for Department, 23 April 1906. Colenso Collection 40, H.R. Fox Bourne to H.E. Colenso, Westminster, 24 June 1903.

Supreme Chief would also be empowered to remove Africans from location or Crown lands and private properties to any part of the Colony⁶⁷. A storm of criticism was raised against the measure, especially by the Aborigines Protection Society which argued that the proposed bill "affords opportunities for grave injustice to the natives of Natal in supervision of equitable provisions made before the granting of self governing powers to the Colony and is, in fact, an infringement of the rights of all British subjects⁶⁸". The bill was however proceeded with and was passed by both houses of parliament in May 1903 and was reserved by the Governor, Sir Henry McCallum, for the Colonial office's assent⁶⁹. Even though the Aborigines Protection Society had appealed to the Secretary of State for Colonies for its disallowance, Chamberlain who reportedly did "not take these people too seriously" gave his assent to the bill which became Act 47 of 1903⁷⁰.

Dube continued to advocate the repeal of the code and insisted that Africans desired to be under one law with the rest of the community. "Two separate codes are conflicting", he pleaded, "and the sooner one only is adopted the better will it be for

⁶⁷. N.G.G., LV, 1903, No. 3368, pp. 1713-1714: Act 47, 1903 "To Amend the Code of Native Law" Clause 9 thereof.

⁶⁸. CO 179/228 No. 2331, H.R. Fox Bourne to J. Chamberlain, Westminster, 23 June 1903.

⁶⁹. V.P. of L.A., XLI, 1903, p. 115. V.P. of the L.C., XIII, 1903, p. 69.

⁷⁰. CO 179/228 No 23321, J. Chamberlain to Under Secretary at CO, 25 June 1903. See also GH 226 No. 133, Lyttelton to Bale, London, 23 October 1903. Colenso Collection 40, H.R. Fox Bourne to H.E. Colenso, Westminster, 24 June 1903. N.G.G., LV, 1903, No. 3368, pp 1713 - 1714: Act 47, 1903 "To amend the Code of Native Law".

all concerned⁷¹". Dube's stance became even more resolute when further amendments to the code were proposed in 1906 and 1908⁷². It is remarkable that he adopted a hard-time attitude even in the face of the Aborigines Protection Society which, probably due to the influence of Harriette Colenso who had always supported the upholding of tribal laws and chieftainship, had originally and continuously felt that while it was essential that European laws and structures should supersede African customs and institutions, it would be injurious to force them upon unwilling subjects⁷³. There was however a feeling that "White legislation has armed in tinkering with these Native laws and customs, and mongrelising them. "The government was especially in 1906 earnestly entered to abandon the proposed amendments "last, as is more probable, there should be yet another illustration of mortals stepping in where angels would fear to tread"⁷⁴".

Dube found the two systems of law in Natal to be an antithesis of each other. He thought the Africans were put in an invidious position where "we find them expected to do work and supplied with a short ladder, or alter deficiency of means which disables them and prevents them complying with the demands made of them"⁷⁵". In

⁷¹. Ilanga Lase Natal, 24 March 1905.

⁷². Ibid. 7 August 1908.

⁷³. Aborigines Protection Society, The Native Question in South Africa, p. 13. Report of the Cape Native Laws and Customs Commission, 1883, pp. 33-35.

⁷⁴. The Natal Witness, 5 May 1906. KCL 29241 Marshall Campbell Papers (Bantu Section) No. 12, Marshall Campbell to the Natal Advertiser and the Natal Mercury, April 1907. A. Werner and H.E. Colenso, "Native Affairs in South Africa" in Journal of the African Society, 1905-1907, p. 186.

⁷⁵. Ilanga Lase Natal, 7 August 1908.

support of pleas for the promulgation of one code of law, the Ilanga Lase Natal observed that the Africans would only advance and the Christianized and civilized of the code of native law were repeated. "The foolish notion that the native must be kept separate," the newspaper observed, "will gradually go out of fashion, the better kind of Colonials are giving it up now, and were it not for the slow minds who still cling to predacious selfism, and act like a clog on social progress, the day would not be far off when the Cape Colony franchise would be common to all parts of the South African Union"⁷⁶.

The Ilanga also protested against inequality at law of Africans and whites⁷⁷ and the paper sharply criticised laws which differentiated between the two groups. The most reprehensible were however those measures which, contrary to the letter and spirit of the Letters Patent of 12 May 1843 which stipulated that there would not "in the eye of the law be any distinction of persons or disqualification, founded on mere distinction of colour, origin, language or creed ..."⁷⁸, placed Africans under special separate laws. Many reasons were advanced to justify the enacting of special laws and class legislation that would be applicable to Africans. It was argued by some that these laws were intended to protect the African from undue encroachment by Whites⁷⁹. However, from all accounts race discrimination in the domain of statutory

⁷⁶. Ibid, 7 January 1910.

⁷⁷. Ibid., 25 November 1904.

78. V.C Malherbe (ed), What they said, 1795 - 1910, p. 77 F. Mason, Native policy in Natal: Past and Future, p. 23. J. Bird (ed), The Annals of Natal, Vol. II, p. 166.

⁷⁹. P.A. Barnett and G.W. Sweeney, Natal: The State and the Citizen, pp. 100-101. J.W. Shepstone, "Submit or Die" The Native Problem, p. 8.

laws soon became so rigid and so harsh as to be detestable to the Africans⁸⁰. The Natal Native Affairs Commission of 1906 observed that as from 1893 "there has undoubtedly been an increased in the control by the state in the habits of the Natives, mainly in the supposed interests of the Europeans". The Commission felt the Africans were justified in complaining about the more than forty enactments which in its opinion were grossly intrusive⁸¹. The Ilanga lase Natal complained that the laws that were framed by the white legislators to apply to and govern the Africans were construed "with a feeling of prejudice and racial halo" thus precluding any existence of cordial relations between the two races⁸².

Dube also sharply criticized people who blamed the missionaries for the alleged corruption and despoliation of the Africans. Dube remarked that if ever the missionaries were to be blamed, it would be for preaching the gospel without withholding any truths which was disliked by the whites. He praised the missionaries for doing more for the elevation of the Africans than the government and the white settler community⁸³. As Molema observes the missionaries "stood up for the rights

⁸⁰. G. Lagden, "The Native Question in South Africa" in C.S. Goldmann (ed), The Empire and the Century, London, 1905, p. 548. F. Troup, South Africa: An Historical Introduction, p. 134

⁸¹. Report and Evidence of the Natal Native Affairs Commission, 1907, Report, S 26, pp. 10-11. T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa: A modern History, p. 152. F.W. Bell, The South African Native Problem: A Suggested Solution, p. 7 made hold to say that "if segregation, or separation, be not adopted, extermination will come about through assimilation, but it will be the white race which will be absorbed".

⁸². Ilanga lase Natal, 25 November 1904.

⁸³. J.L. Dube, "Zulus and the Missionary outlook" in Missionary Review of the World, Ns 20, May, 1907, p. 205. Ilanga Lase Natal, 24 April 1903.

of the primitive people, even at the risk of their own popularity and, one may even say, safety⁸⁴". Dube acknowledged the role of missionaries stating that it was only they who dared to assert "the Zulus were not animals, not monkeys or baboons, not even the missing link; they were men⁸⁵". Dube was confident that the Africans would be Christianized and industrialized and observed that the "attempts to keep the black men down will not win ultimately⁸⁶".

The Natal Government was rapped by many people for its lack of concern over the progress of the Africans in the scale of civilization⁸⁷. The government officials discounted these allegations arguing, as did Sir John Robinson, the first premier of Natal, that there were merits and demerits in the whites' administration of Africans and "whether it has erred in excess of toleration and indulgence, or failed in disciplinary grasp and progressive tendency, it has, at any rate, produced a contented,

⁸⁴. S.M. Molema, The Bantu Past and Present, p. 203. According to A.W. Lee, Charles Johnson of Zululand p. 240, Johnson had defended the missionaries against accusation of spoiling the African by remarking that "He has spoiled him as an object of exploitation, as a provider of cheap labour, as a serf contented with his serfdom, as an individual with the temptations and passions of a man, but the mind of the child. In all these ways he has spoiled him: but if this kind of spoiling is a disservice to the State the world we live in must be founded upon injustice and steeped in the abhorrent since of the privileged few battering upon the miseries of the many." See also H. Davis and R.H.W. Shepherd, South African Missions: 1800-1950, pp. 104-105.

⁸⁵. Ilanga Lase Natal, 1 December 1905.

⁸⁶. J.L. Dube, "Are Negroes Better off in Africa: Conditions and opportunities in America and Africa compared" in missionary Review of the World, Ns 20, August, 1904, p. 586.

⁸⁷. W.M. Worsfold, South Africa: A Study in Colonial Administration and Development, p. 87-88. Worsfold writes that in Natal the "natives have been left practically to themselves" p. 87.

loyal, and light-hearted population⁸⁸. Other officials and colonists while acknowledging that the Africans were capable of civilization, still believed that they were possessed of "savage and unpleasing traditions", or that they had "intellects of children with the vices of adults", and that they would relapse into pagan customs once the hand of the white man was removed⁸⁹. Dube praised those whites who had discovered that they were at fault and urged those who had not to realize that "unless they elevate the native African he is bound to drag them down⁹⁰ ..." He, as well as many others, felt it rested with all the whites and not just the missionaries to take up their burden and help raise the Africans from their savage state by giving them industrial and moral training⁹¹.

It was not only the missionaries who were blamed by the government for miscarriages in its administration of Africans. When things came to the worst, the officials censured the colonists for "the cumulative effect of unsteady the entire fabric of Native administration and imperilling the general welfare of the people⁹²". The Ilanga however accused not only the officials but the great majority of whites of banding together "by will intention born of yet viler prejudice to trample upon the

⁸⁸. J. Robinson, A Life Time in South Africa, p. 316.

⁸⁹. Colenso Collection 39, F.E. Colenso to H.E. Colenso, 14 February 1902.

⁹⁰. J.L. Dube, "Zulus and the Missionary outlook in Natal" in Missionary Review of the World, Ns 20, 1907, p. 205. See also M.S. Nathan 364, Governor's Speech at Farmers meeting at Greytown on 1 June and 8 November 1908.

⁹¹. S.M. Molema, The Bantu Past and Present, p. 203,. B. Sacks, South Africa: An Imperial Dilemma, p. 153.

⁹². J. Stuart, A History of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906, p. 29.

African in the mire". It remarked that there were very few whites who liked to see the African breaking asunder the chains that held him in bondage⁹³.

Despite the fact that some whites were bent on denying political rights to and objected to the expenditure of public funds on education of Africans, Dube still pledged the allegiance, loyalty and gratefulness of the Africans, especially the educated, to the whites. He particularly impressed it upon the government to take seriously the advancement and improvement of the Africans⁹⁴. He should have been greatly enamoured to note an increasingly determined campaign launched by the colonial press especially the Natal Witness and the Natal Mercury after the outbreak of the 1906 rebellion supporting more serious efforts in the direction of raising the Africans in the scale of civilisation⁹⁵. "The justification for saying that the white man should rule", in the opinions of Sacks, "did not rest on the ground of his superior civilization but because only through his assistance could the black man be raised to a higher level⁹⁶". It could no longer be assumed that the Africans were generally satisfied with the white's control of their affairs⁹⁷. Some people acknowledged that the Britons had betrayed their thrust and had "mined the Kaffir, driven him from the land, and robbed him in every phase and form, made the Patriot a rebel, and landed him

⁹³. Ilanga lase Natal, 13 January 1905.

⁹⁴. Ibid., 2 June 1905.

⁹⁵. The Natal Witness, 15 August 1907. The Natal Mercury, 19 March 1906 and 6 November 1906.

⁹⁶. B. Sacks, South Africa: An Imperial Dilemma, pp. 149-150. The Natal Witness, 15 August 1907.

⁹⁷. H.R. Fox Bourne, Blacks and Whites in South Africa, p. 47.

in the jail, instead of reclaiming and raising him up in the social scale⁹⁸ ...” Sir Matthew Nathan made bold to affirm his desire while he was governor of Natal “to all ... natives move along the paths of progress, especially in these directions in which their advance can raise no racial feeling as its own impediment⁹⁹”. This was confirmed by no less a person than Dube who then complacently observed that “Public opinion is improving in Natal toward the advancement of the Natives¹⁰⁰”.

While Dube exhorted the Africans to realize that it was absolutely necessary to their existence to recognize the domination of the whites, he dauntlessly fought against any form of discrimination or restrictions on Africans. His view was of Africans who were not “saddled at every turn with restrictions that stifle all the aspirations which hurt within their breasts - restrictions in education - restrictions in religion, ... restrictions in obtaining the franchise ... restrictions in fact wherever there is a possibility of enforcing them¹⁰¹”. He observed that in order to improve the relations between the two races the Africans would have to enjoy the same privileges as the whites¹⁰². Even the Natal Mercury endorsed this view and argued that the African could only live peaceably and contentedly under the white man’s jurisdiction and administration if he were to be treated firmly but fairly and “if he is not harassed and

⁹⁸. Colenso Collection 44, D.P. Carnegie to H.E. Colenso, Durban 7 October 1907.

⁹⁹. Ms Nathan 368, Nathan to Tango Jabavu, London, 14 September 1909.

¹⁰⁰. BTW 346/1907, Dube to Washington, Phoenix, 3 December 1907.

¹⁰¹. Ilanga lase Natal, 4 December 1903. See also D.D.T. Jabavu, “Native Disabilities” in South Africa, p. 8.

¹⁰². Ilanga Lase Natal, 22 April 1904.

worried by unnecessary laws and rules, which he does not understand, of the existence of which in many cases, he has never heard". If the African were subjected to such pettifogging laws, regulations and inconveniences by an incapable administration, he would soon rise up in rebellion¹⁰³. Dube could not but express enthusiastical approval of such "a warning plainly, freely and outspokenly sounded"¹⁰⁴. He had previously inveighed against the imposition of restrictions on Africans. "Ezweni ake kulona anakupumula, endlini ahlezi kuyona akanakupumla, endhleleni ahamba kuyo kanakupumla, nasematawini ahambela, eyosebenza kuwo akanakupumla. Wopumlapi umuntu inkululwane yakulelizwe"¹⁰⁵?"

Dube strongly emphasized that the Africans and the whites should live together in mutual relationships without any racial feelings¹⁰⁶. He is reported to have noted that the "Natives needed the whites' assistance as they owed them so much, and the European, too, needed the native help ..."¹⁰⁷. However there were whites who were not rid of the notion that the African "must be kept under complete control, and made to conform in every respect to all laws, rules and regulations in force. He must be

¹⁰³. The Natal Mercury, 25 August 1904

¹⁰⁴. Ilanga Lase Natal, 2 September 1904.

¹⁰⁵. Ibid., 22 April 1904. It means "On the land in which he resides he is not free, in the house in which he stays he is not free, on the path he walks he is not free, and in towns to which he goes for work purposes he is not free. When shall the Black man be free of the restrictions of this land?"

¹⁰⁶. Ibid., 25 November 1904. See also F. Wilson and D. Perrot (eds), Outlook on a Century: South Africa, 1870-1970, p. 180 G. Lagden, "The Native Question in South Africa" in C.S. Goldmann (ed), The Empire and the Century, London, 1905, p. 555.

¹⁰⁷. F. Wilson and D. Perrot (eds), op cit., p. 182.

taught to show proper respect to his superiors ...¹⁰⁸". Significantly, Lord Selborne found such a feeling towards the Africans to be "as lamentable as it is idiotic"¹⁰⁹ ...". Dube also came out strongly against the treatment of Africans by both the government and the general white public. "The method of governing the natives", he observed, "is wrong and must remain wrong, until the right course is taken. The treatment of blacks by whites is likewise wrong, and must remain wrong, until the right attitude is adopted, and faithfully pursued"¹¹⁰". According to Mdhuli all that the African requested was "... not to be treated as aliens in a land which is as much ours as it is anyone else's"¹¹¹". Evans suggested that it is open to academic debate whether the African was not happier and more contented under the rule of Shaka and Dingane than under the colonial government¹¹²

The Ilanga protested against the rather inordinately mighty influence exercised by the Natal Farmer's Congress upon the government in matters affecting the Africans¹¹³ It advocated the improvement of spiritual relations between the Africans and the whites in order that reform measures could be introduced. It also asked that those who proclaimed themselves "purifiers of man" should of necessity appeal to the hearts of those they sought to purify. "They can never hope to win the spirit of the deprived

¹⁰⁸ J.W. Shepstone, The Native question of Today, p.9.

¹⁰⁹ Ms Nathan 377, Lord Selborne to Nathan, Bulawayo, 22 October 1907.

¹¹⁰ Ilanga Lase Natal, 25 November 1904.

¹¹¹ Ilanga Lase Natal, 25 November 1904.

¹¹² Ilanga Lase Natal, 5 July 1907. See also 7 June 1907.

¹¹³ Ibid., 25 November 1904.

by violence, or heated words", the newspaper observed¹¹⁴.

Quite interestingly, Dube was opposed to social equality as he did not regard it feasible or good for either the Africans or the whites, and for the reason that it would produce another race which would be despised by both races. He characteristically attested to his patriotism saying "I am as jealous of the purity of the black race as Anglo-Saxon is of his". All that he would like to see was his people being treated as children "..... who will be encouraged to enjoy the blessings of fitness as soon as they are able".¹¹⁵ After the 1906 rebellion, Dube made even more truculent demands, calling upon the legislators and officials to ensure that "the liberty and manhood of all classes" were protected.¹¹⁶ At a time when the whites were sharply divided amongst themselves, Dube should have been gratified by the support he received from such philanthropists like Evans who advocated that in the framing and execution of African policy "we should more consider than has been always the case in the past, the legislation will affect us, but also how it will affect them."¹¹⁷ Dube pledged himself to fight faddism which sought to treat both educated and the uneducated African as a child because in his opinion the "native is not a child" but "a youth rapidly approaching manhood, very many natives have indeed become men".¹¹⁸

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 3 December 1904.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 8 December 1905.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 7 September 1906.

¹¹⁷ M.S. Evans, *The Native Problem in Natal*, p. 28.

¹¹⁸ *Ilanga Lase Natal*, 14 June 1907.

Dube also descended on officials of all departments who dealt with Africans and especially the magistrates whom he accused of maltreating Africans. The magistrates were not only out of touch with the Africans but also ignorant of African laws and customs and failed to speak the Zulu language. Dube observed that this resulted in convicting many Africans simply because their statements were not properly interpreted or construed.¹¹⁹ With the support of Ipepa Lo Hlanga, Dube advocated the appointment of educated Africans as interpreters, police and messengers at magistrates courts. In time, public opinion favoured the appointment of magistrates who were mature, experienced, uniquely gifted with sympathy and introspective powers, specially trained for the work and familiar with African laws and customs.¹²⁰

Dube thought it desirable that Africans should be consulted on the choice of magistrates as it was injurious to appoint them "on the basis of their acceptability to the white community".¹²¹ According to Anthony Ngubo, it would have been better if the magistrates understood their duty not to be just "loyal and faithful enforcement officials of colonial laws even against the resistance of the people" but also

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 8 May 1903. See also The Natal Witness, 18 February 1905.

¹²⁰ Ipepa Lo Hlanga, 28 August 1903 and 4 September 1903. Ilanga Lase Natal, 8 May 1903. The Natal Mercury, 29 May 1905. The Natal Witness, 9 June 1906. M.S. Evans, The Native Problem in Natal, p.16. F.W. Bell, The South African Native Problem in Natal: A Suggested Solution, p.15. E.H. Brookes, White Rule in South Africa, 1830 - 1910, pp.155, 157.

¹²¹ Ilanga Lase Natal, 21 September 1906. See also D.D.T. Jabavu, The Black Problem, p.7.

trustworthy interpreters of African law.¹²² "The natives knowing their own law, could not tell what to make of the white chief's decisions, which were manifestly at variance with it, but had perforce to submit" write Colenso and Werner.¹²³ It was at this point that many magistrates floundered and which, in Dube's opinion, made the Africans to have no confidence in them.¹²⁴ It was as a result of the incompetence and unsuitability of the magistrates "that the Natives do not know the laws and the regulations for the breaking of which they are punished."¹²⁵

On the matter of the treatment of the Africans by the whites even the missionaries were on the receiving end of Dube's wrath and impeachment. He found them to blame for showing, even though they claimed to be religious, "the most bitter feeling against a native simply because a native was a native, or as in some places, because the poor are the poor".¹²⁶ It is not clear why the men of the cloth earned this indictment, but it was probably related to the issue of the Mission Reserves which was a major cause of friction between Dube and the missionaries. Dube took issue with those who were "speaking of the native people as though they were a herd of cattle" and who often remarked that "if they are kept in tutelage it would be best for

¹²² A. Ngubo, "The Development of African Political Protest in South Africa, 1882 - 1910: An Analytical Approach" (Ph.D., California, 1973), pp.46 - 47.

¹²³ A. Werner, and H.E. Colenso, "White and Black in Natal" in Contemporary Review, 1893, p.207.

¹²⁴ Ilanga Lase Natal, 17 April 1908.

¹²⁵ Debates of the L.A., XLIV, 1908, p.152.

¹²⁶ Ilanga Lase Natal, 25 October 1907.

them."¹²⁷ This was probably an indirect reference to those missionaries who reportedly did not "expect that the Natives, just coming out from barbarism, should be equal to European nations, with a civilization some hundreds of years old".¹²⁸ If Dube, however, ever questioned the integrity of the missionaries his distrust should have been displaced as to all intents and purposes, they were as committed to their mission as he himself often acknowledged. The combined effect of missionary work and the use of African agents was undoubtedly conducive to better character, cleaner life and more useful and industrious modes of living amongst a very large portion of the African population.¹²⁹ The missionaries succeeded in replacing the old tribal customs and restraints with "new ideals and hopes, new disciplines and a new social life".¹³⁰

As early as 1895 there had been complaints in the black press that meagre amounts were spent out of the £10 000 reserved for the advancement of Africans. The Inkanyiso complained that the parsimonious funding out of the reserved fund of the building of roads in and the erection of fences around the locations ostensibly for the benefit of Africans was "quite as much as the advantage of the white man".¹³¹ It strongly urged that more appropriations should be made out of the fund for the

¹²⁷ Ilanga Lase Natal, 6 December 1907.

¹²⁸ Natal Missionary Conference, Proceedings, July 1908, p.10. Presidential address by Reverend R. Blake.

¹²⁹ SPG Letters, 1908, Minute from Bishop of Natal, F.S. Barnes, to SPG, 21 January 1908. R. Plant, The Zulu in Three Senses. p.80.

¹³⁰ B.B. Burnett, Anglicans in Natal, p.151.

¹³¹ Inkanyiso, 5 March 1895.

amelioration of blacks especially in the field of the neglected industrial education.¹³²

However, the government maintained that the amount expended on Africans was far in excess of the amount contributed by them to the revenue. It therefore argued that without a large outlay industrial training could not be taken to any considerable extent.¹³³ Of the £10 000 more than half was placed annually at the disposal of the education authorities for furthering African education. The balance was applied to other purposes, such as industrial training, cottage hospitals, irrigation, dipping tanks, and barrack and shelter accommodation. By 1906 it was clear that with sharp rise in the African population, the reserved fund was inadequate "particularly when regard is had to the fact that the beneficiaries have contributed, on the average, about £250 000 per annum in direct taxation".¹³⁴ This viewpoint by a government official and a member of the Native Affairs Commission gives weight to Dube's plea that more money or at least an amount equal to that expended in the Cape Colony should be expended on African education in Natal and that Africans should be placed in positions where they would use their education. He observed that since the introduction of responsible government in 1893 Africans had been removed from positions of authority at the head offices with the result that in 1906 there was no educated African in these offices.¹³⁵ J. Stuart, the Secretary of the Native Affairs Commission, conceded that Africans "are better able to manage their own affairs than

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ GH 234 No. 42, Lyttelton to McCallum, London, 25 May 1905 and Encl Minute from H.D. Winter to C.J. Smythe, 23 August 1905.

¹³⁴ J. Stuart, A History of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906, p.35.

¹³⁵ Ilanga Lase Natal, 2 November 1906.

we can do it for them, but they need our help in international matters and in matters between white and black".¹³⁶

In the period leading to the 1906 rebellion, Dube persistently challenged the Natal Government over its handling of the "Native Problem" more especially as it did not have a fixed policy but "a policy of incongruities" which Africans could not but notice".¹³⁷ The Natal Mercury similarly complained about the "policy of drift" in the administration of Africans. The colonists were accused of pursuing a policy that could be conceived as "nothing more than how to get all the labour possible out of the native at the cheapest rate" and "how to keep the Kaffir 'in his place' - what is denoted by his place being unquestioning subserviency to the superior white man".¹³⁸

One sequel of the 1906 disturbances was an increasing demand by the press and some members of the public that the erstwhile policy of 'laissez faire', of letting the Africans alone,¹³⁹ and "our weak-kneed, narrow, and short-sighted policy",¹⁴⁰ had to be replaced by a coherent and intelligent policy that would appear meaningful and sensible to the Africans. "The frequent breaks in continuity of policy irritated and

¹³⁶ Colenso Collection 43, J. Stuart, Secretary of Native Affairs Commission to H.E. Colenso, Pietermaritzburg, 20 November 1906.

¹³⁷ Ilanga Lase Natal, 23 June 1905. See also 10 August 1906.

¹³⁸ The Natal Mercury, 11 September 1905 and 15 February 1906 respectively.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 16 February 1906. Colenso Collection 43, Franz Mayr to H.E. Colenso, Pietermaritzburg, 23 February 1906.

¹⁴⁰ R.C.A. Samuelson, Native Question, p.12.

perplexed them" writes Brookes.¹⁴¹ Sir Matthew Nathan, the Governor, in giving the official view of the problem thought that it would be only when the ruling class wholeheartedly "rules for the benefit of the ruled without any thought of its own material interests", that the dangerous situation in African policy would be eliminated.¹⁴² Dube also found fault not only with the Native Affairs Department but also with all the government officers who were responsible for the administration of African affairs.¹⁴³ He strongly favoured the introduction of policy that would be similar to the Cape's which specially provided for the interests and advancement of the Africans.¹⁴⁴ In contradistinction to the Natal Mercury which was against F.R. Moor's taking charge of the ministry of native affairs because it doubted his flair for administration,¹⁴⁵ Dube expressed complete confidence in Moor. He strongly felt that disaffection amongst Africans was greatly intensified when Moor left his position as Secretary for Native Affairs in 1904 and that if his ministry had been in office in 1906 there would have been no rebellion.¹⁴⁶

It should have been tremendous source of satisfaction to those who execrated the policy of the Native Affairs Department when the Native Affairs Commission of 1906

¹⁴¹ E.H. Brookes, The History of Native Policy in South Africa, p.76.

¹⁴² Ms Nathan 368, Nathan to J.W. Shepstone, Pietermaritzburg, 2 January 1908. See also Ms Nathan 177, J.W. Shepstone to Nathan, Pietermaritzburg, 1 January 1908. F.W. Bell, The South African Native Problem: A Suggested Solution, p.11. Bell advocated "a settled, fixed and continuous native policy".

¹⁴³ Ilanga Lase Natal, 10 August 1906.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 24 May 1907.

¹⁴⁵ The Natal Mercury, 4 March 1907.

¹⁴⁶ Ilanga Lase Natal, 8 March 1907.

reported that the government was "..... without a Native policy, because of the absence of persistent purpose, high aim, or clear principles".¹⁴⁷ Though Dube disagreed with the sweeping condemnations of the Commission in formulating the Native Administration Bill, No. 2 of 1908, which sought to improve the administration of Africans,¹⁴⁸ the bill was hailed by the legislators as a measure that would stop further trouble amongst the Africans and "will lead to a better government of the Natives and to a forward movement of these people".¹⁴⁹ Dube and his associates opposed the enactment of the measure because they felt it maintained the status quo and "opened the way to arbitrary action by a host of officials and closed all doors to redress through the courts".¹⁵⁰ The bill was proceeded with and passed to become the Native Administration Act No. 1 of 1909 that was acclaimed as the "Native Charter" and a significant advance on anything that had been done previously and a genuine attempt to give the Africans a voice in their affairs.¹⁵¹ It was, however, remarked in the period leading to the Union that there were issues to be ironed out before the responsibility for the control and management of the African population was handed over to the Union government.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁷ Report and Evidence of the Natal Native Affairs Commission, 1907, Report, §§12, 16, pp.8 - 9.

¹⁴⁸ Debates of the L.A., XLIV, 1908, p.145.

¹⁴⁹ S.P. of the L.A., 1908, L.A. No. 1, p.9. Budget speech by Treasurer in moving Second Reading of the Supply Bill, 1908 - 9, No. 7 of 1908.

¹⁵⁰ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p.362.

¹⁵¹ The Natal Mercury, 24 April 1909.

¹⁵² Ibid., 19 June 1909.

Dube also took it upon himself to allay the whites' intense fear of the spectre of Ethiopianism. In a manner that discounted all the accusations that were levelled at Dube for having Ethiopian tendencies, the Ilanga sharply denounced the Ethiopian movement in 1904. The newspaper incisively censured the adherence of the movement for influencing the Africans' minds in a very undesirable direction. It strongly urged that steps should be taken "to stop the evil before incurable harm shall have been done".¹⁵³ In this stance, the Ilanga was supporting the Times of Natal which regarded the tactics of the movement as calculated to create distrust between the black and white races.¹⁵⁴ Contrary to the viewpoint of the Colonial Defence Commission of 1903 and government officials that the movement aimed to displace missionaries and oust whites from Africa,¹⁵⁵ Dube felt that the "Ethiopian teaching has been used as an argument to interfere with the work of missionaries".¹⁵⁶

It remains true, however, that the Ethiopian movement had some elements of political expression and that it was a deliberate search for avenues of personal advancement amongst educated and nationalistic minded Africans.¹⁵⁷ They keenly felt a sense of belonging which white Christian congregations denied them and craved political and

¹⁵³ Ilanga Lase Natal, 15 July 1904.

¹⁵⁴ The Times of Natal, 28 May 1904 and 9 June 1904.

¹⁵⁵ P.M. 94 Confid, No 30/1903, Report of the Colonial Defence Commission, 14 January 1903, G.H. 761 W. Hely-Hutchinson to J. Chamberlain, Cape Town, 8 April 1902.

¹⁵⁶ J.L. Dube, "Zulu and Missionary Outlook in Natal" in Missionary Review of the World, Ns 20, 1907, p.205.

¹⁵⁷ S.N.A. 1/4/12 No. C12/03, Bishop J.G. Hertzell to J.G. Spring, Prime Minister of Cape Colony, 14 November 1902. G. Shepperson, "Ethiopianism and African Nationalism" in Phylon. Vol.XIV, Spring 1953, p.9. A.Z.W. Kuzwayo, op. cit., p.172.

social rights which the Natal government had deprived them.¹⁵⁸ Ethiopianism meant "a people trying to express themselves", Dr W.M. Carter, the Archbishop of the Church of the Province of South Africa, said in 1909, "If it had a political side, why should not natives express themselves thus, even as white people do. Ecclesiastically, it was an effort to stand on their own legs and work out their own purposes".¹⁵⁹ For his part, Dube was extremely critical of the white missionaries failure to implement the "concept of self-support". According to Collins, though he was aware of the somewhat limited objectives of the independent church movement, he sympathized with it and indeed, at the time of his crossing paths with the American Zulu Mission, played a prominent role in the formation of the Zulu Congregational Church which was reportedly named by Dube himself.¹⁶⁰

Many writers blame the whites for the Africans' switch of faith and allegiance and the resultant establishment of churches of their own with ministers of their own kith and kin, the so called separatist churches.¹⁶¹ As R.C.A. Samuelson puts it "we do worse than these Ethiopians, we so act or omit to act as regards the natives as to turn them into a field very highly prepared for the reception of all influences antagonistic to us

¹⁵⁸ G. Shepperson and T. Price, The Independent African, p.73. B. Sacks, South Africa: An Imperial Dilemma, p.156. B.G.M. Sundkler, Bantu Prophets in South Africa, pp.302 - 303. D.P. Collins, "Origins and Formation of the Zulu Congregational Church" (M.A., Natal, 1978), p.98.

¹⁵⁹ S.P.G. Africa Reports, 1909, Church Chronicle, 3 March 1909: Speech by the Archbishop elect, Dr W.M. Carter, before Provincial Synod at Bloemfontein, 13 - 19 February 1909.

¹⁶⁰ D.P. Collins, op. cit., pp.106-107.

¹⁶¹ W.H. Dawson, South Africa: Peoples, Places and Problems, p.379. B. Sacks, op. cit., p.156. B.G.M. Sundkler, op. cit., pp.302 - 303

and our interest".¹⁶² The Natal Government apparently fearing the movement and suspecting every European-dressed and educated African to be an Ethiopian,¹⁶³ and also believing that most missionaries, especially of the American Zulu Mission, were agitators¹⁶⁴ acted in an altogether unwarranted nature.¹⁶⁵

It resolutely refused, for example, to allow churches to be erected and African evangelists to reside in any location unless they were placed under the personal charges of resident European male missionaries.¹⁶⁶ It also refused to issue marriage licences to African pastors who worked by themselves in the locations.¹⁶⁷ In all this the American Zulu Mission of which Dube was a pastor appears to have been singled out for particular attack by the government¹⁶⁸ most probably because, as Shula Marks observes, it was the oldest, largest and richest of the missionary societies on the land, it was also run on Congregationalist lines, its reserves were on excellent sugar lands,

¹⁶² R.C.A. Samuelson, Native Question, p.17.

¹⁶³ S. Marks, "Harriette Colenso and the Zulus" in Journal of African History, Vol.4, No.3, 1963, p.409. G. Shepperson and T. Price, op. cit., p.73.

¹⁶⁴ A.B.M. A/2/24, S.O. Samuelson to Reverend F.B. Bridgman, Pietermaritzburg, 15 April 1904. G.H. 1234 No.70, McCallum to Elgin, Pietermaritzburg, 10 May 1907.

¹⁶⁵ S. Marks, "Harriette Colenso and the Zulus" in Journal of African History, Vol.4, No.3, 1963, p.409.

¹⁶⁶ S.P.G. Letters, 1904, Bishop of Natal, F.S. Barnes, to Bishop Montgomery, Pietermaritzburg, 5 January 1904. Natal Missionary Conference, Proceedings, July 1905: Report of Reverend W.J. Harker's Exigency Committee Report, 5 July 1905. A.B.M. A/2/11, Minister for Native Affairs, Geo Leuchars, to Reverend John Bruce, Secretary for Natal Missionary Conference, Pietermaritzburg, 18 February 1905.

¹⁶⁷ G.H. 1274, Encl. No.2: Notes on Proposals of Native Affairs Commission for Educating the Natives in Desp 5, Nathan to Elgin, Pietermaritzburg, 6 January 1908.

¹⁶⁸ The Natal Mercury, 11 September 1905. The Natal Witness, 22 May 1906.

and it had established a purely African church, the African Congregational Church, which the Native Affairs Department, suspected of marked inclination towards Ethiopianism.¹⁶⁹

At the start of the 1906 disturbances, the Ethiopians were suspected of fanning the flames of discontent and preaching sedition and rebellion.¹⁷⁰ They were accused of mischievously meddling with political and social issues and ".... their influence amongst our uneducated natives is pernicious, and even dangerous to the interest of the State."¹⁷¹ The government and especially the Governor, Sir Henry McCallum, who is caricatured as having had "the hide of a rhinoceros", inadvertently questioned the loyalty of and grossly misrepresented the missionaries especially of the American Zulu Mission.¹⁷²

As might have been expected, the measures drove a wedge between the Africans and the missionaries on the one hand, and the government on the other. The Natal Missionary Conference believed that the regulations and stipulations were repressive and that "instead of securing the objects presumably sought are actually operating to produce feelings of unrest and disaffection among the Native Christians in the

¹⁶⁹ S. Marks, "Christian African Participation in 1906 Zulu Rebellion" in the Bulletin of the Society for African Church History, Vol.2, No.1, December 1965, pp.63 - 64.

¹⁷⁰ S.N.A. 1/4/19 No.C234/07, T.E. Foxon to S.O. Samuelson, Ixopo, 14 November 1907.

¹⁷¹ The Natal Mercury, 5 March 1906.

¹⁷² A.B.M. A/2/18, E.E. Strong, Editorial Secretary to the Board, to Reverend J.D. Taylor, Boston, 1 March 1907.

locations".¹⁷³ In his evidence before the Native Affairs Commission, Dube expressed similar views. While he submitted that Ethiopianism had political and religious motives, he denied that it was wholly to blame for the disturbances and that every Christian African was an Ethiopian. In his opinion, the Ethiopian movement should not have been made the excuse for preventing African evangelists from spreading the gospel to their own people. "Those who propagated seditious teaching ought to be punished individually", he observed and added that "the whole population should not be placed under disabilities because of wrongdoing of one or two men".¹⁷⁴

Dube's sharp criticism of the government's administration of African Affairs caused the whites and the officials to view him with suspicion. Through the columns of Ilanga he influenced and lightened the political consciousness of the Africans. Dube was convinced that the complaints of the disaffected Africans could be eliminated if they were educated, and given representation in the legislature through which they could voice their demands and make their grievances known. The whites were, however, not as yet prepared to entertain ideas which when implemented would be detrimental to their position of power.

¹⁷³ S.N.A. 1/1/323 No.1885/05, Memorial from Natal Missionary Conference to Secretary for Native Affairs, 19 July 1905. See also S. Marks, "Christian African Participation in 1906 Zulu Rebellion" in the Bulletin of the Society for African Church History, Vol. 2, No.1, 1 December 1965, pp.63 - 64.

¹⁷⁴ Report and Evidence of the Natal Native Affairs Commission, Evidence, Vol. II, Section III, p.962.

CHAPTER FIVE

DUBE AND THE GOVERNMENT ON THE ISSUES
OF LAND AND LABOUR

The land and labour issues were some of the points over which Dube disagreed with the Natal Government. Dube challenged the government not only on what he believed to be an unequitable distribution, but also on the nature, the purchase and the system of holding of land by Africans. He also had the profoundest and most fundamental disagreement with the authorities on the issue of African labour supply. Entering the field at a time when the whites were complaining of a shortage of land and labour, Dube earned the wrath of the government and the colonists by sympathising with the Africans who themselves subjected to inhumane and inconsiderate treatment on the labour market.

By the year 1903, the area of what the Africans believed to be ancestral land had been greatly reduced and several tribes occupied considerably less than the extent of the country previously held by them.¹ This can be attributed to the system of land - holding by the whites who were lavishly granted land in excess of 2000 acres, the possession of large tracts by absentee owners and the government, the latter in the form of Crown lands, and the rapid increase in the colony's population.² The direct

¹ Report of the South African Native Affairs Commission, 1903-1905, §416, p.64.

² C.W. de Kiewiet, A History of South Africa, p.71. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp.120-121.

outcome of these developments was the Africans' complaint that their rights of ownership had been violated and the argument that the transfer of sovereign rights to the Crown and private owners did not involve the surrender or forfeiture of ownership of land which they claimed belonged to them on account of priority of possession.³ According to Dube the Africans found that "..... their lands have been taken from them, and to be independent, and self-supporting is well-nigh an impossibility".⁴ The whites, however, assumed that there was nothing avaricious or arrogant in their occupation of land that they had found uninhabited which then rightly belonged to them with the exemption of those areas which were legally set aside for the blacks.⁵

The policy of setting aside land as locations for the exclusive occupation of Africans, though occasioned "both by humanitarian motives and administrative needs,"⁶ soon became a subject of controversy between the government and the colonists as well as Africans. The whites looked at the locations for the supply of labour that they desperately needed. On its part, the government had established these areas to avert the threat of large concentrations of Africans that might pose a danger to white

³ Report of the South African Native Affairs Commission, 1903-1905, §416, p.64. M. Cornevin, Apartheid: Power and Historical Falsification, p.103. G.S. Were, A History of South Africa, p.64. A.W. Lee and J.L. Dube, "The Clash of Colour" in Natal Missionary Conference Papers, Durban, 1926, p.1. D. Kidd, Kaffir Socialism and the Dawn of Individualism, p.99.

⁴ J.D. Taylor (ed), Christianity and the Natives of South Africa, p.54: Article by J.L. Dube, "Native Political and Industrial Organizations in South Africa." See also C. Legum and M. Legum, South Africa: A Crisis for the West, p.147.

⁵ F. Troup, South Africa: A Historical Introduction, p.200. B. Roberts, The Zulu Kings, p.357. E.A. Walker, The Frontier Tradition in South Africa, p.21.

⁶ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p.121.

settlements. They were so interspersed as to prevent combinations of Africans to prevent government.⁷ complained of being assigned to lands that, as Dube put it, were "..... worthless tracts said to be good for nothing but the niggers and monkeys."⁸ Another complaint was that of quality of the land "for the topography and climate render many areas unsuitable for normal cropping."⁹ Dube specifically resented the obstacles which he believed were devised by the whites to prevent an African from acquiring "any title in land of his birth" thus forcing him to work for whites.¹⁰ The Africans also complained that even when they had been settled in the locations their lands could still be expropriated "to assuage the insatiable appetites of European land barons"¹¹ who could not understand "why should natives have the good land that white men could use so much better."¹² However, the condition of the land assigned to the Africans was such that there could be no large scale agricultural development by means of the erstwhile methods of tenure and occupation.¹³

⁷ T.G. Karis, South Africa: The End is not Yet, p.11. P.L. Van den Berghe, South Africa: A Study in Conflict, p.31. B. Magubane, The Politics of History in South Africa, p.73. R.E. Gordon, Shepstone, p.128.

⁸ J.L. Dube, "The Black Problem in South Africa" in Missionary Review of the World, 1916, p.205. See also C.W. de Kiewiet, A History of South Africa, pp.71, 74 and The Imperial Factor in South Africa, p.192. Ilanga Lase Natal, 11 August 1905.

⁹ N. Hurwitz and E.H. Brookes, Native Reserves of Natal, p.9. C.W. de Kiewiet, A History of South Africa, p.80 and The Imperial Factor in South Africa, p.192.

¹⁰ J.L. Dube, "The Black Problem in South Africa" in Missionary Review of the World, March, 1916, p.205. See also A. Ngubo, "The Development of African Political Protest in South Africa, 1882 - 1910: An Analytical Approach" (Ph.D., California, 1973), p.50. J.Burger, The Black Man's Burden, p.50.

¹¹ N. Mandela, No Easy Walk to Freedom, p.41. B. Magubane, op. cit., p.73.

¹² E.A. Walker, The Frontier Tradition in South Africa, p.21.

¹³ SANRC, The South African Natives: Their Progress and Present Condition, p.61.

The whites did not leave these accusations unchallenged. It was, for example, argued that the Africans themselves chose the badlands in order to isolate themselves in locations far removed from whites "where they could live their lives of barbarism with small risk of oversight or interference."¹⁴ Poor cropping was attributed to poor and wasteful use of land occasioned by the dead weight of illiteracy, ignorance and superstition.¹⁵ According to Plaatjie, Dube discounted the argument that Africans were not making economic use of their land and depended on the labour of their wives, when he gave evidence before the Lands Commission of 1905. To Dube, it could not be denied that "the white man has got the best" which he was failing to use any more profitably than the Africans."¹⁶

The locations were also overcrowded as a result of smallness of their areas, unequal distribution of land, and the heavy influx of Africans from Zululand and elsewhere.¹⁷ This soon placed a severe strain upon the land that was left. As a result the great majority of the African population overspilled onto Crown lands and private properties.¹⁸ In turn this created the problems of squatting on these lands and of

¹⁴ J. Robinson, A Life Time in South Africa, p.282.

¹⁵ C.W. de Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor in South Africa, p.192. J. Burger, The Black Man's Burden, p.53. R.J.H. King, "Premiership of C.J. Smythe, 1905-1906, and the Bambata Rebellion" (M.A., Natal, 1980), p.43.

¹⁶ S.T. Plaatjie, Native Life in South Africa, p. XIV.

¹⁷ Ilanga Lase Natal, 22 September 1905. S.T. Plaatjie, op. cit., p.20. N. Hurwitz and E.H. Brookes, op. cit., p.11. Z.A. Konckzackie, Public Finance and Economic Development of Natal, 1893-1910, p.175.

¹⁸ S. Marks and A. Atmore, Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa, p.161. C.W. de Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor in South Africa, p.192.

exploitation by their occupiers or owners of the Africans by rack-renting. Since the Africans had no legal tenure, their expulsion from private or Crown lands was easily undertaken.¹⁹ Overcrowding became worse with no further provisions of land being made for Africans.²⁰ In 1907 the Native Affairs Commission observed a "lack of administrative forethought" with regard to "wasteful use of land reserved for Natives, particularly in Natal, where the full and economic occupation of locations has been glaringly neglected."²¹ Even it being so, there was a legislative proposal in 1907 to have the Africans residing in the locations made to pay rent or taxes on the lands they occupied. Dube so vehemently opposed the measure that F.R. Moor who had introduced it had to relent and withdraw it.²²

According to C.W. de Kiewiet, many Africans escaped the hostilities of the Mfecane, the Zulu and Anglo-Boer wars by finding refuge in broken hilly country only to return to find the lands they had previously owned already occupied by white settlers and absentee landlords. Their settlement on the land claimed by the new occupiers was looked upon by whites and the government and strictly encroachment. "The natives became squatters," writes de Kiewiet, "owning no land in their own right, more or less tolerated by the European landowners for the rent they would pay or in the labour

¹⁹ M.S. Evans, The Native Problem in Natal, p.47. G.I.C. Evers, "Individual and Tribal Land Tenure: Aspects of Natal Land Question, 1843-1910" (B.A. Hons, Natal, 1972), p.23. C.W. de Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor in South Africa, p.192.

²⁰ N. Hurwitz and E.H. Brookes, op. cit., pp.1-11.

²¹ Report and Evidence of the Natal Native Affairs Commission, 1907, Report, §10, p.8.

²² Ilanga Lase Natal, 11 October 1907.

could render."²³ Initially the rent was fixed at £1 per hut but in 1903 a proposal was made to have it increased to £2 for the reason that the Africans were then paid higher wages than previously.²⁴ The proposal was embodied in the Native Squatters Rent Bill, No. 12 of 1903, which became Act No.48 of 1903.²⁵ It required the payment of the increased rent by all Africans residing on unalienated Crown lands. The amount was taken to be average of what was paid as rent by Africans living on private estates. F.R. Moor who had moved the second reading of the bill, justified the measure on that "these people living on these Crown lands are not contributing their fair share to the Revenue, and, being, more or less exempt from the sibhalo system, they should make up what is not equivalent in money"²⁶ However, the Natal Mercury, as did the South African Native Affairs Commission, deprecated the levying of exorbitant rentals on the Africans: "The native has no security of tenure," the newspaper pointed out, "he is generally rack-rented, and absenteeism on the part of the landlord is encouraged."²⁷ In 1906 Dube rapped the Natal Land and Colonization Company, a large absentee land-holding concern, for thriving by "squeezing" Africans who were tenants on its various properties in the colony.²⁸

²³ C.W. de Kiewiet, A History of South Africa, pp.73-74. See also R. Oliver and J.D. Fage, A Short History of Africa, p.203.

²⁴ Debate of the L.A., XII, 1903, p.25.

²⁵ V.P. of the L.A., XLI, 1903, pp.16, 19, 92-93, 115-116. V.P. of the L.C., XIII, 1903, pp.44, 52, 84-85. N.G.S., LV, 1903, No.3368, p.1714: Act No.48 of 1903.

²⁶ Debate of L.A., XXXIII, 1903, p.132.

²⁷ The Natal Mercury, 14 February 1905. See also S.T. Van Der Horst, Native Labour in South Africa, p.112.

²⁸ Ilanga Lase Natal, 15 February 1906.

The Crown lands issue had long been a subject of controversy and counter-claims between the whites and the Africans. While the colonists criticized the settlement of Africans on Crown lands on the ground that it reduced the supply of labour and the number of tenants seeking to hire privately owned land,²⁹ the Africans complained of difficulties they experienced in using the lands they had leased because of encroachment by the whites especially the Boers who kept on shifting their beacons. They then made representation that boundaries between African-owned and whites' lands should be pointed out to them and permanently fixed,³⁰ and that steps be taken to relieve them of the excessive rents that were charged by private landowners and on Crown lands, by being allowed to purchase white-owned lands or Crown lands that were periodically offered for sale.³¹ they also complained of summary ejection from private farms or the Crown lands by the whites who had purchased them. They also protested against the sale of land over their heads.³² The Africans also observed that the Crown lands that the government offered for sale were very easily acquired by whites because the terms of purchase were made easy for them,³³ while in their case the sale was encumbered with insurmountable obstacles and problems.³⁴ M.S. Evans

²⁹ S.T. Van Der Horst, *op. cit.*, p.112.

³⁰ C.S.O. 2557 Confid. No. C80/1883, Resident Magistrate (Newcastle) to Colonial Secretary, 17 November 1884. C.S.O. 2557 Confid. No. C118, Resident Magistrate (Newcastle) to Colonial Secretary, 28 November 1883.

³¹ Inkanyiso, 17 August 1894. Ipepa Lo Hlanga, 7 August 1903.

³² N.B.B. vol. 30, 1905, p.1. Report by Magistrate of Ixopo, F.E. Foxon, 13 January 1906. SANRC, The South African Natives: Their Progress and Present Condition, p.63. S.N.A. VI/1/1, Minute of the Meeting of 18 February 1909. N. Hurwitz and E.H. Brookes, *op. cit.*, p.10.

³³ The Natal Witness, 7 April 1906.

³⁴ J.Y. Gibson, The Evolution of South African Native Policy, p.14.

writes that "although natives have not been specifically barred from purchasing Crown lands, during the whole process of alienation they only acquired a little over 200 000 acres, and at later sales, although their bids were received, Government did not implement the sales."³⁵

The Africans' discontent with the high rentals that were demanded by resident and absentee landlords and the hut tax that was levied on those residing on Crown lands had, according to evidence before the Natal Native Affairs Commission, resulted in strained relations and chasm between the Africans and the landlords as well as the government. The Commission found the attitude of the Africans to be one of distance and distrust. It observed that Africans "feel as if the hand of the Government was against them."³⁶ Whereas they demanded that they should be allowed to buy Crown land without any restrictions, the whites reportedly failed to exercise self-restraint in their relations with Africans in matters of land.³⁷ Instead, even more restrictive measures were issued at the insistence of the Land Board as created in 1904, whereby the government tightened its control of the land grant system making it all but impossible for the Africans to purchase Crown lands. In terms of Proclamation 3 of 1907, the Minister of Agriculture would declare any of the Crown lands within the colony to be available for selection by whites only at prices and in sizes that would be determined by him. The white allottee was forbidden to bring a number of

³⁵ M.S. Evans, Black and White in South East Africa, pp.132-133.

³⁶ SANRC, op. cit., p.64. See also Report and Evidence of the Natal Native Affairs Commission, 1907, Evidence, Vol. II, Sect. III, pp.212, 919, 921. The Amambozane tribe, and Rev. R. Radebe of Escourt is very interesting.

³⁷ W.A. Cotton, The Race Problem in South Africa, pp.115-116.

Africans larger than that he required for labour.³⁸ An organization called Iliso Lo Muzi, which was formed at Dundee in 1907, drew up a petition and sent a deputation of five men to the government with a view to prevailing upon the authorities to have the measure reconsidered, however, to no avail.³⁹ In 1908 the measure was extended to Crown lands in Zululand which were made available to whites at very low upset prices or on ninety-nine year leases at annual rentals of 1s to 2s per acre depending on the quality of the soil.⁴⁰ As a result of the arrangement all the best land was grabbed by the whites leaving the rugged and unproductive land to the blacks.⁴¹

In 1908 Dube entered the fray by pouncing upon the government and chiding it for its refusal to allow the Africans to buy properties in Crown lands which he had advertised in the Ilanga in 1906 and 1907. He accused the government of being discriminatory and he doubted whether the British Government approved of the restrictions that were placed by whites on the Africans' right to buy land. He animadverted on the removal and unnecessary disturbance of Africans from areas in which they settled.⁴² He also sounded the government "ukuba izwe liyekwe ukuba kube iloku liselaxeshulwa abelungu, abantu betutiswa beshiyiswa izindawo."⁴³

³⁸ Debates of the L.A., XLII, 1907, p.548. N.C.C., 1907, No.3617, pp.619-621.

³⁹ S.N.A. 1/4/18 No. C135/07, N.T. Gule to Resident Magistrate (Dundee), Dundee, 12 August 1907.

⁴⁰ N.G.G. 1908, No. 3662, pp.198-199.

⁴¹ S.P.G. Africa Reports, 1908 B, Rev. B. Markham to Bishop Montgomery, Pietermaritzburg, 30 June 1908.

⁴² Ilanga Lase Natal, 15 May 1908 and 4 September 1908.

⁴³ Ibid., 14 August 1908. This means "to desist from demarcating and assigning land to whites and removing Africans from their lands."

It was only in 1909 that the government addressed itself to the recurrent complaints of the Africans about landlords who were charging inordinately high rents or demanding labour in excess of terms of contract.⁴⁴ The Council for Native Affairs that was created in terms of Act No.1 of 1909, resolved that no rent in excess of forty shillings per hut could be charged on any farm and that for ejectment there would have to be twelve months' notice. Labour would be supplied continuously at the time of the year that would be agreed upon and at the termination of the term the landlord would give facilities for the tenant to seek labour elsewhere if he so required.⁴⁵

Dube held brief for the Africans who sought to acquire land by private purchase but were prevented from doing so by jealous government officials and restrictive measures.⁴⁶ There was no law specifically debarring the Africans from the purchase of land; and there were a few Africans who owned land.⁴⁷ According to H. Slater in 1905 Africans in Natal owned or were in the process of acquiring through purchase 238 473 acres.⁴⁸ Of this only 70 000 to 100 000 acres were held in freehold and quit rent title, the rest being properties occupied by Africans in Crown lands and Mission

⁴⁴ Ms Nathan 363, Notes on Meetings with Chiefs at Stanger, 21 April and 31 May 1909.

⁴⁵ N.P.P. Vol. 231, Documents Presented to L.A., 1909-1910: Subjects dealt with by the Council for Native Affairs in August, 1909.

⁴⁶ Ilanga Lase Natal, 3 August 1906. J.D. Taylor (ed), Christianity and the Natives of South Africa, p.9. S.T. van Der Horst, op. cit., p.290.

⁴⁷ M.S. Evans, Black and White in South East Africa, p.133. J.D. Taylor (ed), op. cit., p.9.

⁴⁸ S. Marks and A. Atmore (ed), Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa, p.163.

reserves.⁴⁹ Not all the land was owned on an individual basis but some had been purchased by syndicates which had been formed at the instance of Dube and several social and political movements among the Africans at the time. In 1906 Dube committed himself and Ilanga Lase Natal to urging his fellow Africans to buy land because "nxa ningenazo izindawo zenu nokufa niyizinja, futi nxa abelungu besifela umona sithenga umhlaba baqamba amanga abaqondile ukuba basisize sibe ncono."⁵⁰

The South African Native Affairs Commission while regarding absolute freedom of purchase of land by the Africans to be right, felt that in the face of possible social conflict "restrictions upon purchase of land by natives are necessary and that purchases in future be limited to areas defined by legislative enactment."⁵¹ The Times of Natal taking its cue from the Commission strongly opposed the buying of land by "land purchasing syndicates" of Africans, as of Indians, for the reason that there were already large areas of land that were reserved solely for occupation by Africans.⁵² The Indians were, however, not as restricted as Africans hence the complaint of the latter that there was in Natal injustice perpetrated by the government "to debar the native from purchasing land in areas where the Indian, who is alien to

⁴⁹ The Times of Natal, 21 March 1905. M.S. Evans, Black and White in South Africa, p.133.

⁵⁰ Ilanga Lase Natal, 3 August 1906. This means "if you do not have lands of your own you will die like dogs, and if whites are jealous of us when we buy land, they are telling lies for it is not their intention to improve our lot."

⁵¹ G. Lagden, "The Native Question in South Africa" in C.S. Goldmann (ed), The Empire and the Century, pp.543-544.

⁵² The Times of Natal, 21 March 1905.

the country, is free to do so."⁵³ Dube railed against the "sheer duplicity" of apparently allowing the Africans to buy land but actually preventing them from doing so.⁵⁴ He stressed that Africans needed land on which to settle and to cultivate as desperately as the whites.⁵⁵

Dube himself was interested in securing land of his own and was assisted by the Natal Land and Colonization Company to acquire 10 acres at Driefontein near Ladysmith.⁵⁶ In 1907, Dube was the chief spokesman for the amaQadi tribe at Nooit-gedacht near Impendle in their fight against harassment by the Natal and Colonization Company. Dube took issue with the company over the fencing out of the Africans from their properties on the strength of beacons that had been fixed by a government surveyor.⁵⁷ The land dispute raged until the boundary line was fixed by the surveyor whereupon the Company asked Dube to urge the amaQadi to vacate the land they occupied or be ejected.⁵⁸ It is not clear whether the matter developed to this point, but as the company was a big and influential concern it would not be much to assume that it did forcefully evict them.

⁵³ S.T. Plaatjie, Native Life in South Africa, p.IX. See also J.F.E. Barnes, Segregation and the Alienation of Lands in Natal, p.2.

⁵⁴ Ilanga Lase Natal, 14 December 1906.

⁵⁵ Ilanga Lase Natal, 3 August 1906.

⁵⁶ N.L.C. 139, Letterbooks Inland, Secretary to Campson, 7 March 1904.

⁵⁷ N.L.C. 149, Letterbooks Inland, Dube to Local Secretary, Phoenix, 14 January 1907.

⁵⁸ N.L.C. 150, Letterbooks Inland, Dube to Local Secretary, Phoenix, 20 May 1907 and Local Secretary to Dube, 21 May 1907.

It is understandable that Dube should have gone to these lengths. As R. Hunt Davis Jr. points out he, like Washington, "placed great emphasis on farming and rural landownership with his ultimate goal being an independent yeomanry respected in their own communities."⁵⁹ Dube was very instrumental in causing Africans to buy farms, a novelty which was detested by whites for it contributed to labour shortage on their farms.⁶⁰ Between 1906 and 1907 Dube in association with R.H. Tatham, conceived of a plan to establish a Native Centralization Scheme which was intended to provide a means of cooperation through which Africans' ownership of land could be enhanced so as to cover all branches of agriculture, including sugar, wattle bark and other products. It could also be used as a means of capturing African trade that was dominated by Indians and of establishing businesses under African management. Dube was, however, forced to abandon the scheme ostensibly because the "Native mind is not yet fitted for it - nor is the European either,"⁶¹ and really because of possible whites' opposition to purchase of land by Africans. In spite of these setbacks, he was not shaken in his belief that "the more the natives have interest in the land, the better will they be contented, and less likely to rebel."⁶²

Dube and his fellow Africans were baffled by the whites' opposition to acquisition of

⁵⁹ R. Hunt Davis Jr., "John L. Dube: A South African Exponent of Booker T. Washington" in Journal of African Studies, Vol. II, No.4, Winter 1975-76, p.519.

⁶⁰ P.G. Mlambo, "John L. Dube, First President of the SANNC (ANC) and the Natives' Land Act of 1913" (B.A., Lesotho, 1980), p.2.

⁶¹ Colenso Collection 44, R.H. Tatham to H.E. Colenso, Durban, 13 May 1907.

⁶² Ilanga Lase Natal, 4 January 1907. See also R. Plant, The Zulu in Three Tenses, p.146.

land by Africans.⁶³ Africans' lack of capital militated against any major purchases while the frequent inability to continue payments made their position insecure even when the land had been allotted to them.⁶⁴ In African society monetary transaction and ideas featured but little. They were therefore placed "in a hopeless position when faced with a foreign concept of land transaction"⁶⁵ The African was, however, still keen to acquire land because like the owning of cattle, "the possession of land, to Native, is a natural ambition."⁶⁶

In giving evidence before the Natal Native Affairs Commission, Dube emphasized that the Christian Africans were very anxious to purchase land. Whereas he could countenance the imposition of restrictions in regard to land bought from the government, or land set apart for exclusive occupation by Africans, he was totally averse to any conditions being imposed in respect of land bought by Africans themselves in the open market.⁶⁷ It was in a similar vein that the Natal Mercury welcomed the Native Land Settlement Bill introduced by Moor in 1908 incorporating the recommendation of the Commission, as a measure that would benefit the Africans as it provided for the fixity of tenure and beneficial occupation especially

⁶³ Ilanga Lase Natal, 25 January 1907.

⁶⁴ A.J. Christopher, "Natal: A Study in Colonial Land Settlement" (Ph.D., Natal, 1969), pp.300-301.

⁶⁵ J. Sikakane, A Window on South Africa, p.11.

⁶⁶ D.D.T. Jabavu, The Black Problem, p.12. See also F. Wilson and D. Perrot (eds), Outlook on a Century: South Africa, 1870 - 1970, pp.271-272.

⁶⁷ Report and Evidence of Natal Native Affairs Commission, Evidence, Vol. II, Sect. III, p.958.

cultivation.⁶⁸ Dube similarly observed that it was a great folly to allege that the Africans were idle on the basis of waste lands in their areas, whilst lands owned by whites were also lying idle. "What is greatly needed to make the natives contented," Dube argued, "is to firmly establish him on the soil as a civilized farmer with a stake in the country to which he owes both birth and allegiance."⁶⁹

Very few whites favoured the grant of individual tenure to Africans. Sir Theophilus Shepstone was also opposed to a freehold land tenure system which he believed would make the granting of the franchise inevitable. He favoured instead the system of communal tenure which was believed to be acceptable to Africans.⁷⁰ The Natal delegates to the South African Native Affairs Commission also pointed out that the lands reserved for minute division into individual holdings.⁷¹ According to Mackenzie, Dube and his fellow educated Christian Africans strove towards the bourgeois ideal of individual ownership of land and the formation of communities in which each individual own his piece of land, with a local council administering the affairs of these areas.⁷² The few whites who supported the possession of landed

⁶⁸ The Natal Mercury, 24 April 1908. See also The Natal Witness, 30 May 1908.

⁶⁹ Ilanga Lase Natal, 4 December 1908.

⁷⁰ G.I.C. Evers, "Individual and Tribal Land Tenure: Aspects of the Natal Land Question, 1843-1910" (B.A. Hons, Natal, 1972), p.26. S. Trapido, "Natal's non-racial Franchise, 1856" in African Studies, Vol.22, 1963, p.28. L. Marquard and T.G. Stading, The Southern African Bantu, p.42.

⁷¹ The Natal Mercury, 14 February 1905.

⁷² D.J. Mackenzie, "Dube and the Land Issue, 1913-1936" (B.A. Hons, Natal, 1980), pp.11-12. A.B.M. A/2/24, Report on Conference held in Native Affairs Department on 5-7 February 1908.

property by Africans justified it on the grounds that it "will always be sheet anchor to contentment, enlightenment, and loyalty."⁷³ Lord Selborne, the High Commissioner, thought it unjust that civilized Africans who were struggling to escape the thralldom of tribal influence could be denied legal individual ownership of land.⁷⁴ The missionaries also pressed for individual freehold tenure in the Mission reserves in spite of its rejection by chiefs. They blamed the system of communal land tenure for the widespread wasteful use of land which they considered subversive of the best interests of the Africans.⁷⁵ In the opinion of Sir Matthew Nathan, the governor, if the Africans were given individual tenure of small plots of land "a great step would have been taken towards a partial working solution of a problem that humanly speaking can never be completely solved."⁷⁶

Dube also challenged the government over the parcelling out of land in Zululand without regard to African interests. Dube, who had cherished the view that the Africans who had fought side by side with Imperial forces against their brethren in the Anglo-Zulu War would be rewarded with plots of land in Zululand for their loyal service, was disturbed that instead the government thanked the African volunteers with

⁷³ R.C.A. Samuelson, Native Question, p.6. See also S.T. Plaatje, op. cit., p.X. The Natal Witness, 13 June 1903.

⁷⁴ Lord Selborne, Address Delivered before the Congregation of the University of Cape of Good Hope on 27th February 1909, p.25.

⁷⁵ H.D. Goodenough, Reply of the American Mission Reserve Trustees to Lands Commission Report, p.3. A.B.M. A/2/24, S.O. Samuelson to Rev. F.B. Bridgman, Pietermaritzburg, 15 January 1908. J.P.E. Barnes. op. cit., pp.1, 6.

⁷⁶ Ms Nathan 368, Nathan to Fr. Abbot, 10 June 1909.

an increase in taxation.⁷⁷ He berated the government for spending large sums of money keeping soldiers and volunteers to watch over possible African rising in Natal and Zululand when if appeased the Africans with land grants they would be prepared to sacrifice their lives in defence of colony.⁷⁸

According to C.R. Saunders, the Commissioner for Native Affairs in Zululand, the white farmers and speculators sought to acquire land without considering Africans as a factor in the settlement.⁷⁹ The land-grabbing spree was consummated when the Zululand Commission of 1902 - 1904, after delimiting a number of locations for the Zulus threw open large areas of the coveted territory to white settlements. The Natal government undertook to ensure that the occupation of Zululand by whites was accepted by the Africans.⁸⁰ In the initial arrangements Africans resident in Zululand could bid for lands if they were interested in occupation of the demarcated areas. Later the Sutton cabinet, however, stopped this because it felt that the Commission had treated the Africans with liberality as regards reserves and that they were apparently satisfied.⁸¹ Sir Henry McCallum attested that in his tours of Zululand he found that "the natives fully recognized the British as their conqueror and looked upon

⁷⁷ Ilanga Lase Natal, 19 June 1903.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 7 August 1903.

⁷⁹ P.M. 94 Confid. No. 6/1903, C.R. Saunders to Secretary for Native Affairs, Eshowe, 6 January 1903.

⁸⁰ G.H. 1232 No. 161, McCallum to Chamberlain, Pietermaritzburg, 4 June 1903. P.M. 95 Confid. No. 78/1903, Interview Report of the Zululand Land Delimitation Commission, 2 May 1903.

⁸¹ G.H. 1232 No. 309, McCallum to Lyttelton, Pietermaritzburg, 21 October 1903.

the setting aside of a portion of the conquered territory as the victor's spoils - a proceeding in accordance with native custom."⁸² The government had, therefore, decided that all available land in Zululand would be secured for purposes of white settlements and "it is not the intention to allow natives - whether exempted from native law or not - to buy land from European settlers."⁸³

Lands Delimitation Commission in 1905, the Ilanga Lase Natal maintained, however, that the Africans had the first and inalienable right in the land for which they looked upon the government to defend and protect.⁸⁴ This was more so because on the annexation of Zululand, Sir Melmoth Osborne, the Resident Commissioner, pledged that Zululand would be reserved for the sole occupation of the Zulus.⁸⁵ The Ilanga directly scoffed at the whites who were critical of the Commissioner's decision to allot reportedly good lands to the Africans at the expense of whites. It instead complained of unfair dealing that was motivated by the desire of the government and whites to pick out all the best parts of the land and give it to whites settlers leaving the Africans landless and homeless.⁸⁶

⁸² G.H. 1232 No. 373, McCallum to Lyttelton, Pietermaritzburg, 21 December 1903.

⁸³ G.H. 464 No. G994/1903, Geo. M. Sutton to McCallum, 18 December 1903. See also S.P. of the L.A., 1904, No. 22, p.344: Speech by Minister of Agriculture on the Alienation of Zululand Lands.

⁸⁴ Ilanga Lase Natal, 16 June 1905.

⁸⁵ P.M. 60 No.718/1906, A.J. Shepstone to Minister of Justice, Newcastle, 22 May 1906.

⁸⁶ Ilanga Lase Natal, 16 June and 7 July 1905.

The Ilanga also expressed profoundest discontent with the condition of the lands allotted to Africans by the Commission as barren, valueless and unsuitable for occupation. Dube sympathized with his Zulu brethren whose lands were demarcated and given to whites with the promise each time this was done that no further cutting up would be made, which was inexorably not fulfilled.⁸⁷ He also complained of unbridled land speculation and exploitation by companies and syndicates which used persons as their fronts when they applied for grants of land which, however, through lack of means they failed to develop. Dube viewed this as gross infringement of the granting of land in Zululand.⁸⁸ Dube subsequently blamed the delimitation of Zululand for the 1906 rebellion.⁸⁹

One other issue on which Dube did not see eye to eye with the government was the control and management of mission reserves.⁹⁰ In 1903 the mission reserves were 127 000 acres in extent with a population of 26 976 living in 6 359 huts and 2 914 kraals.⁹¹ Under Act No.25 of 1895 the governor-in-council was given extensive powers over mission reserve lands and their inhabitants. The law, however, remained a dead letter owing to the opposition of the American Zulu Mission which had more

⁸⁷ Ibid., 7 July 1905 and 6 September 1907. See also J.Y. Gibson, The Evolution of South African Native Policy, p.45.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 10 April 1908.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 4 November 1906. See also S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p.211. The causes of the rebellion are discussed in Chapter 8.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 10 July 1903.

⁹¹ Debates of the L.A., XXXIV, 1903, p.33. N.B.B. Vol. 24, 1904, Report of the Under Secretary for Native Affairs for 1904, 25 April 1905.

land in its possession than all the other missionary societies put together.⁹² Following upon the report of the Natal Lands Commission with remarks on the control of reserves under the jurisdiction of the American Zulu Mission, a bill was proposed whose purpose was to restore the complete control of mission lands to the government. The government whose authority would be vested in the Natal Native Trust, would be empowered to charge the Africans rent or to levy taxes of which it would retain half, with the other half going to the missionary bodies to be devoted to mission work, education and technical training. The government would after deducting expenses for collection devote the half retained by it to the improvement of the reserves concerned, like building of roads, bridges and other public work. In the opinion of F.R. Moor, who was then Secretary for Native Affairs, the Africans had to know that the money collected was used in their interests and for their benefit.⁹³

Dube immediately expressed the Africans' apprehensions towards the bill. Besides blaming the missionaries for ceding the reserves to the government, Dube felt that the real intention of the bill was to take away the reserves and hand them over to the whites who might have been considered better fitted to develop them.⁹⁴ He seriously

⁹² L.E. Switzer, "The Problems of an African mission in a white-dominated multi-racial Society: The American Zulu Mission in South Africa, 1895-1910" (Ph.D., Natal, 1971), pp.147-184).

⁹³ A.B.M. 1/2/24, Clerk of Natal Native Trust to Rev. J.D. Taylor, Pietermaritzburg, 12 February 1904. Debates of the L.A., XXIV, 1903, pp.32-38. V.P. of the L.C., XLI, 1903, pp.90, 608. V.P. of the L.C., XIII, 1903, pp.357, 404: Bill No.42 of 1903. L.E. Switzer, op. cit., pp.180-181, 185.

⁹⁴ Ilanga Lase Natal, 3 July 1908. L.E. Switzer, op. cit., p.164.

questioned the tenor of the bill in so far as it could mean the isolation of the trust created by the deeds of grant to the missionary bodies in which it was expressly stated that the lands would be kept for the sole occupation of the Africans to whom it was assumed they would eventually pass with the grant of freehold titles.⁹⁵ "No great improvements can be expected among the natives," Dube argued, "so long as they do not hold titles to these lands."⁹⁶

The government was, however, opposed to freehold tenure in the mission reserves and preferred leasehold system. F.R. Moor had remarked when he introduced the bill for the second reading that the idea of freehold was foreign to the Natal Africans and that if introduced it would lead to the government's loss of control over the Africans and a breakdown of the tribal system that would bring about "a condition of things by which each individual landowner is going to become a law unto himself."⁹⁷ In desperation, Dube urged the residents of the reserves to oppose the measure because it did not provide for the sale of these lands to Africans. "Leasehold," he opined, "remains to soothe your disappointment - leasehold ad infinitum - to be sure."⁹⁸

The bill was, however, proceeded with and promulgated into Act No.49 of 1903

⁹⁵ Ilanga Lase Natal, 10 January 1903 and 14 October 1904. L.E. Switzer, op. cit., pp.165-169.

⁹⁶ Ilanga Lase Natal, 10 July 1903.

⁹⁷ Debates of the L.A., XXIV, 1903, pp.34-35 Quotation on p.35.

⁹⁸ Ilanga Lase Natal, 14 October 1904.

whereupon the government drew up regulations based on it.⁹⁹ Significantly, nothing was said about individual tenure and, indeed, nothing was said about the rights of those who already had freehold tenure. Instead, rent was fixed at £3 a year. It was to be paid by all tenants, male or female, regardless of whether they held the land in freehold or not "..... in respect of every hut or dwelling situated in any Mission Reserve"¹⁰⁰ It also provided for the eviction or removal of a resident who failed to pay rent. This would also apply to any resident who was found to be notoriously immoral, insubordinate to constituted authority on the reserves, or was ill-disposed to and a disturber of peace, or who was convicted of any felony or misdemeanour in a court of law in the colony. The magistrates and appointed supervisors were to be in charge of the administration of the reserves.¹⁰¹

Christian Africans were quick to register their protest against the imposition of the £3 rent. Feelings were so deep and intense that some were threatening to leave the reserves. As reported by Rev. F.B. Bridgman, the Secretary of the American Zulu Mission, a committee was formed under the aegis of the Church and led by Martin Lutuli who owned land in Umvoti Mission Reserve, which made representations to the government on behalf of the residents who were reportedly opposed to the rent-paying principle even though it was one shilling a year instead of the sixty shillings.

⁹⁹ N.G.G.; L.V., 1903, No.3371, pp.1779-1780: Mission Reserves Act, No.49, 1903. A.B.M. A/2/24, S.O. Samuelson to Rev. J.D. Taylor, Pietermaritzburg, 23 January 1904.

¹⁰⁰ N.G.G.; LVI, 1904, No.574, p.1294: Regulations under the Mission Reserves Act, No.49, 1903. L.E. Switzer, *op. cit.*, pp.189-191.

¹⁰¹ N.G.G., LVI, 1904, No.574, p.1292 - 294: Regulations under the Mission Reserve Act, No.49, 1903. L.E. Switzer, *op. cit.*, pp.189-191.

They demanded freehold rights or failing that the government could "shoot them down like dogs, if it will"¹⁰²

In Dube's opinion, the Natal Native Trust would be well advised not to demand rent that the Africans could not afford as they were already paying the hut tax. If exorbitant rent were to be levied the residents would either leave the reserves or resist payment.¹⁰³ The Ilanga regarded the increased rent as unbearable and a cause of hardship to the Africans who as a result were finding it difficult to "give to the support of the pastors, to the maintenance and repair of churches, and to the whole missionary work."¹⁰⁴ The Ilanga also felt that the threat of eviction and removal of defaulters meant that the Africans would eventually be effectively deprived of those lands which they had understood to be granted to them in perpetuity.¹⁰⁵ The residents of reserves in Mapumulo and Indwedwe divisions made representations through their chiefs to the government complaining about the poverty of soil in these areas which necessitated the use of all earning in the purchase of food. S.O. Samuelson, the Under Secretary for Native Affairs, dismissed these pleas for the reason that to his knowledge the quality of arable land in the majority of the reserves

¹⁰² AZM (Pretoria), microfilm A756, F. Bridgman to Smith, 6 January 1905 as cited by L.E. Switzer, *op. cit.*, p.199.

¹⁰³ Ilanga Lase Natal, 15 January 1904 and 20 October 1905.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 11 November 1904. See also L.E. Switzer, *op. cit.*, pp.198-200. M.S. Evans, The Native Problem in Natal, p.19. N.B.B. Vol. 24, 1904, Report of Under Secretary for Native Affairs for 1904, 25 April 1905.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 9 December 1904 and 7 July 1905.

was good.¹⁰⁶

The missionary bodies also found themselves on the receiving end of the wrath wreaked by Dube and other indignant Africans. They were accused not only of ceding the reserve to the Natal Native Trust but of being responsible for the lack of provision for the sale of plots to residents of the reserves.¹⁰⁷ According to Wilcox who supported Dube in his opposition to the Act, the American Zulu Mission was against freehold tenure because it did not promise to bring any money from the Africans into its coffers. It had ceded the reserves to the government so that it could maintain and even improve its source of income without having to face the problem involved in collecting the money.¹⁰⁸ Significantly, even before parliament passed the measure, the American Zulu Mission hopefully looked forward to being "relieved from the laborious duties of administration, while at the same time the Reserves are to be administered substantially for the ends in view when the Reserves were first granted"¹⁰⁹ It also felt that it was weighed down with a heavy responsibility in running the reserves "for which we have received but little thanks from native, from colonist or from government and which has never added to our spiritual influence with the people among whom we labour."¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁶ N.B.B., Vol.24, 1904, Report of Under Secretary for Native Affairs, 25 April 1905.

¹⁰⁷ Ilanga Lase Natal, 3 July 1903 and 14 October 1904.

¹⁰⁸ L.E. Switzer, op. cit., pp.200, 202. A.B.M. A/2/24, Clerk of Natal Native Trust to Rev. Taylor, Pietermaritzburg, 30 August 1904.

¹⁰⁹ A.B.M. A/2/11, J. Smith to H.D. Goodenough, Boston, 23 March 1903.

¹¹⁰ A.B.M. A/2/11, General Letter for 1904, Undated. See also L.E. Switzer, op. cit., p.193.

The African residents of the reserves felt that the £3 rent was going into the pockets of some white missionaries whom they suspected of being responsible for it thus betraying the trust that existed between the two.¹¹¹ They were also accused of being in the campaign aimed at dispossessing Africans of their land. "Your missionaries came," writes J.W. Shepstone of the complaints of Africans, "and told us that we were to raise our eyes to Heaven, and while we did so our land was taken from us."¹¹²

Dube lambasted the missionaries for their apparent connivance with the government at hardships of residents of reserves. In 1907 and 1908 Dube bitterly attacked the decisions of the missionaries on land allotment on the reserves, and mission reserve rent, as well as their general social aloofness, lack of trust in their lay members, inadequate selection of African officers and constant failure to defend African interests.¹¹³

The AZM angrily dismissed Dube's attack on it "not only because of its gross misstatements and misrepresentation of the facts but even more because of its very unwholesome spirit."¹¹⁴ Dube was accused of casting serious reflection on the common honesty of the missionaries and of manifesting a spirit which could work irreparable harm in relations between the Africans and the mission. The AZM

¹¹¹ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p.77. Ilanga Lase Natal, 15 November 1907.

¹¹² J.W. Shepstone, "Submit or Die" The Native Problem, p.7.

¹¹³ Ilanga Lase Natal, 15 November 1907 and 20 March 1908.

¹¹⁴ A.B.M., Rev. F.B. Bridgman to S.A. Samuelson, Durban, 28 November 1907.

criticized Dube for his advice to Africans to have nothing more to do with the mission in as far as the reserves were concerned and his assurance that they could secure better terms from the government without the mission. The mission was placated only when on declaring its cheerful readiness to withdraw altogether from further participation in the reserves negotiations, the majority of Africans at the meeting where the announcement was made, disclaimed and disassociated themselves from Dube's indictment of missionaries and when Dube subsequently promised to insert a partial retraction in the Ilanga which, however, he did not do.¹¹⁵

The American Zulu Mission felt that the Africans would be well advised to learn the wisdom and trust missionaries in their efforts to secure them worthy rights and privileges from the government. It also cautioned the Africans against making the negotiations extremely difficult "by insisting upon impossible things and accepting nothing less than that."¹¹⁶ It continued to view the question of reserves as a lingering burning issue that was most difficult of final settlement. The Board's headquarters in Boston was disturbed by the position that Dube had taken but hoped that its local body would be able "to bring him back into line again and not let him swing off permanently."¹¹⁷ Dube's disillusionment with the mission was, however, more deep. It probably precipitated his resignation from the pastorate of Inanda

¹¹⁵ A.B.M. A/3/37, Rev. F.B. Bridgman to Rev. J.L. Barton, Durban, 30 November 1907.

¹¹⁶ A.B.M. A/2/18, Rev. J.L. Barton to Rev. F.B. Bridgman, Boston, 11 December 1907.

¹¹⁷ A.B.M. A/2/18, J.L. Barton to Rev. F.B. Bridgman, Boston, 13 January 1908.

ostensibly on grounds of being overworked.¹¹⁸

The AZM also blamed the government for punting it into hot soup by failing to honour its pledge not to increase rents on the reserves. It felt it was the imposition of the £3 rent by the Natal Native Trust, immediately upon the Missions' relinquishing of the trusteeship, that generated the feeling of injustice among Africans. The Mission continued, however, to make representations to the government on the issue, especially on behalf of families which through long residence considered that they had acquired a right in the land.¹¹⁹ It also accused the government of being animated by a desire to limit the freedom and independence of residents of reserves and warned that this might precipitate "a rising, not pacific and quiet, but fierce and irrepressible".¹²⁰ Significantly, the Mission had earlier dismissed the government's oft expressed wish to take control of the reserves on account of their being "used as the refuge of bad characters and of such natives as want to escape from the jurisdiction of their chiefs and live of a life of sheer idleness." It argued that the residents were much more industrious than the tribal Africans in the locations.¹²¹ Dube was of the same view. He attributed the castigation of Africans on the reserves

¹¹⁸ S. Marks, "The Ambiguities of Dependence: John L. Dube of Natal" in Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 1, No.2, April 1975, p.173.

¹¹⁹ A.B.M. A/2/18, Rev. J.L. Barton to Rev. J.D. Taylor, Boston, 2 May 1906. A.B.M. A/3/37, Secretary of AZM to S.O. Samuelson, Durban, 13 November 1908. Report and Evidence of Natal Native Affairs Commission, 1907, Evidence, Vol.II, Sect. III, p.962.

¹²⁰ A.B.M. A/2/18, J. Smith to Rev. J.D. Taylor, Boston, 9 December 1904.

¹²¹ H.D. Goodenough, Reply of the American Zulu Mission Reserve Trustees to Lands Commission Report, p.4.

as "a few lazy, drunken natives doing no good for themselves or the colony" to ".... jealousy and hatred of some of the Europeans" He felt that the policy of the government on the reserves had failed to bring about peace among the people, which was ironically just what the government had blamed the mission bodies for.¹²² The government's refusal to sanction the sale of land in the reserves to African residents was blamed by Dube and other people for the African's lack of enthusiasm to improve themselves.¹²³

The American Zulu Mission responded to the criticisms levelled at it by holding a series of meetings with the Christian Africans, seeking to convince them that it had their interests at heart. Interviews were arranged with government officials and when these proved unsuccessful, the mission in conjunction with the Africans presented petitions through F.F. Churchill and Marshall Campbell to the Legislative Assembly requesting that the £3 rent be reduced.¹²⁴ The Mission argued, much as did the government, that it derived no material benefits from the "exorbitant" rents. It merely sought to use the portion so that "those who pay the taxes may receive the greatest good from them."¹²⁵ To demonstrate to the African Christians that it was not to blame on the issue, it at one time thought of temporarily giving back its share to the

¹²² Ilanga Lase Natal, 19 May 1905 (from which the quotation comes) and 23 June 1905.

¹²³ Ilanga Lase Natal, 10 November 1905. A.B.M. A/3/37, Secretary of AZM to Rev. J.D. Taylor, Pietermaritzburg, 14 August 1905. M.S. Evans, The Native Problem in Natal, p.56.

¹²⁴ L.E. Switzer, *op. cit.*, pp. 192-195, 202-205. A.B.M. A/2/18, S.O. Samuelson to Rev. J.D. Taylor, Pietermaritzburg, 12 April 1906. A.B.M. A/2/18, Rev. J.L. Barton to Rev. J.D. Taylor, Boston, 31 May 1906.

¹²⁵ A.B.M. A/2/18, Rev. J.L. Barton to Rev. J.D. Taylor, Boston, 4 April 1906.

government but apparently ultimately decided against such a move.¹²⁶ As a result of increasing pressure from the Christian Africans and the Mission, the government finally relented in July 1906 and reduced the rent to £1 10s Od. per hut. The Natal Native Trust pledged to make a further reduction where and when it realized that the rent was excessively heavy on the residents.¹²⁷

While Dube was pleased with the outcome, he still stressed that the matter would be satisfactory resolved only when the Africans on the reserves were not made to pay rentals.¹²⁸ When he gave evidence before the Natal Native Affairs Commission, Dube interpreted the rental to mean that the land belonged to the government entitling it to turn to the Africans off the land.¹²⁹ Interesting enough, African pastors in the AZM had previously stated that the reserves belonged to the Africans "by right of original occupation and this right has been recognized in a great many ways."¹³⁰ Dube similarly informed the Commission that he thought the Africans believed that they were living on their own lands. He found the imposition of the rent repugnant because it discouraged the residents from carrying out their agricultural and business enterprises as they would otherwise have done. Equally obnoxious was the threat of

¹²⁶ A.B.M. A/2/18, Rev. J.L. Barton to Rev. J.D. Taylor, Boston, 31 May 1906.

¹²⁷ L.E. Switzer, *op. cit.*, pp.202-205. Ilanga Lase Natal, 31 August 1906.

¹²⁸ Ilanga Lase Natal, 31 August 1906.

¹²⁹ Report and Evidence of the Natal Native Affairs Commission, 1907, Evidence Vol.II Sect. III, p.962.

¹³⁰ A.B.M. A/2/30, Paper Prepared for the Union Conference of Missionaries and Native Pastors in the AZM, Umzumbe, 18-24 April 1906.

eviction of residents.¹³¹ He specifically cited the instance at Inanda where the resident magistrate had announced that all those who were in arrears with or failed to pay rentals would be fined £2 and in addition to be imprisoned and on their release be still ordered to leave their places of abode even though they had nowhere to go. Dube reviewed this as gross betrayal of trust by the British Government to whom the Africans commonly looked for their protection and security of tenure. He deplored the threatened eviction saying "Yeka izwe lobaba, yeka izwe letu."¹³²

The American Zulu Mission lent its support to Dube by petitioning the government to inform the residents of the reserves timeously if there were new measures to be enforced which were "likely to add to the confusion of the natives because of the want of uniformity in the action taken by the several Magistrates." It also urged that whenever the government dealt with defaulters it would have to take into account the loss of cattle, the almost universal lack of employment and the reduced wages that Africans were experiencing or getting.¹³³ The Mission was, however, astonished when the government responded by insisting that it expected the missionaries dismissed this, Moor considered them very ungrateful. The Mission still pressed that the issue be resolved by granting freehold rights to the residents which the government

¹³¹ Report and Evidence of the Natal Native Affairs Commission, 1907, Evidence, Vo.II, Sect.III, p.962.

¹³² Ilanga Lase Natal, 26 June 1908. The quotation means "Cry, our fatherland, Cry, our land."

¹³³ A.B.M. A/3/37, Secretary of AZM to S.O. Samuelson, Durban, 21 July 1908.

found difficult to entertain.¹³⁴

Dube also incisively criticized the Natal Native Trust for the inconsistent policy it pursued in its administration of the reserves. Dube poignantly remarked that whereas the government took over the reserves professedly to improve the conditions of the Africans, it had abjectly and dismally failed to effect this. Dube observed, as Brookes also confirms, that the Trust had controlled the locations for many years, but besides some tree planting, fencing and the construction of a few water-courses and roads, no attempts were made to improve the vast estates controlled by the Trust to make them habitable or carry a larger population.¹³⁵ Dube was of the view that Africans resident on the reserve would develop habits of industry and thrift if they were given allotments of land with the promise of permanent occupation and security if, after five years, they had developed the plots by erecting houses, planting fruit trees, raising pigs and poultry and planting crops.¹³⁶ According to Brookes, the 1906 Native Affairs Commission reported that the work of the Trust was adversely affected by the men who served on it and had recommended a change of trustees which was, however, not effected until Law 29 of 1910 which was itself promulgated with view to the Union.¹³⁷

¹³⁴ A.B.M. A/3/37, Rev. F.B. Bridgman to Rev. J.L. Barton, Durban, 18 September 1908, and Rev. F.B. Bridgman to Rev. E.F. Bell, Durban, 14 November 1908.

¹³⁵ Ilanga Lase Natal, 16 March 1906. E.H. Brookes, White Rule in South Africa, 1830 - 1910, p.164.

¹³⁶ Ilanga Lase Natal, 16 March 1906. Report and Evidence of Natal Native Affairs Commission, 1907, Evidence, Vol.II, Sect.III, p.962.

¹³⁷ N.G.G., LXIX, 1910, No.3815, pp.457: Law 29, 1910 "To Amend the Constitution of Natal Native Trust and Zululand Native Trust."

The Native Affairs Commission vindicated Dube's stance when it reported that Africans wanted fixity of land tenure on the reserves. It did not, however, recommend the granting of individual holdings to residents except to call for "the better utilization of Mission Reserves and the establishment of Village Settlements, under an inceptive form of self-government (including local taxation)." It recommended that conditional titles be granted but, significantly enough, "concurrently with an attempt to secure the surrender or purchase of the practically free titles already granted for portions of such lands." It also advocated the "rectification" of various specific grievances, among which was the "application of rents collected from Natives on Mission Reserves."¹³⁸

In its implementation of the Commission's recommendations, the Native Affairs Department attempted to persuade the Africans to accept the leasehold tenure it knew they did not favour. It also sought to divide responsibility with the missionaries and the African residents for whatever system it could introduce in the reserves.¹³⁹ Consequently, in 1908 the Department commissioned a small deputation consisting of Rev. F.B. Bridgman, Martin Lutuli and P.J. Gumede to the Transkeian territories where it would study the Glen Grey system and report back on its applicability to Natal conditions.¹⁴⁰ The Mission probably consented to its secretary, Bridgman, serving on the delegation because it hoped that if the matter of the reserves could be

¹³⁸ Report and Evidence of the Natal Native Affairs Commission, 1907, Report, pp.9, 17, 19-21, 52, 54. L.E. Switzer, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

¹³⁹ A.B.M. A/3/37, Rev. F.B. Bridgman to Rev. E.F. Bell, Durban, 8 April 1908.

¹⁴⁰ Ilanga Lase Natal, 28 August 1908.

solved in a manner satisfactory to the missionaries and the Africans it would signal the removal of a great burden from its shoulders thus leaving it free to concentrate on direct Christian work.¹⁴¹

The Christian Africans and in some places even non-Christian communities especially in the Amanzimtoti, Amahlongwa, Ifafa, Impapala and Umvoti reserves consistently clamoured for the introduction of individual tenure.¹⁴² In the Impapala reserve they strenuously opposed the leasehold system and made representations to the authorities at Eshowe requesting that they be allowed to buy the land they occupied and had improved. Even the reduction of the rent from £1 did not appease them.¹⁴³ Dube emphasized that the African could be contented only if he were given fixity of tenure in the reserves. "To leave him herded like cattle on locations with insecurity of tenure, or no tenure at all, and then expect him to behave, at mere bidding of authority," Dube pointed out, "..... is about as sensible as to expect a baby to read Shakespeare before mastering the ABC."¹⁴⁴

When the deputation that had been sent to the Transkei reported its observations, it considered that individual tenure would result in even greater saving of land in Natal than it did in the Transkei and would also promote industry and beneficial occupation.

¹⁴¹ A.B.M. A/2/18, Rev. J.L. Barton, to Rev. F.B. Bridgman, Boston, 20 June 1908.

¹⁴² A.B.M. A/3/37, Rev. F.B. Bridgman to Minister for Native Affairs, Durban, 30 December 1907.

¹⁴³ A.B.M. A/3/37, Rev. F.B. Bridgman to Nathan, Durban, 10 March 1908, and Rev. F.B. Bridgman to Rev. J.L. Barton, Durban, 18 September 1908.

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¹⁴⁴ Ilanga Lase Natal, 4 January 1907.

Freehold tenure also protected holders of land from injustice at the hands of chiefs and headmen, saved labour on the part of magistrates, greatly increased the government's revenue, and, by giving the title holder a stake in the country, increased his desire for its prosperity and deepened his loyalty.¹⁴⁵ Significantly, F.R. Moor, the Prime Minister and Minister for Native Affairs, was, according to Dhupelia, averse to granting land freehold to the Africans as he was convinced that "if an African owned land the government would lose control of him and he would consider himself equal to the white man."¹⁴⁶ In the bill for the "Creation and Administration of Native Land Settlements," he could only take the advice of the Commission and provided "for the establishment of Village Settlements under an inceptive form of self-government (including local taxation) and the issue of conditional titles thereon to secure fixity of tenure and beneficial occupation."¹⁴⁷

Though Dube initially hailed the bill as "decidedly beneficial" and holding tremendous possibilities for the Africans and the colony, he later changed his mind when as shall be shown in Chapter Nine, Africans who had sought an interview with Moor realized that they could not hope for anything but a raw deal and consequently took an

¹⁴⁵ Cd 4328, p.36: Report of Deputation to the Transkeian Territories, Encl. in Desp. 39, Nathan to Crewe, Durban, 23 July 1908. *The Natal Witness*, 22 August 1908.

¹⁴⁶ U.S. Dhupelia, "Frederick Robert Moor and Native Affairs of Natal, 1893-1903" (M.A., UD-W, 1980).

¹⁴⁷ N.G.G., 1908, No.3668, pp.302-308: Bill "For the Creation and Administration of Native Land Settlements." G.H. 1235 No.72, Nathan to Crewe, Durban, 1 May 1908.

uncompromising stand on the freehold tenure of land.¹⁴⁸ Dube joined forces with others on the committee that had been hurriedly formed by Africans to oppose the so-called "Moor's Bills" and he was very instrumental in having the bill dropped.¹⁴⁹

Moor reeled under the blow delivered by the Christian Africans. Without acknowledging his miscalculations and mistakes, he was softened into admitting that the measures contemplated by the bill could still be implemented under the then existing legislation thereby serving as a useful experiment before individual tenure and local self-government were tried on an extended scale. He proposed experimenting with the issue of individual titles to residents of the Umvoti Mission Reserve, who had long expressed themselves to be keenly in favour of such a move.¹⁵⁰ The American Zulu Mission, while regretting the uncertain fate of the Land Settlements Bill, also still hoped that the main features of the measure could be brought into operation.¹⁵¹ When the issue came before the Council for Native Affairs which was constituted in 1909, the Mission saw cause for rejoicing over the proposed cutting up of the reserves into individual holdings which it had long been advocating.¹⁵² Dube should have

¹⁴⁸ Ilanga Lase Natal, 15 May 1908 (from which the quotation is taken). A.B.M. A/3/37, Rev. F.B. Bridgman to Rev. J.L. Barton, Durban, 13 June 1908.

¹⁴⁹ Ilanga Lase Natal, 17, 24 July 1908. SNA 1/1/411 No.2812/08, Dube to Moor, Durban, 4 September 1908. G.H. 1235 No.261, Nathan to Crewe, Durban, 30 October 1908. See Chapter 9 for further details.

¹⁵⁰ G.H. 1235 No.261, Nathan to Crewe, Durban, 30 October 1908.

¹⁵¹ A.B.M. A/3/37, Rev. F.B. Bridgman to S.O. Samuelson, Durban, 13 November 1908.

¹⁵² A.B.M. A/3/37, Rev. F.B. Bridgman to Rev. J.L. Barton, Durban, 3 September 1909, and Rev. F.B. Bridgman to Resident Magistrate (Ndwedwe), Durban, 9 December 1909.

been pleased with the turn of events.

If there was one issue over which Dube most openly challenged and strenuously opposed the policy of the government, it was land. The reason for the stance he adopted over this question is that he personally regarded ownership of land as crucial and central to the social, political and economic development of the Africans. He continued to attach great significance to the acquisition of land by Africans even after the period under discussion.

LABOUR QUESTION

As early as 1904, Dube questioned the absolute powers of the Governor as Supreme Chief to call chiefs and their men to supply labour for public works. He sharply criticized the forcing of the men to go to work on the roads against their will. Equally demnable was the fines that were imposed on chiefs who failed to supply the required men.¹⁵³ The governor exercised these powers in terms of Law 19 of 1891 which amended and codified previous enactments.¹⁵⁴ The principle upon which the system had been established was that the supreme chief had the right, according to the custom of the Zulus, to call upon members of his nation for their services when he

¹⁵³ Ilanga Lase Natal, 15 April 1904.

¹⁵⁴ E.D. Gasa, "The Native Question in Natal, 1880 - 1893: An Inquiry with reference to the Struggle for Constitutional Reform in the colony" (M.A., UNISA, 1974) pp.130-140.

had occasion for it, and that they were bound to obey the call and give that service.¹⁵⁵ It was also justified on the grounds that in Zululand "the man's life and property were taken and used at the chiefs' uncontrollable whim and caprice."^{156(a)} In Dube's opinion the system was tantamount to "forced labour,"^(b) which, according to Samuelson, added "another grievance to the long list that the natives were enduring."¹⁵⁷

That the system was utterly detestable to the Africans there can be little doubt. As Colenso points out the Africans "knowing their own law, could not tell what to make of the white chiefs' decisions, which were manifestly at variance with it, but had perforce to submit."¹⁵⁸ Not only was the exercise of these powers by the Supreme Chief described as outrageously autocratic and despotic by concerned Europeans, but Africans so intensely resented the compulsion that they preferred to dwell on private farms rather than go into and settle in the locations.¹⁵⁹ Besides, the practice put arbitrary power into the hands of strong chiefs who at time used it with slight regard

¹⁵⁵ G.H.1273 No.122, Beaumont to Elgin, Pietermaritzburg, 2 August 1907. The Natal Witness, 8 April 1903.

¹⁵⁶ (a) G.H. 1555 No.G59/1877, Report on the Supply of Labour by the Attorney-General, M.H. Gallwey, 9 May 1878.

(b) Ilanga Lase Natal, 15 April 1904.

¹⁵⁷ R.C.A. Samuelson, Long, long ago, p.188.

¹⁵⁸ A. Werner and H.E. Colenso, "White and Black in Natal" in Contemporary Review, London, 1893, p.207. See also L. Marquard and T.G. Standing, The Southern African Bantu, pp.41-42.

¹⁵⁹ Blue Books Vol.2, 1903 - 1909, Annual Reports of the Department of Native Affairs for the year 1909 by A.J. Shepstone, pp. IV-V. A Werner and H.E. Colenso, op. cit., p.210. M.S. Evans, Black and White in South East Africa, p.130.

to justice by repeatedly calling out men from the same homesteads. It also reduced the power of the weak chiefs in the eyes of the government and their people when it became increasingly difficult for them to comply with the demands of the government and were fined or sharply rebuked or defied by their subjects¹⁶⁰.

Dube considered the compulsory rendering of service on public works to be as mischievous as the corvée system in pre-revolutionary France. It was the cause of great hardship to the Africans and of needless irritation to the whites. Not only did it intensify "race hatred", but it also retarded progress of the colony¹⁶¹. The whites' expression of discontent was, however, directed more at the government than at the Africans whose freedom to work for whom they pleased, was restricted. The colonists complained that the government had the monopoly of African labour from this source and that it fixed wages far lower than they were willing to give¹⁶². It is not surprising that Africans in their preference to work for higher wages and for whom they chose, often endeavoured to evade the obligation to render service for the government by producing written documents purporting to show that they were in service, and by alleging liability for money advanced on the understanding that labour

¹⁶⁰ M.S. Evans, The Native Problem in Natal, p.20. Extant Circulars Issued to Magistrates by the Department of Native Affairs, 1893-1905, S.N.A. No. 2/05 by Harrison, 17 January 1905: Men who were called out were in certain instances in excess of the estimated ordinary requirements and formed a surplus that was deliberately created from which the public works department could draw for special purpose.

¹⁶¹ Ilanga Lase Natal, 25 March 1904.

¹⁶² Z.A. Konckacki, Public Finance and Economic Development of Natal, 1893-1910, pp.148-149. C.E. Alexson, "The History of Taxation in Natal prior to Union" (M. Comm., Natal-Union, 1936), p.44. The Natal Witness, 25 April 1905.

would be given in return¹⁶³. Whereas this smacks of the whites' exploitation of the situation and obviously prompted the government to adopt control measures, the Africans were evidently delivered into the hands of desperate colonists by conditions under which they had to work for the government.

One of the main grievances of the Africans against the isibalo system was that wages which varied between £1 and £1 10s were so bad and low that they could not meet their tax obligations, chief among which was the 14s hut tax¹⁶⁴. According to Statham, however, the Africans were satisfied "... and as he gets his food, and in nearly all caswes his clothes, all he recieves in the way of wages is clear again"¹⁶⁵. Another cause for complaint might have been the period of service of six months at far away places where the basic pleasures of Zulu source life like courting of girls and beer drinking were adversely restricted¹⁶⁶. These grievances led the Africans to believe that they were called up to exert themselves less energetically thereby making the system very expensive in money terms. "The native is very human", the Natal Mercury observed, "and when he feels he has to work at a lower wage than the market value of his labour, he takes very good care that he does as little as possible"¹⁶⁷.

¹⁶³ Extant Circulars Issued to Magistrates by the Department of Native Affairs, 1893-1905, S.N.A. No 14/02 by S.O. Samuelson, 21 April 1902.

¹⁶⁴ B.S. Kelleher, "Isibalo System in Natal and Zululand" (B.A. Hons., Natal, 1970), p.15. N.B.B. Vol., 1904, Report of the Under Secretary for Native Affairs, 25 April 1905. M. Wilson and L.M. Thompson, The Oxford History of South Africa, Vol II, p. 117.

¹⁶⁵ F.R. Statham, Black, Boers and British: A Three cornered Problem, p.152.

¹⁶⁶ J. Stuart, A History of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906, p.27.

¹⁶⁷ The Natal Mewrcury, 9 April 1903.

Consequently, there were strong protests against the system which ranged from pressure to contrive means to make the isibalo system more popular, to calls that forced labour should be done away with¹⁶⁸. The South African Native Affairs Commission sharply deprecated the system of compulsory labour which it considered not only as unjust but also as economically unsound¹⁶⁹. The Commission recommended that the obligation on the Africans to render such labour should cease on the imposition of increased taxation up to and above £1 per annum that it proposed as a measure that would compel them to work¹⁷⁰.

The government, though quick to adopt the recommendation of increased taxation, did not abolish compulsory labour. The reason advanced for this step was that it feared that that might encourage many Africans residing on locations and Crown lands to lead idle lives especially in view of the only 14s hut tax that they paid and the infrequent call out to render service on public works. H.D. Winter, the Minister of Native Affairs, remarked that the rate of levy "is a small one, namely one man for every eleven huts per annum, so that you will see that this is anything but a

¹⁶⁸ Colenso Collection 74, H.E. Colenso to W.A. Accult, Pietermaritzburg, Bishopstowe, 24 October 1903. The Natal Mercury, 9 April 1903. The Natal Witness, 12 May 1906. According to Marshall Campbell the System was "a mild form of slavery". Debates of the L.A., XIV, 1905, p.196.

¹⁶⁹ Report of the South African Native Affairs Commission, 1903-1905, \$380, p.58. "It is wasteful, ineffective and at the same time intensely distasteful to the native". The Times of Natal, 16 February 1905.

¹⁷⁰ Report of the South African Native Commission Affairs Commission, 1903-1905, \$419, p. 65.

hardship."¹⁷¹

Even in the aftermath of the 1906 rebellion, F.R. Moor, then the Prime Minister and Minister of Native Affairs, was loathe to include compulsory labour in the terms of reference of the Natal Native Affairs Commission on grounds that there was no much that was known about the subject that the Commission would be unlikely to elicit any new facts. In his opinion "the natives have no reason to complain of the manner in which they are treated beyond that the system is one of forced labour."¹⁷² Significantly, this was said at a time when the Natal Native Congress, through its secretary, H.C.C. Matiwane, had come out strongly against compelling Africans to work in public works and road parties that were far removed from their locations. it had urged the government to abolish compulsory labour and to employ its own labour and pay it decent wages.¹⁷³

Dube completely denounced the taxation of the Africans as a means to force them to labour for the government and the whites. He condemned all the attempts and legislation which had in view the increase of the African labour supply as bent "towards making the native a muscular machine and too little towards making him a man."¹⁷⁴ Taxation as an indirect means of compulsion to labour in the service of the

¹⁷¹ G.H. 1237 No.G235/1906, Minute S.N.A. No.915/06, Minister of Native Affairs to Prime Minister, 2 April 1906.

¹⁷² G.H. 1555 No.G350/1906, C.J. Smythe to McCalllum, 13 September 1906.

¹⁷³ S.T. Van der Horst, Native Labour in South Africa, p.49. J. Burger, The Black Man's Burden, p.23.

¹⁷⁴ Ilanga Lase Natal, 24 July 1903.

whites served more to exploit the Africans than to civilize them as was claimed by government officers.¹⁷⁵ It was in the time used in conjunction with heavy tariffs on African-purchased imports, the enforcement of European-style dress, fines and medical fees as a lever for bringing forth labour that the whites desperately needed.¹⁷⁶ Unfortunately, these measures had the unpredicted outcome of irritating and arousing the suspicion of the Africans as to the good faith of the government.¹⁷⁷ The Africans resisted such exaction of their labour by seeking work in diamond and gold mines outside the colony which caused an incensed public agitation and outcry amongst the whites who were hard pressed for labour.¹⁷⁸

When the whites failed to recruit and secure African labour in fair amount, the only alternative was to import Indian and Chinese labour, as well as labour from neighbouring countries.¹⁷⁹ Dube was sharply critical of the move as he considered it to be fraught with dangerous consequences and difficulties for the African. He warned that the importation of labour from the Orient would create "a hot bed of poverty and discontent" among the Africans to whom Natal owed its prosperity and

¹⁷⁵ S.T. Van der Horst, Native Labour in South Africa, p.49. J. Burger, The Black Man's Burden, p.23.

¹⁷⁶ J. Robinson, A Life Time in South Africa, p.301. S. Marks and A. Atmore, Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa, p.161. D.D.T. Jabavu, "Native Disabilities" in South Africa, p.11.

¹⁷⁷ SANRC, The South African Natives: Their Progress and Present Condition, p.49.

¹⁷⁸ SNA 1/8/10a No.C15/03, F.R. Moor to Commissioner for Native Affairs for Johannesburg, Pietermaritzburg, 27 January 1903. S. Marks and A. Atmore, op. cit., p.162.

¹⁷⁹ J.M. Tinley, The Native Labor Problems of South Africa, p.19. The Natal Witness, 1 January 1903.

economic advancement.¹⁸⁰ Openly declaring that he was speaking not only for the Zulus but for all the African races, Dube maintained that there was sufficient African labour in Natal to meet the general requirements but that "the only way to secure it is to pay for it fairly and squarely"¹⁸¹ Dube also felt that there was need for legislation that would compel the African, for his own benefit and well-being, to constant employment in healthy conditions enabling him to contribute to the prosperity of the colony while at the same time improving his person and social character.¹⁸² The Natal Mercury was of the same opinion for while admitting that the colony was dependent upon Africans for labour, deficient though this was in terms of both quantity and quality,¹⁸³ it impressed the need for organising the labour supply in a way that would be beneficial to both the colony and the Africans. The Africans could be drawn to work and the supply and reliability of their labour maintained if the conditions and period of service were changed and the labourers provided with accommodation so that they could live with their families.¹⁸⁴

The vexed and burning labour question was made the more so by the whites' sad lack of knowledge of the African way of life. As Tinley observes, there was no labouring class in a traditional Zulu society and the idea of working for wages had no part in their social structure. The wage lure alone, earned after irksome employment, hard

¹⁸⁰ Ilanga Lase Natal, 24 April 1904.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., 7 October 1904.

¹⁸² Ibid., 8 December 1905.

¹⁸³ The Natal Mercury, 26 March 1906.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 4 August 1908.

and hazardous work, far from home and friends, was thus insufficient to ensure a continuous and adequate flow of African labour.¹⁸⁵ Africans only worked when they were faced with problems of scarcity of food and want of money for lobola.¹⁸⁶ The tribal Africans had for long regarded it as a shame for a Zulu to work for a white man and anyone of them who dared to do that was despised and called a "kafula". Only the Zulu king and his big indunas could have service rendered to them.¹⁸⁷ It was only very late that the Zulus felt the changes brought by the powers of money, and when they did they complained of the high cost of living which led to them to press that "we must be better paid than formerly when we were not accustomed to the ways of white man."¹⁸⁸

Dube also remonstrated with those whites, who though often raising the hue and cry against lazy Africans, held fixed notions that "the natives are here to be exploited." He was delighted to find that in spite of the low wages and the inhumane treatment that they received at the hands of the whites, there was a remarkable increase in the number of working Africans.¹⁸⁹ Dube's view is confirmed by Sowden and Burger who observe that many whites laboured under the impression that the Africans only

¹⁸⁵ J.M. Tinley, op. cit., pp.18-19. See also SANRC, op. cit., p.46.

¹⁸⁶ N.B.B. Vol.20, 1903, p.24: Report by the Magistrate of Umlazi, W.R. Saunders, 11 January 1904.

¹⁸⁷ Natal Missionary Conference, Proceedings, July 1908, pp.9-10: Presidential Address by Rev. R. Blake.

¹⁸⁸ Ilanga Lase Natal, 12 February 1904.

¹⁸⁹ Ilanga Lase Natal, 26 April 1907. See also A. Werner and H.E. Colenso, "Native Affairs in South Africa" in Journal of the African Society, 1905-1907, pp.179-180.

existed to be at the whites' beckoning, and that locations had been created to be reservoirs from which they would draw labour.¹⁹⁰ According to A.W. Lee, whites expected the African "to labour in order to uphold the dignity of the European, but with no rights of his own outside of those common to all humanity, namely, the right of eat, sleep, and draw his breath".¹⁹¹

Dube constantly and persistently pleaded for a much more considerable treatment of African labourers. He, like Sir Godfrey Lagden and Lord Selborne, exhorted employers not to regard the African as simply as species of slave, but in their own interests to look after the well-being of their employees and provide some training on basic essentials of decent living.¹⁹² It was in this way that they would be assured of loyal and long service by Zulus who, on the whole, ".... are good humoured, anxious to oblige, offended at nothing and extremely honest"¹⁹³ Dube advocated the abolition of the *togt* system and substituting registration and apprenticeship arrangements. The *Ilanga*, as well as the *Natal Mercury*, called for written agreements between employers and servants and the inspection of premises where

¹⁹⁰ L. Sowden, *The Land of Afternoon*, p.15. J. Burger, *The Black Man's Burden*, p.50.

¹⁹¹ A.W. Lee and J.L. Dube, "The Clash of Colour" in *Natal Missionary Conference Papers*, Durban, 1926, p.1.

¹⁹² A.W. Lee and J.L. Dube, *op. cit.*, p.9. G. Lagden, "The Native Question in South Africa" in C.S. Goldmann (ed), *The Empire and the Century*, London, 1905, p.554. Lord Selborne, *Address Delivered before the Congregation of the University of the Cape of Good Hope on 27th February 1909*, p.9.

¹⁹³ A. Trollope, *South Africa*, Vol.I, p.322. See also G.R. Hance, *The Zulu Yesterday and Today*, p.46. *Ipepa Lo Hlanga*, 26 June 1903. The paper wrote "One has only to go to those farmers who treat their native farm labourers well and pay them reasonable wages and one will be satisfied that a native is a reliable man."

Africans were employed.¹⁹⁴ In the opinion of the South African Native Races Committee the employers who were indifferent to efforts to improve the education of their employees and were content to express their preference for uneducated Africans, were doing so at their own peril. It observed that where basic training had been provided by the employers, it had been possible to apply labour economically and to introduce progressive methods of agriculture and industry.¹⁹⁵

The Ilanga, emphatically denied that the Africans were lazy which was a common indictment that ran freely from the tongues of some colonists.¹⁹⁶ Even missionaries believed that Africans lived in idleness, a ".... sloth, they commonly suspected, depended on the evils of polygamy."¹⁹⁷ Obviously, one mistake that the whites committed was to assume that because the African would work for an employer for only six months at a stretch, the rest of the time he was idle and could not be made to work all the year round for a white master except upon the adoption of certain measures which would vary according to requirements of the case. As the Natal Mercury observed, the African was unreliable as a labourer "not because he is indolent, but because of the condition of his life, and these conditions cannot be altered in a day, or in even a generation."¹⁹⁸ According to Sir John Robinson, the

¹⁹⁴ Ilanga Lase Natal, 15 May 1908. The Natal Mercury, 26 August 1908.

¹⁹⁵ SANRC, op. cit., pp.50-51.

¹⁹⁶ Ilanga Lase Natal, 11 November 1904. See also The Natal Advertiser, 3 April 1903. F.R. Statham, Black, Boers and British: A Three-cornered Problem, p.151.

¹⁹⁷ L.H. Gann and P. Duignan, Colonialism in Africa, 1870 - 1960, p.485.

¹⁹⁸ The Natal Mercury, 5 January 1906.

first premier of Natal, the Africans might have detested working for the whites because of "undoubted jealousy with which the intrusion of Europeans into their midst has been viewed."¹⁹⁹ Dube attested to the existence of discontent among Africans which, to him, was not only natural but also acceptable "for a people who could be contented with things as they are, would offer very little inducement for a forward and enlightened policy being pursued. The discontent is a sign of manhood, that manhood, which if rightly used will be a boon to South Africa and to the Empire."²⁰⁰

Dube attributed the Africans' disinclination to work to the fact that their wants were few "consequently their exertions are demanded and applied accordingly."²⁰¹ According to Hertslett, Trollope, and Doxey, among others, the Africans could be stimulated to work if and when their needs were increased through education and advancement.²⁰² Molema observes that despite his limited wants, the African worked to support "the whole economic fabric on his despised and dusky back".²⁰³ "It is, as a rule, from those who want the Native to work for them at their own terms," Werner and Colenso write, "that we hear so much about his idleness..."²⁰⁴

¹⁹⁹ J. Robinson, Notes on Natal, p.41.

²⁰⁰ Ilanga Lase Natal, 5 July 1907.

²⁰¹ Ibid., 11 November 1904.

²⁰² L.E. Hertslett, The Native Problem, p.49. A Trollope, op. cit., p.323. G.V. Doxey, The Industrial Colour Bar in South Africa, p.50.

²⁰³ S.M. Molema, The Bantu Past and Present, p.254.

²⁰⁴ A. Werner and H.E. Colenso, "Native Affairs in South Africa" in Journal of the African Society, 1905-1907, p.182. E.D. Gasa, op. cit., p.91.

most probably did not occur to those who rapped the Africans for refusing to come out and work for the whites that their disinclination to work was due to long absence from home and its pleasure, life in squalid and unfamiliar surroundings, restriction and constraint of regular hours and continuous work, and the abandonment of the ease, comfort and pleasure of African village life.²⁰⁵ Under the circumstances even their white counterparts would have been loathe to work.

The issue of African labour supply was superseded by the taxation measures that were introduced in 1905 in order to get the Africans to work and also to cause them to contribute to the colony's exchequer. In the eyes of the African these measures were nothing but harsh and drastic as they were out of keeping with his natural inclination, needs and life style. Hence they were detested and opposed in the manner evidenced by Dube and his contemporaries. The labour issue might have been resolved differently if the colonists were patient with the evolutionary growth of new African needs instead of pressing for immediate satisfaction of their demands for African labour. The Africans should have been made to come out voluntarily and work to satisfy, as Dube observed, increased wants.

²⁰⁵ M.S. Evans, Black and White in South East Africa, p.175. L.E. Hertslett, op. cit., p.4.

CHAPTER SIX

DUBE'S CLAMOUR FOR A WORTHWHILE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
FOR THE AFRICANS

For some time, Dube was at loggerheads with the government and the whites on the issue of African education. Dube was determined to lead the Africans to the realization that education and knowledge were the key to advancement in the developing industrial society of Natal. On the other hand, the whites thought that education unfitted the black man for his station in life which was labouring for the white man. Dube became a symbol of scorn, hatred and prejudice amongst the officials and the colonists because of his teachings, activities and projects. It was only after the 1906 rebellion that for the first time the government realized that Dube was not a troublemaker but a person devoted to the advancement of his people.

Dube's stance on African education was largely influenced by the views of Booker T. Washington. Dube set great store by the development of the virtue of thrift and industry, education and capitalistic trends amongst his fellow Africans.¹ It was with this in view that he founded Ohlange in 1901 which in spite of humble beginnings was to produce under his guidance men and women who could stand independently and be equal to the human tasks in their society.² Like Washington, Dube believed that

¹. S. Marks, "The Ambiguities of Dependence: John L. Dube of Natal" in Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 1. No. 2, April 1975, p. 165.

². B.T.W, 228/1903, F.M. Sutton to Washington, Broadway, 25 June 1903. BTW 219/1903, E.D. Horton to Washington, Brooklyn, 26 June 1903.

educated Africans "should not protest to alter but to struggle to become part of a competitive culture."³ Of the white who was afraid of African competition, Dube said he "..... is not worthy of the race to which he belongs."⁴ Dube cherished lofty notions of educated Africans whom he regarded as having a singular mission amongst their people. He felt that "... the Christianizing and civilizing of Africa's millions must be largely accomplished through the agency of her own sons and daughters."⁵

The government was alarmed by the possible outcome of Dube's activities and not only overtly refused him assistance and grants in aid but also harassed him. Dube managed to survive and maintain his school with little help of his American associates and he made numerous appeals to Washington for material assistance.⁶ Even here the governments' ugly intentions were periodically to surface in attempts to frustrate Dube. For example, the government could not allow him to employ Afro-American teachers for fear that they would teach Africans racial ill-feeling.⁷ Dube also remarked that he had difficulty in collecting and obtaining money in Natal to run his school because the majority of whites were hostile to the education of blacks. These

³. W.M. Marable, "Booker T. Washington and African Nationalism" in Phylon, December 1974, p. 402.

⁴. J.L. Dube, "A Native View of Christianity in South Africa" in Missionary Review of the World, Ns 14, June, 1901, p. 425. See also Inkanyiso, 25 May 1894.

⁵. J.L. Dube, A Talk upon my Native Land, p. 41.

⁶. B.T.W. 346/1907, Washington to Dube, 25 October 1907; Dube to Washington, Phoenix, 30 November 1907; Washington to Dube, 3 January 1908. S. Marks, op. cit., p. 169.

⁷. B.T.W. 346/1907, Dube to Washington, Phoenix, 21 September 1907.

whites went on to brand him "an undesirable agitator", to which he retorted by stating that he had no motive other than the welfare of his people.⁸ Far from being disillusioned by these manoeuvres, he was happy that "a great number of civilized natives are anxious to push forward in spite of prejudice of our white people."⁹

Evidently, Dube had assumed the role of spokesman for the exempted and Christian Africans who in their identification with the values of the whites were making increasing demands for education. He claimed that the Africans were not satisfied to live under servile conditions but were desirous of civilization and also aspired to education for which the demand exceeded the supply.¹⁰ The Ilanga observed that the rallying cry amongst Africans was enlightenment which would free them from the chords of bondage and political tyranny of the ruling caste: "Sipe imfundo epapeme, sipe imfundo enkulu."¹¹ Dube strongly condemned the attitude of those whites who were bent on placing obstacles on the African's acquisition of learning.¹²

⁸. K.C.L 20444 Newspaper Book 9, in Natal Advertiser, 21 September 1936.

⁹. BTW 346/1907, Dube to Washington, Phoenix, 21 September 1907.

¹⁰. J.L. Dube, "The Black Problem in South Africa" in Missionary Review of the World, March, 1916, p. 205. S. Marks, "Christian African Participation in 1906 Zulu Rebellion" in the Bulletin of the Society for African Church History, Vol. 2, No. 1, December 1965, p. 66.

¹¹. Ilanga Lase Natal, 30 January 1903. See also the issue of 17 June 1904. It means "Give us better education, give us education of a higher quality".

¹². Ibid., 24 June 1904.

Dube's views were confirmed by the South African Native Affairs Commission when it reported that "it is evident that there is among the people themselves a growing desire for education, which cannot and need not be suppressed."¹³ It did not, however, recommend any measure of compulsory education for Africans. Nor did it approve of any system of general public undenominational education, independent of existing missionary bodies, a point which most probably chagrined Dube. He should, however, have been mollified by the Commissions' recommendation that special encouragement and support by way of grants-in-aid should be given to schools and institutions which offered efficient industrial training.¹⁴ Marshall Campbell who was Natal delegate on the Commission, brought home to the whites his realization that "the native who is Christianised and educated, and is not simply a clotred native, is a far more useful man than the raw Kaffir".¹⁵ Though it was generally acknowledged that education had a wholesome effect on the Africans, the Natal Native Affairs Commission reaffirmed the 1903 Commission's findings that the Africans' "cry for education, assistance, and advice ..." had not been met despite the evidence that "the Christian, or educated, Native wants more education."¹⁶

¹³. Report of the South African Native Affairs Commission, 1903 - 1905, & 329, p. 49.

¹⁴. Ibid., SS 329, 342, pp. 51, 52 respectively.

¹⁵. K.C.L. Pam 380 Sug Article Entitled "The Sugar Industry etc," in Cape Argus, 14 September 1911.

¹⁶. Report and Evidence of the Natal Native Affairs Commission, Report, SS 13 - 14, p. 9. See also O.E. Emanuelson "A History of Native Education in Natal between 1835 and 1927" (M. Ed., Natal - Unisa, 1927), p. 174.

The clamour for education was, however, not restricted to exempted, or Christian, educated Africans. According to Emanuelson tribal Africans had as early as 1896 realized the value of education as far as the earning of money was concerned because of the success of their educated brethren on the gold mines. The result was that several chiefs and headmen applied for schools to be established in their areas.¹⁷ As reported by Hertslett, they demanded education "because we want to learn, to progress, and to improve ourselves, because we see what education has done for you white people, because some white men take advantage of our ignorance."¹⁸

Dube personally thought that there were tremendous possibilities in the raising of agricultural production if the Africans could be taught to use ploughs, harrows and other farming implements.¹⁹ He specifically blamed the lack of education which he called the Africans' bane causing "all his barbarism and wicked customs; all his witchcraft and superstition; all his indolence and uselessness in the labour market, all his social degradation and abject poverty, all his pathological stupidity and political misunderstanding....."²⁰ Dube maintained that the majority of Africans "..... are just emerging from barbarism; and are still ignorant of civilization; and if nothing is done to educate us and bring us in touch with civilization we are bound to retard the

¹⁷. L.E. Hertslett, The Native Problem, p. 62. See also C.W. de Kiewiet, A History of South Africa, p. 233.

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¹⁹. J.L. Dube, "Zululand and the Zulus" in Missionary Review of the World, Ns 21 June, 1898, p. 438. See also Report of the South African Native Affairs Commission, S 342, p. 52.

²⁰. J.L. Dube, The Zulu's Appeal for Light and England's Duty, p. 6.

progress of South Africa."²¹

Concerning the much published feeling of animosity and mutual hatred between tribal and educated Christian Africans, Dube believed that this was formed by "those of his own and of the white race who ferment discord between the races, and who wish to keep the black man from rising."²² It has also been suggested that an increasing number of educated Christian Africans relapsed into heathenism or barbarism as soon as they were back home.²³ This was mostly probably adduced to justify that Africans were uneducable. John Robinson, the first Prime Minister, argued that the remark "... does not, of course, apply to the denizens of mission stations, who keep decently clad, both at home and abroad, all through the year."²⁴

Dube also reflected on the government and colonists' meanness about African education and questioned the assertion that education was of no utility to the African. He discountenanced the paternalistic and patronizing attitude of those who were only interested in the type of education of Africans that would serve their interest and

²¹. Ilanga Lase Natal, 2 June 1905.

²². J.L. Dube, "Are Negroes Better off in Africa: Conditions and Opportunities in America and Africa Compared" in Missionary Review of the World, Ns 27, August, 1904, p. 584. See also O.E. Emanuelson, op. cit., pp. 153 - 154. D. Kidd, Kaffir Socialism and the Dawn of Individualism, p. 153.

²³. H. Davies and R.H.W. Shepherd, South African Missions: 1800 - 1950, p. 217. F. Wilson and D. Perrot (eds) Outlook on a Century, p. 199. G.R. Hance, The Zulu Yesterday and Today, p. 147.

²⁴. J. Robinson, A Life Time in South Africa, p. 314.

would restrict their progressive advance in other types.²⁵ According to Konckzacki the whites' attitude towards African education was "one of widespread prejudice and was influenced by a feeling of anxiety arising from the overwhelming number of Africans."²⁶ In order to preserve themselves from possible swamping by hordes of educated Africans, it was claimed that the African was not educated because "intellectually in the knowledge of matter and life he is a child."²⁷

Dube, as well as many others, however, disclaimed any existence of intellectual differences between Africans and whites. "In mental as well as in physical ability", Dube wrote of the Zulus, "we may regard them naturally as in no respect inferior to the whites. They are as capable of as high a degree of culture as any people on the face of the globe."²⁸ He called the whites bluff and plied them hard with accusations of failing to support African education the denial of which only served to intensify the

²⁵. Ilanga Lase Natal, 12 February 1904. See also H. Davies and R.H.W. Shepherd, op. cit., pp. 159 - 160. W.H. Dawson, South Africa: Peoples, Places and Problems, p. 368.

²⁶. Z.A. Konckzacki, Public Finance and Economic Development of Natal, 1893-1910, p. 167.

²⁷. A. Davis, The Native Problem in South Africa, p. 12. See also M.S. Nathan 370, Margaret Campbell to Nathan, Mount Edgecombe, 6 June 1909. The Governor himself observed that "... when native brains are forced thro' European moulds quaint disturbance results."

²⁸. J.L. Dube, "Zululand and the Zulus" in Missionary Review of the World, Ns 21, June, 1898, p. 436. See also J. Burger, The Black Man's Burden, p. 172. P. Smith (ed), Africa in Transition, p. 30. R. Oliver and J.D. Fage, A Short History of Africa, p. 215 where they wrote "Africans were as capable as anyone else of becoming educated, efficient, and responsible....".

desire.²⁹(a) They will have it, and we cannot stop them," then wrote Hertslett, "they will get it somehow and somewhere." (b) The Natal Mercury observed in indirect reference to Dube that there was a danger in denying Africans education which they could obtain in the United States or Britain with the result that "many of them come back imbued with Ethiopian and other doctrines, which are anything but desirable in the interests of the loyalty of their brethren in this country to European rule."³⁰ Dube nevertheless assured the whites that the problem was not of Africans who had visions of social, economic and political equality with whites, but with the wholesale disregard of the Africans' crawling for education. He warned that "to neglect the Native children is to let them grow up with ideas that are not only foreign to us, but frequently in opposition to our common usages."³¹

Dube strongly felt that the education of Africans held tremendous prospects for the whole colony. He believed that if the African was more educated "the further he is led in the path of civilization, the greater are his wants and to gratify those wants he must work."³² Education would make all Africans purchasers of European goods

²⁹. a) Ilanga Lase Natal, 1 April 1904.

b) L.E. Hertslett, The Native Problem, p. 61. See also Ilanga Lase Natal, 30 June 1905. J.W. Shepstone, "Submit or Die" The Native Problem, p. 14. K.C.L. Pam 380 SUG Article Entitled "The Sugar Industry etc, etc" in Cape Argus, 14 September 1911.

³⁰. The Natal Mercury, 3 May 1906. See also P. Walshe, The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa, p. 8.

³¹. Ilanga Lase Natal, 7 September 1906.

³². The Natal Advertiser, 24 August 1905. See also Ilanga Lase Natal, 29 November 1907.

which would be a tremendous boost to the trade of the colony.³³ "If we do not educate the native," writes Mason, "it will be a bad thing for him, and quite as bad, or worse, for us."³⁴ Le Roy, amongst others, expressed his disagreement with the opinion and sentiments that were common amongst whites that "education spells the ruin of the native, and the great majority of educated natives turn out to be criminals." He attributed these pronouncements to self-professed experts who though speaking with authority did not establish the truthfulness of their statements.³⁵

Dube was at pains to point out that to whites "the education of 'niggers' is not a project that is dear to their hearts."³⁶ The Africans who were interested in more than just elementary education, which according to the Natal Advertiser was the limit to which they could advance,³⁷ could therefore not hope for improved educational facilities or higher education of which Dube was a prominent protagonist.³⁸ Many whites were according to Kidd convinced of the dangers of such education as it ".....puffs up the Kaffir, it makes him difficult to manage; it leads him to think that he is on equality with white men in general knowledge and culture; it

³³. Ilanga Lase Natal, 20 October 1905. The Natal Advertiser, 11 October 1905.

³⁴. F. Mason, Native Policy in Natal: Past and Future, p. 33.

³⁵. A.E. Le Roy, "The Educated Native: Fact versus Theory" being a paper delivered before the South African General Missionary Conference in Johannesburg on 9th July, 1906, p. 2.

³⁶. Ilanga Lase Natal, 24 February 1905.

³⁷. The Natal Advertiser, 10 February 1905.

³⁸. Ilanga Lase Natal, 24 February 1905.

prompts him to listen to political agitators; it vastly increases his power to do evil, and greatly undermines his character..."³⁹

Dube also accused the government of serious neglect of and of inadequately providing for African education. Dube reiterated the views of Ipepa Lo Hlanga in 1900 when it condemned the lukewarm attitude of the government towards the provision of higher education for the Africans and its failure to adequately support their schools.⁴⁰ Dube insisted that education was the guarantee for loyalty, the lack of which was the surest way of breeding discontent amongst Africans.⁴¹ "The desire of the natives for education merits encouragement rather than repression," the SANRC affirmed and "it offers the government an exceptional opportunity for promoting better relations between the two races."⁴² Dube viewed it as a matter of grave concern that, as the Natal Missionary Conference had observed, only one per cent of the African population received education.⁴³ Consequently, a considerable number of schools were closed down because "the Government seem to have no money for native education nor indeed any sympathy."⁴⁴ Even R. Plant, the Inspector of Native

³⁹. D. Kidd, Kaffir Socialism and the Dawn of Individualism, p. 153.

⁴⁰. S.N.A. 1/4/9 No. C1/01, Ipepa Lo Hlanga, 14 December 1900. The translation of 29 December 1900.

⁴¹. Ilanga Lase Natal, 14 August 1903.

⁴². SANRC, The South African Natives: Their Progress and Present Condition, p. 150.

⁴³. Ilanga Lase Natal, 14 July 1905. Natal Missionary Conference, Proceedings, July 1905, pp. 19 - 21.

⁴⁴. Colenso Collection 41, A Stead to H.E. Colenso, Durban, 11 July 1904.

Education, complained of "the sad neglect and bad management" of African affairs in general and education in particular.⁴⁵ In Dube's opinion, it was not surprising that the Zulus were "in the self-same state of nudity and barbarism and uselessness in which the British people found us in the days when Shaka ruled our land."⁴⁶

When it was reported in 1905 that the government was experiencing great difficulty in its efforts to provide schools for the Indians and Coloureds, Dube was quick to observe that if it were Africans very few people would have been concerned. Dube stressed that Africans deserved as good schools as did other people of colour. "The government," he declared, "has special obligation to us."⁴⁷ In the opinion of H.C.C. Matiwane, secretary of the Natal Native Congress, the whites had not given African education adequate consideration because there was no mutual understanding between the government and the Africans on the status of educated Africans and the need for educating Africans as a group.⁴⁸ Dube also remarked that there were problems in African education because "I Ngilandi ayikawutati ngomfutho umsebenzi wayo wokufundisa indhlu emnyama e Natal."⁴⁹

Most probably, the whites feared that the giving of higher education and advanced

⁴⁵. Colenso Collection 42, R. Plant to H.E. Colenso, Pietermaritzburg, 18 August 1905.

⁴⁶. J.L. Dube, The Zulu's Appeal for Light and England's Duty, p.19.

⁴⁷. Ilanga Lase Natal, 20 October 1905.

⁴⁸. The Natal Mercury, 29 May 1906.

⁴⁹. Ilanga Lase Natal, 2 July 1909. The quotation means "England has not seriously taken its duty of educating the black people in Natal"

technical training to Africans would put them in positions where the Africans would compete with colonists.⁵⁰ Much as many people advocated restrictions that would ensure that Africans were prepared for only "the ruder classes of workmanship,"⁵¹ the government was ill at ease over the question of whether to train a large number of natives industrially, and thus to bring them into competition with Europeans.⁵² Dube considered the technical and agricultural education of Africans as central to the solution of the so-called "native problem".⁵³ Dube was convinced that the whites opposed the industrial training of blacks because they feared that it would "....revolutionize the country, for the Zulus are intellectually and physically capable of the highest civilization and the whites know that if we are educated as they are we shall rule the country."⁵⁴

The Governor, Sir Matthew Nathan, impressed it upon the whites that if they denied the African facilities for education, that would be "the surest way to make him discontented." He also urged them to recognize that "the native will get education and that if he gets it independently of the Government there will be a tendency to use

⁵⁰. M.S. Evans, Black and White in South East Africa, p. 113. F.W. Bell, The South African Native Problem: A Suggested Solution, p. 6.

⁵¹. R.D. Clark, The Native Problem, p. 14.

⁵². G.H. 234 No. 42, Lyttelton to McCallum, London, 25 May 1905 and Encl., No. G502/1905, Minute No. S.N.A. No. 1833/05, Samuelson to Winter, 22 August 1905.

⁵³. Ilanga Lase Natal, 3 May 1907.

⁵⁴. J.L. Dube, "Need of Industrial Education in Africa" in Southern Workman, July, 1897, p. 142.

technical training to Africans would put them in positions where the Africans would compete with colonists.⁵⁰ Much as many people advocated restrictions that would ensure that Africans were prepared for only "the ruder classes of workmanship,"⁵¹ the government was ill at ease over the question of whether to train a large number of natives industrially, and thus to bring them into competition with Europeans.⁵² Dube considered the technical and agricultural education of Africans as central to the solution of the so-called "native problem".⁵³ Dube was convinced that the whites opposed the industrial training of blacks because they feared that it would "...revolutionize the country, for the Zulus are intellectually and physically capable of the highest civilization and the whites know that if we are educated as they are we shall rule the country."⁵⁴

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⁵⁰. M.S. Evans, Black and White in South East Africa, p. 113. F.W. Bell, The South African Native Problem: A Suggested Solution, p. 6.

⁵¹. R.D. Clark, The Native Problem, p. 14.

⁵². G.H. 234 No. 42, Lyttelton to McCallum, London, 25 May 1905 and Encl., No. G502/1905, Minute No. S.N.A. No. 1833/05, Samuelson to Winter, 22 August 1905.

⁵³. Ilanga Lase Natal, 3 May 1907.

⁵⁴. J.L. Dube, "Need of Industrial Education in Africa" in Southern Workman, July, 1897, p. 142.

it against the Government."⁵⁵ Nathan felt that the problem of industrial education could be solved by making arrangements whereby Africans would work for Africans. He also thought that competition would be beneficial to both Africans and whites. "As the native learns to do well," he remarked, "then the white man will do better."⁵⁶ Dube tried to dissuade the whites from fearing that the educated Africans would become formidable rivals on the labour market. He personally thought that African artisans would only be supplemental "and shall at best be a mere aid in keeping the balance of things in the supply of labour."⁵⁷

Dube also sharply rebuked the colonists for their low regard for educated Africans to which he attributed the sustained opposition to any advance in African education.⁵⁸ The whites generally preferred the "good old native, loyal, and faithful....."⁵⁹ the one who was "....raw, amiable, laughing, superstitious," and who "will neither argue, question, think, nor take to heart...."⁶⁰ and was "less amenable to Church

⁵⁵. G.H. 1274 No. 5, Nathan to Elgin, Pietermaritzburg, 6 January 1908 and Encl. No. 2 : Government Notes on Proposals of Natal Native Affairs Commission on Educating Natives.

⁵⁶. MS Nathan 360, Governor's Address at Ohlange, 25 November 1907.

⁵⁷. Ilanga Lase Natal, 1 October 1909. See also B. Sacks, South Africa: An Imperial Dilemma, pp. 151 - 152.

⁵⁸. Ilanga Lase Natal, 22 December 1905. The Times of Natal, 28 February 1905. S. Marks, "The Ambiguities of Dependence: John L. Dube of Natal" in Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 1. No. 2, April 1975, p. 171.

⁵⁹. The Natal Witness, 17 December 1904.

⁶⁰. A. Davis, The Native Problem in South Africa, p. 50.

discipline"⁶¹ to the one with a school certificate who in Dube's words "has his ideas of life elevated, and feels he ought to have a home and land of his own."⁶² Dube arduously defended the educated Christian Africans against accusation of indolence and frowning upon menial labour by stating that educated Africans sought better paying positions than lowly jobs like herding cattle. He challenged the colonists to teach the Africans the nobility of service by precept and example. "The reason that the Christian natives have a bad name, among the lower class of Europeans especially," Dube pointed out, "is that he does not submit to being treated like a dog."⁶³ According to Wilson and Perrot the conspicuously inconsistent cry of many for ".....the raw Kaffir" was because "owing to his simplicity and ignorance, he can be exploited as an economic asset."⁶⁴

Dube praised the missionaries who despite meagre grants-in -aid they received from the reserved fund administered by the government, made a significant contribution to the education and training of Africans at a time when the government was not doing its share of the work. "All the rest - and it is practically the whole of what is being

⁶¹. J. Robinson, Notes on Natal, p. 48.

⁶². The Natal Witness, 17 December 1904. Ilanga Lase Natal, 22 December 1905 from which the quotation comes.

⁶³. J.L. Dube, "A Native View of Christianity in South Africa" in Missionary Review of the World, Ns 14, June, 1901, p. 425.

⁶⁴. F. Wilson and D. Perrot (eds), Outlook on a Century, p. 199. See also H. Davies and R.H.W. Shepherd, South African Mission, 1800 - 1950, pp. 217 - 218.

done-," Dube remarked, "is and always has been the work of the missionaries alone."⁶⁵ The missionaries could, however, only touch the fringe of African society with their slender resources.⁶⁶ On the one hand, their endeavours were frustrated by the government's maintenance of the tribal system and its legalizing of the so-called "native laws,"⁶⁷ and on the other hand, by the tribal Africans' distrust of and suspicious attitude towards the missionaries' work for fear that it would disrupt their traditional way of life.⁶⁸ As a result, interested people, some with the avowed intention of minimizing the "pernicious influences" of the missionaries,⁶⁹ and others for the reason that they regarded it as their duty, appealed to the government to not only provide generously towards, but also support and control African education.⁷⁰

Dube remarked that it was cause for great concern to the Africans that while the government lavishly financed the education of the whites, money was grudgingly and

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- ⁶⁵. J.L. Dube, The Zulus' Appeal for Light and England's Duty, p. 21. See also S.V.H. Mdhluli, The Development of the African, p. 13 in which the author says "the truth will always remain that our education is purely a missionary enterprise."
- ⁶⁶. M. Wilson and L.M. Thompson, The Oxford History of South Africa, Vol. I, p. 386. O.E. Emanuelson, op. cit., pp. 190 - 191.
- ⁶⁷. The Natal Witness, 11 April 1903. See also the issue of 7 May 1904.
- ⁶⁸. M. Wilson, Missionaries: Conquerors or Servants of God, p. 5. P.L. Van den Berghe, South Africa: A Study in Conflict, p. 157.
- ⁶⁹. F.W. Bell, The South African Native Problem: A Suggested Solution, p. 11.
- ⁷⁰. M.S. Evans, The Native Problem in Natal, pp. 12, 14. R. Oliver and J.D. Fage, A Short History of Africa, pp. 214 - 215. The Natal Witness, 7 November 1908.

parsimoniously doled out to the Africans. "Abamnyama baningi kunazo zonke izizwe," Dube noted, "Kepa noko imali ecitwa uHulumeni eyicitela imfundo yabo ipantsi ngoku amahloni."⁷¹ His views were collaborated by, amongst others, Jabavu and Molema, who felt that the expenditure on African education was disproportionate to the blacks' contribution to the public revenue.⁷² The government, however, argued that these were too small to warrant any large expenditure, a statement which was disputed by many.⁷³ Mason contends that even if it were true "the higher method of statesmanship would endeavour to promote their education as right in itself, and as the surest means of increasing the revenue by raising the standard of living amongst them, and thus multiplying their wants."⁷⁴

In the period from 1903 to 1908 only about 156 to 168 schools were receiving grants - in - aid. The total amounts expended ranged from £7265 10s 5d in 1903 to £7599 19s 3d in 1908 and on the basis of average daily attendance the per capita expenditure was about 18s. Significantly, the expended sums were less than the voted supplies.

⁷¹. Ilanga Lase Natal, 25 November 1904. The quotation means "The blacks are more than the other nations; yet the money spent by the Government on education is so small as to be beneath contempt." See also the issues of 2 November 1906 and 12 February 1909.

⁷². D.D.T. Jabavu, The Black Problem, p. 14. S.M. Molema, The Bantu Past and Present, p. 226. E. Buxton, South Africa and its Native Problem, p. 5. SANRC, The South African Natives : Their Progress and Present Condition, p. 150.

⁷³. The Times of Natal, 28 February 1905. The Natal Witness, 30 May 1908. Z.A. Konczacki, Public Finance and Economic Development of Natal, 1893 - 1910, p. 167. W.H. Dawson, South Africa: Peoples, Places and Problems, p. 370.

⁷⁴. F. Mason, Native Policy in Natal: Past and Future, p. 19.

Equally remarkable was the non-existence of a government school for Africans in the colony.⁷⁵ Interesting enough, the money that was spent on white education in 1906 was £84 496 16s 6d which included the cost of administration at a time when there were only 97 000 whites, as against £8235 10s 1d that was spent on the education of Africans who totalled 921 000.⁷⁶ According to the Times of Natal the amount contributed by Africans in 1905 in direct taxation totalled £162 193.⁷⁷

The government's failure to provide adequately for African education was not because of it being a financial burden which depended on the whites "clarity", but simply because it shirked its responsibility towards the subject race.⁷⁸ Dube complained that it would appear that the government was bent "ukuba izwe letu lepuze ukukanyiswa."⁷⁹ The Africans were contributing sufficient amounts of money to finance their education.⁸⁰ Instead, at one time the government toyed with the idea

⁷⁵. C.O. 181/54 - 66, Reports of Superintendent of Education, 1903 - 1908. G.H. 251 No. 41, Elgin to Nathan, London, 25 March 1908. B. Sacks, South Africa: An Imperial Dilemma, p. 147. G.H. 1233 No. 76, McCallum to Lyttelton, 14 April 1905.

⁷⁶. S.P. of the L.A., 1904, No. 5., p. 26.: Reply by Minister of Justice to Question asked by Anchetill. F. Mason, op. cit., pp. 18 -19. Z.A. Konckzacki, op. cit., p. 167.

⁷⁷. The Times of Natal, 28 February 1905.

⁷⁸. R.F.A. Hoernle, South African Native Policy and the Liberal Spirit, p. 17. See also W.H. Dawson, op. cit., p. 370. F. Mason, op. cit., pp. 18 - 19. B. Sacks, op. cit., p. 147.

⁷⁹. Ilanga Lase Natal, 25 November 1904. The quotation means "on that our land should be the last to be enlightened."

⁸⁰. W.H. Dawson, op. cit., p. 370.

of making the Africans pay for their education if more schools other than missionary institutions were provided.⁸¹ The government of the day was accused of jiggling its funds in such a way that part of whites education was somehow paid for out of African taxation.⁸²

When he gave evidence before the Natal Native Affairs Commission, Dube expressed his surprise at, and the dissatisfaction of Africans with, the government's niggard expenditure on African education. He was perturbed by the fact that the government intended spending only £10 000 on almost a million Africans, and that in many cases the grants that were made to a school were insufficient to pay the salary of one teacher. He urged that the government should treat the Africans as liberally and considerately as it was doing in the case of the Indians and Coloureds. He even thought that Africans should be compelled to be educated.⁸³ The recommendations of the Commission and the pressure of the Colonial Office, and his own personal attitude towards the Africans, influenced the Governor, Sir Matthew Nathan, to give his personal attention to their education.⁸⁴ Dube greatly appreciated the changes that were effected in the post - rebellion period like increased expenditure on African

⁸¹. G.H. 234 No. G. 502, Minute No. SNA 1833/05, Samuelson to Winter, 22 August 1905.

⁸². Z.A. Konckzacki, op. cit., p. 171. F. Mason, op. cit., pp. 18 - 19. D.D.T. Jabavu, "Native Disabilities" in South Africa, p. 12.

⁸³. Report and Evidence of the Natal Native Affairs Commission, Evidence, Vol. II, Sect. III, pp. 960 - 961. See also Ilanga Lase Natal, 25 November 1904.

⁸⁴. G.H. 251 No. 41, Elgin to Nathan, London, 25 March 1908. G.H. 251 No. 16, Nathan to Crewe, Pietermaritzburg, 25 January 1909.

education,⁸⁵ but he observed in 1909 that there was room for improvement and that "we think the Government of Natal is equally aware of the fact that the native schools deserve better attention and liberal allowance."⁸⁶

Even before he founded Ohlange, Dube was interested in and advocated the industrial training of Africans. According to Inkanyiso as early as 1894, the Africans assumed that it was the duty of the government "to fit the Natives by the full development of their industrial capacity to occupy that position which they were undoubtedly interested to occupy."⁸⁷ Dube was, however, instrumental in committing Africans to the vigorous pursuance of this goal. At a meeting held in the Friendly Benefit Society Hall in Pietermaritzburg on 1 August 1900, he prevailed upon the Natal Native Congress to adopt a resolution which stressed the need for carpenters, blacksmiths, and builders among the Africans.⁸⁸ The die was cast. According to Ipepa Lo Hlanga, African leaders then contended that the education of the rand was the most necessary for their people.⁸⁹ Much as they appreciated the work done by missionaries, they felt that more than just a literary, academically - biased curriculum would promote the upliftment of Africans. They also regretted that very few schools offered industrial training and that even in these the work was such a farce, and so

⁸⁵. Ilanga Lase Natal, 12 February 1909.

⁸⁶. Ibid., 1 October 1909.

⁸⁷. Inkanyiso, 18 May 1894.

⁸⁸. A.W.Z. Kuzwayo, "History of Ethiopianism in South Africa with particular reference to the American Zulu Mission from 1835 to 1908" (M.A., Unisa, 1980), p. 200.

⁸⁹. Ipepa Lo Hlanga, 24 July 1903.

seldom of any practical value, that it might as well be done away with.⁹⁰ Dube felt that the Christian Africans needed to have the better tastes and higher ideals which they had developed, encouraged, directed, and nurtured by industrial education. He therefore stressed the need for a school which would teach the African youth "the Bible and other helpful branches of learning, hand in hand with trades and handicrafts..."⁹¹

Dube considered it ideal that every Christianized man, be he white or black, should be "transformed in heart, instructed in mind, and trained to use his hands for good works."⁹² He himself practically demonstrated this when due to the lack of funds that could be used to provide the first building at Ohlange, he "..... wheeled stone and mixed up mortar with his own hands for the work on the building".⁹³ Dube was

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- ⁹⁰. W.M. Marable, "African Nationalist: The Life of John Langalibalele Dube" (Ph. D., Maryland, 1976), p. 26. H.D. Goodenough, Reply of the American Mission Reserve Trustees to Lands Commission Report, p. 6. O.E. Emanuelson, op. cit., pp. 178 - 179. R. Plant, The Zulu in Three Tenses, p. 101. C.O. 179/256 No. C6301/1910, T.W. Jones to Crewe, Harled, 1 March 1910. C.O. 181/58, 66, Report of the Superintendent of Education, 1905, 1908.
- ⁹¹. J.L. Dube, "Zululand and the Zulus" in Missionary Review of the World, Ns 21 June, 1898, p. 441. See also J.L. Dube, "Practical Christianity Amongst the Zulus" in Missionary Review of the World, Ns 20, May, 1907, p. 372.
- ⁹². J.L. Dube, "Are Negroes Better off in Africa: Conditions and Opportunities in America and Africa Compared" in Missionary Review of the World, NS 27, August, 1904, p. 585. See also J.L. Dube, The Zulus' Appeal for Light and England's Duty, p. 20.
- ⁹³. W.C. Wilcox, "John L. Dube: The Booker Washington of the Zulus" in Missionary Review of the World, Ns 32, 1909, p. 918.

convinced that industrial education would contribute in no small measure to the upliftment and development of the Africans.⁹⁴ The industrial training that the Africans craved for was not of the type restricted to teaching the trades, but that which would, by precept and example, teach the importance of manual work and the dignity of honest labour, an aspect which had been overlooked by the missionaries.⁹⁵ In pursuance of this goal, pressure was brought to bear on the government to build a school where industrial training would be offered, and to provide efficient and suitable staff for this purpose.⁹⁶ Apparently referring to Dube, Mason observed that "men of the Booker Washington type are not plentiful; still, we have a fair number of persons in South Africa who have great experience in native schools, and who love their work."⁹⁷

Dube lent his weight to the public sentiments of people who were consistently and systematically pressing the government to assist all mission schools with increased grants for purposes of improving the simple industrial training that they were

⁹⁴. J.L. Dube, "Are Negroes Better off in Africa: Conditions in America and Africa Compared" in Missionary Review of the World, Ns 27, August 1904, p. 586.

⁹⁵. A.B.M. A/2/18, Report of Deputation to Africa, Encl. in J. Smith to Rev. A.D. Taylor, Boston, 9 March 1904. L.E. Hertslett, op. cit., p. 64. S.V.H. Mdhluli, The Development of the African, p.14. The Times of Natal, 13 January 1904.

⁹⁶. T. Karis and G.M. Carter, From Protest to Challenge, Vol. I, pp. 29 - 34.

⁹⁷. F. Mason, op. cit., p. 21.

offering.⁹⁸ The consensus of opinion was that industrial training institutions should turn out capable artisans and tradesmen who besides being of service to the white community, would benefit the Africans.⁹⁹ This was the whole purpose for establishing Ohlange and creating an industrial training section which sought to teach the scholars to become skilled artisans and labourers.¹⁰⁰ There was also the growing realization that "with advancing needs the natives will have to rely more on themselves to meet their own requirements in matters such as building, agriculture etc."¹⁰¹ It was when the African was trained that he could take his rightful place "either as owner of his own plot of ground or as a worker and the white man's helper."¹⁰² Dube had earlier remarked that if the missionaries "... had been developing our people's minds, hands and hearts by establishing industries, and giving instruction in the various trades, the Zulus would today be reaping as much benefit from the land, as the white men who are living there."¹⁰³ The Ilanga chided the whites who opposed industrial education of Africans for fear of competition in the

⁹⁸. Ilanga Lase Natal, 12 October 1906. See also the Natal Witness, 16 July 1904. O.E. Emanuelson, op. cit., p. 117.

⁹⁹. N.B.B. 20, 1903, P. 45: Report by Magistrate of Dundee, M. Matthews, 1 January 1904. The Natal Witness, 16 July 1904. F. W. Beli, The Native as a Political Factor and the Native Franchise, p. 6.

¹⁰⁰. J.L. Dube, The Zulus' Appeal for Light and England's Duty, p. 8.

¹⁰¹. C.A. Wheelwright, "Native Administration in Zululand" in Journal of African Society, Vol. XXIV, No. XCIV, Jan 1925, p. 98.

¹⁰². J.F.E. Barnes, Segregation and the Alienation of Lands in Natal, p. 7.

¹⁰³. J.L. Dube, "Need of Industrial Education in Africa" in Southern Workman, July, 1897, p. 142.

labour market. "If the native youth is held back from entering into the skilled work", the newspaper pointed out, "the country will be so much poorer. It is fear, only fear, beggarly fear that can stand in the way of the country's natural development."¹⁰⁴

Not that the government was oblivious of the need for industrial training of the Africans. In 1905 governor McCathern faced the obligation of industrial education of Africans with the result that the country and especially the farming community had suffered. McCallum had prevailed upon the cabinet to provide suitable industrial training for the blacks, of which the ministry approved in principle but had to shelve for lack of funds with the promise that it would be provided for in 1906.¹⁰⁵ "It is essentially a question of pounds, shillings and pence, and policy," S.O. Samuelson, the Under Secretary for Native Affairs, had proclaimed. Samuelson also conceded willy - nilly that industrial training "would increase the demand for building materials and would have a very elevating and advancing influence on the natives as a mass."¹⁰⁶ Joseph Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for Colonies, tacitly supported the view that the money expended on African education was more than they had contributed to the revenue as a consequence of which the colony was in financial

¹⁰⁴. Ilanga Lase Natal, 1 October 1909.

¹⁰⁵. C.O. 179/232 No. 39373, Minute from McCallum to Smythe, 19 July 1905 Encl. No. 1 in Desp. No 227, McCallum to Lyttelton, Pietermaritzburg, 11 October 1905.

¹⁰⁶. C.O. 179/232 No. 39373, Minute from S.O. Samuelson to Minister of Native Affairs, Encl. No. 2 in Desp. No. 227, McCallum to Lyttelton, Pietermaritzburg, 11 October 1905.

straits.¹⁰⁷ As had happened with the Zwartkop Industrial School which had for reasons of financial stringencies closed down in 1892, the projected Watersmeet Industrial School at Driefontein, was abandoned in 1905, as well as others elsewhere, professedly on account of lack of funds but basically because the government was opposed to industrial education of Africans.¹⁰⁸

Undaunted by all this, Dube emphasized to the Natal Native Affairs Commission that it was the government's duty to establish an industrial training school in each location where the Africans could learn to work and be taught industrial pursuits. He believed that if the whole African population were trained "there would be more than sufficient to supply all the requirements of the labour market."¹⁰⁹ The Natal Witness also stressed that the trained Africans would form a vast reservoir of labour which could easily be harnessed for the development and enrichment of the country.¹¹⁰ It was to the course that he had mapped and the vision that he had of industrial training that Dube committed Ohlange in 1907. "We shall at all times inculcate steady industry and the sober enjoyment of life," he declared, "and to this training we shall add all the technical teaching which it shall be our power to give...."¹¹¹ The whites and the government were, however, not to be relieved of the obligation of providing what the

¹⁰⁷. C.O. 179/232, No. 39373, Elgin to Under-Secretary at Colonial Office, 15 December 1905.

¹⁰⁸. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 56 - 57. R. Plant, The Zulu in Three Senses, pp. 100 - 101.

¹⁰⁹. Report and Evidence of the Natal Native Affairs Commission, Evidence, Vol. II, Sect. III, p. 961.

¹¹⁰. The Natal Witness, 26 September 1908.

¹¹¹. Ilanga Lase Natal, 29 November 1907.

Africans required for their improvement "hence remedial propaganda must be initiated by the Colonials."¹¹²

It was with the support of, amongst others, Sir Marshall Campbell and R.H. Tatham that Dube succeeded in causing the government to take interest in and recognize his work.¹¹³ It was a red letter day for Dube when Sir Matthew Nathan, the Governor, visited and officially opened his school on 25 November 1907.¹¹⁴ It should have warmed the cockles of Dube's heart to hear Governor Nathan declare that "each upward step made by the native in the scale of civilization will not only help him but will assist the white man to improve conditions of life in S.A." The governor was confident that the establishment of Ohlange would help in such an upward movement and that the institution would carry on useful work for many years to come.¹¹⁵ Not only did Nathan subsequently publicly and definitely associate himself with especially the agricultural work of the school, but he also wanted to be kept informed about its progress as he was determined that the school should be made "a success and become

¹¹². Ibid., 7 January 1910.

¹¹³. B.T.W. 346/1907, Dube to Washington, Phoenix, 21 September 1907. K.C.L. 20444 Newspaper Book 9, Interview in Natal Advertiser, 21 September 1936. Colenso Collection 44, R.H. Tatham to H.E. Colenso, Durban, 7 March and 3 May 1907. R. Hunt Davis Jr., "John L. Dube: A South African Exponent of Booker T. Washington" in Journal of African Studies, Vol. II, No.4, Winter 1975 - 76, p. 518.

¹¹⁴. W.C. Wilcox, "John L. Dube: The Booker Washington of the Zulus" in Missionary Review of the World, Ns 32, 1909, p. 919.

¹¹⁵. M.S. Nathan 360, Governor's Address at Ohlange, 25 November 1907.

a prominent factor in the industrial education of the Natives of the Colony."¹¹⁶

Dube was appreciative of the governor's commitment to and the government's sympathetic consideration of the school's needs which he was sure would win the confidence of and draw into "unquestioning and unfaltering loyalty" all the Africans.¹¹⁷ Following upon the recognition of his school, Dube so cooperated with the government officials, especially R. Plant, the Inspector of Native Education, that Nathan remarked that he thought "he is seriously trying to make something of the institution.....".¹¹⁸ Nathan also said he was certain that "if Dube will work hard, eschewing eyewash, it may become a vast success."¹¹⁹ When Dube visited England and the United States in 1909 for purposes of raising funds for the school he had the blessings of Nathan who with the assistance of Sir Marshall Campbell kept a close watch on Dube and Ohlange.¹²⁰

Dube persistently pressed for a worthwhile educational system for the Africans. He continuously expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of life amongst the Africans. He was convinced that the blacks would have been advanced if their education were supported and adequately financed by the government. He also construed education

¹¹⁶. M.S. Nathan 368, Nathan to Marshal Campbell, Pietermaritzburg, 14 January 1908.

¹¹⁷. Ilanga Lase Natal, 29 November 1907.

¹¹⁸. M.S. Nathan 368, Nathan to Moor, Durban, 15 April 1908.

¹¹⁹. M.S. Nathan 368, Nathan to Marshall Campbell, Kearsney, 22 April 1908.

¹²⁰. M.S. Nathan 370, Marshall Campbell to Nathan, Mount Edgecombe, 19 June 1909.

as a significant and central factor in the solution of the so-called "Native Problem". He attributed the government's attitude towards African education to the fear that the educated blacks would pose a serious threat to the privileged position of whites on the labour market or that they could replace them as the ruling class.

CHAPTER SEVEN

DUBE AND THE AFRICANS' DEMAND FOR

THE FRANCHISE AND REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT

Dube used the columns of the Ilanga Lase Natal to urge his fellow Africans to petition the government for the extension of the electoral franchise and to grant them representation in the white Natal parliament. He also urged the government to provide for the representation of Africans by whites. Dube was, however, pitted against formidable and unyielding opposition from whites who were determined to limit the right to vote to a few Africans.

Early in 1903 Dube complained about the checks and balances that had be placed in the way of enjoyment of the franchise by the Africans by the enactments of 1864 and 1865. While he admitted that Africans were not sufficiently civilised to be on a par with whites, he urged that educated and exempted Africans should be granted full civil rights. This would have the effect of encouraging others to become educated.¹

The whites were, however, opposed to the grant of political rights to Africans. The colonial legislature promulgated acts that were designed to circumscribe the Africans'

¹. Ilanga Lase Natal, 29 May 1903.

right to vote.² Each time the matter of the franchise was subsequently raised in either parliament or the press, it was generally argued that Africans had no desire to exercise the franchise, and that, if they were granted the privilege, they would almost certainly abuse it, not only to their own detriment, but also to that of the whole community. The Africans were referred to as "a community of wild animals" whose customs, usages, privileges, and habits were not comparable with those of the enfranchised white community.³ It was argued that they could not be helped except by giving them "an opportunity to help themselves by developing in a natural manner their own customs and institutions."⁴

Educated and exempted Africans, like Dube, however, insisted on their demands and vehemently complained of the restrictions imposed upon them. They opposed laws which they regarded as not ordinary laws of the colony to which they were supposed to be subject after their exemption from African law, that were applicable to them.⁵ Since education was regarded as the hall-mark of a civilized man, educated Africans tended to view themselves not only as civilized, but also as entitled to the rights and

² For details of Laws No. 11 of 1864 and No. 11 of 1865. See E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb., A History of Natal, pp. 75, 76 - 77. E.H. Brookes, The History of Native Policy in South Africa, pp. 58, 59, 283. C.W. de Kiewiet, A History of South Africa, pp. 238 - 239. G.W. Eybers, Select Constitutional Documents Illustrating South African History, 1795 - 1910, pp. 194 - 197.

³ E.D. Gasa, "The Native Question in Natal, 1880 - 1893: An Inquiry with reference to the Struggle for Constitutional Reform in the Colony." (M.A., Unisa, 1974), pp. 55, 56.

⁴ The Natal Witness, 17 September 1904.

⁵ E.D. Gasa, "The Native Question in Natal, 1880 - 1893: An Inquiry with reference to the Struggle for Constitutional Reform in the Colony" (M.A., Unisa, 1974), p. 57.

privileges which the whites enjoyed. Dube personally felt that "..... nxashane umuntu esesenze ncono isimo sake nje ngomlungu ufanele ukuba apatiswe komlungu, anikwe amalungelo anje ngomlungu."⁶ According to one researcher, nothing less than full recognition would satisfy such aspirations, while this was itself a factor in the refusal of the white community to extend such privileges to the Africans.⁷

Consequently, as the Africans began to climb out of the condition of backwardness, they found themselves faced with "(a) thousand hands stretched out to hold them just there, and a thousand voices calling upon them to 'keep their proper place' and 'not to try to be equal of the white man'."⁸ Many whites also argued that, though there were Africans who as individuals had overtaken "the laggards of the higher race," the idea of civilization related to race and not to individuals.⁹ This type of thinking was usually based on the grounds that the Africans had turned to western civilization, thereby rejecting the tribal way of life in order to gain cultural assimilation with the whites.¹⁰

⁶ Ilanga Lase Natal, 29 May 1903. The quotation means "when a black person has improved his condition like a white, he should be treated like a white, and granted all the rights that a white enjoys". See also R.D. Clark, The Native Problem, p. 17.

⁷ A. Ngubo, "The Development of African Political Protest in South Africa, 1882 - 1910: An Analytical Approach" (Ph. D., California, 1973) p. 66.

⁸ M.S. Evans, The Native Problem in Natal, p. 52. See also J.L. Dube and A.W. Lee, "The Clash of Colour" in Natal Missionary Conference Papers, p. 5.

⁹ M.S. Evans, Black and White in South East Africa, p. 201.

¹⁰ L. Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie, p. 74. M.S. Evans, The Native Problem in Natal, p. 52.

The educated, Christian and exempted Africans were claiming what they thought were their legitimate rights. In the word of Maurice Evans, they viewed themselves as "... law-regarding people, on the side of law and order, and anxious to show by their actions that they recognize the advantages of settled Government and civilization"¹¹ Another contemporary commentator attributed this to "a very keen sense of justice" which had been fostered by the judicial system of the traditional tribal African life.¹² Instead, they found that the white government was reluctant to accept their services and to recognize them.¹³ Consequently, there developed amongst them "a growing feeling of distrust in the white man's lordship, loss of faith in his protestation of just intentions, and loss of confidence in the old-time kindly protection of the British Constitution."¹⁴

There were people in Natal, the Cape and in Britain who urged the Natal government to repeal the restrictive and offensive laws, to extend civil liberties to Africans and to ensure that Africans were properly administered. In 1905, for example, insistent demands were made to the British Government to ensure that the franchise was granted to all fully qualified man irrespective of colour, race or creed. If this failed, Britain was urged that the local government had no right to tax Africans while they were unrepresented in parliament, as presented by the principle of no taxation without

¹¹. M.S. Evans, The Native Problem in Natal, p. 51.

¹². "Gebuzza," The Peril in Natal, p. 23.

¹³. M.S. Evans, The Native Problem in Natal, p. 52.

¹⁴. D.D.T. Jabavu, "Native Disabilities" in South Africa, p. 1. See also B. Magubane, The Politics of History in South Africa, p. 228.

representation.¹⁵

The Natal and British governments paid no heed to these pleas. Dube did not relent. He earnestly believed in the "British sense of justice." He was convinced that co-operation between blacks and whites of goodwill would ultimately lead to political equality between Africans and colonists. He warned his white fellow-men that, even without their full assistance, "the attempts to keep the black man down will not win ultimately."¹⁶

In the face of the Africans' increased desire for the franchise, yet another obstacle in the way of their enjoyment of the right was contemplated. This was in the form of educational and property qualifications. It was proposed to allow Africans to exercise the privilege only if they owned unencumbered freehold property, were also adequately educated and had stayed in the colony for a long period of time.¹⁷ Dube concluded that such qualifications would effectively deny the vote to Africans. "No black man in this Colony," he poignantly observed, "be he endowed with the wisdom of the celestial, and the wealth of all the earth - would by reason of the tests, be admitted to such a privilege."¹⁸

¹⁵. H.R. Fox Bourne, Black and White "Rights" in Africa, p. 21. A.P.S. Mss G 198, A. Abdurahman to Secretary of APS, 28 July 1906.

¹⁶. J.L. Dube, "A Native View of Christianity in South Africa" in Missionary Review of the World, Ns 14, June, 1901, p. 424.

¹⁷. R.D. Clark, The Native Problem, p. 9. The Natal Witness, 24 December 1904. L.E. Hertslett, The Native Problem, p. 20.

¹⁸. Ilanga Lase Natal, 16 September 1904.

Dube sharply differed with the Natal Mercury when it later observed that the extension of the vote to Africans should be dependent on education.¹⁹ He argued that double standards should not be applied, as there were many whites who were not educated, but were fully qualified for the franchise. In his opinion, the Africans were not opposed to educational qualification as long as it was impartially applied. "The evil", he remarked, "lies in making destructions without scientific warrant."²⁰ Incidentally, the application for the franchise by Chief Mini, a prominent and educated leader of the Kolwas and landowner in Edendale, was refused in 1905, and apparently on subsequent occasions, without any reason being given.²¹

Obviously, the whites were seized with intense fear of the dangers inherent in the granting the vote to the numerically preponderant Africans. They consequently resorted to stratagems to exclude the Africans. In the opinion of the Natal Witness it was necessary that the whites should first "..... extirpate the characters of the native - make him, in fact, an altogether changed man before he can be trusted, with any degree of safety to the white man, with the vote."²² The Natal Advertiser strongly felt that the evils of the unrestricted African vote were so manifest that opposition to it was not only justifiable but invincible.²³ The whites feared that they would be overwhelmed at the poll, thereby losing their supremacy. They were

¹⁹. The Natal Mercury, 2 September 1908.

²⁰. Ilanga Lase Natal, 18 December 1908.

²¹. S.N.A. 1/1/342 No. C1576/05, Minute of USNA, undated.

²². The Natal Witness, 24 December 1904.

²³. The Natal Advertiser, 9 February 1905.

wedded to the idea that Africans were unfit to exercise the vote.²⁴

African spokesmen insisted, however, that the government could not adequately provide for their welfare without extending the franchise to them. When he gave evidence before the South African Native Affairs Commission, Martin Lutuli, then president of the Natal Native Congress, indicated that the Congress would request the government to grant the franchise to Africans so that they would have a say in parliament.²⁵ Sir Godfrey Lagden, the chairman of the Commission, retorted that the whites were equally insistent that the vote would not be given to Africans because they were not mentally or morally fit to decide the affairs of white people. Lagden also pointed out that there was a fear that the granting of the vote to Africans would lead to the formation of organisations upon racial lines, as a consequence of which the Africans "might first serve as a prey to parties and party politics and then by sheer numbers secure the balance of political power."²⁶ A contemporary pamphlet went on to argue that the franchise would have a bad effect on the African, who "by his very nature - akin to that of children - is one to be led" and for whom the only suitable government was a tribal and patriarchal one,²⁷ for which reason the wholesale extension of the vote to all Africans would be fraught with gravest danger,

²⁴. B. Sacks, South Africa: An Imperial Dilemma, p. 156. Lord Selborne, Address Delivered before the Congregation of the University of the Cape of Good Hope on 27th February 1902, pp. 41, 43.

²⁵. T. Karis and G.M. Carter, From Protest to Challenge, Vol. 1, pp. 29 - 34.

²⁶. G. Lagden, "The Native Question in South Africa" in The Empire and the Century, pp. 549 - 550. See also The Times of Natal, 11 January 1905.

²⁷. F.W. Bell, The Native as a Political Factor and the Native Franchise, p. 5.

not only to the whites, but also the Africans themselves, the colony and the British Empire.²⁸

There were, however, whites who felt that, if the vote were strictly confined to exempted Africans, no risk would be involved. They consequently urged that the franchise should be hedged about in such a way as to render the participation of Africans in it absolutely innocuous to the whites.²⁹ Others advocated the separation of black and white votes, stressing that the African vote might be so manipulated in some constituencies that it might hold the balance between parties.³⁰

Dube, writing in the Ilanga, outrightly dismissed these arguments. He instead supported the adoption of the New Zealand example and asked that Africans, like the Maoris, should be allowed to sit in the colonial legislative.³¹ The paper also complained that Africans had to pass through an intricate and formidable ordeal before they were granted the vote. With regard to Law II of 1865, it observed that in 1905 there were but a few exempted Africans, of whom only two had the right to vote. This was so in spite of the fact that there were many Africans who were large landholders. It bemoaned the erection of concealed and effective barriers against Africans which were but "a species of political cowardice on the part of the ruling caste." It pointedly remarked that, though the Africans had been contented with their

²⁸. Ibid., p. 6.

²⁹. The Natal Witness, 11 February 1905.

³⁰. The Times of Natal, 11 January 1905.

³¹. Ilanga Lase Natal, 10 February 1905.

lot, they were convinced that they would ultimately enjoy the privilege when all prejudice and opposition to it had disappeared.³²

There were whites who supported this view. Samuelson, for example, argued that under their tribal rulers the Africans had had a voice in the administration of their country. consequently, he was convinced that both tribal and educated Africans would behave responsibly once their rights had been restored to them and once they were able to feel that they were equal fellow citizens with whites.³³ Persons like Samuelson were, however, a small minority. The mass of the white population was very averse to the granting of the right to vote to Africans, even on the lines it had been done in the Cape Colony, where even with its theoretical availability to all who wanted it only a few Africans actually enjoyed it.

The Natal Mercury opposed the Cape type of franchise because it would put in the African's hands a weapon of probable offence to whites. Its grant would also presuppose "the existence of a definite civilization, of an understanding of what is meant by the franchise, and of ability to use political power for right ends."³⁴ Evidently, what the whites feared most was that Africans would combine against and impose their immense numerical superiority on them.³⁵ It is no wonder that the Natal Advertiser suggested a qualified collateral franchise in terms of which white

³². Ibid., 3 March 1905.

³³. R.C.A. Samuelson, Native Question, p. 8.

³⁴. The Natal Mercury, 26 March 1906. See also The Natal Witness, 9 June 1906.

³⁵. D. Kidd, Kaffir Socialism and the Dawn of Individualism, pp. 122 - 123.

representatives, chosen by Africans themselves, would represent Africans in parliament "but never in conjunction with, or in opposition to, the interests of the whites."³⁶

There were also whites who sharply rapped the educated Christian Africans, who were thought to be only a handful, for their clamours for the franchise. According to them, these Africans did not know what they wanted and would certainly be more discontented than before once they had got what they demanded. No special treatment could be given to them as they were still part of an "uncivilized race" and, despite "progress in civilization", were as a rule immature from a political point of view.³⁷ Others differed and advocated the granting of the franchise to those Africans who were of undoubted "loyalty" and "character".³⁸ It was on these whites that Dube and his contemporaries pinned their hopes. It could be for this reason that Dube was to emphasize later that "ivoti nati tina bantu asiliceleli wonke umuntu, silicelela labo asebelifanele."³⁹ At no time did he advocate the granting of the vote to all Africans without restriction. Obviously, he might have realised that this would make the proposal totally unacceptable as far as the white community was concerned.

While the 1903 - 1905 South African Native Affairs Commission reported that the few

³⁶. The Natal Advertiser, 15 May 1906. See also E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb, A History of Natal, p. 217.

³⁷. The Natal Witness, 1 December 1906.

³⁸. M.S. Evans, The Native Problem in Natal, pp. 57 - 58.

³⁹. Ilanga Lase Natal, 12 June 1908. It means "even we blacks are not asking for the granting of vote to everybody, but to those who are fit for it."

African witnesses from Natal who had appeared before it had timidly pleaded for political rights, this was no longer the case in 1906. In their evidence before the Natal Native Affairs Commission, Stephen Mini, S. Nyongwana, Rev. E. Mdolomba, Cleopas Nene and Dube strongly criticized the government's denial of the franchise to Africans. They submitted that there were many Africans who were fully qualified and were keenly desirous of the vote.⁴⁰

Dube personally advocated the extension of franchise to Africans with the proviso that they would be represented in parliament. He appealed to the colonists not to entertain unwarranted fears or misgivings about the grant of the vote to properly qualified Africans. He would be happy to have the vote limited by applying the same qualifications as applied to whites. The electoral privilege would thus be granted to blacks who were holders of freehold property or who paid rentals on property of not less than £12 per annum. The Africans had a more direct interest in the country than did whites, and he argued this was sufficient security that they would behave responsibly. The enfranchisement of a few Africans in this way, who would qualify, would have the effect of reassuring Africans in general that the government and the whites were to be trusted.⁴¹

It is therefore not surprising that Dube was disappointed when Moor told a meeting of educated Christian Africans in 1908 that the whites would not countenance the

⁴⁰. Report and Evidence of the Natal Native Affairs Commission, Evidence, Vol. II, Sect. III, pp. 909 - 916 *et. seq.*

⁴¹. Ilanga Lase Natal, 10 April 1980.

grant of voting rights to them. He felt that Moor had let the Africans down terribly because he was in a position to convince the whites to the contrary "ngoba uyabazi abantu avule indhlela aze ehlulwe yibo pela angabacabangeli." He also wanted the whites to know that "nxa sivinjelwa ukuba sibe nezwi ezindabeni zombuso sohlala sikononda."⁴²

There was no change in the attitude of the whites. Though theoretically colour-blind, the qualifications remained so restrictive that in 1909 only six Africans possessed the vote. Even the suggestion that the power of conferring the franchise should be removed from the governor-in-council and the matter dealt with under the ordinary laws of the colony, was studiously ignored and shelved indefinitely.⁴³

The Ilanga Lase Natal also sharply discounted the popular notion amongst some whites that Africans aspired to social equality.⁴⁴ Africans were also accused of attempting to force the government into conceding reforms in order to assume a position of power, after which they would "neglect... white man's rules, governmental and municipal."⁴⁵ In the view of Ilanga Lase Natal, all that the Africans required was consideration from those who governed them. "Freedom is the one thing for which

⁴². Ilanga Lase Natal, 12 June 1908. The first quotation means "because he knows blacks he must open the way (i.e. with whites) until they frustrate him but not think for them." and the second one means "if we are denied a say in the affairs of the state, we shall continue to fret." See also Ilanga Lase Natal, 10 July 1908.

⁴³. R. Hallett, Africa Since 1875: A Modern History, p. 666. F. Mason, Native Policy in Natal: Past and Future, p. 15.

⁴⁴. Ilanga Lase Natal, 2 September 1904.

⁴⁵. The Natal Witness, 5 November 1904.

they yearn - ", the paper observed, "FREEDOM in so far as it is their heritage by natural right, and by law."⁴⁶ The African could, however, not hope to find it easy to attain this freedom in the face of whites anti-black sentiments and "... being without the franchise, he has no political pull on Government."⁴⁷

Dube persistently and consistently championed the cause of the exempted and educated Christian Africans. This included all Africans who had renounced the authority of their chiefs and had given up the traditional way of life in the hope of being accommodated in the European society which was, however, not prepared to receive them.⁴⁸ Their position and status had become so ambiguous and untenable, that there were people who felt that the law itself had to be amended or repealed.⁴⁹ In the words of a Wesleyan missionary, exempted Africans were "... expected to remain like Mahomets coffin, between heaven and earth, having neither the privileges of a Kaffir nor the rights of an Englishman."⁵⁰

The Government had for long been criticized for its failure to encourage Africans to improve their educational standards, to become converted to Christianity so to qualify

⁴⁶. Ilanga Lase Natal, 2 September 1904.

⁴⁷. D.D.T. Jabavu, The Black Problem, p. 2.

⁴⁸. D.P. Collins, "Origins and Formation of the Zulu Congregational Church" (M.A., Natal, 1978), pp. 103 - 104. Ilanga Lase Natal, 19 June 1904.

⁴⁹. R.C.A. Samuelson, Long, Long Ago, p. 191.

⁵⁰. D. Welsh, The Roots of Segregation, p. 238. See also A. Ngubo, "The Development of African Political Protest in South Africa, 1882 - 1910: An Analytical Approach" (Ph. D., California, 1973), pp. 8 -9.

for exemption. Exempted Africans, were furthermore invariably yoked together with uncivilized and tribal Africans.⁵¹

The Ilanga Lase Natal also remonstrated with the authorities regarding Africans who resided on mission reserves and were largely educated and exempted. The newspaper likened the lot of exempted Africans to the uncomfortable position of "the deceased wife's sister in England" who in certain instances was regarded as the most esteemable person and in others was just simply tolerated for the sake of mercy. It pointed out that, when the exempted African sought to assert himself and walk uprightly, he was scorned by both whites and tribal Africans and that, when he did the opposite, he was equally reviled by both.⁵² The chariness of the government in granting exemption was evident in that, early in 1903, there were in a total black population of 460 000 only 498 male Africans who were exempted (this exemption applied also to their wives and children).⁵³ Significantly Moor, then the Secretary for Native Affairs, had declared himself unwilling to accept or recognize the existence of a special class of Africans, as this would be difficult to accommodate in the system of administration. The Ilanga Lase Natal was prompted to observe that the small number of exempted Africans was no credit to Natal, a colony which had periodically

⁵¹. Inkanyiso, 5 July 1895. S.N.A. 1/4/9 No C1/01, Ipepa Lo Hlanga, 14 December 1904 translation of 29 December 1900.

⁵². Ilanga Lase Natal, 3 June 1904 and 8 September 1905. See also F.R. Cana, South Africa from the Great Trek to the Union, p. 61. R. Plant, The Zulu in Three Tenses, pp. 71 - 72. M.S. Evans, Black and White in South East Africa, p. 104. Lord Selborne, Address Delivered before the Congregation of the University of the Cape of Good Hope on 27th February 1909, p. 14. The Natal Witness, 7 November 1908.

⁵³. Ilanga Lase Natal, 12 February 1904. F. Mason, Native in Natal Past and Future, pp. 14, 15, 28.

boasted that it was one of the most valuable parts of the British empire.⁵⁴ The Natal Native Affairs Commission found that the desire of Africans to emancipate themselves had been studiously discouraged.⁵⁵ Hence the small number of Africans who were qualified to vote.⁵⁶

Obviously the government mistrusted educated, Christian and exempted Africans whom it also suspected of being bent on turning other Africans against the government and consequently needed consistent watching.⁵⁷ In the opinion of the Times of Natal, the whites would be perpetuating an obvious injustice and giving the blacks a grievance, if they gave exempted Africans the vote and recognized political equality between the two.⁵⁸ On the other hand, educated Christian and exempted Africans felt that they were unjustly discriminated against and thus became susceptible to subversive or Ethiopian sentiments. They also resented unsavoury taunts from some whites who urged them to return to traditional African life so that they could help to civilize their people instead of aspiring to accommodation in the white society. Though few, and therefore regarded as unrepresentative, they expressed discontent with the procedure laid down for obtaining exemption for their children and the

⁵⁴ U.S. Dhupelia, "Frederick Robert Moor and Native Affairs of Natal, 1893 - 1903" (M.A., UD-W, 1980), p. 64.

⁵⁵ Ilanga Lase Natal, 12 February 1904.

⁵⁶ Report and Evidence of the Natal Native Affairs Commission, Report, 13 - 14, p. 9.

⁵⁷ SNA 1/4/14 No C8/05, A.c. Varty to Magistrate of Ndwedwe Division, Ndwedwe, 14 December 1904.

⁵⁸ The Times of Natal, 24 January 1905.

franchise for themselves.⁵⁹ Most whites looked askance to anyone who dared, like Dube, challenge and question the basis of the caste and discriminatory system. They would have the Zulus accept their inferior position, thereby ensuring permanent security for the ruling race. Dube, in particular, was viewed especially after 1905 as a threat that was quite out of proportion to the actual danger he represented.⁶⁰ This was due to the political statements he published on the matter of poll tax and its possible effect on Africans particularly the educated, Christian and exempted ones.⁶¹

There were some whites who urged that Africans should be educated to a fitness for the use of the franchise. Initially, it could be freely given to them in a modified form, instead of leaving them to seek to secure it by political intrigue.⁶² For this purpose, it was necessary to distinguish between the tribal African and his educated, Christian and exempted kinsman.⁶³ There were other whites who insisted that the educated and exempted Africans should be stopped from clamouring for the franchise and be advised to direct their thoughts to moral, intellectual and social

⁵⁹ J. Stuart, A History of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906, pp. 514 - 515, 520. F.W. Bell, The South African Native Problem: A Suggested Solution, p. 14. D. Kidd, Kaffir Socialism and the Dawn of Individualism, p. 131.

⁶⁰ S. Marks, "Christian African Participation in 1906 Zulu Rebellion" in the Bulletin of the Society for African Church History, Vol. 2, No. 1, December 1965, pp. 66 - 67. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 76.

⁶¹ See for example, Ilanga Lase Natal, 4 and 11 August, 15 September, and 3 November 1905.

⁶² R. Plant, The Zulu in Three Tenses, pp. 145 - 146.

⁶³ M.S. Evans, The Native Problem in Natal, p. 30.

improvement.⁶⁴ It would appear that the whites so sadly lacked knowledge of the Africans that they proposed schemes which hardly approximated what the Africans wanted.

The denial of status of exemption to the children who were born after the taking of letters of exemption by their parents, became a hot issue in the Funamalungelo Society in 1905. This was precipitated by the judgement of the Native High Court which ruled that an African, Ephraim Mahludi, was not exempted because he was born after his father had been exempted. When the ruling was upheld by the Supreme Court which reviewed the case, the Ilanga Lase Natal urged all exempted Africans to write and appeal to the Provincial Council.⁶⁵ It is not clear whether the matter was taken up or what the outcome was. It, however, led to other significant developments.

One of them was that it brought the issue of the granting of voting rights to exempted Africans into sharp focus. In 1906, Dube took up the cudgels for his group and suggested that a start be made by giving the franchise to Africans who were exempted from African law and allowing them to elect one or two representatives to parliament. Other provisions would have to be made for tribal Africans.⁶⁶ Dube was obviously motivated by the spirit of the time, as in the wake of the rebellion, many whites began to urge a change of policy towards blacks. The cause of exempted Africans was also championed by colonial newspapers and was the subject of debate between

⁶⁴ D. Kidd, Kaffir Socialism and the Dawn of Individualism, Solution, pp. 14, 131.

⁶⁵ Ilanga Lase Natal, 20 January, 17 February and 12 May 1905.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 31 August 1906.

government officials. The Natal Witness, for example, found it a strange and startling anomaly that exemption raised its recipient "no higher than he was before and it confers upon him no power of raising, or of otherwise benefitting, the own of his race."⁶⁷ It conferred upon an African relief from the operation of African law but did not exempt him from special laws enacted in respect of Africans.⁶⁸

In his evidence before the Natal Native Affairs Commission, Dube chided the government for its neglect of exempted Africans. To him, it was but common justice that when a person renounced African law, he should be governed by common law. This was, however, not the case. Exempted Africans were at a loss because having moved out of one system of law it was by no means clear what they had moved into. In practice they remained under African law and were under the control of the chiefs of their tribes, whoever they were. They were thus like "bastards", who could not claim to be either Africans or Europeans.⁶⁹

Dube also pointedly remarked that after they had been exempted from African law, it was impossible for Africans to revert to their original state, nor did they desire to do so.⁷⁰ Instead all "amakolwa afisa inqubeko ati tina sifisa ukuya pambili" because

⁶⁷ The Natal Witness, 5 October 1906.

⁶⁸ S.N.A. 1/1/375 No C 2365/07, Under-Secretary for Native Affairs to Magistrate of Underbege Division, 13 November 1907.

⁶⁹ *Report and Evidence of the Natal Native Affairs Commission, Evidence, Vol. III, p. 957.*

⁷⁰ Ibid.

laws relating to Africans were obnoxious and restrictive.⁷¹

In its report, the Natal Native Affairs Commission favoured the relaxation of the conditions of exemption so that they would be fixed by educational and property qualifications but would exclude polygamists. The governor, Sir Matthew Nathan, agreed with these sentiments. He conceded that the law required drastic amendment. He personally favoured the idea that the children of exempted Africans born after their parents' letters of exemption had been issued should be automatically exempted. He was also against the proposal that exemption should be cancelled if the individual was found guilty of a criminal act, preferring instead the cancellation only on the evidence of reversion to tribal life or custom.⁷²

It is not clear whether Nathan's views were ever seriously considered. Similarly, no specific legislation action on the subject of exemption seems to have been contemplated or framed as a direct outcome of the recommendations of the Natal Native Affairs Commission. The plight of Africans, consequently, remained unaltered despite the protest that Dube and his contemporaries had registered.

Closely linked with the franchise and exemption, was the issue of representation. In 1903 the editor of Ipepa lo Hlanga, M.S. Radebe, strongly deprecated any system

⁷¹ Ilanga Lase Natal, 6 March 1908. See also Ilanga Lase Natal, 28 February 1908. The quotation means "the Christians want progress, they say we want to move forward".

⁷² Report and Evidence of the Natal Native Affairs Commission, 1907, Report, No 64, p. 187. G.H. 1274 No. 5, Nathan to Elgin, Pietermaritzburg, 6 January 1908.

which denied Africans representation in parliament. Referring to the famous doctrine, he bitterly observed that Africans were taxed without representation and that laws which directly affected them were enacted without consultation. He suggested the establishment of a body, consisting of whites who had the interest of the Africans at heart, which would keep the government and the whites in touch with aspirations of Africans.⁷³

Interestingly, the Times of Natal also favoured the a proposal of having the legislative body guided by expert authorities when matters affecting Africans were contemplated or enacted. Either provision could be made for representation in the assembly, or seats could be reserved in the senate to which representative of Africans would be nominated.⁷⁴ The number of whites who were known to take an earnest and sympathetic interest in the fortunes of the Africans was, however, negligible then and afterwards, when compared to the large mass of conservative colonial opinion⁷⁵ The scheme therefore stood little chance of implementation or success.

Dube himself strongly supported the nomination of whites to represent the interests and feelings of Africans in parliament. The nominees would have to be independent of the white electorate in order to speak without fear on matters of principle. The Africans and chiefs would submit their views and grievances to the representatives

⁷³ Ipepa Lo Hlanga, 31 July 1903.

⁷⁴ The Times of Natal, 11 January 1904.

⁷⁵ A.P.S. Mss Brit. Emp. 519 D1/5, Travers Buxton to H.E. Colenso, 11 October 1909.

who would take them to parliament for consideration and action. He could not see whites effectively administering African affairs without any knowledge of how the Africans felt.⁷⁶

The official view was, however, different. It was expressed by no less a person than H.D. Winter, then the Minister of Native Affairs, who was known for his prejudiced attitude towards Africans, when he submitted evidence before the South African Native Affairs Commission. He categorically declared that every member of parliament represented the Africans both directly and indirectly.⁷⁷ In practice, however, and especially from their utterances, it could hardly be said that the white members recognized the responsibility of representing the Africans. They were also not elected by the blacks, being accountable to their white constituencies.

H.D. Winter's statements contrasted sharply with those of R.C.A. Samuelson, an attorney of the Natal Supreme Court, an author of numerous books on African affairs and confidante of leading Christian africans, who recommended the division of the colony into circuits within each of which Africans would nominate whites to parliament. The representatives would continuously sound the opinions of, and, during parliamentary recess inform the Africans of laws that had been passed.⁷⁸

Maurice S. Evans was surprisingly, initially averse to giving the Africans a

⁷⁶ Ilanga Lase Natal, 29 January 1904.

⁷⁷ L.M. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, 1902 - 1910, p. 115.

⁷⁸ R.C.A. Samuelson, Native Question, p. 9.

representative voice for fear that it would 'unsettle' them and give them 'false ideas'. He, however, sharply criticised the policy of the government which had led to the weakening of the authority of the chiefs. He consequently advocated the appointment of two commissioners, one for Natal and another for Zululand, whose task it would be to keep the Department of Native Affairs in touch with the feelings of Africans in different parts of Natal.⁷⁹ The scheme was obviously at variance with the aspirations of the Africans who wanted indirect representation. Evans later changed his views when it became clear that the Africans would settle for nothing less than what they wanted.

Dube's suggestion was that there should be a system which provided for separate voting for a fixed number of white representatives by African electors. The separate African voters' roll would consist of two classes. The first would comprise of educated, Christian and exempted Africans with property to the value of £25, and the second would be made up of chiefs and of headmen.⁸⁰ Colonial opinion was not amendable to the idea of African representation in white parliament. Even the colonial press, which was in a good position to educate public opinion generally rejected the idea.

Only The Natal Mercury advocated the grant of representation to African tax-payers. It feared that if this were not done, "... some of the more intelligent natives will preach the doctrine to their ignorant fellow-countryman in a mischievous spirit, and

⁷⁹ M.S. Evans, The Native Problem in Natal, pp. 32 - 35.

⁸⁰ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 358.

with evil consequences...."⁸¹ The Times of Natal and The Natal Witness, on the other hand, were convinced that Africans had not evolved sufficiently on the scale of civilization to receive the vote. If they were prematurely granted representation, it "will only enable jobbers and schemes to ply their trade."⁸² The Times of Natal strenuously discounted the assumption that "a smattering of education, and the possession of squeaky boots, can educate a native up to democratic conceptions of modern society."⁸³

Dube forcefully insisted that the Africans desired that their voice should be heard. He rejected the granting of a vote to Africans that was limited to their intrinsic rights and circumstances, arguing that if the whites were to undergo the same hardship as the blacks, they would immediately protest their dissatisfaction and grievances.⁸⁴ Dube was more urgent and impetuous when the bill for levying the £1 poll tax was before the legislature in 1905. He strongly felt that the measure was of such vital importance that it could not be enacted and sent to Whitehall without regard to the feelings of the Africans who contributed more to the income of the colony than did the whites.⁸⁵

Similarly, The Natal Mercury found it absurd that parliament even ventured to discuss

⁸¹ The Natal Mercury, 11 September 1905.

⁸² The Natal Witness, 6 February 1904.

⁸³ The Times of Natal, 28 May 1904.

⁸⁴ Ilanga Lase Natal, 17 February 1905.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 21 July 1905.

the matter when there was nobody in it who was directly empowered or specially deputed to voice African opinion. The Secretary for Native Affairs no more represented the Africans than any other member of parliament. It strongly felt that time had come for the Africans to be represented by one or more members, not in any way responsible to white voters for their seats.⁸⁶

Dube outrightly rejected J.W. Shepstone's proposal for an "African parliament" consisting of twenty chiefs who would regularly confer with the Secretary for Native Affairs on matters affecting Africans which would be passed on to the government. The scheme, first mooted in 1905, was more widely publicized at the height of the rebellion, being hailed as an honest attempt at bringing the colonists and the government in touch with African thought and feelings.⁸⁷ Dube had felt in 1905 that, as most chiefs were illiterate and uninformed, they could not be expected to deal with public matters. Instead, he suggested that the proposed parliament should consist of ten chiefs and ten educated Christian Africans,⁸⁸ arguing that educated Christian Africans were so numerous that they would be only overlooked at the peril of the colony. "To win their confidence is not difficult and to use them.... as a leaven of good to those of their own race," Mason observed, "is, one would think, an obvious duty."⁸⁹ Dube's views were similar to those expounded by H.C.C. Matiwane, the

⁸⁶ The Natal Mercury, 18 July 1905. See also Debates of the L.C., XIV, 1905, pp. 201 - 202.

⁸⁷ The Natal Mercury, 16 February 1906.

⁸⁸ Ilanga Lase Natal, 18 and 25 August 1905.

⁸⁹ F. Mason, Native Policy in Natal: Past and Future, p. 13.

Secretary of the Natal Native Congress. When it was pointed out that the chiefs and educated Christian Africans might not work harmoniously, Matiwane retorted that the ignorant chiefs would be assisted by their educated followers.⁹⁰ It has indeed not been unusual for chiefs to have educated subjects as their councillors and advisers.

After the 1906 rebellion, the issue of representation of Africans was more hotly discussed than previously. The Natal Witness, for example, in a turn-about probably occasioned by the pangs of conscience which the whites at the time experienced, strongly deprecated the lack of consultation between the government and the Africans on matters affecting them, and even more the failure to explain measures which imposed on them fresh obligations and rendered them liable to heavy penalties and to obtain their views thereon. Strongly in favour of a more direct approach to African representation, it advocated the creation of a council of Africans consisting of members elected by themselves to meet a representative of the government who would present their feelings and grievances to parliament. In its opinion, the Department of Native Affairs, was in no way representative of the people it governed, nor was it even in proper touch with them.⁹¹ The proposed scheme, though a far cry from what the Africans pleaded for, had in it more that commended it for acceptance by Africans as it would give the Africans a voice in parliament.

It is, therefore, no wonder that Dube supported the proposal. On the eve of the elections which subsequensely placed Moor at the helm of the Natal government, he

⁹⁰ The Natal Mercury, 29 May 1906.

⁹¹ The Natal Witness, 4 August, 6 and 13 October 1906.

repeatedly insisted on the importance of representation of Africans in parliament, whether they had the vote or not. He particularly enjoined the candidates for election to acquaint themselves with Africans' views, "to hear what native men of position have to say, and to get a schedule of grievances and also a list of suggestions for the better control of affairs affecting the natives."⁹² He strenuously complained about laws which he felt were so obnoxious that they were not fit to apply even to dogs. "Uma sinabapenduleli embusweni," he remarked, "zonke lezinhlupe nga ziqondwa ngenye indlela....."⁹³ Quite interestingly, he had not shifted from his original standpoint that the Africans wanted to be represented by two or more white men of trust who would sit in parliament as the equals of the representatives of whites. Though fully aware that the Maoris with "the tattoo marks of heathenism" sat in the New Zealand parliament, he reiterated that Africans were not asking to be represented by their own men "although we have several in the colony who are enlightened enough to intelligently represent us."⁹⁴ Obviously, Dube was referring to people like himself. He was convinced that the exercise of the electoral right would be educative to Africans as was the case in the Cape.⁹⁵

Even before the Natal Native Affairs Commission reported, Dube hoped the government would be motivated to give appropriate attention to African

⁹² Ilanga Lase Natal, 24 August 1906.

⁹³ Ilanga Lase Natal, 21 September 1906. It means "if we have representatives in parliament, all the grievances will be seen in a different perspective."

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 26 October 1906.

administration. The government was also advised to discard the patching-up process of the past and to map out a new course of policy in its dealing with the African population. It could relieve itself of recurring headaches if it placed on the Africans themselves the responsibility of nominating men whom they deemed fit to represent them in parliament.⁹⁶ Discouraged by the performance of the Natal Native Congress which left much to be desired especially when it came to pleading for electoral and civil rights, Dube declared the Ilanga Lase Natal was the only true spokesman for Africans. He consequently requested all Africans interested in progress to support the newspaper in its drive to promote African advancement. He suggested names of the whites on whom the blacks could depend as parliamentary representatives. They included M.S. Evans, F.O.F. Churchill, and G.S. Armstrong in the Legislative Assembly and M. Campbell and J. Baynes in the Legislative Council.⁹⁷ He was convinced that there would have been no rebellion in 1906 if there had been "no legislation without representation" and "no administration without representation".⁹⁸

Upon publication of the report in 1907, Dube dismissed as fallacious the popular view that government officials and white MP's represented the Africans in any sense at all. In his opinion, the Africans were unrepresented and could only be represented by men of their own choice.⁹⁹ Besides, there was also the view that only a few white

⁹⁶ Ibid., 21 June 1907.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 18 October 1907.

⁹⁸ J.L. Dube and A.W. Lee, "The Clash of Colour" in Natal Missionary Conference Papers, Durban, 1926, pp. 10-11.

⁹⁹ Ilanga Lase Natal, 3 April 1908.

legislators know the history, customs, thoughts and character of the Africans and were therefore in a position to produce legislation that would be just and wise.¹⁰⁰

The whites in general, however, remained averse to the grant of direct representation to the Africans. While admitting that the Africans were improving and "are tax payers and economic factors in the general polity,"¹⁰¹ many whites viewed with grave foreboding the representation of Africans in the white parliament, viewing this as being tantamount to giving "children" what they would certainly abuse.¹⁰² Indeed, it was hoped that the proposed Council for Native Affairs would give the Africans direct representation in a quasi - parliament in which all their affairs would be discussed and from which could ensure measures acceptable to both blacks and whites for ratification by parliament. The membership of the Council was, however, to be restricted to whites, and while in effect only the chiefs would come into contact with the Council through the four district commissioners.¹⁰³ To Dube, this meant that Africans would remain unrepresented because they would continue to be denied the right to choose their own representatives.¹⁰⁴

The bill to increase members of the Legislative Council by four members also fell far

¹⁰⁰ Lord Selborne, Address Delivered before the Congregation of the University of the Cape of Good Hope on 27th February 1909, p. 34.

¹⁰¹ Gc. Lagden, "The Native Question in South Africa" in The Empire and the Century, p. 551.

¹⁰² D. Kidd, Kaffir Socialism and the Dawn of Individualism, p. 121.

¹⁰³ The Natal Witness, 25 April 1908.

¹⁰⁴ Ilanga Lase Natal, 15 May 1908.

short of the aspirations of Africans. This was so in spite of the fact that the members were to be appointed by reason of their knowledge of and special acquaintance with Africans.¹⁰⁵ Though they were to be appointed to represent the interests of the Africans, their chances of success were greatly reduced by the level at which they were supposed to operate. The whole measure was intended to evade direct representation in the lower house, where the important decisions were made, granting only a measure of representation in the upper house, which was constitutionally powerless to negate the wishes of the Legislative Assembly. There was no way in which the representatives could originate laws or measures that intended to improve the lot of Africans as that right belonged to the lower house. Besides, the ten-year term of office for the members, was likely to prevent the infusion of new ideas and therefore likely to lead to adherence to conservative and traditional lines. There was also the grave danger, pointed out by Dube, that the new members could be a source of irritation to other members and could therefore become "a handle of free-lances to use at awkward moments."¹⁰⁶

In spite of Africans' protests in the NNC as well as Ilanga Lase Natal against the measures and their pleas that they should be allowed to elect the members of the Council for Native Affairs and should be consulted in the choice of the four members of the Legislative Council, the bills were proceeded with and became law. In this manner, a scheme of parallel institutions was established in Natal.¹⁰⁷ While the

¹⁰⁵ N.G.G. 1908. No. 3668, p. 298.

¹⁰⁶ Ilanga Lase Natal, 15 May 1908.

¹⁰⁷ E.H. Brookes and C. de B Webb, A History of Natal, p. 228.

whites had unrestricted say in the institutions, the blacks were denied a direct say or right of choice of representatives in theirs.

Much as there was much to commend the new system of administration, especially the appointment of non-official members to the new Council for Native Affairs which was intended to mix moderately liberal with very conservative thinkers,¹⁰⁸ it is difficult to believe that the new system would have worked. As it was, Natal ceased to be an independent colony shortly afterwards so that the questions of the franchise and the representation for Africans were caught up in the debates concerning the new Union constitution.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 229.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE COMING OF THE CRUNCH: THE 1906 REBELLION
AND ITS AFTERMATH

Dube also challenged the government's stance on the issue of African taxation. In the wake of the resultant Bambatha rebellion, he also severely criticised the government for its attitude towards the grievances of the Africans and its handling of the rebellion. As a result, he was sharply rebuked by the governor, Sir Henry McCallum, especially for the strong-worded articles which he published in the Ilanga, which were viewed as instigatory and inflammatory. Dube did not relent. He published yet another article in which he strongly criticised the whole system of African administration to the chagrin of the authorities who had thought that after the first rap he would behave properly. Dube continued to expound his ideals when he testified before the Natal Native Affairs Commission. He felt vindicated when the Commission published its findings and recommendations.

From the time it was first levied, Africans were not happy with the 14s hut tax which was paid by only them¹. They also suspected that only a small portion of the tax was expended for their benefit². Contrary to the official view that Africans paid their taxes promptly and cheerfully³, they were under the constant fear that if they failed to pay they would be "shot in the head and

¹ E. Buxton, South Africa and its Native Problem, p. 5.

² S.T. Plaatje, Native Life in South Africa, p. xix.
W.M. Worsfold, South Africa, p. 85.

³ The Natal Mercury, 8.5.1902, NBB Vol (1903) p. 25.

their cattle confiscated and their women folk handed over to white soldiers".⁴

When the 1904 census was called many Africans feared that it would be followed by additional taxation with the result that some tribes refused to give the required information⁵. In spite of assurances that their fears were groundless, there was an increasing manifestation of a spirit of insubordination amongst Africans. No definite attempts were made by the government to trace the roots of the anxiety and restlessness⁶. Instead, there were firm proposals for increased African taxation because it was generally assumed that Africans were so wholly untaxed that they had abundance of money⁷. Dube persistently disputed this, arguing that Africans made financial contributions in both direct and indirect taxation far out of proportion to their means⁸.

The proposals for increased taxation were largely due to the fact that as from 1903 the colony was expending money at a rate far greater than its income. When the loan funds dried up and retrenchment measures failed to have the desired effect, and the imposition of taxes on unoccupied lands and houses,

⁴ R.C.A. Samuelson, Long, Long Ago, p. 189. C.F.J. Muller, Five Hundred Years: A History of South Africa, p. 329.

⁵ G.H. 1555 369/04, Confid. Desp. No. 2, Administrator to Secretary of State, Pietermaritzburg, 6.5.1904. The Natal Witness, 1.4.1903.

⁶ S.N.A. 1/8/10a Acting V.S.N.A. to Magistrate of Mapumulo Division, 25.5.1904.

⁷ The Natal Witness, 16.5.1903. C.W. de Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor in South Africa, p. 199.

⁸ Ilanga Lase Natal, 9.06.1905.

succession duties and the issue of bank notes met with considerable criticism, the beleaguered government was increasingly forced to seriously contemplate increased African taxation⁹. This was in spite of the fact that the Africans constituted to the revenue in the form of hut tax L156 000 in 1903, L174 000 in 1904 and L144 000 in 1905. In addition they paid dog tax, squatters' rent, pass fees and marriage fees¹⁰.

Dube was strongly opposed to increased taxation of Africans on grounds that the benefits which they received were not proportionate with the money they contributed to the revenue¹¹. They were also not paid good salaries. At the time, he dismissed the possibility of resurrection amongst Africans, attributing the rumours of unrest to whites who were bent upon goading Africans into rebellion in which they could only be annihilated by the by the sophisticated weaponry of the whites¹².

The government had, however, proceeded to seize upon a recommendation of the South African Native Affairs Commission that the taxation of Africans should be based upon what could be deemed to be their adequate contribution

⁹ The Natal Witness, 11.6.1903, and 30.7.1904. G.H. 1303, Confid. Desp. No. 2, McCallum to Secretary of State, Pietermaritzburg, 23.3.1905. B. Sacks, South Africa: An Imperial Dilemma, p. 107.

¹⁰ Z.A. Konczacki, Public Finance and Economic Development of Natal, 1893 - 1910, p. 148. NBB Vol. 20 (1903), Vol. 30 (1905 pp. II & III, Annual Report of Natives, USNA, 20.7.1906.

¹¹ Ilanga Lase Natal, 24.7.1903.

¹² Ibid., 24.6.1904, 2.9.1904, 28.10.1904 and 20.1.1905.

to the revenue. The Commission had subsequently proposed direct taxation which could either be a hut tax or a poll tax of L1 per annum by all African males above the age of eighteen and under fifty years, who resided on locations or reserves where no rent was paid¹³. The legislative was not in favour of increasing hut tax because it had difficult to use huts as sources of taxation. African were evading the tax by crowding into few huts thereby also creating a health hazard and encouraging the spread of consumptive and contagious diseases¹⁴. It also brought an inordinately heavy burden on the heads of Kraals who were responsible for it, especially when their sons became increasingly reluctant to pay the tax and the heads consequently lost control over them¹⁵.

In April 1905, the government proposed four tax bills by which it sought to meet expected deficit. These included a poll tax of L1 on every male in the colony exclusive of indentured Indians, a tax on absence landowners of one half-penny per acre on inoccupied lands, a tax on private African locations of ten shillings per hut to be imposed on the landowner, and succession duties from one to five per cent, according to the degree of consanguinity¹⁶. The government also introduced the Native Personal Tax Bill, No 57 of 1905,

¹³ Report of the South African Native Affairs Commission, 1903 - 1905, §417 - 419, pp. 64 - 65.

¹⁴ The Natal Advertiser, 14.4.1905.

¹⁵ Ilanga Lase Natal, 10.3.1905.

¹⁶ Debates of L.C., XIV, p.183.

which directly affected Africans¹⁷. It assumed that the Africans would prefer the poll tax to the hut tax because each man would be responsible to the government for his own tax. While the government admitted that the Africans were paying more direct taxes than the Whites and Indians, it argued that they could still be required to constitute more because the other groups still paid more indirect taxation¹⁸. They would thus be bearing their fair share of taxation which was necessary to defray the cost of administration which afforded protection to their huts and properties. The government hoped that the Africans would pay the proposed tax as readily and more cheerfully than they would pay an increased hut tax¹⁹. It was estimated that the tax would bring in L100 000 in excess of hut tax. The magistrates would be enlisted to prepare the Africans for what was to come. It is doubtful to establish whether the magistrates ever discuss the necessity or suitability of the laws or regulations which they communicated to the Africans and whether they solicited African opinion thereon²⁰.

Obviously, the Whites were quite unfairly determined to evade direct taxes at all costs. Africans, on the other, would be burdened with both direct and indirect taxes. In actual terms, they would be taxed by over fifty per cent more than the Whites because as from 1860 they had been paying taxes on

¹⁷ Debates of the L.A., XXXIX, pp.662,704.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid. Vol XXIX, 1905, p.707.

²⁰ J. Swart, a History of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906, p. 32.

blankets and other consumer goods²¹.

However, the bill was generally opposed in both the Legislative Council and the white press chiefly because the Africans were not entitled to consideration on the disbursement of the expenditure of funds that the bill would lead to²². It was strongly felt that the bill would "predictably bring about a state of lawlessness, bitterness of feeling, and vindictiveness with evil consequences"²³. Opposition to the measure became more intense when the house and unoccupied land tax bills were withdrawn, apparently because the Whites were determined to avoid taxes on their properties²⁴.

Still intent on getting the young, unmarried African males to pay their share of the tax burden, the government subsequently introduced the Poll Tax bill, No. 65 of 1905. Though it sought to impose a poll tax of L1 on all male residents of Natal, whether white, coloured, African or Indian, it would obviously hit the Africans the hardest. In Dube's opinion, they were already smarting under many and confusing taxes which had been promulgated on the assumption that Africans were not paying their proportionate share of taxation and in order to force Africans to come out and work for the whites. He specifically mentioned the 14s tax on huts paid annually on every hut in the

²¹ C.W.de Kiewiet, a History of South Africa, p.82.

²² Debates of the L.C., XIV, pp. 193-202.

²³ Ibid, pp.-241.

²⁴ C.W.de Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor in South Africa, p.190.

Kraal, the 5s to 10s dog tax, pass, licence and custom fees, and the rent paid by Africans living on white farms, Crown lands and mission reserves²⁵.

Dube viewed the new tax proposals as every oppressive. He implored the Africans, both educated and exempted, not to be over-anxious and angry as consequence of these developments. He urged them to make representations to the government using F.R. Moor and M. Campbell who had already protested against increased African taxation. He expected them to set a good example and lead the masses of Africans towards the discarding of angry moods and rebellious tendencies. It will also be possible "ukuba babonise ngomoya wokuva nesive nokukatazela, becela njengengane kubazali ngoba okwakomkulu ukupoqwa nangayiphi indlela." He protested that Africans could not afford to pay the poll tax chiefly because of the low wages they received from their employment both in public works and by whites²⁶. He, like Harriette Colenso and Marshall Campbell, strongly felt if the taxes were imposed they would be in excess of the recommendations of SANA and would be motivated by malicious intentions of which they would be mischievous results. He pleaded with the government to let taxation go hand in hand with political rights acceptable to the Africans by making them responsible for the management of their properties on both location and mission reserves²⁷.

²⁵ Ilanga Lase Natal, 4.8.1905 and 3.11.1905.

²⁶ Ibid., 4.8.1905. See also 11.8.1905.

²⁷ Ibid., 15.9.1905.

The enactment and promulgation of the poll tax bill in September 1905²⁸ and the announcement that it would become effective in January, though legally enforceable in May 1906, proved to be an ill-considered measure which timed out to be the proverbial last straw. Very few white then saw injustice in it. What barely amounted to a 1% increase in tax for whites was generally more than 10% for Africans. It was evidently calculated that it would yield £165 000 of which the Africans would pay about £100 000. It became more detestable because it was suspected of having been devised to force many Africans to seek work in towns and on white farms²⁹. It was also argued that it was evidently the intention or expectation that no serious or permanent efforts would be made to collect the tax from the white minority, was therefore the advantage of saving it, on its invitation, from having the appearance of class legislation³⁰ which had been the main reason for the rejection of Native Personal Tax bill though lately approved in watered down or milder form. The poll tax was evidently wrong in essence and incidence. It would fall on people who, from accounts of magistrates, had intensely felt

²⁸ N.G.G. 1905, No. 3492, pp. 1569 - 1570 (Act No. 38, 1905).

²⁹ R.D. Clark, The Native Problem, pp. 9 - 10. J.D. Smail, Those Restless Years, p. 150. B. Sacks, South Africa, p. 107. E.H. Brookes, "Work of Harriette Emily Colenso in Relationship to Dinizulu kaCetshwayo culminating in the Treason Trial of 1908 - 9". C.M.A., Natal, 1969. pp. 29 - 30. Debates of L.A., XXXIX, p. 668. G. Buthelezi, The Past and Future of the Zulu People, p. 4. E. Roux, Time Long Than Rope, p. 88.

³⁰ G.H.237 G235/06, Bourne to Lyttelton, 28.9.1905.

many ravages of poverty, depression and diseases³¹.

In Dube's opinion, the most unjust aspect of the tax, from the African point of view, was that while the African was being taxed he was refused representation in the legislature to watch over his interests and did not enjoy political rights which even Indians were boasting about. He bemoaned the fact that the African was at the mercy of legislators who secured their seats by declaring that they would "sit" on Africans³².

Consequent upon its promulgation, the government made very little, if any, attempt to acquaint the Africans with its provisions³³. It did not use even the traditional machinery of conveying information through chiefs in order to ensure that there was no possible misconception³⁴. It was only in rare instances that magistrates, like J. Stuart of Durban, independently and preemptively took the initiative to explain to the Africans that the tax had been imposed because the government urgently required the money for purposes of

³¹ Z.A. Konczacki, Public Finance and Economic Development of Natal, 1893 - 1910. p. 150. M. Benson, The African Patriots, p. 19. E.A. Walker, A History of Southern Africa, p. 52. C.E. Axelson, "The History of Taxation in Natal prior to Union" (M Comm., Natal - Unisa, 1936), p. 160. The Natal Witness, 9.12.1905. Ilanga Lase Natal, 1.12.1905.

³² Ilanga Lase Natal, 15.9.1905, 1.12.1905.

³³ The Natal Witness, 9.12.1905. F. Troup, South Africa: A Historical Introduction, p. 200.

³⁴ L. Swart, "Work of Harriette Emily Colenso in Relationship to Dinizulu kaCetshwayo Culminating in the Treason Trial of 1908 - 9" (M.A., Natal, 1967) p. 35. M.S. Evans, The Native Problem, p. 18.

administrastion. Those who did so were rebuked and cationed by government officials for humbling themselves "in the eyes of the natives by explaining the tax and practically apologising for it....."³⁵. Even the churches or ministers who explained the tax were brushed aside or strongly censured. Even the request of Christian Africans to officials to properly explain the developments to their kinsmen in order to remove cause of irritation, was refused³⁶. Instead the Christian Africans themselves were urged to venture to remove erroneous impressions and misunderstanding amongst the uneducated Africans³⁷.

Dube himself also strongly urged the government to inform the Africans of the tax measures as it has done in the case of Whites through both the officials media and the press. He pleaded that the Africans should not be punched upon and expected to carry the tax burden, but should be given the opportunity to express their views on the tax³⁸. In the defence of Stuart, he remarked that the Africans did not take kindly to being ruled by force but "batanda ukucaciselwa kuzwakale umoya wabo odabeni ngoba futi abanamkulumeli empakatini"³⁹. Dube also pleaded with Africans to discard rebellious

³⁵ SNA 1/4/14 c43/1905
The quotation is from The Natal Mercury, 21.05.1906.

³⁶ SNA1/8/10a, Under Secretary of Native Affairs to Rider, 2.12.1905, SNA1/4/14 c53/1905 Rev.W.Wilkson to SNA, 30.11.1905

³⁷ SNA 1/4/14 c68/1905
The quotation is from The Natal Mercury, 21.5.1906

³⁸ Ilanga lase Natali, 10.11.1905.

³⁹ Ibid, 17.11 1905.

tendencies and to accord respect for authority when addressed by magistrates. He advised them to abide by the law which had already been issued and that if they had objections to it they had to express them peacefully and respectfully⁴⁰.

Rumours of unrest and disaffection began to spread with the announcement that the tax was due in January 1906. Reports of defiance of authority increased and there were talks of premeditated strategy to murder all the Whites after the harvest of mealie crops in 1906. The name of Dinizulu was freely mentioned as promoting the unrest and putting himself at the head of the army which would invade Natal. The government reportedly investigated the rumours and could find no substantial foundation for them. Apparently, Dinizulu was, as usual, made the bugbear⁴¹. The government attributed the rumours to nervous Whites who were unduly alarmed at the withdrawal of imperial troops from Natal, and the young African men who worked in towns and were to be taxed for the first time⁴².

Dube also dismissed the war scare and lashed out at the so-called enemies of the Africans consisting mostly of the poor and haggard Whites who engineered and nurtured the rumours of African unrest and insurrection. They would, however, be sadly disappointed because Africans, who lacked the

⁴⁰ ibid, 10.11.1905.

⁴¹ G.H.1233 Desp 4 McCallum to Secretary of State, Durban, 5.1.1906. SNA 1/4/14 c48/1905.

⁴² Ibid.

sophisticated weapons that Whites possessed, would not rise up against the government⁴³.

Unrest and dissatisfaction amongst Africans, however, showed no signs of warning. The government was urged to inform the Africans that poll tax was only a temporary measure intended to tidy the government over in expenses⁴⁴. Winter, however, refused to make any announcement to the Africans and indicated the intentions of the government to continue collecting the tax amongst Africans. he even stressed that all efforts were, and would be, made to bring to justice disseminators of false reports⁴⁵. The situation deteriorated further in all quarters and Dinizulu's name was mentioned again in all reports which were filtering through. For instance it, was reported that he intended to destroy the Whites by magic means. A most extra-ordinary rumour was spread that he had directed the Zulus to kill pigs and Whites fowls and to dispose of all European-made cooking utensils, post and plank doors because lightning which these items attracted would be used to strike those who would attempt to enforce the payment of poll tax⁴⁶.

⁴³ Ilanga laseNatal, 8.12.1905.

⁴⁴ T.V.Bulpin, To the Shores of Natal, p.327-328. SNA 1/4/14,

⁴⁵ SNA 1/4/14, T.F.Carter to the Secretary of Native Affairs, 22.12.1905.

⁴⁶ C72,C75,C95
S.N.A. 1/14/14
T.V. Bulpin, To the Shores of Natal, pp. 327 - 8.

The situation had been so altered or got out of hand that the Minister of Native Affairs, H.D. Winter, himself in a dramatic turrabout decided to visit various parts of the country and chiefs to explain the tax. Much criticism was levelled against the trip which, in view of the critics, should have been undertaken earlier as it was certain that in spite of the magistrate's explanations many Africans did not understand what was required of them⁴⁷. In a sense, the tour was too little too late and was further bedevilled by unwarranted display of force by contingents of field-force men who accompanied Winter wherever he addressed meetings of chiefs⁴⁸. This could have only served to confirm tribes in their beliefs that the government would militarily enforce the payment of the tax.

It was also confirmed by the government that the military forces would be and were used to present misconduct and enforce authority on and punishment of chiefs who were defiant towards the authorities⁴⁹. It actually held by arrest, dealt severely with, and deported chiefs or headmen who defied magistrates and were found guilty of seditious or treasonable conduct or language⁵⁰. Even colonial opinion was convinced that the use of force was perfectly

⁴⁷ The Natal Mercury, 9.1.1906. SNA 1/4/15 ^{C63} 1906

⁴⁸ SNA 1/4/15 C63/1906.

⁴⁹ SNA 1/4/15 C71/1906, Minister of Native Affairs to J.W. Hull, 12.3.1906. The Natal Mercury, 12.3.1906.

⁵⁰ W. Bosman, The Natal Rebellion of 1906, p. 7. SNA 1/4/18 C176/07, Attorney-General to Prime Minister, 22.6.1907.

justified in that it would show the Africans that the country would be governed by the white administration which would continuously enforce its authority⁵¹.

Dube was highly appreciative of Winter's tour but strongly felt that since the Africans were already paying the tax, it would not yield significant results which it might have produced had it been undertaken earlier to sound the feelings of Africans in the same manner as those of whites had been solicited and canvassed. Ilanga expressed the Africans' resentment of the practice whereby "tina abamnyama sifunzwa imiteto singazange sasika nelijikayo nxashane isabunjwa." It also reported that the Africans were solidly united in their opposition to the new tax, and that the young men were refusing to pay it saying "sesikatele ukutela zonke izinsuku, nxa siyinsimu yake nga eke akaule ukufula abhekele ukuvuna⁵²".

The Ilanga pleaded with the government to waive the collection of the tax until it had been understood by everybody. It also took issue with T. Hyslop, the Colonial Treasurer, for reportedly having said at a Durban meeting that the poll tax was fair enough when applied to Africans, but unfair in its incidence when applied to whites. Hyslop had predicted that it would be speedily discontinued for whites. Dube strongly decried differentiated treatment of whites and blacks by the government and remarked that if the Africans were

⁵¹ The Natal Mercury, 12, 14.2.1906.

⁵² Ilanga Lase Natal, 12.1.1906.

represented in parliament the government would be better informed of their feelings and grievances about the tax⁵³.

In an utterance that smacked of Dube's influence which he customarily wielded a lot over the chief, Chief Mqawe protested that he did not know where the "boys" would obtain the required amount as they worked for their parents and assisted them to pay the hut tax. Dube's shadowy weight became clearly perceptible or sharply defined when the chief remarked that Africans had good grounds to complain about the act because they were not represented at "umhlangano" where such laws were framed. Chief Mqawe's protestations were curtly dismissed by the magistrate who retorted that no amount of talking could lead to the repeal of the poll tax act and was ordered to make this known to his tribe⁵⁴.

On reporting on the incident in Ilanga, Dube remarked that the chief had not insisted that he had not told his people not to pay the tax, but had complained that the poll-tax had not been properly explained to him⁵⁵. Winter was apparently infuriated by the magistrate's failure to report all the chief's utterances to him. At a subsequent interview with the chief, Winter extracted an assurance from Chief Mqawe that he was not defiantly opposed to the poll tax and that he would obey it since it was law. It was only thereafter that the

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ SNA 1/4/15 C56/1906 Magistrate of Ndwedwe Div. to V.S.NA 6.2.1906.

⁵⁵ Ilanga Lase Natal, 16.2.1906, 19.1.1906.

officials fully explained the poll tax to the people. Dube subsequently looked out at chiefs who readily agreed to pay the tax because in doing so they sold out their people⁵⁶.

Generally at most of the meetings addressed by the magistrates, many chiefs also protested against the imposition of additional taxation of which African had not been advised beforehand. At other meetings there were loud remonstrances accompanied with disrespect to the magistrates⁵⁷. Like Chief Mqawe, many chiefs protested that their tribes had no money so that they could not comply with the poll tax law⁵⁸. They were subsequently invariably warned about the seriousness of their conduct. It was pointed out to them that any resistance or opposition to the poll tax by either themselves or their people would be viewed as misconduct, flouting of authority and disregard of the laws of the government, of which they would be held responsible.⁵⁹

Even in Zululand, the Commissioner for Native Affairs, C.R. Saunders, reported that most reliable and loyal chiefs were under moral pressure of their people to at least make a show of opposing the tax and not to be the first to

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ J. Smart, A History of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906, p. 118.

⁵⁸ CSO Confid Desp 2597 C8/1906, RM Camperdown to Col. Secy, 18.1.1906.

⁵⁹ SNA 1/4/15 C34/1906, Umzimkulu Magistrate to Minister of Native Affairs, 22.1.1906. SNA 1/4/15 C43/1906, Umzimkulu Magistrate to Under-Secretary of Native Affairs, Port Shepstone, 25.1.1906.

pay as they gained nothing by readily complying with the government's stipulations, regulations and laws as had been the case when the hut tax was implemented. Interesting enough, when Dinizulu's name was implicated on the ground that he was identifying with the movement, the Commissioner denied that there was any ground for the accusation⁶⁰.

Significantly, more and more magistrates and later the Minister of Native Affairs himself awoke to the need of explaining the poll tax act to the Africans. At some of the interviews between McCallum and prominent chiefs, the latter were generally thrilled by the explanation of the various important matters of administration⁶¹. Dube, in an implicit structure, assured the government that chiefs would always be agreeable and co-operative if they were properly consulted and informed of new measures in time⁶².

When incidents of unrest and disturbances increased, Dube was perturbed. He sternly warned the insurgents of the futility of their action advising them to look for money and pay the tax. He stressed that he and Ilanga hated the law as much as did all the Africans. He urged, however, that he and all the Africans were obligated to abide by the enacted measure. It was only after they would have paid the tax that they could make representations to the

⁶⁰ SNA 1/4/14 C70/1905, C. Saunder's Telegram, 5.12.1905.

⁶¹ SNA 1/4/16 C88/1906, Newspaper Cutting from the Times of Natal, 16.2.1906.

⁶² Ilanga Lase Natal, 19.1.1906.

government to have the act repealed.⁶³

He sounded even more serious and desperate when he reported on the Richmond incident. He advised the leaders and the young men who were involved in the uprising that they would make themselves cannon fodder to the whites who, he cautioned, possessed advanced weapons which would practically mow them down. Reverting to his anticism of the government, he warned that the incident would not have taken place if the Africans had a voice in its imposition, were generally understood, well paid and treated fairly by the whites⁶⁴.

He also urged educated, exempted Christian Africans to be exemplary by throwing their influence on the side of law and order⁶⁵. When it was reported that tribes were forming combinations to stage united opposition to the collection of the tax⁶⁶, he stepped into protest against the widespread demonstrations by the forces arguing that they made the Africans edgy and restless⁶⁷. He assured Marshall Campbell that as long as he was at Inanda, he would use his influence to prevent any serious disturbance other than idle

⁶³ Ibid., 2.2.1906, 9.2.1906.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 23.3.1906.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 16.2.1906, 9.2.1906.

⁶⁶ SNA 1/4/15 C76/1906, Garlond to Foxon, Spring Vale, 6.2.1906.

⁶⁷ Ilanga Lase Natal, 16.2.1906.

rumours⁶⁸. He would also impress upon fellow educated, exempted and Christian Africans not to shirk their responsibility of asking the government to take precautionary measures to prevent the disturbances from spreading and to curtail the excesses of the military forces. They were also urgently requested to press the government to grant that, as they were taxed, the Africans should be represented or given a voice in the government of the colony. It is then that they would be given the chance of having their case investigated and remedied⁶⁹.

Dube consistently insisted that his class of educated Christian Africans preferred to achieve their rights through education and political organisation than armed warfare⁷⁰. They identified themselves with the values of the whites by whom they wished to be received and accepted as distinct from tribal Africans⁷¹. At the same time, Christian Africans began to appreciate the need for solidarity between tribal and educated, Christian Africans to fight not only the imposition of the poll tax but also promote national causes⁷².

It was in the latter vein that Dube, in a surprise move, out of keeping with his

⁶⁸ Ibid., KCL 29241 No. 2 J.L. Dube to M. Campbell, undated probably of 1906.

⁶⁹ Ilanga Lase Natal, 16.2.1906.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, pp. 331 - 333.

⁷² F.R. Cana, South Africa for the Great Trek to the Union, p. 245.

declared stand against armed resurrection, reprimanded the Edendale "loyal levies" for fighting their brethren. He, however, continued to caution the tribesmen against the futility of taking up arms against the whites. Dube strongly felt that the root cause of the opposition to the tax was the government and the white's despise of Christian Africans and their failure to explain it to the chiefs and headmen and to understand that opposition to it was widespread⁷³.

Dube commented on the nature and severity of the punishment that was inflicted on the Africans who took part in the Richmond incident. He especially deprecated the subsequent executions of the rebels before the firing squad in the presence of the Africans. The Africans had been made to witness the event arguably as a salutary reminder of the inexorable obligation of public order⁷⁴. Though the government later assured Africans that it did not intend to proceed against the whole population and that the step had been compelled by the urgent desire to stamp out sedition and rebellion and to teach all rebels "severe lessons as to the folly of their action,"⁷⁵ Dube was not so assured. He appealed to and urged the British Government to inquire into punishment

⁷³ Ilanga Lase Natal, 16.2.1906.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 16.3.1906, 13.4.1906. CO179/239 Natal 12923, Secy of International Arbitration and Peace Assn, Stad Loom, 12.4.1906.

⁷⁵ SPG, 1906 B Natal 226, F.S. Natal to Bishop Montgomery Pietermaritzburg, 10.2.1907. See also G.H. 1234 Desp. 41 McCallum to the Secretary of State, Pietermaritzburg, 16.3.1906. Cd 3247 pp. 22 - 23 Desp 27, McCallum to Secretary of State, Pietermaritzburg, 12.7.1906.

and treatment of Africans by whites in Natal. He even asked the Africans whether the time had not arrived when they felt like leaving Natal and seeking homes in other countries where they would not be treated as they were in Natal⁷⁶.

Dube also plunged himself in the constitutional controversy between Natal and the British Government over the matter of the court martial sentences passed on the insurgents involved in the Richmond incident. He also questioned the declaration, extension and maintenance of martial order over the colony in peace time as consequence of the unrest. In his opinion, the British government was justified and competent to ask that the harsh death sentences passed on the twelve Africans of Richmond by the court martial, should be stayed or commuted. By so doing, Dube had flown straight into the face of the colonists who were amuck over the Secretary of State for Colonies' alleged unwarranted unconstitutional interference in the affairs of Natal⁷⁷.

The whites justified the declaration of martial law and the use of force against Africans on that they were intended "to impress upon the native and the fact that the time for palavering with sedition mongers was done, and the time for action had arrived⁷⁸." The whites maintained that the sentences which had been passed were arrived at after most careful consideration of the facts. The

⁷⁶ Ilanga Lase Natal, 13.4.1906.

⁷⁷ PM58 344/1906, 3126/1906, 399/1906,

⁷⁸ The Natal Witness, 10.3.1906.

Africans would be taught that they should obey both their chiefs and the government⁷⁹. "The forces of soldiers," wrote the Natal Witness, "had not been brought there to play, but meant business". The sound of the guns were fitfully discribed to the Africans as "the voice of the Supreme Chief"⁸⁰.

Dube pressed the government to refrain from pursuing a policy of suppression instead of one of sympathetic guidance of Africans which would teach them the right way of progress. In a bold statement which probably referred to him and his associates, he urged the whites to take the cause of the Africans, and become intimate with their leaders so as to be able to guide, advise and champion their interest in the government⁸¹. The Imperial government was obligated to intervene in the control of Agricans by the colonists who were not the people who were knowledgeable about African legislation and administration⁸².

Dube consequently strongly deprecated the restriction of public opinion and the muzzling of African complaints during the disturbances⁸³. On the point raised by the Natal Mecury that the government could not be questioned about

⁷⁹ The Natal Mercury, 22.2.1906.

⁸⁰ The Natal Witness, 10.3.1906.

⁸¹ Ilanga Lase Natal, 23, 30.03.1906.

⁸² Ibid., 30.3.1906, 20.4.1906.

⁸³ Ibid., 20.4.1906, 27.4.1906.

public business⁸⁴, Dube retorted that the general public could similarly not be hemmed in by a few who had been entrusted with the responsibilities of public affairs. With regard to Africans, Dube thought it was inconceivable that they were ordered to pay various taxes according to the caprice of a few, and yet not allowed to even question what that taxation measure was to do⁸⁵.

Dube also sharply disagreed with the view that the Ethiopian movement was the prime factor behind the disturbances. He contemptuously dismissed the accusation that was levelled at the churches of the Congregationalist order that their ministers were cantabrous sedition mongers. He and others felt that unrest could not be attributed to Ethiopianism, but was "the result of a policy of indifference and drift"⁸⁶. In Dube's opinion, the facts show that the struggle was in the main led by tribal Africans and chiefs who were not Ethiopian in outlook, and was the direct outcome of the imposition of the poll tax. Most probably the new class of Africans in whose category Dube and his associates fell, which not tribalistic or Ethiopian and had begun to articulate political views, supported the unrest, though not effectively⁸⁷.

Dube and others attributed the spread of the disturbances to the weakness and inadequacy of the magistrates who were appointed to administer African to

⁸⁴ The Natal Mercury, 20.4.1906.

⁸⁵ Ilanga Lase Natal, 27.4.1906.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

administer African policy⁸⁸. In their view if the magistrates in their daily contact with Africans were just, firm, considerate, wise and tactful, the disturbances would have been averted. Equally darnable were senior officials including the Minister and Secretary for Native Affairs who were so complacent that they could not read the signs of the impending unrest. They were so out of touch with the mass of the Africans that a minor, and previously unheard of chief, like Bambata, could dangerously influence many Zulus to rise up the government.

Equally to blame was the absence of the African voice in the administration of their affairs⁸⁹. The government had ruled out any possibility of protests and representation. It had failed to pay heed to sullen silence from rebellion and the impudent defiance from the men. It made no attempts to provide safe channels into which the energies of the demilitarized and unemployed men might be directed⁹⁰. When the poll tax was proclaimed, it gave them a much desired opportunity to "wash their speers"⁹¹. Dube, however, warned the Africans against taking up arms and insurrections. Rather, they would have to return the whites' ill-treatment with peaceful words and actions which "will

⁸⁸ The Natal Mercury, 19.3.1906. Ilanga Lase Natal, 27.4.1906, 4.5.1906. CSO. Vol. 2597, Confid. Desp. Col. Secy to Magistrate Stanger, 1906. C. Kadalie, My Life and ICU, p. 25.

⁸⁹ Ilanga Lase Natal, 4.5.1906.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 11.5.1906.

⁹¹ E.H. Brookes, The History of Native Policy in South Africa, p. 76 -7. C. de B. Webb, White Rule in South Africa, 1830 - 1910, p. 65. NBB Vol. 30 (1905).

“speak more loudly for us than ten Bambatas with their spears⁹².”

Dube strongly urged the government to inquire into the causes of the disturbances and to placate the Africans by removing all ungenerous acts that reduced their confidence in the government⁹³. If the government regained the confidence of the Africans it would get them on the road of progress “not as handicapped or as jaded steeds, but as worthy factors feeling that they are recognized and treated as human beings⁹⁴.” He also pressed the government to encourage whites to discard their opposition to African advancement in general and racist attitudes in particular. He thought that these were contributory to misunderstanding which he viewed as the direct cause of the disturbances⁹⁵.

Dube also blamed the government for the loss of control by chiefs over their subjects. In his opinion, the whites had so curtailed the chiefs’ authority, with the magistrates going so far as to belittle the chiefs before their people, that they could no longer demand obedience from the young men⁹⁶. The government paid no heed to the complaints of Kraalheads that the payment of poll tax would further lower their authority over their sons who would be

⁹² Ilanga Lase Natal, 11.5.1906. Colenso Collection, Box 43, 22.1.1906.

⁹³ Ilanga Lase Natal, 15.6.1906.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 22.6.1906.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 27.7.1906.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 16.3.1906.

personally liable for it. They would consequently decline to contribute towards hut tax and other taxes which their fathers were required to pay⁹⁷. The Kraalheads had ruefully and recentfully indicated that this would further increase their sons independence of parental discipline and control⁹⁸. The chiefs had been reduced "to mere salaried puppets, acting as tax-collectors and continuing in office only so long as they duly carried out the policy and orders of the white Government⁹⁹."

Dube prevailed upon the government to examine the causes of loss of control and to reinstate the chiefs into the authority which it expected them to execute their duties¹⁰⁰. Some chiefs had to be credited for their loyalty to the government and to guts with which they registered their opposition to the unpopular tax measure with only respectful remonstrance. This was also due to Dinizulu who counteracted his people's possible resistance of tax by prevailing upon them to be the first to pay, which they did prior to the date set for its collection¹⁰¹.

Dube also advocated the resumption of direct-control of Natal, and the

⁹⁷ Ibid., See also NBB Vol. 30 1905 Annual Report, 1906. The Natal Witness, 18.11.1905.

⁹⁸ C. de Webb and E.H. Brookes, A History of Natal, p. 221. J. Stuart, A History of the Zulu Rebellion, 1906, p. 101.

⁹⁹ E. Roux, Time Longer Than Rope, p. 87.

¹⁰⁰ Ilanga Lase Natal, 6.4.1906.

¹⁰¹ Ilanga Lase Natal, 29.1.1909. NBB Vol. 32 (1906), Annual Reports undated, The Natal Witness, 13.3.1909.

direction of African affairs in the colony by the Crown. It was then that it could assure itself that Africans were properly administered¹⁰². Colonial opinion defended the administration by pointing out that it had not been willfully unjust or morally depraved. "If we have sinned against the natives" wrote the Natal Mercury, "it has not been by sin of tyranny, but rather of indulgence. Our Government has not been harsh and stern, but rather generous and lax..."¹⁰³

The colonists and the Natal government were strongly opposed to the Crown's involvement in local affairs that they were firmly against appealing to the British Government for assistance with post-rebellion reparations. They felt that this would be a confession that Natal had failed to fulfil the conditions of her responsible government. The British government itself refused to intervene or to assume direct control of African affairs which it believed rested with the government of Natal. It, however, hoped that all the malpractices and irregularities connected with the disturbances would be sorted out¹⁰⁴. This could have vindicated the government, the ministry and the colonists who still felt that the Colenso's and the Aborigines Protection Society were by their statements and exposures bent on demaging the image and well-being of the

¹⁰² Ilanga Lase Natal, 6.4.1906.

¹⁰³ The Natal Mercury, 5.5.1906.

¹⁰⁴ GH238 G475/1906, Desp. 31, Lord Elgm to Sir Henry McCallum, Downing Street, 5.5.1906. CO 179/239, Natal 14345, Lord Elgm to Secretary of Aborigines Protection Society, Westminster, 8.5.1906.

government¹⁰⁵.

Dube strongly believed that Africans would welcome the return of Natal to Crown colony status as they would be assured of better treatment. A disastrous and narrow-minded policy would thereby be discarded¹⁰⁶. He believed that the Natal government with its recurrent "effervescing patriotism" needed "steadying power of mature authority to guide it to useful issues." If this was not done it would "bask in its own sublimity and wither away until it becomes a dreary record of misdirected force¹⁰⁷." He vouchsafed that the hostile feeling that had been evinced by Africans during the rebellion was entirely against the Natal government authorities and not the British government. It had been motivated by the conviction that there could be no remedy to maladministration of Africans without striking at the local government¹⁰⁸. He was also opposed to the placing of Zululand under Natal. Instead, he advocated that it should be ruled directly by the British government because the Zulus who were in Natal "akuko mizamo yokuwaquba, nemali etelwa yiwo akubonakali okukanyisa uZulu okwenziwa yiyo¹⁰⁹."

Dube was also devastatingly critical of the government in hard-hating editorials

¹⁰⁵ PM69 1377/1907 Sir William Arbuckle to F.R. Moor, Westminster, 13.2.1907.

¹⁰⁶ Ilanga Lase Natal, 31.7.1908, 24.8.1908.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 28.2.1908.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 18.12.1908.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 27.3.1908.

of 4 and 11 May 1906. He outspokenly protested against the execution of Zulus during the rebellion, bombardment of Kraals, the confiscation of cattle even of innocent Africans, and the subsequent loss of life and property they suffered as result of the military operations. Entitled "Vukani Bantu" or "Africans should awake" the message of the editorials was that Africans should awake from indifference and ignorance and learn to organize themselves like the Indians and Coloureds and raise funds and send delegates who would submit their grievances to the Imperial government¹¹⁰.

As a result of the misinterpretation of the editorials by the Natal Witness and the Under-Secretary for Native Affairs, S.O. Samuelson, Dube was brought before the governor and charged with stirring up seditious feelings amongst Africans. He was also infringing the conditions of martial law. He was also accused of discussing in his paper issues which were prohibited while the rebellion lasted¹¹¹. The governor justified the seizure of cattle, forfeiture of their lands, deposition of chiefs on the African custom according to which if a section of the tribe offended the government they were all punished. He insisted that the rebellion was to him a matter of tribal and not individual responsibility. It was, therefore, in the interest of all members of tribes to

¹¹⁰ Ilanga Lase Natal, 4, 25.5.1906. See also M. Benson, The African Patriots, p. 29. B. Sacks, South Africa, p. 114. Gebuza, The Peril in Natal, pp. 23 - 25. CO179/239, Natal 12589, HR Fox Bourne to Secretary of State, 9.4.1906. SNA 1/4/16 C220/1906, Statement of Intelligence Officer No. 2, 26.7.1906.

¹¹¹ The Natal Witness, 12.5.1906. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 333. Ilanga Lase Natal, 4, 11.5.1906.

keep recalcitrants and offenders in order and subjection otherwise they themselves were partners in any fines which might be inflicted or imposed for the offences committed¹¹².

Dube admitted that he might have given the government cause to suspect his loyalty by the manner in which he commented on the rebellion. However, the situation was so grave that he could not but make the exposures with the hope that the government would know and take into account the feelings, opinions and the standpoint of the Africans when it promulgated laws and in post-rebellion reparations¹¹³. This would bring about a policy of peace and sympathy¹¹⁴. He protested his innocence of any intentional disloyalty towards the government. He pointed out that on many occasions he had stood by the government and had urged Africans to obey the law. He had also edited the Ilanga with painstaking care so that it was not interfered with by the authorities. He blamed those who translated his Zulu editorials, who as consequence of their lack of sympathy for the African cause rendered them in such a way that they caused offence¹¹⁵.

Dube should have been only surprised when McCallum rested his case upon

¹¹² GH 1234 Desp. 103, Sir Henry McCallum to Secretary of State, Pietermaritzburg, 30.5.1906. See Gebuza, The Peril in Natal, p. 25.

¹¹³ Ilanga Lase Natal, 25.5.1906. GH1269 Desp 105 Encl. No. 2.

¹¹⁴ Ilanga Lase Natal, 8.6.1906, 13.7.1906.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 25.5.1906, 29.6.1906, 13.7.1906.

African law and argued incongruously and yet with feeling as if it entailed greater and more sublime principles of justice and equity than British law, and not upon martial law and the plea of necessity¹¹⁶. He did not expect it of the British government to approve of the callous excesses that were perpetrated by its military forces¹¹⁷.

Dube was, however, ordered to publish a renunciation and apology in both Zulu and English. Seemingly at first Dube failed by omission or commission to publish the apology in vernacular. He, however, animadverted on the official translations of his editorials vindicating and depending himself and his articles so that he was ordered again to do what he was told or requested to do at the interview¹¹⁸. He was also taken to task for writing offensively of the Christian Africans who served in the Natal Native Horse Regiment, whom he had criticized them for fighting fellow Africans¹¹⁹. McCallum was insistent that they could not be blamed for enrolling in the force because they were doing what all loyal Africans were expected to do, viz. to fight for the King. Dube subsequently did as instructed and McCallum was impressed that Dube had realized the disadvantages attendant upon rebellion and was aiding the government in its drive to prevent it from spreading. The governor was,

¹¹⁶ Gebuza, The Peril in Natal, pp. 24 - 25.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ GH1234, 1270 Encl. No. 1 in Desp. 128, Sir Henry McCallum to Secretary of State, Pietermaritzburg, 21.6.1906.

¹¹⁹ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 335.

however, not rid of the view that Dube was "pronounced Ethiopian who ought to be watched"¹²⁰." McCallum did not, however, profess or pretend to like Africans or anybody with ".... negrophile tendencies"¹²¹

It was not long before Dube was again enmeshed in a controversy over yet another sharply worded article in the Ilanga. It had originally been intended for a meeting of the Natal Native Congress and when this failed to materialize, he published it for general information. He stressed that it was not his intention to stir up either rebellions sentiments amongst Africans or racial ill-feelings between blacks and whites. He pointed out that in his clamour for justice and equal rights for all, he was basing his petitions on reason and not emotion¹²².

He bitterly protested against the abrogation of the Africans' right to land, the denial of the vote to close to 5 000 educated, Christian and exempted blacks, the isibhalo and low wages and the labour conditions that were applicable to Africans, the proposed appointment of a permanent Secretary for Native Affairs, the lack of provision for the representation of Africans in parliament and the absence of blacks in the Natal Native Affairs Commission. He would

¹²⁰ S. Marks, The Ambiguities of Dependence: John L. Dube "of Natal" in Journal of Southern African Studies. Vol. I, No. 2, April 1975, p. 164.

¹²¹ G.H. 1234 Desp. 267, McCallum to Secretary of State, Pietermaritzburg, 10.11.1906.

¹²² Ilanga Lase Natal, 4.9.1908. See the publication or issue of 24.8.1906.

have preferred to see two or three blacks on the Commission in order that African witnesses could present their evidence without trepidation. He was deeply concerned about the silencing of Africans who, when they dared to open their mouths and make whatever voice of complaint indicating their displeasure at certain laws, were moved down by hails of bullets¹²³.

The Natal Mercury was quick to descend on Dube. It discounted the view that the address was meant for Africans, with a view to offer them a glimpse of future African policy of the government. It was of the view that the article was intended to inflame Africans with "a sense of terrible wrong doing". It was calculated to stir up rebellious sentiments and racial hatred. It was therefore likely to alienate a good deal of sympathy which some whites had in the way of extending the privileges of educated and uneducated Africans alike. In its view, Dube had overstepped his liberties that he was bound to observe as his relations' counsellor. He was cautioned against putting forward theories of equality between blacks and whites. It was stressed that the two stood on different planes¹²⁴. Even missionary newspaper like Ikwezi, an Anglican monthly tabloid, rebuked Dube. Dube was challenged for advocating the extension of the franchise to, and representation of Africans in parliament, and the grant of the right to carry arms to exempted Africans. Ikwezi did not

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ The Natal Mercury, 14.11.1906. D. Kidd, Kafir Socialism and the Dawn of Individualism, p.160. S. Marks, "Christian African Participation in 1906 Zulu Rebellion" in the Bulletin of the Society for African Church History, Vol.2, No1, December 1965, p.65.

think that the granting of electoral rights would be of any benefit. It therefore cautioned Dube against indulging in useless talk instead of concentrating on issues that meant progress like Christianity, education and social advancement¹²⁵. Amongst the major newspapers, it was only the Natal Witness that commended the address. It found it seething with such a sense of wrong, misgovernment and oppression as compelled immediate government attention and action¹²⁶.

Dube angrily reacted to the criticism of the Natal Mercury. He attacked the paper for perpetuating the fossilized notion that the African was incapable of doing any good for himself and consequently had to be kept in check by the whites. He insisted that all that the government had to pursue in its administration of African affairs in order to promote political and social advancement of the blacks¹²⁷. He decried the criticism that they were intended to muzzle him and others and discourage the aspirations of all Africans who might dare to criticize the government of the day. He insisted that what he had proposed in the address was sincere, judicial, and fair-minded when compared to the criticism that the article had elicited. He rebuked the whites for their evasion of the truth, and their attempts to deprive Africans of education so that they would continue to do what they liked with the voiceless

¹²⁵ Ikwezi, Dec. 1906.

¹²⁶ The Natal Witness, 17.11.1906.

¹²⁷ Ilanga lase Natal, 23.11.1906.

black masses¹²⁹.

However, criticism continued in the press. The Natal Mercury still thought that Dube suffered from "a swelled head" and had as a result done a great and irreparable disservice to his people¹²⁹. Dube was deeply depressed by the criticism that he backed down and pleaded with his detractors to pardon his apparent errancy and petulance, and correct and guide him along acceptable modes if his political standpoint was wrong. He emphatically denied that he was an agitator or a sedition monger, and that he had received his political views from the missionaries¹³⁰.

Dube still emphasized the points he had originally made and still clamoured for direct representation of Africans in parliament¹³¹. He defended himself against accusations "with dignity but with force¹³²." He subsequently informed Washington that he had been so perturbed by the deteriorating situation in African administration that as one of the leaders of the people he felt bound to speak the whole truth. He was happy to see that the authorities realized that he was representing Africans' views and that they respected him

¹²⁹ Ibid, 7.12.1906 see also 23.11.1906.

¹²⁹ The Natal Mercury, 3.12.1906.

¹³⁰ Ilanga Lase Natal, 7.12.1906.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Colenso Collection 44, R.H. Tatham to H.E. Colenso, Durban, 21.1.1907.

for that¹³³.

When martial law was unexpectedly proclaimed over Zululand, Dube was requested by the Minister of Native Affairs to publish the proclamation in his paper. He was also asked to explain the object of the government action to the Africans. Dube apparently complied though he expressed his concern over military operations. He pleaded with the authorities to ensure that the reported atrocities by the troops, who not only frightened even loyal and innocent Africans by the display of arms, but also burnt their houses and food, and rabbed their women and children, were not repeated. Dube stressed that Africans were fearful of brutalities which were obviously no longer dictated by military exigencies as the government contended. There was neither restoration of pillaged houses nor compensation for losses that the Africans suffered at the hands of rampant soldiers¹³⁴. Dube refrained from criticizing, as others were doing, the governor who was evidently wrongly advised by the ministry to declare the ill-conceived martial law. He might have feared that he would once more incur the wrath of the government¹³⁵.

Interestingly, there were few Africans who criticized Dube's standpoint and

¹³³ B.T.W. Papers, 346/1907, J.L. Dube to B.T. Washington, Phoenix, 21.9.1907.

¹³⁴ ABM A/2/30, Rev. J.D. Taylor to Goodenough, Durban, 1.8.1906. GH 1234, Desp. 178, McCallum to Secretary of State, Pietermaritzburg, 26.7.1906.

¹³⁵ GH252, C231/1908, Lord Crewe to Sir Matthew Nathan, Downing Street, 30.4.1908.

views, and opposition to the government. It was said that he was not taken seriously by Africans he purported to represent¹³⁶. His professed leadership was reportedly not recognized by the urban African proletariat because it did not "empathize with its aspirations"¹³⁷. Obviously, the remarks were made by people who probably failed to appreciate, and were bent on downplaying, Dube's role in African politics.

There were, however, prominent whites who subsequently saw through the persistent detraction of Dube's works and commended him. They included Marshall Campbell, Wood Bush, and Geo. Payne who had publicly admitted that they originally thought that "uyisikuni esibhebhetayo, utanda ukona abantu, ubangenisele umoya omubi." After matching closely though, they realized that he meant no ill towards whites and the government and if he refrained from dabbling in contentions politics, there would be no other better suited person "ukubuyisa umoya omuhle kubelungu ukuba babuse kahle abantu bakini"¹³⁸. Dube's standpoint was obviously further vindicated when the veracity of his facts on the punishment suffered by Africans under martial law was later confirmed. It then became clear that the Africans were so seething with deep-seated discontent and dissatisfaction that they could not but question,

¹³⁶ PM68 1290/1907 Statement by Rev. E. Mdolomba, undated.

¹³⁷ S. Marks, "The Ambiguities of Dependence: John L. Dube of Natal" in Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. I, No. 2, April 1975, p. 165.

¹³⁸ Ilanga Lase Natal, 13.11.1907.

as Dube himself did, the white man's authority¹³⁹.

Consequently, even the authorities recognized his worth and periodically sought his assistance. When after the trial of Dinizulu, the officials heard of reports of pending unrest amongst dissatisfied Africans in Natal and Zululand, they requested Dube to furnish them with particulars of rumours on which he had hinted in the Ilanga. Dube complied by giving sources of information and names of areas where the rumours were prevalent because he was desirous of keeping the government posted on the feelings of the Africans¹⁴⁰. He, however, sought and got an assurance from the authorities that the information would be treated with absolute confidence and that it would not be used against people who had supplied it¹⁴¹.

Dube was also vindicated when in the aftermath of the disturbances, the government was lambasted for not only the financial costs of the operations and the dislocation of commerce, but also mismanagement in African administration¹⁴². He was extremely contented that the whites were at last prepared to grasp and grapple with problems in African administration. He

¹³⁹ The Natal Mercury, 15.10.1908. GH249 G126/1908, Desp. No. 13 Lord Elgin to Sir Nathan, Downing Street, 8.12.1906.

¹⁴⁰ Ilanga Lase Natal, 19.2.1909.

¹⁴¹ SNA 1/4/22 C11/1909 Samuelson to J.L. Dube, 24.2.1909, Dube to Samuelson, 26.2.1909, 12.3.1909, and Samuelson to Dube, 16.3.1909.

¹⁴² T.V. Bulpin, To the Shores of Natal, p. 332.

advocated a policy of unity and goodwill between blacks and whites. When the Smythe government lost the favour of the public and decided to go to the country, Dube deeply involved himself in the electioneering stakes. He came out strongly in support of F.R. Moor. Moor might have endeared himself to Dube by gallantly opposing the introduction of the poll tax and his subsequent advocacy of a new policy in African administration¹⁴³

Dube was delighted that the poll tax was used as an issue in the elections. He had always felt that it was an unjust and ill-considered measure which was rightly resented by Africans. They could ill-afford to pay it and other fees that were expected of them. He rejoiced that it had failed and receipts were decreasing because it did not have the support of the Africans. He joined the ranks of those who fought for its summary removal from the statute book. He did not feel that the repeal of the income tax which was a legislative ineptitude would be "misconstrued as a concession won at the point of the assegai"¹⁴⁴. It would instead appreciably improve the lot of Africans because it would reduce the onerous liabilities that the poll tax placed on the shoulders of the Africans¹⁴⁵

¹⁴³ Ilanga Lase Natal, 7, 9, 21.9., 7.12.1906. The Natal Mercury, 3.12.1906. A. Warner and H.E. Colenso, "Native Affairs in South Africa" in Journal of the African Society, 1905 - 1907, p. 183.

¹⁴⁴ Ilanga Lase Natal, 21.6.1906. See also issues of 14.12.1906, 7.6.1907.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

Dube, as well as N.P. Palmer, who initiated the move to have it repealed, was convinced that the tax could not be justified on any ground of either good finance or expediency. If the government had urgent items to pay for, they had to be met out of the normal revenue¹⁴⁶. Reportedly, even those who had initially opposed the repeal then agreed that the colony could not indefinitely maintain a discriminatory, obnoxious, inequitable, and indefensive poll tax¹⁴⁷. Dube then elatedly urged that it be removed and replaced by more acceptable modes of indirect taxation like customs and excise¹⁴⁸. The government, however, persisted in enforcing the law in spite of its shortcomings because it avowedly could not find other legitimate sources of taxation¹⁴⁹. Dube sharply enticised the proposals to retain the tax¹⁵⁰. He insisted that the accursed tax should be abolished especially for the poor African people because it was disproportionate to and made unquestionable inroads into their earnings¹⁵¹.

Upon the success of Moor in the elections, Dube expressed the hope that

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 21.06.1906, 14.12.1906, 7.06.1907. Debates of L.A., 1907, XLII, pp. 384 - 387.

¹⁴⁷ Report and Evidence Natal Native Affairs Commission, 1907, Vol. II, Sect. III, p. 908. The Natal Witness, 29.08.1908, The Natal Mercury, 3.4.1909, 28.10.1910.

¹⁴⁸ Ilanga Lase Natal, 15.10.1909.

¹⁴⁹ SP of the L.C., Budget Speech, No. 1, p. 9. Debates of L.A., 1910, Vol. XLI, p. 676-7.

¹⁵⁰ Ilanga Lase Natal, 7.9.1906.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 11.2.1910, 18.2.1910. D.D.T. Jabavu, 'Native Disabilities' in South Africa, p. 10.

Moor, as well as his ministry, would not disappoint the Africans. He would have to adhere to his conviction that reforms in the African administration were absolutely necessary, and that justice to the Africans was essential to the well being of the colony¹⁵². He, however, urged that the Imperial government should be involved in the administration of Africans in order to keep their control out of the colonial rut¹⁵³.

Dube also ventured to comment on the personnel of the Department of Native Affairs. He was in favour of the appointment of a permanent Secretary of Native Affairs. He, however, urged that he should not be a colonist as it was likely to be case at the time. If that was the final arrangement, the appointed would have the peculiar views and bias of the average colonial mind. Dube was of the conviction that the official "should be a gentleman of England, appointed by the King-in-council to be at the head of all those people who have no representation in Parliament¹⁵⁴."

At the conclusion of hostilities, Dube as well as J. Stuart, came out in strong support of the appointment of a commission which would investigate the causes of the disturbances and the indespread dissatisfaction among Africans. He felt that it was extremely necessary that the government understood what

¹⁵² Ilanga Lase Natal, 21.9.1906. A Warner and H.E. Colenso, "Native Affairs in South Africa" in Journal of the African Society, 1905 - 1907, p. 163.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 28.9.1906.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

was wrong with its administration of Africans. It would then be in a position to prevent a recrudescence of rebellion¹⁵⁵. Dube and Stuart combined to suggest names of people who were to serve in the commission. Dube's list included Harriette Colenso, Marshall Campbell, Maurice S. Evans M.L.A., Judge Campbell of the Native High Court, Frank Churchill M.L.A., and G.S. Armstrong M.L.A. Obviously all these people were highly regarded by Dube because of their outspokenness on African matters. They therefore, had credibility and were acceptable to Africans¹⁵⁶.

Dube strongly enjoined the authorities to set their houses in order and to confess their sins of both omission and commission. He also urged all concerned Africans to come forward and give evidence before the commission. He specifically called upon certain people to come together, formulate, and give evidence before the commission. These were Harriette Colenso, S. Nyongwana, S.E. Kambule, J.M. Majozi, P.M. Malinga, H.C.C. Matiwane, S. Mini, C. Kunene, M. Sivetje, I. Mkize, M. Lutuli and P. Gimede¹⁵⁷.

Upon its appointment, Dube urged the commission to obtain evidence from reliable Africans. He also stressed the need to properly record and interpret the evidence given by African witnesses. He, like many others, awaited the

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 3.8.1906, 17.9.1906.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 17.8.1906, 7.9.1906, 21.9.1906. See also PM61 967/1906 Memorandum of J. Stuart on Proposed Commission on Native Affairs, Pietermaritzburg, 12.8.1906. The Natal Mercury, 1.9.1906.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 21.9.1906, 5.10.1906, 12.10.1906.

report with interest and high expectation in the hope that it would bring to light the African mind and provide the basis of a just and progressive policy of African administration. He hoped that the Commission would pay particular attention to the issues of representation, taxation and land tenure which he regarded as crucial to the grievances of the African¹⁵⁸.

However, the meeting of people whom Dube had recommended that they should converge and formulate evidence to be submitted to the commission, did not materialize. Dube was obviously so disappointed that he resolved not to give evidence ostensibly because if he spoke the truth and pointed out the fears in African administration, he would be viewed as an Ethiopian and could bring untold harm to his people.

It is, however, probable that he was under the spell of his erstwhile friend, R.H. Tatham, who was so opposed to give evidence before the Commission that he vehemently chided H.E. Colenso for having done so. Tatham strongly felt that the Commission would do no good¹⁵⁹. The two parted company over the appointment of Renaud as Dinizulu's defence attorney, and Tatham's discovery that Harriette Colenso had written sections of the Code of Native Law to which he had objected on various occasions¹⁶⁰. This probably

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 21.9.1906, 28.9.1906.

¹⁵⁹ Colenso Collection, 43, R.H. Tatham to H.E. Colenso,

¹⁶⁰ Colenso Collection 44, R.H. Tatham to H.E. Colenso, Durban, 9,10,14,17.01.1907.

accounts for Dube's surprise decision to give evidence to the delegation of the Commission which might have also softened him by visiting Ohlange on 3 April, 1907, a point about which he wrote appreciatively¹⁶¹.

Upon the publication of the report of the Commissioner, Dube joined other figures and bodies which urged the government not to pigeon-hole the report as it had done with previous ones, but to take immediate steps to give effect to the recommendations of the Commission. He particularly impressed upon the authorities to introduce administrative reforms which would serve to the grievances of the Africans and restore their confidence in whites and the government¹⁶². He strongly entreated the government to do more than just paying lip service to reform while absolutely doing nothing to bring about a reformed African administration. He was going to patiently wait for further developments which were not long in coming¹⁶³.

¹⁶¹ Ilanga lase Natal, 26.04.1907

¹⁶² Ibid. 11.12.1908.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

CHAPTER NINE

DUBE WITH HIS CONTEMPORARIES ON REFORM OF
AFRICAN ADMINISTRATION

Dube welcomed the appointment of the new governor, Sir Matthew Nathan, with the feeling of pleasure more especially because he would be restored. He was hopeful that the government would appreciate the efforts that were being made by the Moors' ministry to remedy previous mistakes in African administration.¹

Christian Africans who lined around Durban were called upon to organise a meeting where they would present their greetings to Sir Matthew Nathan. It is not surprising that Dube was one of the six people who were chosen to execute the task. He was the originator of the idea; no wonder he was requested to steer the course and to welcome the government. This was done on the 18th September 1907.

In his welcome speech Dube stressed that Africans were trustful that the governor "ayunaka isimo somuntu nokuba umbala wake nokuba isizwe sake, kepa bonke uyopata ngokumnene." He also pointed out that Africans were expectant that "abomdabu kulelizwe abezwele kuko konke."²

¹ Ilanga Lase Natal, 30 August 1907. See also 19 April 1907.

² Ibid., 20 September 1907. When translated the first quotation means "will not concentrate on the condition and colour of either a person or his nation, but will administrate humanely", and "to be considerate to the Africans as regards everything", respectively.

The governor drew applause from the audience when he promised to work hand in hand with Moor when he would need to consult regularly because of his vast knowledge of the aspirations and ways of the Africans. He would promote their development in the fields of education, labour and agriculture.³ It is no wonder that many persons were grateful to have "a governor who seems to have a heart as well as a head."⁴ He pursued the interest of the colony without the distinction of race or creed. He identified himself with all the people of the colony.⁵ It was on this note that Dube had to remark on the day the colony bade farewell to the government in 1909 that "the natives of this land will remember you with pleasure."⁶ The American Board of Missions was convinced that the governor was "permanently helpful to the work of the mission."⁷

On commenting report of the Natal Native Affairs Commission of 1906 - 7, Dube made far - ranging remarks. He observed that the conclusions and recommendations would not please many colonists especially those who believed that "the native can do no good." The whites were generally to blame for raising difficulties for the government. They would not assist it to correct the problems in African

³ Ibid.

⁴ A.B.M., A/2/18, E.E. Strong to F.B. Bridgman, Boston, 1 April 1908.

⁵ G.H.1236, Desp 1, Bale (Administrator) to Crewe, Pietermaritzburg, 01 January 1910.

⁶ Ilanga Lase Natal, 10 December 1909.

⁷ A.B.M. ABM A/2/18 J.L. Dube to F.B. Bridgman, Boston 6 April 1908.

administration but they were generally against the advancement of Africans.⁸

Significantly, the Commission observed that "the domain of statutory law has been more intensive since the advent of Responsible Government than formerly." This was due to the concerted drive to promote the interests of the whites. Many statutory measures "give weight to the complaints of Natives that they are ignorant of the laws to which they are expected to yield obedience." The Commission quoted 48 parliamentary enactments applicable to Africans and 66 laws and parts of laws having special relevance to African administration.⁹ There had undoubtedly been an increased governmental control of the ways of life and habits of the Africans.

Consequently, Dube was happy that many members of the Commission observed and commented on the plight of the Africans. Many commissioners had pointed out that originally they had a sad lack of knowledge of African affairs. In the light of this, the government and the colonists had not satisfied any section of the African population.¹⁰ Significantly, the editor of the Natal Witness had also observed that the whites "have blundered and muddled on, with a supreme indifference for the welfare and susceptibilities of the native population."¹¹ The Natal Mercury urged that a council or board be created "in order to bring the natives and the Government

⁸ Ilanga Lase Natal, 3 May 1907.

⁹ Report and Evidence of the Natal Native Affairs Commission, 1906 - 07. & 26, pp. 10 - 11.

¹⁰ Ilanga Lase Natal, 23 August 1907.

¹¹ The Natal Witness, 14 August 1907.

of the country into touch, and more harmonious relations."¹²

Dube was courageous enough to state that African administration had been weighed and found wanting. He was, however, confident that Africans, especially those who had testified before the Commission, would co-operate with the government in promoting whatever would be done "to enable their people and the white colonists getting on together without the course of distrust.....". He urged the government to look at the report as "a hard firm rock upon which it can sharpen its mental edge, to exercise its function in a proper spirit."¹³

Dube joined hands with those who strongly urged that recommendations of the report be implemented. The changes might be modified by opinions of commentators.¹⁴ However, the implementation would have to do with regard to Africans who would be greatly affected thereby. He strongly appealed to the colonists and the government to rid themselves of the notion that "the Natives are but children."¹⁵ He was very happy that the government was not only impressed with the importance of the matter that the Commission it had been appointed to investigate, but was also determined to implement its recommendations.¹⁶

¹² The Natal Mercury, 16 August 1907.

¹³ Ilanga Lase Natal, 23 August 1907.

¹⁴ The Natal Mercury, 21 August 1907.

¹⁵ Ilanga Lase Natal, 30 August 1907.

¹⁶ Ilanga Lase Natal, 7 September 1907. Debates of Legislative Assembly, 1907, XLIII, p. 350.

In actual fact, the government was very determined to give effect to these and it kept the Colonial Office informed of the various steps that it wanted to take.¹⁷ Actually, it did not take the government time to appoint officials especially members of the Native Affairs Department to prepare legislation to deal with the recommendations of the Commission. A general feeling that was abroad was that the administration had lost touch with the Africans and there was no doubt that it was determined to place the relations on a sound footing.¹⁸

No sooner had the officials started to work than they proposed three measures which, when they were presented to parliament, were popularly known as "Mass Native Bills." Firstly, they recommended that the powers of the Supreme Chief be more clearly defined, he should be free from interference from the courts and that the position of the Secretary for Native Affairs be made a permanent one. Their proposal also included the appointment of four new district commissioners who would be expected to be in direct, personal contact with the Africans. It was also envisaged to increase the power of the chiefs as patrilineal heads of their clans. There would also be a council for Native Affairs which would advise the government on all legislative measures that would affect Africans. These proposals were ultimately incorporated into the bill "to provide the Better Administration of Native Affairs."¹⁹ Dube should have felt indicated by those incentives because they embraced the points on which he had been continuously harping.

¹⁷ GH252 G324/1908, Desp. No. 60, Crewe to Nathan, Downing Street, 18 April 1908.

¹⁸ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 342.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 342 - 343.

Secondly, the officials proposed a measure whereby the membership of the Legislative Council would be increased from thirteen to seventeen members, by the addition of four members chosen by the Governor-in-Council for their special knowledge and regard for the Africans.²⁰

This is the proposal that Dube sharply and abundantly commented on. He was of the opinion that its effect would be variously felt and it would be "a source of irritation, and also a handle of freelanders to use at awkward moments." More than that, the additional members would increase the steadying power of the Legislative Council. Their presence would also bring about more awareness of the whites to the fact that "the Native question is also their question, and that security for the natives is security for Europeans, and that prudence enjoins care, consideration and equity for guiding the legislation that is now before us"²¹.

He, however, urged that the Africans themselves should propose the names of the councillors who would represent them. He also strongly recommended that they should always be a consultative contact between the councillors and the Africans²². Subsequently, he strongly ridiculed two parliamentarians who observed that Dube and other Africans who expressed views on the appointment of the four commissioners were doing so because "ukona umlungu owa esifunza loko kukuluma". He encouraged the Africans not to desist from coming forward with their views and

²⁰ Ibid., p. 344.

²¹ Ilanga Lase Natal, 15 May 1908.

²² Ibid.

suggestions untli "kuse kubelungu ukuthi sifuna abakulumeli"²³.

He further encouraged Moor to continue in his drive to represent the interests of the Africans and to do so at all costs.²⁴ When it came to a push Dube did, however, refute Moor's views and stance on Africans. For example, Dube took issue with Moor when it was reported that Moor had said in Parliament that the Africans were represented by members of the Assembly in a very substantial way in respect to expenditure on public works. Dube contested that the whites in no way represented the blacks "with respect to expenditure on public works or in any other way." Dube was, however, continuously supportive to Moor. He continually urged him to press on with the measure to have the Africans represented by the four counsellors. Dube observed that the predicament that was facing Moor was very great. It was bedeviled by the fact that they were two sides to the issue. They were the Africans who were complaining that they had been deprived of the franchise or the vote, and the Europeans who were anxious to have the Africans disenfranchised²⁵.

The bill did not, however, become law because the governor objected to the provision that stipulated that the commissioner would be appointed from the general run of Natal magistrates. Sir Matthew Nathan was not impressed with their calibre and

²³ Ibid., 26 June 1908. The two questions mean "there is or white who is feeding us to say all this' and, "until it dawns to whites that we need representatives or spokesmen."

²⁴ Ibid., 10 July 1908.

²⁵ Ibid.

work²⁶.

The third legislative enactment that had been proposed by the officials was intended to pull the Africans away from tribalism and introduce them to the concepts of local self-government, leasehold individual tenure in landholding and local council system. They formed a bill that was designed for the creation and administration of Native Land Settlement. It was widely hoped that individual tenure would improve African agriculture and thus enable the Reserve to hold a greater proportion of Africans. It was envisaged that the five-member councils would be appointed by the district commissioners in consultation with the local inhabitants. There would not be any general council but the local councils would join up into divisional councils²⁷.

Dube and other educated Africans strongly opposed the measure. In this view, it was intended to console them in their plight of not having the franchise. They objected to the principle of having African affairs controlled by "unknown" authorities from "superior" positions²⁸. Dube was keenly in favour of unrestricted political advancement of Africans. He did not, therefore, oppose the measure as long as it was designed to have the franchise qualifications educationally restricted. In his view, the proposed higher franchise qualifications could not be objected to "provided it is general, and partiality shown; the evil lies in making distinctions without scientific

²⁶ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 344.

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 346 - 7.

²⁸ Ilanga Lase Natal, 15 May 1908.

warrant"²⁹. The bill subsequently fell through not only because of opposition by educated Africans but also the majority of the members of the Legislative Assembly felt it went too far³⁰.

It is difficult to evaluate the impact of the reforms that were introduced by the Moor ministry in the wake of the 1906 - 08 rebellion on the basis of the Commission. The reason therefor is that they were not very extensive and generally applicable, and their application or implementation was not timely. The delay was caused by many factors, some from the white sector, others from the black section of the population. They were effectively too insignificant and ineffectual. They should, and were in actual fact, be regarded as, "too little too late" because the malady they would have cured had long been there and had spread intertwined tentacles. Had they been applied earlier, there would have been no need for them to be implemented, let alone conceived.

One weighty reason why the recommendations of the Commission were not introduced was the unification of the South African colonies. The Natal government's handling of the rebellion in a way contributed to the desire and urge of the British Parliament to unite the South African territories. The Imperial Government had been woken to the hazard of leaving large issues of African administration to small colonies, like Natal, "where there is neither largeness of vision nor the wholesome check of a strong

²⁹ Ibid., 18 December 1908.

³⁰ S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 347.

opposition and influential leaders"³¹.

Abroad, there were two issues. These were unification and federation. Dube, however, made no bones about his preference of unity of the colonies. He was opposed to federation because he strongly believed that it was in a South African parliament that the Africans would be represented. In his opinion, this was an instance in which Natal had dismally failed³². It was only in a unified parliament that "the natives shall choose their own representative; nominations by anybody, no matter how high, will not do"³³. He emphasized his belief that the Africans were demanding, or desirous of, what they believed was right for them. If they did not, "we must remain as we are leaving part of the sad burden which a shortsighted policy empower the Colony"³⁴.

He was very delighted with the progress towards the unification of the South African colonies. He hoped, however, that unification would not spell the discussion of the British Empire. He strongly urged all the people of Southern Africa to stand firm against international ingenuity and intrigue, especially from sources which were opposed to the unification of British Colonies in South Africa³⁵.

³¹ Ibid., p. 352.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid., 22 May 1908.

³⁵ Ibid., 22 May 1908.

Dube was vehemently opposed to the scheme and strategy of politicians in Natal in particular, and in other South African Colonies in general, who were urging that each colony should be consulted and respected on the franchise issue.³⁶ The general feeling was that "each colony should maintain its separate identity to fashion its own franchise for its local legislative."³⁷ He urged that the franchise be given to the Africans. It was, in his view, only then that "the Native problem won't be difficult to solve."³⁸

There were times when Dube was, however, opposed to the unification of South African colonies. At one time, i.e., in 1907, he was afraid that the Transvaal system of taxing Africans, where taxes ranged between L2 would be extended to all Africans throughout South Africa³⁹. In 1908, his chief reason for opposing the unification was the oft - stated prediction that the Afrikaners would be the rulers because they were in the majority. He was firmly convinced that "..... nxa uMbuso usumunye; lowoMbuso eSouth Africa uyoba pantsi kweMilanga yakoPiet nakoke kuwe muntundini."⁴⁰

Dube voluminously commented on the national convention that was scheduled to meet

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ The Natal Mercury, 15 May 1908.

³⁸ Ilanga Lase Natal, 22 May 1908.

³⁹ Ibid., 3 July 1907.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 28 August 1908. The quotation means " when there is a unified Government, that Government in South Africa will be controlled by the Kith and Kin of the Boers, the descendants of Piet, woe unto you Africans."

in Durban in October 1908. He was displeased that it was only the whites, with no blacks or their representatives, who were discussing the future of the country in general, or the fate of the Africans in particular. He urged the Africans to come together and prepare a petition demanding political rights for Africans. If this failed, they would have to petition the High Commissioner who would pass their pleas to the British Government.⁴¹ He even appealed to other black news papers, i.e.; Imvo, Izwi, the Basuto Star, the Koranta, and the September to join Ilanga Lase Natali and form a union that would urge all the Africans to send delegates who would keep vigil on the national convention.⁴²

It was probably due to Dube's impact or widely publicized views that there was a change of attitude or view in many previously conservative quarters. Even the Natal Mercury entreated the British Government to make "some kind of fair provision for native representation, and provide some kind of outlet for the advancement of the natives in the scale of civilization."⁴³ It should be noted, however, that the newspaper was in support of federation instead of union.⁴⁴

Dube was, however, as opposed to federation that when colonies continuously and strenuously expressed themselves in favour of federation rather than union, he strongly urged Africans to rally to his support, much more strongly than ever before. In his

⁴¹ Ibid., 18 September 1908.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ The Natal Mercury, 24 September 1908.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 15 October 1908.

opinion, they would then be able to impress upon "uMbuso omkulu wapesheya ukonze labantu befunge ukuti labantu ausoze wabamunca lona, nokuti asebefuna ukudatshulelwa bangadatshulelwa, nasebekanyisiwe banikezwe ilungelo levoti nokuziketela abakulumeli emibusweni abapantsi kwayo."⁴⁵ He stressed that the intention of this stance was not to bring about friction between the Africans and the various governments. A lot of ground would, in his view, be covered if the Africans were accorded a fair and adequate learning in the government of their land. Should that not be provided, there would be no happy relations between the Africans and their government.⁴⁶

Dube's opposition to the exclusion of Africans from the convention that was deliberating on the unification of the South African colonies gained impetus more than ever before towards the end of 1908. He was, however, still as before confident that the British Government would not leave the Africans in the lurch. If the schemes of the colonists were adopted and implemented, the British Government would ultimately be confronted with the task of "mopping up all sorts of incoguities under a government that will likely be prolific of disabilities and dissatisfaction." The British Government was, in his view, the only authority to bring justice, equity and reasonableness into the course.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Ilanga Lase Natal, 25 September 1908. The quotation means "the big Government should make these people swear that they will not deprive us of the rights and those who want enlightened will be accorded voting rights and the right to elect representatives into the governments which govern them."

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

Dube was of the strong conviction that the Africans had to be granted direct representation in the proposed parliament. He urged the British Government not to commit the same mistake as when it accorded responsible government to the colony and when it annexed Zululand. It had then denied the Africans their natural rights in the legislative of their country. He was of the view that the Africans should be granted the franchise under a uniform generous policy as that which was operative in the Cape Colony.⁴⁸

Dube got himself increasingly involved in the struggle by Africans against closer union of the South African colonies for the reason that it was then clear that the intention of the whites was to exclude them from the legislature of the projected government.⁴⁹ On 1 July, 1909 Dube left for England. He was a member of a delegation of Africans from all over South Africa, who had resolved to present a petition to the British Government on the proposed act of unification.⁵⁰ On their arrival in Britain and their reception in Westminster the petitioners reminded the House of Commons of their loyalty and claimed as British subjects, their right to liberty, freedom and equality.⁵¹

While Dube was overseas, his brother, Charles, took over the reigns of editing the Ilanga Lase Natal. The paper was always emphatic that the Africans were against

⁴⁸ Ibid., 19 February 1909.

⁴⁹ Ilanga Lase Natal, 23 October 1908 and 20 November 1908.

⁵⁰ ibid., 2 July 1909.

⁵¹ M. Benson, The African Patriots, p. 19.

unification in its then proposed form because "the natives, were not allowed a word in developing the plan of the Union." Then, the Africans were, however, not objecting to the unification because they were aware that the union "stands for a great deal more than all those things that affect themselves." Their objection to the ideal was only due to "the manner in which it was brought about."⁵²

The British Government, however, continued with the promulgation of unification of the South African colonies. No special attention was given to nor provision made for African rights and representation of their interests in the Union parliament. Dube remarked on his return to South Africa, after an absence of two years, that the Africans should, in spite of their disappointment, be happy that "kukona amadoda atile akulumela kahle uhlanga olumnyama." He was happy that the department of African affairs was to be headed and controlled by a trustworthy and reliable person, H. Burton, who, in his opinion, was promising.⁵³

Dube had hoped that the rebellion of 1906 and its aftermath would set Natal in a new direction. He was expectant that the political developments after the disturbances would usher in a new socio-economic life in the colony. He should have very dissapointed and flabbergasted when none of what he was desirous of came to fruition. He then placed his hope on the proposed unification of South African colonies. Here, again, he was to be spiritually hurt when the white authorities turned deaf ears towards the political aspirations of the blacks. He did not, however, lose

⁵² Ilanga Lase Natal, 17 December 1909.

⁵³ Ibid. 10 March 1911. The quotation means "there are certain men who speak well of the black nation."

hope but looked onto the future. He believed that then things would turn for the better if the Africans continued their noble fight for their rights in the way that he had mapped for them.

CHAPTER TEN

**DUBE'S ROLE IN THE EARLY PERIOD OF
AFRICAN POLITICS IN MODERN SOUTH AFRICA**

Dube played a significant role in many developments in the aftermath of the unification of colonies in South Africa. He was one of the prominent Africans who worked energetically in early modern South Africa to consolidate Africans into a permanent national organisation. He strove to make Africans progressive in all spheres of life and to defend their interests.

The behaviour of the whites in the years leading to and after Union caused the Africans to seriously consider the formation of a national political organisation for Africans¹. Dube was the spearhead of this move of drive. He contributed significantly to the opening of channels of communication with the government. He was one of the Africans who continuously represented the interest of African group to the officials².

Dube and the Ilanga expressed the hope that the newly appointed governor-general would be welcomed by everybody. The appointee would have to be assured of the support of everybody so that he would do his best to repair the wrongs of the past³. Dube and his African contemporaries also made no bones about favouring J.X. Merriman as the prime minister of the first Union government. This was for the reason that Louis Botha had

¹ A. Odendaal, Vukani Bantu, p.231.

² Ilanga Lase Natal, 28 January, 29 April 1910.

³ Ibid. 28 January 1910.

advocated the breaking up of the African reserves for labour supplies. He had predicted further restriction of African political rights after Union⁴. The Ilanga also favourably commented on the appointment of Henry Burton as the Minister of Native Affairs, and Edward Dower as Secretary for Native Affairs. It viewed the appointments as reassuring and favourable auguries for the position of Africans under Union⁵.

Dube was grateful to the first ministry of the Union for having authorised the release of Dinuzulu from Jail. He had been imprisoned for complicity in the 1906 Bambatha rebellion. Dube, who was overseas, greeted the news with delight. He assured the government that the action had widespread support amongst Africans for it had raised hopes about their position in the new dispensation. Dube was of the view that because of Dinuzulu's prominence amongst Zulus in particular, and Africans in general, his release by the Union government would have an important psychological effect at an important time⁶.

He also urged the Africans to be supportive to the Union ministry. The Ilanga Lase Natal made no objection to Africans participating in Union ceremonies. It, however, criticised distinctions that were being drawn between black and white children in the distribution of commemorative memorial medals⁷.

Dube was very instrumental towards the formation of a new national organisation for the

⁴ Ibid. 31 May 1910.

⁵ Ibid. 5 July 1910.

⁶ Ibid. 3 June, 2 September 1910.

⁷ Ibid. 3, 30 September 1910.

African people. Working in close collaboration with Pixley Ka Isaka Seme, another Zulu, Dube contributed a lot to the convergence of Africans in Bloemfontein on 8 January 1912⁸. This represented a landmark in the history of African politics in South Africa.

He, himself, did not attend the meeting because of pressing commitments. He was represented by his brother, that is Charles. Though it was originally thought that it would be difficult to achieve national unity, it was ultimately proved that the Africans could co-operate and unite the separate bodies and work for the good of all⁹. Dube had urged the Africans to move upward and "not backward into the slump of darkness nor downward into the abyss of the antiquated tribal system"¹⁰. Under the congress, Africans would then be able to speak with a united voice when they asked for something in return for the taxes they paid to the central government and local authorities¹¹.

At the end of the proceedings and deliberations the then South African Native National Congress (now known as the African National Congress) was formed and established. Significantly, Dube was elected president in absentia by a large majority. This might have been for the reason that Africans wanted to express their solidarity with the Zulus in the trials and tribulations they had suffered in the 1906 - 1908 period. The other might have been that this could lead to the achievement of the greatest possible degree of unity, and that Dube's election would demonstrate that political activity was no longer centred on the relatively

⁸ Ibid. 26 January 1912.

⁹ Ibid. 12 January, 2 February 1912.

¹⁰ Mss British Empire S19 d2/3 (Rhodes House, Oxford) Ohlange 2 February 1912.

¹¹ A. Odendaal, Vukani Bantu, p. 273.

privileged Cape¹².

When he formally accepted the presidency, Dube welcomed with gratitude the formation of the Congress which, to him, heralded the political awakening of the Africans. On behalf of the Congress, he also tended to the government his organisation's support and expressed the hope that the government would in turn have confidence in the Congress and duly consider its lawful request. He also mobilised the congress to protest against the Native settlement and Squatters Registration Bill and other policies and principles which the government proposed to adopt and apply against Africans¹³.

Dube wasted no time attacking government plans to segregate Africans through the Lands Act of 1913¹⁴. Simultaneously, he appealed to Africans to reject the system of tribal segregation. In his view, it only suited "a period when barbarism and darkness reigned supreme." It was, however, opposed "to all enlightenment and christianity" and was lacking the Africans, demand of the supreme requirement which was "the power and the means of raising the native people out of the slough of ignorance, idleness, poverty and superstitions"¹⁵.

Dube also urged the Congress to work towards closer co-operation between the African and

¹² Ilanga Lase Natal, 26 January 1912. S. Marks, Reluctant Rebellion, p. 365. A.P. Walshe, The Rise of Nationalism in South Africa, p. 35.

¹³ Ilanga Lase Natal, 2 February, 29 March 1912.

¹⁴ S. Marks, John Dube and the Ambiguities of Nationalism, p. 65.

¹⁵ S. Marks, The Ambiguities of Dependence, pp. 53 - 54.

coloured people. He was successful in his drive and Congress decided that the representatives of the two bodies should meet at least once a year to discuss matters of joint concern¹⁶. He was very instrumental in causing the Congress to start a newspaper, the Abantu/Batho, to act as an official mouthpiece for the congress. In time the Abantu/Batho became the most widely read newspaper in South Africa¹⁷.

Under the direction of Dube, representatives of the Congress galvanised the African people into action. Dube contributed a lot to the removal of disunity in provincial bodies which sought to work as separate and independent organisations. He urged them to affiliate to the national congress¹⁸.

The Congress also found Natal's "native policy" to have been an utter failure. In its view, It was such a menace to the public peace and a cruel infliction on the African population that it appealed system of African administration in Natal and in the other three provinces. Dube probably saw in this suggestion an opportunity to institutionalize the aim of the congress to act as a "Native parliament"¹⁹.

He was also very outstandingly a Zulu nationalist. His politics and ideology were characterized by "the complex interplay between the poles of rejection and co-operation"²⁰.

¹⁶ Ilanga Lase Natal, 29 March 1912.

¹⁷ A. Odendaal, op cit, pp 279 - 280.

¹⁸ A. Odendaal, op cit, p. 280.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ S. Marks & A. Atmore, Economy and Society, p. 277.

Dube was always pro- Dinuzulu and all the time "in league with the ex-king and agitating for his re- instatement"²¹. Until his death, Dube supported the Zulu monarchy. He was very attached to rich history and ritual it provided for ethnic nationalism. He continuously turned to the Zulu royal family as part of the strategy to find a large constituency. He strengthened and consolidated his links with the Zulu royal family even more strongly than in the wake of the Bambatha rebellion²².

Dube was also very determined to improve the status of African women especially in their domestic work status. Mediating on behalf of the woman, Dube tried to arrange a meeting for their delegation with the Minister of Native Affairs. However, the Minister advised that it would be inadvisable and unnecessary for the woman. They were consequently not granted the privilege²³.

The man also travelled widely to address meetings with the aim of collecting funds of the Congress. He also dedicated himself to get possibly many if not all the traditional chiefs involved in their tribes' affairs. He also strove for the enfranchisement of Africans. This provided a spurn to many Africans to affiliate to the SANNC. He also wooed Africans in the eastern Cape, who were then without political leverage of the franchise which had been withdrawn from them, to support the nationalist movement. Dube was therefore one of the Africans who sowed the seeds of an Africanist nationalist movement that was destined to

²¹ S. Marks, The Ambiguities of Dependence, p. 60.

²² Ibid, pp. 67 - 68.

²³ A. Odendaal, op cit, pp. 281 - 282.

pose a major challenge to white domination²⁴.

Dube, during his presidency of SANNC, opposed the nature of land granted to Africans because it was "malarial, sandy and badly watered"²⁵. He also attacked the 1913 Lands Act "with such vigour.....that both lent plausibility to the Kholwa claim to speak on behalf of all Africans....."²⁶.

He was therefore instrumental in causing Africans to respond keenly to the main political developments. He contributed towards the emergence of many political and commercial organizations not only in Natal but in the whole of South Africa that were destined to provide crude framework for action on a national level²⁷.

When he was not returned to the presidency of SANNC in 1917, Dube supported the Zulu monarchy. He was also very instrumental in resuscitation by the Zulu royal family of traditional forms and active collaboration by all educated Africans in traditional and cultural activities, to which many present entities including Zulu Cultural Council or Inkatha owe their origin²⁸.

Unfortunately, Dube was hampered in his grandiose schemes by many factors that are

²⁴ Ilanga Lase Natal, 26 April 1912.

²⁵ S. Marks, The Ambiguities of Dependence, p. 63.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 65.

²⁷ A. Odendaal, op cit, p. 285.

²⁸ S. Marks, The Ambiguities of Dependence, p. 69.

confronting leaders of today. These included inadequate organization, limited financial resources, lack of mass base for effective action, regional separation and parochial tribal differences. These obstacles to a co-operation caused the Africans to be divided amongst themselves²⁹.

It should have been pleasing to Africans with social, political or historical eye to see such an attempt by an African, as Dube was in all aspects. He was dedicated to the upliftment and strengthening of his kinsmen. He wanted social structures and political organisations which would provide material and moral support for the national movement. Needless to say, Dube was a prominent spur in all this.

²⁹ A. Odendaal, Vukani Bantu, pp. 284 - 285.

CONCLUSION

Dube made a significant contribution to the political and socio-economic development of Africans who were resident in Natal during his time. He was instrumental in bringing the plight of the blacks to the notice of the whites and the colonial government.

However, in his younger and more fiery days he was viewed by some whites as an agitator and trenchant critic of the colonists. He nevertheless mustered courage and continued the fight for African rights. He never lost sight of the fact that injustice or repression was abroad in almost all the spheres of life of the Africans. He used a restrained and moderate language when he pointed out his discoveries and the feelings and expectations of his contemporaries to the authorities. It was in this way that his utterances were made to carry weight.

Dube demanded and fought for equality, Justice and African unity. He openly challenged the basis of white power in Natal. He was, however, always conscious of the existence of whites' reality that was different to that of the Africans. He managed to survive the effects which this revelation had or might have had on his personality. His dynamism and political stature, by relating white values and world views to the consciousness and perspective of the Zulus. His tenacity was solid; thus he managed to maintain his cool and was progressive and successful right through till the end of the period under this survey.

Dube periodically and consistently showed the Zulus that it was their lack of thrift, their attitude towards labour, their want of perseverance, their lack of co-operation and unity, that were militating against their progress. They were urged to adopt new ways of thought and modes of life with the hope that they would change the way they were administered by the Natal government.

He encouraged them not to be misled by persons who had ulterior motives. Their malefactors were, according to him, bent to see the Africans in Natal deprived, monopolised and dispossessed of what was rightfully theirs. They were urgently and repeatedly called upon to be united so that they would dedicate their lives towards, and use their talents for, the civilization and progress of their people.

There is no doubt that Dube, like his mentor, Booker T. Washington, sought for himself and his people what he wanted. He sought to moderate the policy of administration. Thus he strongly urged that Shepstonism be modified in all aspects. The main reason for this was that only then would the plight of the Africans be removed and replaced by happiness. They would then be in a position to make their contribution to the desired prosperity of the country that they liked as everybody or everyone else.

In the face of the whites' opposition to the political, and socio-economic advancement of Africans, Dube involved himself with great zeal and enthusiasm in political activity of Africans. He strove for their organisation so that they could and would speak with a united, strong, audible and respectable voice. For the information of the general

public, he strove for, and succeeded in having the medium of a newspaper launched. It stands to his credit that the monument for which he laid the foundation in the time he entered the fray of the mercurial political arena, still stands to this day.

Dube proved himself to be an all-round ambassador for his people. His policy and humanity challenged the Natal government on its policy of administration of Africans. In his opinion, the effects of the policy left too much to be desired. The Africans, like all nations in the world, desired progress. They were desirous of reaching the highest rungs in the scale of civilization. They needed to be consulted on their affairs. There was need for inter-or intra-personal contact between blacks and whites on all issues. This would serve to smoothen the race various statutes that were applicable with moderation, equity, fairness and humanity. Officers of law, especially magistrates, needed to be acute to avoid cumbersome officialdom which could lead to African resistance.

The labour and land issues were two of the many items on which Dube challenged the Natal government. They were crucial points which, in Dube's opinion, were hurtful to the Africans. He constantly vied with the government on the distribution of land. He was averse to the view that the hostile feelings between the Africans and the colonists would have been averted if land had been equitably distributed. He advocated that the whites' demand for land be moderated and that the alienation of crown lands be justifiably approached. Coupled with these, were matters of the alienation of Africans. The government needed to be more critical of the whites' demand for African labour. In Dube's views there was in this more than met the eye.

Dube was confident that the Africans were desirous of education. Africans could not look down upon education when they had realized the benefits that could be derived thereby. Education, which Africans, however, needed was the one which would equip them to face and cater for all aspects of their lives. He found that there were some colonists who were opposed to African education. In his view, these colonists had ulterior motives. They probably resolved that the Africans would not be emancipated until it was only when he had not been enlightened that he would be administered and depended on the mercy of white colonists. Though Dube's efforts were not always supported by the authorities for a long time, for no apparent reason, the man fought on. He was, as he should have been, highly elated when the franchise question was finally settled, and the credit was accorded by no less a person than the governor, Sir Matthew Nathan, in 1907.

Dube constantly and diligently fought for the franchise for the Africans and their representation in parliament. He continuously urged that the political and social aspirations of the Africans be catered for. He also advanced that the barriers and obstacles that the whites sought to erect on the way to prevent the Africans from having these electoral privileges, be demolished and buried. He fought for justice in the British sense of justice and equity. When he was, however, disappointed by the outcome of events, he did not despair. He continued to fight right through to the end of his life time.

When the death-knell of 1906 fell, Dube, though disappointed, did not lose heart. He hoped that the government would then appease the disgruntled African populace. He

urged the government that it should not brace itself for having suppressed the rebellion. Contrarily, it should awaken to and comprehend the clarion call of the emigrants. The Africans were disgruntled and their problems needed redress. There needed to be a *finis* to its comedy of errors. Indeed, it needed to be a *finis* to the era of the maladministration of African affairs.

Dube's hope were even higher than before with the appointment of new officials to the provincial columns of the administration. He was of the conviction that a new life would be injected in the whole structure or system of administration in Natal. It, however, proved that it was too little too late. The prospect of the unification of Natal with the other colonies had been given the go-ahead. The new government's sight was then focused on the new political development. Whether he was or would be pleased with the prospect of a new era was left open to speculations or further historical enquiry.

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