

UNIVERSITY OF ZULULAND

**THE ORGANIZATIONAL OPERATIONS AND IMPACT OF THE
PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS ON THE STRUGGLE FOR
LIBERATION IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1959 -1990**

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CONGRESS ON THE STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1959 -1990**

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QUOTATIONS

“I have fought against white domination and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.” – **Nelson Mandela**

“Occupied Azania, reactionarily known as South Afrika, is a country that has a history written in blood. It is a history spanning over many centuries, a history that narrates centuries of harmony and also, centuries of turmoil. The misconception that the history of this country began in 1652 must be annihilated, for it is a construct of the White world that seeks to measure the journey of Afrikans using a White ruler. Our history began before our colonisation. It began at a time when our people were one with the earth, when no human-being was subjected to the brutality of starvation, destitution and poverty.” — **Malaika Wa Azania**

APPROVAL**APPROVAL**

This dissertation has been read and approved in fulfilment of the academic requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in History, Department of History, Faculty of Arts, University of Zululand, South Africa.

.....

Date.....

Dr Maxwell Zakhele Shamase

SUPERVISOR

DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation “**The Organizational Operations and Impact of the Pan Africanist Congress on the Struggle for Liberation in South Africa, 1959 -1990**” represents my own work and that all sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and properly acknowledged for future reference.

By.....

Student Name: Sphamandla Siyabonga Gumede

DEDICATION

This research work is gallantly dedicated to my father Bhekabantu Gumede and my loving mother Thoko Busangani, for their love and trust in educational pursuit.

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ABSTRACT

This research study addresses the organisational operations and the impact of the Pan Africanist Congress of South Africa (later- of Azania) in the liberation struggle from its inception to 1990. Having been formed in 1959 by a coterie of renegade African National Congress (ANC) members, the PAC masqueraded as the Africanist movement. 'Africanist' is a 19th century ideology that says that black people should determine their own future - Africa for the Africans. The ideology of the PAC embodied external Africanist influences as well as South African experiences. This was clearly illustrated in the basic documents of the organisation, e.g. the Pan Africanist Manifesto, PAC Disciplinary Code, the Constitution, Oath of Allegiance and most importantly, Sobukwe's inaugural address. These documents show how the Africanists conceived of the South African struggle as part of the broader struggle of the peoples of Africa against colonialism, imperialism and white domination. The PAC was barely a year old when it was banned in 1960 with its leaders restricted and scattered before they could clearly formulate a coherent approach on many pressing issues like African socialism, dialectical materialism, co-operation with other population groups and their attitude towards the South African Communist Party (SACP) and its members. It is generally believed that through 40 years of exile, self-marginalisation, political somersaults and internal leadership wrangles, the one point of consistency has been the PAC's attempt to define itself in opposition to the ANC. A plethora of scholars have over the years extensively and painstakingly researched the role of the PAC in the struggle for the liberation of South Africa. However, a survey of the available literature on the PAC reveals a lack of in-depth academic analysis of its organizational modus operandi and impact thereof. As such, the research is geared towards studying the dynamics of the PAC's policies and mode of operations to fill the lacuna that exists in the literature.

NGOKUFINGQIWE

Lolucwaningo lubheka futhi luhlaziye ukusebenza negalelo lenhlangano yezombusazwe eyaziwa ngoMbutho WamaAfrika Jikelele, phecelezi- Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), yaseNingizimu ne-Afrika (noma yase Azaniya), kusukela ibunjwa kuze kube ngunyaka wezi- 1990. Selokhu yaqanjwa lenhlangano ngabahlubuki bakaKhongolose, phecelezi-African National Congress (ANC) ibisebenza njengombutho omele ubuAfrika. Lokhu kwaqala ngekhulu leminyaka leshumi nesishiyagalolunye, okwakusho ukuthi abantu abampisholo kumele bazimele ngokwabo bazakhele ikusasa labo ngokombono wabo ohambisana namasiko ezwekazi labo. Lendlela ke iyinhlanganisela yemiqondo eyavela emazweni angaphandle nangaphakathi ezweni laseNingizimu ne-Afrika. Indlela yokusebenza nenqubomgomo woMbutho WamaAfrika iqukethwe emibhalweni yayo enhlobonhlobo kusukela kuMthetho Sisekelo kuze kuyofika nakwezinye izincwajana ezichaza ngawo loMbutho. Yonke lemibhalo nezincwajana zikubeka ngokusobala ukuthi loMbutho wawubuka umzabalazo wezwe njengengxenywe yomzabalazo jikelele wezwekazi lase Afrika ekulweni nobukoloni, ingcindezelo nobandlululo lwabaMhlophe, phecelezi- 'izifika namthwalo'. UMbutho wamaAfrika Jikelele wawusenonyaka nje wakhiwe mhlazana uvalwa umlomo kanye nezinye izinhlangano zomzabalazo wenkululeko ezweni ngonyaka wezi- 1960. Ngaleso sikhathi wawungakakubeki ngembaba ukuthi uzosebenzisa maqhinga mani ekubhekaneni nezinselelo zenqubo yobusoshiyali, ukuphangwa kwezwe, ubudlelwano neminye imibutho yomzabalazo wenkululeko eyayifana namaKhomani, phecelezi- South African Communist Party namalungu ayo. Bakhona abacwaningi abahlaziye babhala ngaloMbutho ngesikhathi usese kudingisweni noma abanye kubo bebhale kakhulu ngobudlelwano bawo neqembu likaKhongolose kanye nezingxabano zangaphakathi okufaka kukho nendlela okwakuphiliswana ngayo ekudingisweni. Luncane ucwaningo olunzulu noluseqophelweni eliphezulu ngegalelo laloMbutho emzabalazweni nangokusebenza kwawo ezikhathini ulwa nombuso wobandlululo. Lolucwaningo-ke lugxile kulokho okungazange kwacwaningwa ngeso lobunyoningco esigabeni semfundo yamazanga aphezulu. Lomsebenzi uphinde uvale lesosikhala esivulwe ngabanye ocwaningweni lwabo uze wedlulele ubheke inqubomgomo waloMbutho ngesikhathi sekuvulwa komlomo wazo zonke izinhlangano zomzabalazo ngonyaka wezi- 1990 kuze kuyofika okhethweni lokuqala lwentando yeningi olwabanjwa ngonyaka wezi- 1994.

ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|--------------|--|
| ANC | African National Congress |
| ANCFC | African National Congress Freedom Charter |
| BAA | Bantu Authority Act |
| BBWA | Bantu Building Workers Act |
| BC | Board of Censors |
| BCM | Black Consciousness Movement |
| BEA | Bantu Education Act |
| BLM | Black Liberation Movement |
| BPC | Black People's Convention |
| CCB | Civil Co-operation Bureau |
| CD CPA | Criminal Procedure Act |
| CRW | Counter Revolutionary Warfare |
| DMI | Department of Military Intelligence |
| FS | Frontline States |
| GRA | Group Areas Act |
| HRC | Human Rights Commission |
| IMA | Immorality Amendment Act |
| ISA | Internal Security Act |
| LA | Land Act |
| NAA | Native Administration Act |
| NGK | <i>Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk</i> -Dutch Reformed Church (Afrikaans acronym) |
| NLA | Native Labour |
| NLA | Native Land Act |
| NLA | Native Labour Act |
| NLAA | Native Laws Further Amendment Act |
| NP | National Party |
| NRA | Natives Resettlement Act |
| NRC | Native Representative Council |
| NTLAA | Native Trust and Land Amendment Act |
| PAC | Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania |

| | |
|-------------|---|
| PASS | Pan-Africanist Security Service |
| PMMA | Prohibition of Mixed Marriage Act |
| PRA | Population Registration Act |
| PSA | Public Safety Act |
| RCB | Race Classification Board |
| RSA | Republic of South Africa |
| RSAA | Reservation of Separate Amenities Act |
| SACP | South African Communist Party |
| SADF | South African Defence Force |
| SAP | South African Parliament |
| SASF | South African Security Force |
| SCA | Suppression of Communist Act |
| SHRCR | South African Human Rights Commission Review |
| SOSA | South African Students Organization |
| SOWETO..... | South Western Township |
| SRVA | Separate Representation of Voters Act |
| SSC | State Security Council |
| TRC | Truth and Reconciliation Commission |
| USA | United States of America |
| USSR | United Soviet Socialist Republic of Russia USSR |

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The advent of the PAC, its organisational operations and impact thereof, could better be understood in the context of what happened internationally in the 19th Century, The rise of Pan African Movements outside the African continent and participation of African leaders in these movements prompted the appropriation of Pan Africanist ideas by Africans in various African countries. Pan Africanist ideas were articulated to fit specific conditions of colonialism in Africa. The 1960s were an epoch when dramatic changes and developments took place in the continent and colonial states were liberated from colonial masters. These events generated a mood of optimism which influenced the development of Pan Africanist ideas in South Africa, hence the formation of the PAC in 1959, just a year after the 1958 all-African People's Conference held in Ghana.

The ideology of the PAC, if carefully examined, straddles the divide which separates the 'derived' ideology from 'inherent' ideology. It is derived in the sense that it draws heavily from outside influences as it was first articulated by African Americans, West Indies and other parts of the Western world. Thus, as a body of thought, Pan Africanism was brought into South Africa and the rest of Africa from outside. Pan Africanism is also an inherent ideology in the sense that it combines and expresses shared historical experiences of peoples of African descent from anywhere in the world.

A plethora of publications and articles on the history of South African (Azanian) struggle for national freedom and independence have been written with a bias that often conceals certain vital facts and issues essential for the proper understanding of the direction and real purpose of that struggle. Indeed, some of these publications even go the extent of deliberately concealing and avoiding mention of facts that would, if mentioned, weaken the political position that the authors want to promote. For instance, very few writers mention the fact that Sharpeville massacres of 21 March 1960 where 69 peaceful demonstrators were shot dead by the South African apartheid police, were the result of the 'racist' government's panic aroused by the campaign organized and launched by the PAC. The purpose is invariably to hide the fact that the PAC is a potent force, especially because Sharpeville massacres became a watershed in the South African (Azanian) national struggle.

The PAC's exile scenario was characterized by threats, opportunities and challenges which were the result of the interaction of a variety of factors both internal and external to host states. The 'underground and exile' notions infer the totality of circumstances defining the nature of life in host states where banned political movements for national liberation operated to continue the liberation struggles against illegitimate regimes in their home countries. The way various liberation movements dealt with the circumstances of exile constituted their experiences of exile. In terms of its pan-Africanist outlook, the PAC made Africa its mainstay as front-line support. Thus, it was not an accident that the PAC became the first movement to acquire recognition by the Organisation of African Unity through the OAU's Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa.

An intelligible evaluation of the PAC'S organisational operations and impact in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa shall also be made by interrogating its leadership diversity, particularly the first four leadership (Potlake Kitchener Leballo '1962-1979', Vusumzi Maake '1979-1981'; John Nyathi Pokela '1981-1985' and Johnson Mlambo '1985-1990') styles and attributes. The four leadership epochs identified in this study had a significant impact on the PAC in terms of defining the stature or profile, capacity and its overall strength. The PAC emerged from the four leadership epochs weakened, incapable of comprehending and adjusting to the dynamic landscape of the politics of national liberation in South Africa. Hence, by the time the PAC was unbanned, it had not been able to assert itself as the sole and authentic voice of South African people before international eyes.

The Frontline States and International Community played a critical role in Southern Africa and the entire African continent during the era in question. The Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU), formed in 1963, was the umbrella organisation of all African states. The Frontline States emerged in the context of the broad mandate of the OAU as stated in its Charter. The OAU Charter committed all member states to a fight for the eradication of colonialism in its different forms. The role performed by International Community, particularly the superpowers, as a point of interaction with Southern Africa remains an ambiguous, inconsistent and sometimes difficult to comprehend aspect of Southern African political history. Thus, the nature and extent of PAC relations with international community was largely determined by ideological dispositions of the superpowers, i.e the US, China and Russia, and perceived threat to their interests in Southern Africa. In terms of its policy position, the PAC strongly believed that the elimination of apartheid meant the removal from the statute books of racially – based discriminatory laws. It argued that the elimination of apartheid had, first and for most, to aim at restoration of the inalienable rights of the dispossessed people.



Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe, first President of the PAC

CHAPTER ONE: AIMS, METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY

"I refuse to accept the idea that man is mere flotsam and jetsam in the river of life which surrounds him, I refuse to accept the view that mankind is so tragically bound to the starless midnight of racism and war that the bright daybreak of peace and brotherhood can never become a reality" - Martin Luther King Jr. 1964

1.1 Introduction

This research study addresses the organisational operations and the impact of the Pan Africanist Congress of South Africa (later- of Azania) on the liberation struggle from its inception to 1990. The PAC was formed by a group of renegade African National Congress (ANC) members in Orlando, Soweto, on 5 and 6 April 1959¹. The breakaway group was led by members of what became known as the Africanist movement. **Africanist** - An ideology that says that black people should determine their own future - Africa for the Africans. It was first expressed by a Xhosa missionary, Tiyo Siga, in the 19th century.

Along with the ANC, the Pan Africanist Congress was the only "official" South African liberation movement recognized by the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity at the time.

The Africanists experienced many difficulties with the views of the ANC. They themselves were primarily members of the Youth League of the ANC, formed in 1944 under the leadership of Anton Lembede. According to them, membership of the Youth League was open to all who "lived like and with blacks". They felt the ANC had made too many concessions to the apartheid regime in respect of oppression and was incapable of promoting black liberation. The Africanists took the view that the Congress Alliance (formed in 1954 and consisting of the ANC, the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), the Congress of Democrats and the Coloured People's Congress), because of its large number of White Liberals and Communists allies, had diluted the traditional Black Nationalist position of the ANC. One of the Alliance's first endeavours was to organize the successful Congress of the People in Kliptown in 1955, where the Freedom Charter, demanding a South Africa with equal rights for all, was adopted². The newly-formed South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) sent delegates to Kliptown and subsequently joined the alliance. Many Alliance leaders were charged with high treason in 1956. The Africanists felt blacks were to be in control of their own liberation struggle, and not to be

¹ S. Johnson: 'The Soldiers of Luthuli: Youth in the politics of resistance in South Africa' in Shaun Johnson (ed.), *No Turning Back*, Bloomington: Indiana press. 1989, pp. 94-143.

² Ibid.

influenced or dictated to by white liberals and communists. According to the Africanists, the whites had too much to lose to be regarded as reliable allies.

They also rejected the Freedom Charter (drawn up by the new Alliance in the mid-1950s), mainly because of the guarantees it contained for minority rights. These guarantees, they felt, would entrench minority domination. The Africanists believed that the land which the white “settlers” had “stolen” from the indigenous people had to be returned to the latter. They also rejected the ANC and the Congress Alliance’s view that disciplined leadership was necessary for the struggle. Instead, they believed that if the notion of liberation was correctly propagated by the leadership, resistance would be spontaneously created among the masses. For the Africanists an armed struggle was the primary struggle and they supported the principle that political power would never be relinquished and was therefore to be seized by force.

1.2 Literature review

It has already been observed that few scholars of political history in South Africa have undertaken in-depth research about the role of the Pan Africanist Congress of South Africa (Azania) in the struggle for liberation. In this regard, Ali Hlongwane is an exception, even though his work is focused on the life history (biography) of Zephania Mothopeng.³ He, nevertheless, deals with the politics of the PAC.

His work is helpful in documenting debates which arose within this organization that caused the emergence of opposing views within it after the unbanning of political parties in the early 1990s. His work is further enhanced by the fact that he was part of PAC politics during this period. In this regard he provides an insightful “insider’s view” to the organization’s operations.

Shaun Johnson’s work provides an interesting review of the emergence of the “youth component of resistance” in the late 1950s.⁴ He traces the development of youth politics from the late 1960s with the formation of the South African Student Organization (SASO) to the eruption of youth revolts in the 1980s. Johnson, at one point in his work, alludes to PAC’s ideology and its critique by the Charterist-aligned organizations.⁵ In similar vein, he provides PAC’s response to the critique.

³ A. Hlongwane, ‘To Independence Now! Tomorrow the United States of Africa: The Story of Zephania Lekoame Mothopeng, 1913-1990’, MA Dissertation, (University of the Witwatersrand, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences and Education, 2002)

⁴ S. Johnson, ‘Soldiers of Luthuli’ in S. Johnson (ed.) *No Turning Back*, pp.94-143.

⁵ The Charterist-aligned organizations were political organizations that adhered to the Freedom Charter. Their politics were based on non-racialism

This work, although, does not deal with the politics of PAC *per se*, it is valuable in providing the historical background to the emergence of Africanist organizations and their role in the politics of resistance.

Similarly, Jeremy Seekings in his study of youth politics in *Heroes or Villains* provides a more illuminating account of the emergence of Africanist organizations in the country from the mid-1970s. He discusses their activities in detail. His work is helpful in differentiating between the activists who were involved in the struggle in the 1970s and those involved in the struggle in the 1980s. In his work he illustrates that in the 1970s it was young people or student activists (and not the youth) who were in the forefront of the struggle because of their specific focus on school politics. And in the 1980s youth took the lead because of their involvement in the broader politics. Even though Seekings does not discuss PAC's political activities in detail he acknowledges its existence. For instance, he notes that in 1982 already there was a PAC branch in Kagiso in the West Rand although it does not appear to have attracted a large following.⁶

Kumi Naidoo and Ari Sitas' work focus on the politics of Africanist resistance in Durban. Sitas' work looks at the 'making of the comrades movement' and Naidoo deals with 'major difficulties encountered by youth organizations and activists' [in trying to organize themselves into a united organization].⁷

The two scholars provide similar views about the factors which drew the young Africanists (in Durban) to the struggle for liberation. They wanted the political struggle for the liberation of the indigenous Africans in South Africa to be in the hands of the Africans themselves. The young Africanists in Durban believed that the African people in South Africa were colonised and their political struggle was to end and uproot colonialism and replace it with the self-determination of the African people and the ushering in of a substantive democracy covering the spheres of participatory governance; social life; economic arrangement, ownership and control; culture and institutions⁸. Both refute the argument that Africanist movements (or comrades) emerged because of the social indicators such as "black unemployment and anomic behaviour"⁹. They, instead, contend that young Africanists' induction into the politics of resistance was influenced by various factors.

Naidoo, in his study, further provides an illuminating account about the socio-cultural and political differences between the Indian and Coloured and African activists. He asserts that

⁶ Seekings, *Heroes or Villains?*, p.39.

⁷ K. Naidoo, 'The politics of youth'; Sitas, 'The making of the comrades' 6

⁸ Pan Africanist Congress of Azania: Know the PAC-A Brief Insight, p.5.

⁹ Pan Africanist Congress of Azania: Know the PAC-A Brief Insight, p.5.

these differences were the main reasons why the Africanists in Durban could not organize themselves into a united movement.

However, in both scholars' work there are silences about the life histories of the young activists, which would have enabled the studies to throw light on the socio-economic factors that caused them to join the struggle. Even though these scholars do not deal with an Africanist youth organization (they both focus on the charterist youth) they provide a valuable account of the emergence of youth organizations; of the different characteristics of youth organizations; and of internal functioning of youth organizations.

Monique Marks' work has made a valuable contribution towards the illumination of the socio-economic and political factors which prompted PAC members to become involved in the politics of resistance. In her studies of liberation politics she focuses on a particular young Africanist organization in a specific area – Diepkloof in Soweto in the 1980s and early 1990s. In her paper titled 'Youth and Political Violence' she provides a valuable analysis of the factors that contributed to young activists' involvement in immoral activities. She attributes this to moral degeneration because of lack of moral authority. For her, this could only be curbed with the "formation of youth organizations led by mature and respected leadership".¹⁰

This work throws light on the important role played by youth organizations and the PAC's mature and disciplined leadership in the struggle for liberation. Marks notes that the latter were instrumental in leading and guiding young activists' involvement in the struggle in a constructive manner and to instil discipline in them.

In her paper titled 'We are fighting for the liberation of our people...' she illustrates how the PAC leaders involved in the struggle justified their use of political violence. She notes they did this by stating that they were "responding to the clarion call to take up the armed struggle as a strategy for change"; and that "bloodshed [was] necessary for liberation". She concludes that the "key to understanding the willingness of the (Diepkloof) young activists' participation in political violence is their identity as 'comrades' whose role was to protect the community from physical and moral threat".¹¹

Although Marks' work focuses on the charterist organization in Diepkloof, it sheds light in the understanding of why PAC young activists engaged in political violence, and how they

¹⁰ M. Marks, 'Youth and Political Violence: The problem of anomie and the role of youth organizations', Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR), University of the Witwatersrand, Seminar 5, 30 July 1992. <http://www.csvr.org.za/pubslst/pubspolt.htm>

¹¹ M. Marks, 'We are fighting for the liberation of our people: Justifications of violence by activist youth in Diepkloof, Soweto' Seminar 3, 1995, <http://www.csvr.org.za/pubslst/pubspolt.htm>; See also Sitas, 'The making of the comrades'

interpreted their involvement in it. This work will be particularly important in this research report's analysis of the PAC members' interpretation of their belief that war was inevitable in the struggle for liberation.

In another paper titled 'Onward Marching Comrades', Marks provides an invaluable account of the PAC's response to the changing nature of politics in the 1990s precipitated by the unbanning of the liberation movements. She argues that the 1990s saw the role of the PAC youth in the struggle becoming unclear. This was because, she contends, this period ushered in the politics of negotiations, which resulted in the ANC, and later the PAC, assuming a leading role in the transition period. This left the adherents confused and uncertain about their role.¹²

Marks, in this study, begin by interrogating the role played by organized Africanist activities in the 1980s. She then compares and contrasts it to the role they played in the 1990s. This work is helpful in trying to understand how activists in organized political organizations responded to the transition period. It is, therefore, relevant in this research study's analysis of the PAC's response to the political transition in the early 1990s.

Charles Carter's Ph.D. thesis on the political role of the Alexandra Youth Congress (AYCO), attached to the PAC, in the struggle for liberation is a valuable contribution to the understanding of the character of an activist organization determined to "construct its uniform identity".¹³

He argues that Africanists in trying to achieve this became dominant and coercive. He also explores the socio-economic factors that caused most of the young Africanist activists in townships to become involved in the struggle.

At one point in his work Carter reveals the link between members of the PAC's military wing, APLA, and the ANC's underground operatives, particularly the Mkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), or MK, operatives, in the 1980s. However, there is a disturbing silence about these MK operatives, even though one acknowledges that during the period in which Carter undertook this research it could have been difficult to locate such operatives –for security reasons, a shortcoming which Carter acknowledges.¹⁴

¹² M. Marks, : "Onward Marching Comrades: The Career of the Charterist Movement in Diepkloof, Soweto", Paper presented at the History Workshop Conference at the University of the Witwatersrand, July 1995. <http://www.csvr.org.za/publist/pubspolt.htm>; also see Marks, *Young Warriors*, pp.73-74

¹³ Carter, 'Comrades', pp. 87-138

¹⁴ Carter, 'Comrades', pp. 87-138.

Nevertheless, Carter's work sheds light on underground political work, and links between the exiled PAC, ANC and the young activist organizations operating inside the country. Although, Carters' work, like those mentioned already, does not focus on the Africanist youth organization, it nevertheless throws light on the character and internal operations of activist organizations in the 1980s. This work will be relevant when analyzing the link between the internal surrogates and the exiled PAC and Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA).

1.3 Problem statement

The PAC was barely a year old when it was banned, its leaders restricted and scattered before they could clearly formulate a coherent approach on many pressing issues like African socialism, dialectical materialism, co-operation with other population groups and their attitude towards the South African Communist Party (SACP) and its members. It is generally believed that through 40 years of exile, self-marginalisation, political somersaults and internal leadership wrangles, the one point of consistency has been the PAC's attempt to define itself in opposition to the ANC.

Various scholars have over the years extensively and painstakingly researched the role of the PAC in the struggle for the liberation of South Africa. However, a survey of the available literature on the PAC reveals a lack of in-depth academic analysis of its organizational modus operandi and impact thereof. As such, the research is geared towards studying the dynamics of the PAC's policies and mode of operations to fill the lacuna that exists in the literature.

Many books and articles on the history of the PAC and the struggle for liberation in South Africa have also been written with a bias that often conceals certain vital facts and issues essential for the proper understanding of the direction and real purpose of that struggle. The research is geared towards analysing the PAC's political ideology, identity, strategy and tactics, strengths and weaknesses. It will also throw more light on the impact of the PAC during the period under review. It is hoped that the study will stimulate systematic research on the PAC, update and advance the frontiers of knowledge by way of revisiting the historiography of the liberation struggle in South Africa.

1.4 Aims and objectives of the study

The aim of this research study is to explore and analyse the organizational operations and the impact that the PAC had in the struggle for liberation in South Africa. In pursuit of this aim, the main objectives that will form the focal point of the study are:

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- 1.4.1 To examine the role of the PAC in the struggle for liberation in South Africa during the period in question
 - 1.4.2 To identify and evaluate policy positions, strategy and organizational operations of the PAC in coordinating and implementing its anti-Apartheid strategy during the period in question
 - 1.4.3 To explore the methods employed by the PAC in the struggle for liberation in South Africa
 - 1.4.4 To evaluate the success and failures of the PAC during its struggle against apartheid in South Africa
 - 1.4.5 Explore the legacy of the PAC on the history and historiography of South Africa

1.5 Intended Contribution to the Body of Knowledge

African historians put significant efforts to reconstruct histories of various African communities imperative to the development of any modern nation, and indeed South Africa; given the realities of its past. This study will not only add to the existing literature on the organisational operations and the impact of the PAC in the struggle for liberation in South Africa, but also to the knowledge of the course, causes and effects of the Liberation Struggle in South Africa.

It is hoped that the research will serve as a pointer to future researchers who may wish to study Apartheid regime from different angles. The study will also be of great benefit to researchers, students, and the general public keen in knowing the role played by people, organizations, government, and pressure groups in the struggle for liberation in South Africa.

1.6 Theoretical Framework

Social Movements Theory (SMT)

The nature and scope of this research study demands that the social movements' theory, advocated by Marks, be employed. According to Marks social movements involve:

"...A collective actor constituted by individuals who understand themselves to have common interest, and for at some significant part of the social existence, a common identity. Social movements are distinguished from other collective actors in that they have mass mobilization, or a threat of mobilization as their prime source of...power. They are further disassociated from other collectivities such as voluntary associations or clubs, being chiefly concerned to defend or challenge society or the relative position of one group."

In her analysis of South African politics, Marks employs four approaches: those of resource mobilization, identity, political process and 'new social movement'. For the purposes of this study the first three will be adhered to.

Marks points out that the resource mobilization approach '*examines the variety of resources that must be mobilized, the linkages of social movements to other groups, the dependence of social movements upon external support for success, and the tactics used by authorities to control or incorporate movements*'¹⁵. Marks believes that this approach can be criticized on two levels; (1) It does not adequately explain why individuals act irrationally in pursuit of interests as groups, since it does not delve into questions of consciousness. (2) It assumes that 'the poor can only bring about change with the assistance of the elite'¹⁶

For these reasons it is of limited use in the analysis of an organization like the PAC. To understand the PAC politics adequately one would have to critically engage with questions such as 'why did some people form the PAC? What kind of people joined the PAC? What type of an Africanist organization the PAC was? These are the questions that deal with the consciousness of the PAC activists and the character of the organization.

Proponents of the identity approach assert that '*identity is key to understanding collective action...*' However, Marks notes that this approach can be criticized for '*not examining the interaction of the individual participant with the broader group that Makes up the social movement*'¹⁷ Nonetheless, identity played an important part in the politics of the PAC as it provided the organization and its members with a sense of direction and of compatibility with the intricate politics of Pan Africanism. Such politics was based on the tenet that 'Africa belongs to Africans' and clearly defined the oppressor and the oppressed.

The political process approach theorists, according to Marks, are concerned with the political context in which social movements emerge, and the impact which social movements have on the political environment. She notes that '*their importance lies in their insistence that the political environment provides the opportunity and space for social movements to emerge and collective action to occur or for these social movements 'demise*'. This approach, while essential in understanding the dynamic nature of society, can be criticized for 'failing to examine the existence of reactionary forces outside of government, and ignores the importance of both resources and identity to social movements'.¹⁸

This approach is important when analysing political organizations like the PAC because it provides an understanding of why political organizations emerged and why they adopted certain strategies and tactics in their struggle for liberation. The PAC's existence, for instance,

¹⁵ M. Marks, *Young Warriors*, p.140.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.144-145.

¹⁸ M. Marks, *Young Warriors*, p.140.

was also about the lives of hundreds of grass-roots militants, peasants, migrants, young black intellectuals, soldiers who committed themselves to the liberation struggle in good faith and genuine patriumviratetism. The repressive political climate which prevailed during that period forced its leaders to adopt a clandestine militaristic *modus operandi*. This marked the PAC as the first black political organization in South Africa to openly accept the taking of human life as part of its strategy, thereby becoming manifestly more militant than the ANC.

1.7 Research Methodology

This research study follows an approach grounded in social history. Social history has as its main focus the response by the ordinary people to their daily experiences. By addressing them social historians aim to democratize history by recovering what they see as 'hidden history' – thus making history a subject of popular access and people's involvement. This accords with Tosh's argument that '*social history aspires to treat the history of society as a whole, not just the rich and the articulate*'¹⁹.

Its most distinctive methodological orientation has been the emphasis on oral history or oral sources. According to Portelli '*oral sources give us information about illiterate people or social group whose written history is either missing or distorted*'²⁰ In similar vein, Thomson notes that oral history '*is a history built around people. It allows heroes not just from the leaders, but from the unknown majority of the people*'²¹ In short, this is history from below.

In emphasizing oral history's significance, Tosh cautions that it should be '*heard alongside the careful marshalling of social facts in the written record*'²² He points out that there are two main reasons why oral history is practised. First, it is because personal reminiscence is viewed as an effective instrument for re-creating the past. Second, many historians view oral history rather as a democratic alternative.²³ However, this does not intend to imply that oral history is not without its share of limitations.

Even though oral sources or testimonies provide invaluable information as far as '*hidden or distorted*' history is concerned, it is also necessary to caution that they have their limitations as historical sources. One of their limitations is flawed or selective memory. Tosh acknowledges

¹⁹ J. Tosh, *The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods and New Directions in the Study of Modern History*, p.210.

²⁰ A. Portelli, *What Makes oral history different*. Cf. R. Perks and A Thomson (eds.), *The Oral History Reader*, p.64.

²¹ P. Thomson, *The Voice of the Past: Oral History*, p.28.

²² J. Tosh, *The Pursuit of History*, p.210.

²³ M. Marks, *Young Warriors*, pp.16-17.

this and warns that *'the testimony which can be gleaned from surviving members...of groups, like the memoirs of most old people about their youth, is often confused as regards specific events and the sequence in which they occurred'*²⁴ There are two reasons for this. First, it could be because of loss of memory. Second, it could be because oral sources have deliberately *'blocked'* their memory as a result of brutal past experiences.

In his 1992 study, Passerini cautions that certain interviewees tended to confuse either names of mass organizations or significant events because of the brutal past they experienced under the Nazi period or Stalinist era. In this regard she observes *'that people's memories of their own past lives, what they remember and what they forget, are shaped by their own expectations for the future, and also by whether they have children or young people for whom they care and who may outlive them,,,'*²⁵ In this regard oral sources or interviewees tend to provide an unsuspecting interviewer either with distorted and selective information or information that glorifies the interviewee. This is because such information would guarantee them an indefinite respect from their offspring.

Portelli notes that *'it is impossible to exhaust the entire memory of a single informant; the data extracted with each interview are always the result of a selection produced by mutual relationship between the interviewer and interviewee'*²⁶ From this view it can be argued that oral sources cannot provide complete data and are also firmly fixed on power relations between the interviewer and interviewee. An interviewee might decide – for various reasons – to withhold sensitive information from an interviewer and this might hamper the interviewer's research.

In addition the interviewee may relate to the interviewer what he/she thinks the latter has to hear – based on the questions that the interviewer asks. This happens mostly on occasions when an interviewee wants to impress an interviewer about his/her positive role, for instance, in the struggle (interviewees rarely talk about their negative roles in the struggle). This could mislead an unwary interviewer. This problem can however be countered by conducting a wide range of interviews with different people to verify the information. Minkley and Rassool argue that *'South African social historians (or interviewers) impose themselves and their radical methods on ordinary people...thus create correct political (and historical) practice'*²⁷ What

²⁴ J. Tosh, *The Pursuit of History*, p.210.

²⁵ L. Passerini, *Memory and Totalitarianism*, 12.

²⁶ A. Portelli, 'What Makes oral history different?'. Cf. R. Perks and A. Thomson, p.212.

²⁷ G. Minkley and C. Rassool, 'Orality, Memory and Social History in South Africa' Cf. S. Nuttall and Carl Coetzee (eds.), *Negotiating the Past: The Making of Memory in South Africa*, p.94.

Rousseau implies by this is that oral testimonies are not the voices of the ordinary people, as claimed by many oral historians, but of the historians themselves.

Qualifying this argument Portelli remarks that *'Far from disappearing in the objectivity of the sources, the historian remains important at least as a partner in dialogue, often as 'stage director' of the interview, or as an 'organiser of the interview'*²⁸ What this means is that an interview is a historical exercise between two people: the interviewer and the interviewee. What Rousseau does not take into account is that, even though oral history interviewers may have preconceived expectations from an interview, interviewees are in a position to direct the interview in a way that would make their voices heard. This is evident when the interviewees did not know. Thus, Tosh remarks *'ordinary people are offered not only a place in history, but a role in the production of historical knowledge with important political implications'*²⁹

Another limitation in oral testimony is that of age or generational differentiation, especially if the interviewer is young and is interviewing old people. In this regard an interviewer may encounter two challenges. First, old people may refuse to be interviewed – however this scarcely happens. Second, old interviewees may try to relate to the interviewer what they think the latter ought to *'know and hear'* In some occasions old interviewees tend to withhold information, which they think is not meant for the 'ears' of the young interviewer.³⁰

This causes challenges for the interviewer because the information that he/she gathers from such interviews tends to be one- sided, and in most occasions self-glorifying. However this does not mean that young people cannot interview old people. Bozzoli's study of 1998 confirms this. With the assistance of Mmantho Nkotsoe, Bozzoli managed to draw valuable data on the life histories and life strategies of the old women of Phokeng. This was partly because of Nkotsoe's familiarity with the area, and its language and the fact that she was a woman. The old women of Phokeng agreed to be interviewed by Nkotsoe because they saw this as an opportunity for them to *'teach'* her about her history.

Portelli observes that *'there is an insistence that oral sources are distant from events, and therefore undergo the distortion of faulty memory'*³¹ To counter this view she remarks *'indeed, this problem exists for many written documents, which are usually written some time after the*

²⁸ A. Portelli, 'What Makes Oral History Different? Cf. R. Perks and A. Thomson (eds.), The Oral History, p.72.

²⁹ J. Tosh, The Pursuit of History, p.212.

³⁰ B.Bozzoli, 'Interviewing the women of Phokeng' Cf. R. Perks and A. Thomson (eds.), The Oral History, pp.145-154.

³¹ A. Portelli, 'What Makes Oral History Different? Cf. R. Perks and A. Thomson (eds.), The Oral History, p.68.

event to which they refer, and often by non-participants'. She concludes by arguing that *'oral sources might compensate chronological distance with a much closer personal involvement*'. What this implies is that verified information gathered from oral sources can be accepted as authentic because it is either narrated by active participants or by someone who witnessed the events. It is first-hand information.

Even though oral history has its limitations, it is, to quote from Marks' description, however a *'satisfactory source'*³² in discovering *'hidden histories*'. Tosh notes that *'challenges in oral history should not be grounds for having to do with oral history. What they suggest is rather that oral history, like all verbal materials, require critical evaluation and that it must be deployed in conjunction with all the other available sources...'*³³ This view is further enhanced by the keen interest shown by various scholars in oral history despite its limitations. Some of the scholars who have used oral history in the South Africa context include Charles van Onselen, Bozzoli, Bonner, Marks and Carter.³⁴ For this research study, both formal and informal processes of interviewing will be used.

Abundant forms of data or information will be collected and thoroughly examined through a variety of perspectives or from different people. The data collected, will be interpreted to ascertain and enrich and extensively important perspective³⁵.

The scope of this research study also delves on the exploration of primary sources. As such, it will employ a comprehensive study and evaluation of archival materials - both inside and outside South Africa- coupled with other relevant primary documents. The secondary data collection that will be used in this study involves the use of print and electronic sources such as books, journals, pamphlets, dissertations, government publications, reviews, diaries, and other relevant manuscripts.

³² M. Marks, *Young Warriors*, p.15.

³³ J. Tosh, *The Pursuit of History*, p.215.

³⁴ C. van Onselen, *The Seed is Mine: the life of Kas Maine, A South African Sharecropper, 1894-1985*; B. Bozzoli, *Women of Phokeng: Consciousness, Life Strategy, and Migrancy in South Africa, 1900-1983*; P. Bonner, 'Family, Crime and Political Consciousness on the East Rand, 1939-1955', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 3, April 1988; Carter, *Comrades and Community*.

³⁵ R. Bodgan, & S.K. Biklen, *Qualitative Research for Education* ...p.32

CHAPTER TWO: THE FORMATIVE PERIOD OF THE PAC AND ITS IDEOLOGICAL REFINEMENTS

"It is part of our contention that South Africa is an integral part of the continent of Africa and cannot therefore solve its challenges in isolation from and in utter disregard to the rest of the continent. For that reason, therefore, we regard it as our historic role to contribute to the establishment of the United States of Africa" – Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe, 1959

2.1 Introduction

Many books and articles on the history of South African (Azanian) struggle for national freedom and independence have been written with a bias that often conceals certain vital facts and issues essential for the proper understanding of the direction and real purpose of that struggle. Indeed, some of these publications even go the extent of deliberately concealing and avoiding mention of facts that would, if mentioned, weaken the political position that the authors want to promote. For instance, very few writers mention the fact that the Sharpeville massacres which took place on March 21, 1960, where 69 peaceful demonstrators were shot dead by the South African racist police, were the result of the 'racist' government's panic aroused by the campaign organized and launched by the PAC³⁶. The purpose is invariably to hide the fact that the PAC is a potent force, especially because the Sharpeville massacres became a watershed in the Azanian national struggle.

This chapter, while attempting to briefly outline the history of the PAC as its primary purpose, particularly seeks to highlight certain issues and facts normally avoided by some writers and to interrogate some misconceptions about the programme and policy of the PAC. The inaugural conference of the PAC was opened on April 4, 1959 and the organization was finally constituted on April 6, two days later. This day was both deliberate and symbolic. It was the day, 307 years before, on which the first European settlers landed on Azanian soil. The purpose of holding the inaugural conference of the PAC on this date, therefore, was to buttress this organisation's historical orientation in its policies and programmes³⁷. The very genesis of the PAC has its anchor in a historical definition of the struggle for national liberation in South Africa. This

³⁶ D. Sibeko: The Impact of the PAC and Sobukwe- the defier of the undefiable, Azania News, Vol. 25 No. 6 & 7, pp1-60.

³⁷ SG: Pan Africanist Congress of Azania: Know the PAC in a nutshell, pp.4-30; Hlongwane, A. 'To Independence Now! Tomorrow the United States of Africa: The Story of Zephania Lekoame Mothopeng (1913 to 1990)', P.33.

therefore makes it necessary that in writing PAC's history and analyzing its policies and programmes, a brief historical outline in Azania itself be presented.

2.2 Historical Background

On landing at the "Cape of Good Hope" on April 6, 1652, a former criminal, Jan van Riebeeck, the leader of the first settlers from Europe to occupy Azania, had instructions from his masters in Holland, the Dutch East India Company, to set up half-way station to enable ships bound for the Far East to replenish their stocks of food. However as greed would have it, their wealth of the Cape and its attractive climate soon changed those intentions, as Jan van Riebeeck's report back to Holland, recommending the colonization of the territory, demonstrated³⁸.

That was the beginning of the movement of the newcomers into the interior of the country. Even before this movement, Jan van Riebeeck had been hospitably received by the inhabitants of the country who he had found on his arrival with his party. These hospitable hosts soon became slaves and servants of their new guests under force of arms. As the invaders penetrated the country into the interior, they faced a great deal of resistance from more indigenous inhabitants. Word had spread that land-grabbers had arrived. A series of bloody confrontations ensued. Many lives of indigenous people were lost, starting with the Xoi and San people at the tip of the country, extending to the Xhosa-speaking people in the immediate interior, extending eventually to the Sotho-speaking people in the central part, the Zulu-speaking on the eastern flanks and the Ndebele and Pedi-speaking people in the north³⁹. The defeat that the indigenous people sustained gave these foreign settlers eventual control over the whole territory, which culminated in the formation of the "Union of South Africa" in 1910, ruled and controlled solely by European settlers.

This process of land seizure did not, however, go on without a brave effort of resistance on the part of the indigenous Africans; there were impressive battle victories gained by these defenders of the land at Kei River, Thaba Bosiu, Sandlwana, and other places in Azania. For 240 years the wars of dispossession went on until 1906 the final defeat took place when the Bambatha Rebellion was crushed and Bambatha himself, the leader of the rebellion, was executed. Hundreds of thousands of people died during these wars of annihilation. A great deal of killing was unmitigated genocide, as the newcomers from Europe committed random massacres, especially against the San people who they regarded as sub-human, more than they

³⁸ A. Hlongwane: 'To Independence Now! Tomorrow the United States of Africa: The Story of Zephania Lekoame Mothopeng (1913 to 1990)', pp.67-88.

³⁹ SG: Pan Africanist Congress of Azania: Know the PAC in a nutshell, pp.10-38.

did the other indigenous groups⁴⁰. The central dispute in all this brutality-versus-heroism was land. The invaders wanted nothing else but land, while the defenders sought to maintain their national heritage, the possession of the land. The invaders won and seized the land, and the caused the indigenous people to lose the land and become effectively dispossessed.

The act of dispossession was finally consummated through the instrument of the “Union of South Africa Act”, passed at Westminster, the British parliament, in 1909. By this time the Anglo-Boer War had been won by the British, who as a result had acquired control over the two “Boer Republics” in addition to the two British colonies, Cape and Natal, thus controlling the whole of what is now known as South Africa. By passing the 1909 Act the British transferred political (not economic) power to the Boers. This created an all-White parliament; even from the point of view of own value system, shamelessly excluding the indigenous majority from all manner of decision making in the political life of the “Union of South Africa”⁴¹. Not only was the control of land taken away from the indigenous people’s hands, but they themselves were also taken away from their lands. They were bundled onto Reserves, which were created in pursuance of the 1913 Land Act, and constituted only 7.8% of the total land area.

2.3 A National Political Organisation is born

In the face of land dispossession, military defeat and cultural emasculation, the Africans decided to create a political organization, as a new strategy, to fight through peaceful means to regain their lost heritage. Thus was born, in 1912, the South African Native Congress, which in 1925 changed to the African National Congress (ANC). This was decidedly not the first political organization formed by Africans in Azania; Imbumba Yabantundu existed during the 1880s. But the ANC was the first organization on a national scale⁴². It also crystalized the unity of the ethnic groups shed their fears of each other and became one nation.

The central cry within the ANC was about loss of land. Their nationhood, to have full expression, depended on the possession of land; their very survival depended on the fight for land. A delegation was sent to England soon after the ANC had been formed. The aim was to protest to the Crown against the dispossession and subsequent non-enfranchisement. But as their exclusion from the dispensation created by the “South Africa Act” had been a studious contrivance on the part of the imperial government at Westminster, the visit bore no fruit. The

⁴⁰ D. Sibeko: The Impact of the PAC and Sobukwe- the defier of the undefiable, Azania News, Vol. 25 No. 6 & 7, pp1-60.

⁴¹ SG: Pan Africanist Congress of Azania: Know the PAC in a nutshell, pp.8-16; P. Masemola: Fight or Capitulate? Azania News, Vol.26 No. 4 & 5, pp. 4-19; SG: Pan Africanist Congress of Azania: Know the PAC in a nutshell, p.28.

⁴² D. Sibeko: The Impact of the PAC and Sobukwe- the defier of the undefiable, Azania News, Vol. 25 No. 6 & 7, pp18-44.

Liberal party government that was in power then was not so liberal after all, at least not to “black people”⁴³. The ANC delegation came back home with the resolve to fight further for their land. In 1922, the ANC passed a vote of no confidence in the British Crown and in the South African settler government.

Throughout its fight for political rights and human dignity, the ANC upheld the land question as the central issue, until in later years as we shall see. The first president, John L. Dube, used to have a pet phrase to express this sentiment: “*Lapho ake ama khona amanzi, ayophinde ame futhi*”⁴⁴(Where water once formed a pool, there shall be a collection of water take place again). This proverb on interpretation simply means that since the land belonged to the indigenous African people, it shall be restored to them again.

Out of disillusionment, some of the leadership of the ANC started changing the nature of the demands of their people. This accompanied a change in the definition of the struggle as it had first been conceived⁴⁵. A significant section of the leadership started adopting reformist positions, some even becoming involved in government-created institutions, such as the Native Representative Councils, which were really a means of using Africans to control, on behalf of the government, the lives of other Africans, although they had ostensibly been created to give expression to African political aspirations.

Mokgethi Motlhabi, in his book “The Theory and Practice of Black Resistance to Apartheid”, has this to say about some of the ANC’s shortcomings:

*“The ANC retained its strategy of representations and deputations even though it never gained a single concession as a result of it It refused to learn from historical experience. Other Black organizations (for instance the AAC) had seen these shortcomings and criticized the ANC, but all in vain. Not until the formation of the ANCYL (ANC Youth League) did serious policy changes begin to be made”*⁴⁶

⁴³ S. Johnson: ‘The Soldiers of Luthuli: Youth in the politics of resistance in South Africa’ in Shaun Johnson (ed.), No Turning Back, P.10; ‘The Pan Africanist Congress, 1959-1990’ in Ian Liebenberg et.al (eds.), The Long March: The story of the struggle for liberation in South Africa, PP.21-29.

⁴⁴ SG: Pan Africanist Congress of Azania: Know the PAC in a nutshell, pp.27-29.

⁴⁵ M, Motlhabi: “The Theory and Practice of Black Resistance to Apartheid”, pp. 69-71.

⁴⁶ SG: Pan Africanist Congress of Azania: Know the PAC in a nutshell, pp.24-30; V. Maphai: ‘The Role of Black Consciousness in the Liberation Struggle’ in Ian Liebenberg et al. (eds.), The Long March: The story of the struggle for liberation in South Africa, pp.34-41.

2.4 The ANCYL and the Genesis of the PAC

The formation of the Youth League in 1944 was truly a turning point both for the ANC and the Azanian struggle. The date is a milestone, marking the earliest formations of the present dichotomy in the ideology and strategies of resistance in that country. IN fact, the formation of ANCYL was the genesis of the PAC itself. It ushered in three important precepts as pillars of the struggle: non-cooperation with the racist authorities; African nationalism as the primary liberatory creed; and the establishment of a programmatic orientation to liberatory action, as opposed to reaction to individual actions of the racist government at every stage⁴⁷.

2.5 The Central Objective of the Struggle

The ANCYL was inspired by an important principle in national resistance action. This can be stated as follows: In every struggle for freedom, there is an “object of dispute”, something that the oppressor seeks to withhold from the victims of oppression, and which the oppressed seek to achieve or acquire. The object of dispute differs from country to country where such struggles are going on. Needless to say, it is important that, from the onset, the definition of the strategies be formulated around that object⁴⁸. It is axiomatic that one cannot achieve, except by accident, anything higher than what one aims for. History is one of the best indicators towards identifying such an object.

An object of dispute could be civil rights, religious freedom, national autonomy, use of land, ownership of land, etc. In different countries where mass struggles are going on, one or other or a combination of such objective prevail to constitute the object of dispute. In Azania, history has always established that the object of dispute is land, i.e. its ownership. All the struggles and sacrifices made over the years were for the defence or repossession of the land by the indigenous people from the foreign settlers. That the foreign dispossessors have held it away from its owners for such a long time does not in any way alter the fact that it still belongs to its original owners. The original owners never relinquished it willingly. The ANC slogan, *Mayibuye I Africa* (Africa Must Come Back)⁴⁹, represented this eternal sentiment. That the ANC itself dropped the slogan hardly altered the fact.

That the land of Africa belongs to Africans, as upheld originally by that ANC, is a sentiment with which no nation, in respect to itself, could have a quarrel. It goes for the Swiss, as much as it does for the Germans and the Chinese, and all other nations regarding their own countries. It

⁴⁷ M, Motlhabi: “The Theory and Practice of Black Resistance to Apartheid”, pp. 74-77.

⁴⁸ Ibid, pp. 78-79.

⁴⁹ Leo, Kuper: “African Nationalism I South Africa, 1910-1964”, in Oxford History of South Africa, Vol. 2, p.443.

could be said that it is hardly a racist expression, though some people have tended to say that the PAC is racist when it asserts that Africa is for the Africans⁵⁰.

The struggle for land in Azania was redefined and its essence reinforced when the ANCYL was born, and the drawing up of the 1949 Programme of Action, which the ANC was forced by the ANCYL to adopt, was a crystallization of the redefinition. The adoption of the 1949 Programme caused Dr Xuma, the ANC president, to resign saying that the document was too radical. That just went to show how unreliable most of the leadership had become, pandering to distorted liberal values⁵¹.

2.6 The Programme of Action of 1949

The Programme of Action reinforced the original position regarding the dispossession of land and highlighted African nationalism as a forceful liberatory creed. It emphasized the necessity to have a programme that the oppressed should follow in their liberation efforts, instead of being diverted by individual government actions. Having a programme meant that the oppressive system should be seen as something to be outrooted wholly, rather than concentrating on its symptoms. The Programme also emphasized the question of who might be involved in the struggle and at what levels, which was also a definition of who must lead in that struggle. It asserted that the oppressed themselves lead in the struggle because they were the only people who understood what it felt like to be nationally oppressed, and who through that experience would understand what their goal should be. No one who was never oppressed could correctly lead the struggle for liberation, even though they might identify with its aims. Their understanding could be but an intellectual understanding, at best. This was the spirit of the 1949 Programme of Action⁵².

The Programme was a direct product of the Youth League and arose out of the sentiments described above; it was an expression of the Africans' desire to assert themselves, to rise from a mental position of feeling inferior, engendered over long years of colonialism; it was an assertion of human dignity and positive self-appraisal. It was a statement that as long as the Africans felt inferior, there could never be any meaningful unity of cooperation between themselves and the Europeans, except through collaboration by them in their own subjugation⁵³. Only when the Africans have risen from inferiority both by feeling and conduct, can they deal on an equal footing as brother to brother and sister to sister, with those who have

⁵⁰ D. Sibeko: The Impact of the PAC and Sobukwe- the defier of the undefiable, Azania News, Vol. 25 No. 6 & 7, pp1-60.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² SG: Pan Africanist Congress of Azania: Know the PAC in a nutshell, pp.4-38.

⁵³ Ibid.

formerly been their oppressors. A concerted mental revolution was a prerequisite, but it could only go on when the Africans were left to operate alone until they achieved the confidence that they were not inferior to anyone. This can only happen when they see their achievements as entirely theirs instead of thinking they could do nothing without the guidance of the Europeans.

2.7 The Programme Undermined

Already, those forces that before the formation of the Youth League and been at work to alter the course of the ANC were busy again attempting to destroy the spirit of the Programme. The dissolution of the Communist Party of South Africa (now the South African Communist Party, SACP, in its underground reincarnation) and its decision to infiltrate the national liberation movement, accelerated the efforts to change the ANC's position in regard to the question of land and to undermine the spirit of the Programme of Action of 1949⁵⁴. The moving force within the SACP was the people who originated from Europe.

An internal struggle within the ANC inevitably ensued involving those who were under the influence of the infiltrators on the one hand, and the Africanists on the other. The Africanists were those who adhered to the spirit of the Programme of Action⁵⁵. The settler liberals, who masqueraded as communists and were members of the Communist Party, felt threatened by the spirit of African nationalism which the Programme generated. They saw African assertiveness as a direct threat to their vested group interests as "Whites". This kind of fear had been manifest even much earlier⁵⁶. In 1928, the delegation of the Communist Party of South Africa to the Comintern opposed a resolution calling for the creation of a "Native" Republic of South Africa. The delegation protested that the "Native" was not mature enough to run a republic. These reflections had of course nothing to do with the thinking of what they called "Natives".

The advent of the Mau Mau in Kenya gave further impetus to the liberals' fear of African nationalism. They mentally transferred the scenario from Kenya to South Africa, and shuddered; they set to working more vigorously on the ANC leadership to change the course of the organization. Indeed, they succeeded in getting to some of those who had been strong adherents of the principles and spirit of the 1949 Programme of Action and of the African National Congress Youth League. The core of the Africanist element did not let up, either. They established a newspaper, "The Africanist" with Mangaliso Sobukwe as its editor. Sobukwe was

⁵⁴ D. Sibeko: The Impact of the PAC and Sobukwe- the defier of the undefiable, Azania News, Vol. 25 No. 6 & 7, pp1-60.

⁵⁵ V. Maphai: 'The Role of Black Consciousness in the Liberation Struggle' in Ian Liebenberg et al. (eds.), The Long March: The story of the struggle for liberation in South Africa, pp.34-41.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

to become the first president of the PAC. The Bureau of African Nationalism was established to propagate the spirit of the original objectives of the national struggle in Azania. The Africanists were predominantly young people belonging to the ANC Youth League.

Their fear that there was an attempt to hijack the ANC was finally justified and their internal struggle lost when, in 1955, at a conference convened at Kliptown in Johannesburg, the Programme of Action was thrown overboard without so much as a burial ceremony. The spirit of African nationalism as a liberatory creed ceased to have any mention at the conference which was stagemanaged and christened the “Congress of the People”. The most important pillars of the liberation struggle were therefore thrown overboard and in their place came the “Freedom Charter”⁵⁷.

2.8 The Freedom Charter

The “Freedom Charter” was the document adopted by the “Congress of the People” convened in Kliptown in 1955. To this day the ANC accepts it as its manifesto. In its preamble the Charter states that “*South Africa belongs to all who live in it, Black and White*” and that “... we have been robbed of our land”⁵⁸. It does not say who has robbed the “Black and White” of their land. By saying that the land belonged to all who lived in it, the Charter removed the “object of dispute” which had been dictated by history and originally accepted by the ANC as the basis of its objectives. The land now belonged to the oppressor and the oppressed, the dispossessor and the dispossessed, without any explanation as to when this magic happened. The master and the slave became one, even though the slave remained destitute. The inconsistency of the Charter was the mark of its fraudulent nature⁵⁹.

It could be argued that when there is no longer any dispute about the ownership of the land, what is left to fight for except civil rights? At the end of the struggle the dispossessed still remain without land. Indeed, the Charter emphasized civil rights as the goal of the struggle. It spoke of free education, participation in government, not transfer of power anymore; at its silliest it spoke of the removal of fences around townships, as if these ghettos, let alone the fences, would be allowed to remain after the struggle for “land” had been won. The leadership in the ANC, by accepting the Charter, renounced the birthright of their indigenous African people. This was unacceptable to the Africanists. The adoption of the “Freedom Charter”

⁵⁷ D. Sibeko: The Impact of the PAC and Sobukwe- the defier of the undefiable, Azania News, Vol. 25 No. 6 & 7, pp1-60.

⁵⁸ SG: Pan Africanist Congress of Azania: Know the PAC in a nutshell, pp.4-38.

⁵⁹ D. Sibeko: The Impact of the PAC and Sobukwe- the defier of the undefiable, Azania News, Vol. 25 No. 6 & 7, pp1-60.

therefore became the final stage in the internal struggle between the Africanists and what were now to be known as Charterists (from the name “Freedom Charter”).

The adoption of this document brought about the division in the Azanian struggle which still persists to this day and cuts across all kinds of activist groupings that have a political flavor: students’ organisations, trade union organisations, women’s organization, and even theological groupings. Today, it is mainly Africanism and Black Consciousness versus Charterism; the conceptual factors between Black Consciousness and Africanism remain the same. In both Africanism and Black Consciousness, “identification”⁶⁰ is the operational word. Non-indigenous people are required to identify fully with the indigenous people.

Recently, the dichotomy between Africanism and Charterism manifested itself through the National Forum and the United Democratic Front. The former represents Africanism while the latter represents Charterism. The National Forum gets its main support from the grassroots; the illiterate and semi-literate find their aspirations more appropriately represented in that organization. It therefore has the majority support. The United Democratic Front draws its support more from Intellectuals, white liberals, white-led trade unions and ethnic-based organisations such as the Transvaal Indian Congress⁶¹. It has not appealed to the grassroots African working class, despite what the media would have us believe.

To its eternal discredit, the Charter removed the ANC from the path that had been charted by the Founding Fathers; secondly, it created a division within the liberation movement which has caused countless conflicts in the struggle for genuine freedom. The Africanists, after the Kliptown Conference, decided that the struggle within had been lost. In order to protect the sacred principles for which thousands of African heroes and heroines had died, it became necessary to launch a new organization.

Its ignoring of history was the unpardonable crime of the “Freedom Charter”⁶². Without a rational analysis, it failed to make a distinction between the dispossessor and the dispossessed. By its very nature, the document denied the colonial nature of racist South Africa as an entity; yet all anti-colonial struggles are based on the quest for land. It even goes against a strong anti-colonial sentiment that I have observed within ANC ranks.

As for the “Congress of the People”, it excluded from participation all those who were opposed to the liberal infiltrators, who posed as communists. The “undesirables” were removed bodily

⁶⁰ SG: Pan Africanist Congress of Azania: Know the PAC in a nutshell, pp.4-38.

⁶¹ D. Sibeko: The Impact of the PAC and Sobukwe- the defier of the undefiable, Azania News, Vol. 25 No. 6 & 7, pp1-60.

⁶² M, Motlhabi: “The Theory and Practice of Black Resistance to Apartheid”. Johannesburg, Skotaville 1984, pp. 76-77.

from the hall by “Volunteers”⁶³ (a euphemism for muscle-men who did not need brains to stand and block the doorways). The Charter had never been previewed at branch level, charged the Africanists, and was never even referred to the branches of the ANC for possible amendments or additions in the normal course of democratic practice. It appeared for the first time during the agenda item to adopt it. Nor was it discussed at the conference, still less altered in any way during the deliberations, because it was not deliberated upon. It was taken as it was, once and all⁶⁴. This is called mass rubberstamping. Even Dr Wilson Conco, who presided at the Congress, had admitted that he had never seen the Charter before coming to the meeting; nor did Chief Luthuli, who was President General of the ANC, by his own admission, know who had drafted it.

The “Freedom Charter” was really meant to be a document of the Congress Alliance. This was a political association formed of the ANC (represented at the Kliptown Conference on posters for the benefit of the illiterate, as an elephant); the South African Coloured People’s Congress, SACPO (represented by a horse); the Congress of Democrats, COD (a fraudulent reincarnation of the CPSA represented by an owl); the South African Indian Congress (represented as a fox); and the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU)⁶⁵. SACPO later dissolved itself and its members joined the PAC. In effect the “Freedom Charter” was an instrument used by the South African Communist Party to pursue the objectives it had laid out in 1950 when it dissolved itself to infiltrate the African National Congress. The self-dissolution was in anticipation of the “Suppression of Communism Act” which the government was passing through parliament.

One of the objections standing out prominently against the “Freedom Charter” was that it concerned itself with the maintenance of race. “There shall be equal status in the bodies of state, in the courts and in the schools for all national groups and races”⁶⁶ (my emphasis), says the Charter. Nothing about the individual! The Africanists were questioning how different nations can inhabit one territory and still call themselves one nation. They were questioning how equal status can be maintained for “races” without the “races” maintaining their group interests, and whether the encouragement of such racial group interests would not produce disharmony and racial conflict. The answer the Africanists had for a free and conflict-free nation was to place the primacy on the individual in an Africanist non-racial society, where anyone who paid his sole allegiance to Africa would be regarded as an African, and colour would be as irrelevant as shapes of noses.

⁶³ D. Sibeko: The Impact of the PAC and Sobukwe- the defier of the undefiable, Azania News, Vol. 25 No. 6 & 7, p.9.

⁶⁴ SG: Pan Africanist Congress of Azania: Know the PAC in a nutshell, p.14.

⁶⁵ D. Sibeko: The Impact of the PAC and Sobukwe- the defier of the undefiable, Azania News, Vol. 25 No. 6 & 7, p.10.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

Sobukwe had this to say on the matter: “All would be Africans and all would be guaranteed human rights as individuals (not as racial groups or minority groups)”⁶⁷. To the Africanists, “multi-racial”, which was propagated by the Charter, was a perpetuation of racialism and a proper recipe for conflict in an independent country. “Non-racialism” was the correct answer. This is why they stressed individual rights rather than minority rights based on race, as the Charter did. To be an African, they asserted, one simply had to identify oneself with Africa and its people, not only intellectually and materially but psychologically as well⁶⁸. This approach was novel and demonstrated the maturity of the Africanists in spite of their unsavoury experiences under a racist society.

2.9 The Final Parting and the Test of PAC Leadership

The final parting came at the 1958 conference. In a letter dated November 2, 1958, the Africanists reiterated that the “Freedom Charter” was in conflict with the spirit of the 1949 Programme of Action. It claimed, they asserted, that the land no longer belonged to the African people but was “... auctioned for sale to all who live in that country, even though the settlers refuse to identify with the indigenous majority”⁶⁹. This letter, which was addressed to the ANC leadership, also asserted the Africanists’ commitment to continue to fight for the overthrow of white domination and the restoration of the land to its rightful owners; and to accept in a free Azania, as Africans, all who wished to remain in the country and were willing to identify with the indigenous people. “We are launching out on our own”, the letter concluded, “as the custodians of the ANC policy as it was formulated in 1912 and pursued up to the time of the Congress Alliance (1955)”⁷⁰.

On April 6, 1959, the concluding declaration in the letter found expression. The Pan Africanist Congress was founded. It took the majority of the youth with it. This was only natural since the PAC had its genesis in the ANC Youth League. Of the prominent members of the Youth League in the new organization were stalwarts such as Mangaliso Robert Sobukwe, AP Mda, Zephania Mothopeng and many others who continue to play an active role in the liberation struggle today. Yet there were those also who, though they were in the forefront in the propagation of the principles of the Youth League during the late 1940s, remained in the ANC and occupied positions of leadership or of significant influence⁷¹. Among these were Nelson Mandela, Walter

⁶⁷ SG: Pan Africanist Congress of Azania: Know the PAC in a nutshell, p.15.

⁶⁸ D. Sibeko: The Impact of the PAC and Sobukwe- the defier of the undefiable, Azania News, Vol. 25 No. 6 & 7, p.11.

⁶⁹ M. Mafole: ‘The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, 1959-1990’ in Sipho Buthelezi (ed), South Africa: The Dynamics and Prospects of Transformation 1900-1994, pp. 56-61.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ D. Sibeko: The Impact of the PAC and Sobukwe- the defier of the undefiable, Azania News, Vol. 25 No. 6 & 7, p.11.

Sisulu, and Wilson Conco, who has now for good reasons become disenchanted with the establishment ANC; Joe Mathews, whose later quarrels with ANC shot him out into the cold and who is now a lawyer in Botswana; the eight ANC members of the National Executive who started questioning the spirit of the “Freedom Charter” and left the organization after 1969 for the same reasons that the Africanists left in 1958. On leaving they formed the abortive ANC (African Nationalists) in 1975.

Regarding those that remained in the ANC after the 1958 split, Peter Dreyer, in “Martyrs and Fanatics”, reflects: “If the Africanist principles prevented them from emulating Communist opportunism, neither could they rival [sic] Communist blandishments. Youth Leaguers Walter Sisulu and Duma Nokwe, among others, were presently treated to lengthy tours of communist countries where they were given the full Potemkin treatment. They came back well-steeped in Soviet mythology. The Communists worked assiduously to woo the League and in many cases they succeeded, the most notable convert being Oliver Tambo. It was Tambo who, in 1953, took the lead in conjuring up a new all-white fraternal body, the Congress of Democrats (COD), which now became the “legal” home of the former members of the CPSA and sundry fellow travellers”⁷²

This scenario coincided with the peak of the Cold War and wach of the superpowers was looking for spheres of influence. A liberation movement like the ANC would serve as a good vehicle for the future control of the all-important sea route around the Cape⁷³. The future role of the Soviet Union in the liberation movement, as will become apparent below, seems to give credence to Dreyer’s observation.

The PAC was inspired in its policies by, among other factors, the emergence of Ghana from a colonial status. Ghana’s leader, Kwame Nkrumah, had personally been involved in the pan-Africanist movement and had also placed the independence of Ghana in a pan-Africanist context as he declared: “The independence of Ghana is meaningless as long as there is still any square inch of the African soil under foreign domination”⁷⁴. The Africanists could see no other alternative for themselves and the people of Azania. Here it was that their own long-standing views were being crystallized into the reality that was Ghana. This inspiration was also to

⁷² M. Mafole: ‘The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, 1959-1990’ in Sipho Buthelezi (ed), South Africa: The Dynamics and Prospects of Transformation 1900-1994, pp. 58-65.

⁷³ D. Sibeko: The Impact of the PAC and Sobukwe- the defier of the undefiable, Azania News, Vol. 25 No. 6 & 7, p.12.

⁷⁴ SG: Pan Africanist Congress of Azania: Know the PAC in a nutshell, pp.11-16.

become the basis of PAC's foreign policy, which revolved around Africa's primary interests as a determinant of relations with other countries and foreign entities.

In his inaugural speech at the founding of the PAC in 1959, Sobukwe had this to say on the matter:

*"There is again a scramble for Africa and both the Soviet Union and the United States of America are trying to win the loyalty of the African states. Africa is being wooed with more ardour than she has ever been. There is a lot of flirting going on, of course, some Africans flirting with the Soviet camp and others with the American camp ... and the question is, what is our answer? Our answer, Mr Speaker and children of the Soil, has been given by the African leaders of the continent. Dr Kwame Nkrumah has repeatedly stated that in international affairs, Africa wishes to pursue a policy of positive neutrality, allying herself to neither of the existing blocs. We endorse the views of the African leaders on this point. But we must point out that we are not blind to the fact that the [recently de-colonised countries] that pursue a planned state economy have outstripped, in industrial development, those that follow the path of private enterprise. Today China is industrially ahead of India. Africanists reject totalitarianism in any form and accept political democracy ...Borrowing then the best from the East and the best from the West, we nonetheless retain and maintain our distinctive personality and refuse to be satraps or stooges of either power bloc."*⁷⁵

For liberation movement to have said this in Africa as early as 1959, reveals a deep insight on its part. On the question of Nkrumah's influence on the PAC, the PAC flag has a map of Africa and a star where Ghana is. This is recognition of Nkrumah's role in propagating the ideas of African unity or pan-Africanism.

At its inception on April 6, 1959, the PAC was armed with a historically appropriate and adequate definition of the struggle in Azania, namely, the overthrow of White domination and the establishment of national self-determination; it was armed with a liberatory creed to achieve this, namely, African Nationalism, around which to rally and to unite the oppressed masses; it was armed with the recognition of a powerful and dynamic social force, which it called Africanism⁷⁶. Africanism means that Africa is for the Africans, when African is defined as anybody who owes his sole allegiance to Africa and identifies fully with the indigenous people of Africa, and means that "race"⁷⁷ in relating to man in the new democratic society envisaged

⁷⁵ D. Sibeko: The Impact of the PAC and Sobukwe- the defier of the undefiable, Azania News, Vol. 25 No. 6 & 7, pp.13-14.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ M. Mafole: 'The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, 1959-1990' in Siphso Buthelezi (ed), South Africa: The Dynamics and Prospects of Transformation 1900-1994, p. 69.

after liberation would not only be irrelevant but shunned. All this combined, gave the PAC an ideology that pointed the way to the only kind of economic system that would ensure equality of opportunity among individuals, a socialist system; in addition the PAC had in its programme a political system that would ensure individual worth: democracy; and its definition of African ensured a social system that would be divested of all kinds of racism and racialism. This ideology, from the PAC's point of view, would guarantee the protection of both the material and spiritual interests of the individual. Beyond this, the PAC was armed with two other important forces: a programme for continental unity on a pan-Africanist basis, and another for the promotion of the African personality – for the revival, promotion and development of the African cultural heritage and social characteristics which were either destroyed or stultified by the long years of colonialism and foreign domination⁷⁸.

All this is clearly inscribed and elaborated on the PAC's documents, namely, the Manifesto, the Constitution, the Disciplinary Code and the Inaugural Address of the first president, Mangaliso Robert Sobukwe. To this day, all these documents together form the basis of the PAC's national and foreign policy and programme.

The organization had been operating for hardly a year when it was forced underground, with its banning after the anti-pass laws campaign of March 1960.⁷⁹ The banning of the PAC on April 8, 1960 was the first such action on the part of the racist regime in South Africa against and African political movement. At that time, of course, the ANC was already 48 years old and the ban was extended to affect it as well, although it had at first, refused to join the campaign.

The banning that came as a result of PAC action was significant, as it demonstrated the image that it had; in the eyes of the racist regime, it had the potential to overthrow it.

2.10 The Test of PAC's Leadership

Immediately after its formation, the PAC embarked upon the Status Campaign. This meant a reorganization of the social thinking of Africans and their attitudes politically. During the long years of White domination and colonialism, Africans had been forced to believe that they were inferior, that their social practices were primitive and inferior to those of Europeans and other nationalities; they were not creative and could never manage themselves or their affairs without supervision from European or Asian people⁸⁰. It was such destructive indoctrination

⁷⁸ SG: Pan Africanist Congress of Azania: Know the PAC in a nutshell, pp.4-38.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ M. Mafole: 'The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, 1959-1990' in Sipho Buthelezi (ed), South Africa: The Dynamics and Prospects of Transformation 1900-1994, p. 69.

that the Status Campaign sought to reverse, and to substitute a positive self-appraisal and national self-assertion in the African mind. The PAC believed correctly that one cannot think or act beyond one's consciousness. Therefore, if one believed that it was God's ordination that one occupied a certain social position and if one believed in God – as most Africans do – one could never conceivably even think of changing that position. But if one believes that it is one's right to be free and determine one's own destiny, one would use all that one had to strive to be free and independent⁸¹.

The Status Campaign also sought to emphasise that the African people were their own liberators and therefore ought to produce their own leadership. Only oppressed persons, the PAC believes, can understand the nature of their own oppression, as only they go through the experience. By the same token, no one who has not gone through such an experience can understand that experience beyond intellectual appreciation, and cannot therefore provide appropriate or effective leadership⁸². Therefore the Europeans could not be leaders in that struggle.

The Status Campaign was aimed at generating self-awareness, confidence and dignity in the African mind. The campaign was never called off. When the PAC went underground, the campaign continued, as it still does today. It was this campaign in the PAC's underground work that influenced the philosophy of Black Consciousness, which also emphasized leadership by the oppressed. In this regard, M Motlhabi, in his book *Black Resistance to Apartheid*⁸³, says: "... although, because of government banning and censorship laws [the Black Consciousness Movement] could not make any direct borrowing from past organisations, its ideological approach became more in harmony with that of the PAC than that of the ANC. This means that the PAC had become the beginning of a new era in black political awareness and response. It was becoming more expressive of the changing mood of black people than the old-fashioned ANC..."⁸⁴

Another campaign decided upon by the PAC after its inception was the Positive Action Campaign. The Positive Action Campaign was directed against the basic instrument for the maintenance of the oppressive racist apartheid laws, the pass book. Without that instrument, it would be well-nigh impossible to operate those laws. The PAC saw the Positive Action

⁸¹ M, Motlhabi: "The Theory and Practice of Black Resistance to Apartheid". Johannesburg, Skotaville 1984, pp. 78-79.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ M. Mafole: 'The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, 1959-1990' in Sipho Buthelezi (ed), *South Africa: The Dynamics and Prospects of Transformation 1900-1994*, p. 69.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

Campaign as a tool in making the oppressed people ungovernable, thus giving them strength to pursue the other tactics in the total strategy of liberation⁸⁵. Some of the major laws in the apartheid network of statutory instruments were: the Urban Areas Act, which determines who is allowed to live in urban areas; the Group Areas Act, which prescribes where each racial group should live and conduct business, whether commercial or professional; and the Influx Control Regulations, which are a myriad and effectively control the movement of Africans within the country. The Influx Control Regulations are actually central to the apartheid system of *Bantustanisation*; without them, it would be virtually impossible to keep people in the Bantustans and to regulate the number of Africans living in so-called White South Africa⁸⁶.

All these laws were regulated through the instrument of the passbook or what the racist government euphemistically called the *Reference Book*. Without the passbook, these laws would be ineffective. Every detail of these laws that affect the life of every individual African was reflected in the hated passbook: where the holder works, whether he is still employed, which his tribe is and who his chief is. From these and other meticulously-noted details in the passbook, any police official could determine at a glance whether the holder is permitted to be at a particular place or not⁸⁷. To make the passbook really effective, every pass-carrying male or female was required to have it wherever he or she went: at work, in church, at school (if he or she is over sixteen), even at a communal toilet. Failure to produce the passbook on demand by police or other “authorised officials” led to arrest and conviction. It is clear therefore that the passbook was central to the maintenance of the apartheid system. It is apartheid’s equivalent of the Nazi arm band on the Jews during the Third Reich⁸⁸. Today it has been replaced by identity cards but code numbers are used to distinguish urban dwellers from rural and also white from black people.

The Positive Action Campaign was appropriately directed against the passbook as a step toward further mass action against the oppressive system of apartheid colonialism. The mechanics of the campaign were that people were to leave their passbooks at home and hand themselves over at the police stations. In terms of their own law, the police would be obliged to arrest and lock them up. The effect of such action, as envisaged by the PAC, was threefold. First, the police and prisons would be kept busy, locking up people to the point where the goals would be unable to accommodate them, and thus a breakdown in the system would result in the particular

⁸⁵ M, Motlhabi: “The Theory and Practice of Black Resistance to Apartheid”. Johannesburg, Skotaville 1984, pp. 78-79.

⁸⁶ M. Mafole: ‘The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, 1959-1990’ in Sipho Buthelezi (ed), South Africa: The Dynamics and Prospects of Transformation 1900-1994, p. 71.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ M, Motlhabi: “The Theory and Practice of Black Resistance to Apartheid”. Johannesburg, Skotaville 1984, pp. 80-83.

quarter. Second, since the majority of the demonstrators were workers, the factories would be unmanned and an industrial breakdown would be the result. Third, since no one would any longer be prepared to carry a passbook, all the laws for which the book was an instrument would be rendered not efficacious overnight and cause a major breakdown in the management of apartheid⁸⁹. At all events, the country would become ungovernable, which is one of the major aims of revolutionary action, whether violent or non-violent. In spite of the brutal reaction of the police, a measure of the aims of the campaign was achieved.

People gathered at specified points and started moving together toward the respective police stations. Many towns in Azania responded to the call. This was not before the ANC had been invited to join in the campaign. In a report in the Johannesburg Sunday Times on March 20, 1960, the ANC's Secretary General, the late Duma Nokwe, was reported as having said that no self-respecting African would join such an "ill-conceived and irresponsible campaign"⁹⁰. While in some parts of the country the police responded as had been planned and arrested those that gave themselves up, in other towns they refused to defer to the requirements of their own law, fearing the crowding that had been partly intended by the campaign.

From the first day of the campaign on March 21, major flashpoints were recorded at the following places in the country: Stellenbosch, Simonstown, Paarl, Worcester, Muizenberg, Humansdorp, Sommerset West, Port Elizabeth, East London⁹¹, Cradock, Beaufort West, Cape Town (all these in the Cape Province); Bloemfontein (Orange Free State Province); Ermelo, Pretoria, Pietersburg, Benoni, Krugersdorp. Many other places were not registered, as such, since the police refused to arrest anybody. In Cape Town, the police arrested a hundred volunteers on March 24, but on the following day, they refused to arrest an additional 2,000⁹².

In Sharpeville the police panicked on the first day and an order was issued to gun down the demonstrators. Within minutes, dead bodies were strewn all over next to the police station. As the demonstrators had not expected this, the rest ran off in all directions, jumping over dead bodies of men, women and children⁹³. At the end of the shooting, carnage lay below the heavens amid profound dismay, anger and shock. At least sixty-nine people lay dead with their blood wetting the dry earth. As if he felt the exciting action was too short, one member of the police administered his bayonet into a pregnant woman and laid bare an uncounted baby.

⁸⁹ M, Motlhabi: "The Theory and Practice of Black Resistance to Apartheid". Johannesburg, Skotaville 1984, pp. 80-83.

⁹⁰ M. Mafole: 'The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, 1959-1990' in Sipho Buthelezi (ed), South Africa: The Dynamics and Prospects of Transformation 1900-1994, p. 73.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² M, Motlhabi: "The Theory and Practice of Black Resistance to Apartheid". Johannesburg, Skotaville 1984, pp. 79-82.

⁹³ Ibid.

Langa, in Cape Town, was another scene of killings during the campaign, and so was the other African township in Cape Town, Gugulethu. As the story of the killings had been told elsewhere, this brief mention must therefore suffice. The country-wide mass support for the campaign copiously demonstrated its revolutionary relevance to the oppressed people, although the PAC had very little time to organize for it. This in turn was a sign that the PAC had read the mood of the people correctly, thus qualifying itself for the leadership of the African people⁹⁴. This is the most important significance of the campaign. Another important significance was the reaction of the racist government. This was unprecedented and revealed that the government saw the PAC as a potent and formidable contender to power. To forestall PAC's seizure of this power, the government immediately piloted a bill through the all-white parliament to ban the PAC. Within eighteen days from March 21, the *Unlawful Organisations Act* was in the statutes and within hours of this, the PAC was affected by it. The ANC, which in a welcome turnaround had called on its members to join the campaign six days after it had started, was bundled together with the PAC and also became an unlawful organization⁹⁵.

The banning of the ANC provoked dismay from members of the Congress Alliance, of which the ANC was a member. Lee Warden, a member of the Congress of Democrats and an MP in the all-white parliament as a "Natives' Representative" protested in parliament, saying:

*"If ever there was a need, it exists today for the government to realize that it has in the ANC a friend [sic] and not an enemy, because these two organisations (PAC and ANC) that we are asked to ban are diametrically opposed that the government should seize the opportunity of appealing to the ANC to assist it to restore peace and order in South Africa"*⁹⁶.

It was the Positive Action Campaign therefore that triggered the introduction of the Unlawful Organizations Act which was used to ban the PAC and, for good measure, the ANC. The campaign was immediately followed by a stay-at-home that lasted for three weeks in some places. In Cape Town the stay-at-home campaign brought many businesses and industries almost to a standstill, which caused a flight of foreign capital out of the country amounting to £600,000,000 sterling⁹⁷. Cape Town enjoyed the largest response, recording a success rate of

⁹⁴ M. Mafole: 'The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, 1959-1990' in Siphso Buthelezi (ed), South Africa: The Dynamics and Prospects of Transformation 1900-1994, p. 74.

⁹⁵ D. Sibeko: The Impact of the PAC and Sobukwe- the defier of the undefiable, Azania News, Vol. 25 No. 6 & 7, pp.17-19.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ M. Mafole: 'The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, 1959-1990' in Siphso Buthelezi (ed), South Africa: The Dynamics and Prospects of Transformation 1900-1994, p. 76.

between 90% and 95%; Port Elizabeth and Johannesburg had between 80% and 90%, while Durban registered between 25% and 35%.

Even before the campaign had started, the government had issued a nationwide order placing on standby the Citizen Force, Citizen Force Reserve, the Permanent Reserve Force, the entire Commando and the Police Force. The order came out on March 20. The story of the Positive Action Campaign and of Sharpeville became PAC's greatest story of its prowess in the exercise of mass mobilization⁹⁸. The story of the Sharpeville Massacres also demonstrates the fear its strategies and action could produce in enemy ranks. All this was unprecedented: the main action and the regime's response, the international repercussions and the degree of attention the international community has paid to these events, are some of the outstanding results of the campaign and of the Sharpeville Massacres. In respect to the last mentioned, the day of the campaign and massacres, March 21, 1960, was declared by the United Nations as *International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination*, in honour of the events on that day in Sharpeville, in tribute to the fallen of Sharpeville and Langa, in Cape Town, and in solidarity with the oppressed people of Azania⁹⁹. The history of the PAC could not be said to be complete without the story of Sharpeville, as those events are now commonly known. The banning of the organization demonstrated that there was no common code of conduct between the oppressor and the oppressed which they could jointly use in communicating with each other. The relations were rendered antagonistic by the conduct of the racist regime itself, by refusing to respond positively to peaceful approaches. Under such circumstances the only option for the oppressed for redress became armed resistance¹⁰⁰.

2.11 Sharpeville ushers in Armed Struggle

Having demonstrated that it was not prepared to restore the human rights and birthrights of the indigenous people of South Africa, the racist regime invited for itself the only type of communication that it recognized. Preparations for armed struggle ensued. In 1962 the first strokes were delivered upon the oppressive system¹⁰¹. In Paarl, Mbashe, Krugersdorp and Qamata, uniformed police were killed. The armed wing of the PAC, known as POQO (meaning genuine) became popular among Africans and caused a chill to run down the spines of the settlers. The panic on the part of the oppressors inspired to them to set up a commission of

⁹⁸ D. Sibeko: The Impact of the PAC and Sobukwe- the defier of the undefiable, Azania News, Vol. 25 No. 6 & 7, pp.19-21.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ SG: Pan Africanist Congress of Azania: Know the PAC in a nutshell, pp.4-38.

¹⁰¹ D. Sibeko: The Impact of the PAC and Sobukwe- the defier of the undefiable, Azania News, Vol. 25 No. 6 & 7, pp.20-22.

inquiry, the *Snyman Commission*, to investigate what Poqo was, what its objectives were that Poqo and PAC were one thing and that it was “bent on causing a bloodbath in South Africa”. If Poqo was not nipped in the bud, the report of the Commission reflected, the bloodbath would case untold instability.

Inside South Africa, PAC/Poqo was elusive. The only way that the racist regime could get at it was through the Maseru headquarters of the organization. Maseru in the British Protectorate of Basutoland (now Lesotho after independence) was where most of the leadership of the PAC had gone, to direct the struggle in South Africa¹⁰². Since Basutoland was under British authority, this imperial power’s co-operation was sought by the settler regime in South Africa, which asked the British to raid the PAC offices with the aim of seizing vital documents. When the police under British command raided the PAC offices, they came out with a comprehensive list of members of the PAC who were still operating underground in South Africa. It could be argued that this list was used to round up all those appearing on it so that about 10,000 people were detained. Of these, 1,162 were convicted and sent to Robben Island. The Chairman of the PAC, John Mlambo and his predecessor, Nyati Pokela, served twenty years on Robben Island. Not less than 50 PAC activists were executed¹⁰³. Between 1962 and 1965, writes Motlhabi, “not a day passed in the South African scene without a trial being held involving Poqo suspects. The government saw Poqo as its chief adversary ...” (*Black Resistance to Apartheid*)¹⁰⁴

These events make the PAC the organization with the largest number of people to have been executed by the regime to date; they provoked the worst security legislation series in the history of South Africa, the first of which was the 1962 Sabotage Act the precursor to the Internal Security Act. A special clause was built into the *General Laws Amendment Act* to continue detaining political prisoners, even after completion of sentence¹⁰⁵. Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe, the first president of the PAC, was the first and, to date, still the only person ever to be affected by this, so that the clause came to be known as the *Sobukwe clause*, even in parliament itself.

¹⁰² M. Mafole: ‘The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, 1959-1990’ in Sipho Buthelezi (ed), *South Africa: The Dynamics and Prospects of Transformation 1900-1994*, p. 79.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ D. Sibeko: The Impact of the PAC and Sobukwe- the defier of the undefiable, *Azania News*, Vol. 25 No. 6 & 7, pp.22-24.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

2.12 Conclusion

It could be said that by 1963 the external headquarters of the organization had already been established in Basutoland. A day before the launching of the Positive Action Campaign two members, Nana Mahomo (National Executive) and Vusi Maake (former treason trialist and an Africanist), were dispatched abroad to maintain contact with the international community. Offices were opened in Addis Ababa, Cairo and London respectively. The purpose of opening up offices abroad was to solicit support politically, morally and materially. The PAC considered that to build relationships and solidarity with workers and mass movements in other countries was one of the cornerstones for a successful struggle at home.

CHAPTER THREE: THE PAC UNDERGROUND AND IN EXILE

“Africanists are those Africans who believe that African nationalism is the only liberatory outlook that can bind together the African masses by providing them with a loyalty higher than that of the tribe and thus mould them into a militant disciplined force” – Mangaliso R. Sobukwe, 1959

3.1 Introduction

The notions of ‘underground and exile’ infer the totality of circumstances defining the nature of life in the host countries where banned political movements for national liberation operated in order to continue the liberation struggles against illegitimate regimes in their home countries. The way various liberation movements dealt with the circumstances of exile constituted their experiences of exile. In terms of its pan-Africanist outlook, the PAC made Africa its mainstay as front-line support. It was not an accident therefore that the PAC became the first movement to acquire recognition by the Organisation of African Unity through the OAU’s Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa.¹⁰⁶ This chapter focuses on the PAC’s formative period in exile and the Manifesto as official Policy document of the PAC. It delves on conditions inside underground Camps and the development of the PAC’s Military Strategy.

3.2 The Formative Period in Exile

Life in exile was to prove a challenge to the PAC’s staying power, when most other liberation movements from Angola, Namibia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe ran aground.¹⁰⁷ From the time that the PAC went into exile, the number of liberation movements had dwindled, not only because countries were attaining independence at a startling speed, but because some weaker movements fizzled out.¹⁰⁸ The PAC’s non-aligned position put it into trouble at a time when it was highly fashionable for liberation movements to attach themselves to one or the other of the superpowers in the on-going Cold War.

Nevertheless, outlawing the PAC on April 8, 1960, created a plethora of unforeseen challenges for its leadership and general cadres. Its executive was imprisoned and Sobukwe, the PAC President, was sentenced to three years in prison and his colleagues in the national executive, to two years in prison. Others in the lower echelons of the organization were given 18 months

¹⁰⁶ P. Stiff: *The Silent war: South African Recce Operations, 1969-1994*, pp. 36-37.

¹⁰⁷ T. Lodge, ‘Revolutionary exile politics, 1960-1975’, pp. 296-360 in *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945*; H. Barrel: *The Outlawed South African Liberation Movements*; pp.134-138.

¹⁰⁸ D. Sibeko: *The Impact of the PAC and Sobukwe- the defier of the undefiable*, Azania News, Vol. 25 No. 6 & 7, p.21.

prison sentences. The only layer of leadership which remained outside custody entailed those who had left the country on the instruction to mobilise the international community, including the rest of Africa, against Apartheid and also generate resources for the establishment of PAC bases outside South Africa. Acting in terms of the Presidential Decree adopted in December 1959, Sobukwe appointed Mr Z B Molefe as Acting President.¹⁰⁹ Even though Z B Molefe was imprisoned during the period following the banning of the PAC, he was released from prison in August 1960 and this helped to provide a limited degree of leadership for the exiled PAC. He acted as the President of the PAC until August 1962.¹¹⁰

Molefe, Mahomo and Molotsi were tasked to raise funds for the creation of the PAC rudimentary infrastructure in Maseru (Lesotho) and set up PAC missions in Accra (Ghana), London (England) and in Cairo (Egypt).¹¹¹ Different ideological and political tendencies, however, developed in these various offices and there was a dominant tendency of disloyalty to the center of authority in Lesotho, creating an impression "there were different PACs in every part of the world".¹¹² It could be said that the 'official position' of the Maseru PAC was contested. C.L. Lakaje, a PAC official based in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, argued in his submission to the Africa Liberation Committee of the OAU, (made in 1967), that Potlake Leballo (who became Acting President of the 'official PAC in Lesotho'), "unilaterally declared Maseru the headquarters of the PAC. This caused great consternation in the ranks of the PAC", but given the circumstances of 'exiled PAC' in South Africa, and the vicinity of Lesotho to South Africa, PAC members were compelled to join the Maseru group.¹¹³

Even though the authenticity of Maseru as the headquarters and official center of power was contested, it was widely recognized as the official PAC headquarters. When the headquarters were relocated to Tanzania in 1964, Maseru remained as PAC external mission. Tom Lodge argues that the first official exile PAC organ was established in Maseru, Lesotho, in 1962.¹¹⁴ The Lesotho office of the PAC was officially opened in Bonhomme House in Maseru in 1962 when P.K. Leballo arrived from South Africa, after serving a two-year prison sentence for his role in

¹⁰⁹ PAC Archives: 'Background to crucial appointments and policy statement', 20th June 1964, p.1.

¹¹⁰ T.G. Karis and G.M. Gerhardt (Eds): *From Protest to Challenge*, Vol. 5. *Nadir and Resurgence, 1964-1979*, p. 46; Bernard Leeman: *Africanist Political Movements in Lesotho and Azania*, p. 172.

¹¹¹ B. Leeman: *Lesotho and the Struggle for Azania*, p. 100; Interview between Malcom Dyan and A. Mahlangu, Cape Town, October, 1990.

¹¹² D. Sibeko: *The Impact of the PAC and Sobukwe- the defier of the undefiable*, *Azania News*, Vol. 25 No. 6 & 7, p.23

¹¹³ PAC Archive, Fort Hare: C.L. Lakaje: 'Confidential' A statement concerning the disputes within the Pan Africanist Congress (SA) to the African Liberation Committee, Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, 17th November, 1967, p.1.

¹¹⁴ T. Lodge: *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945*. pp. 295-369.

the anti-pass campaign. Leballo took over from Z.B. Molete as acting President of the exiled PAC.¹¹⁵

Nevertheless, the year 1960 witnessed individuals and groups of people from South Africa, some ANC members and other PAC members trickling into the neighbouring states of Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana. It was in Maseru, the capital of Lesotho, where a significant presence of PAC membership established itself. They were initially a loose grouping interspersed amongst the native Basotho population who out of goodwill and sympathy with the political situation of black South Africans accommodated them. Some South African PAC refugees got asylum on the basis of their understanding, however limited, of the relationship between the PAC and the Basotho Congress Party (BCP), of which P.K. Leballo was its founding member and patron.¹¹⁶ During the initial period, when the first groups of PAC exiles skedaddled into Lesotho, the network of relatives of P.K. Leballo (a Basotho national and leader of the PAC) helped provide temporary accommodation to members of the PAC.

At a later stage, as the number of PAC exiles increased, Mr Ellias Skamanie, a member of the BCP provided accommodation to almost all PAC exiles. His home is still regarded by the first generation PAC exiles as the home and the first PAC camp outside South Africa.¹¹⁷ In spite of the widely indicated positive attitude of BCP supporters towards the small but growing PAC exile community, the language barrier made it difficult to communicate needs, advice and support.¹¹⁸

At the beginning, intermittent PAC exile communities were not openly politically active but were spasmodically linked with what was transpiring in South Africa. The major pre-occupation of the first groups were concrete matters of survival and the main concern during the first few months 'was food and accommodation'.¹¹⁹ In spite of Skamanie's accommodation some groups of newcomers in the exile community were still in need of asylum and were accommodated in temporary shelters in the backyards of houses.¹²⁰ Even after the arrival of P.K. Leballo in August 1962 challenges continued unabated. As the PAC exiles grew in Lesotho,

¹¹⁵ B. Leeman: *Africanist Political Movements in Lesotho and Azania*, p. 177.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 150-183.

¹¹⁷ K. Nyatumba: 'AZAPO and the PAC: Revolutionary Watchdogs?' in Glenn Moss and Ingrid Obery (eds.), *South African Review* 6, From Red Friday to CODESA, pp.14-34

¹¹⁸ D. Sibeko: *The Impact of the PAC and Sobukwe- the defier of the undefiable*, *Azania News*, Vol. 25 No. 6 & 7, p.24

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹²⁰ K. Nyatumba: 'AZAPO and the PAC: Revolutionary Watchdogs?' in Glenn Moss and Ingrid Obery (eds.), *South African Review* 6, From Red Friday to CODESA, pp.14-34

challenges became more complicated, thereby spreading PAC exiles to other towns and villages of Lesotho like Mafeteng and Butha-butha.

Security became a strong challenge among the Lesotho-based exiles. PAC members were arrested regularly by members of the police, either on grounds of illegal entrance into the country or pure suspicion of pursuing a political agenda unpalatable to the ruling regime.¹²¹ The PAC publication 'The Africanist' summarized the situation in the following manner"

*"PAC freedom fighters escape from Vorster's banishment, arrests, detention and imprisonment in the Republic of South Africa only to suffer the same persecutions in Basutholand. The Colonial Basutoland government not satisfied by the nefarious collaboration that exists between itself and Vorster's Gestapo police, has decided to try out some of Vorster's outrageous inhuman practices on PAC freedom fighters in this territory. Without giving any reasons and without any cause and/or justification for such an act the Basutholand government has restricted PAC members to the Magisterial district of Maseru and has asked them to report to the police regularly. The penalty for the violation of these orders is the withdrawal of the permit to be in Basutholand. By this desperate act, the British Imperialists hope to halt the inevitable. Come what may, PAC is irrevocably committed to overthrow white domination Now!"*¹²²

In a letter from Sobukwe dated August 25, 1962, P.K. Leballo was entrusted with the powers to act as PAC President. By the end of September 1962, the PAC convened a Presidential Council in March. It was attended by groups of PAC members from various parts of Africa and all PAC regional heads from South Africa. The Council resolved to endorse the Presidential appointment of P.K. Leballo (as acting President), and elected J.N. Pokela as Secretary, M. Gqobose as member of the Presidential Council, T.M. Ntantala as member of the Presidential Council, Z.B. Molete as Secretary for Publicity and Information, Zeph Mothopeng as Acting National Treasurer and E. Mfafa as National Organiser.¹²³ In November 1963, Mr T.T. Letlaka was co-opted to the Presidential Council by virtue of his position as chairman of the Transkei region.

Representatives abroad were also members of the Presidential Council. These, among others, included Mr E.L. Ntloedibe, chief representative in Accra, Ghana; Patrick Duncan, the first white person to become a member of the PAC, a chief representative in Algeria; L. Mgweba, chief

¹²¹ B. Leeman: Africanist Political Movements in Lesotho and Azania (SA), 1780-1984, pp. 210-270.

¹²² PAC Archives, Fort Hare: The Africanist, Maseru, April 1965, p.11.

¹²³ B. Leeman: Africanist Political Movements in Lesotho and Azania, p.219.

representative in Egypt; M. Nkoana, chief representative in Lagos, Nigeria; J.D. Nyaoase, Liaison Officer of Labour in Dar-es-Salaam; L. Masimini and Ms G. Mathuthe, assistants in the Labour desk in Dar-es-Salaam, S. Ndlovu, chief representative in Botswana and was assisted by Mokone and M. Loabile; A.B. Ngcobo, Chief representative in Leopoldville, Congo; D. Ncayiyana, Chief representative in Lusaka, Zambia and R. Mkwana, chief representative in Manzini, Swaziland.¹²⁴ The Presidential Council, (as the new Committee was called), became the first formal PAC executive structure in exile. Mfafa argues that the structure was just a formality because Leballo “did things by himself with only a few handpicked individuals from the national executive”.¹²⁵ In fact, there are a number of similar positions which question and cast doubt on the legitimacy of the Presidential Council. These issues will be analysed in the next chapter.

The formation of the Presidential Council was followed by the declaration of a general statement of policy to regulate the relations between the Presidential Council and other previously existing PAC structures inside South Africa. The policy statement indicated that “the Presidential Council, acting with the powers vested in them by the Presidential Decree of the Pan Africanist Congress of South Africa and confirmed by the President Mr Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe, who is armed with the said Presidential Decree passed by the national congress of the Pan Africanist held in Orlando, Johannesburg, 19th and 20th December 1959, have conferred on them absolute power to rule, govern, direct and administer the Pan Africanist Congress of South Africa during all times the movement is banned.

3.3 Developments of Strategy Documents and Guidelines

One of the few achievements, spearheaded by members of the Presidential Council, during the formative years of the PAC in exile was the development of strategy documents and guidelines for the exiled organisations. Among the strategy documents produced by the PAC exiles in Lesotho was on “Self-reliance and the Mobilization of resources in the PAC”.¹²⁶ The document enunciated the concept of self-reliance and how it could be applied under Lesotho conditions of underground and exile. It explained self-reliance as a three-in-one principle which all PAC exiles had to follow. The document explained self-reliance as follows:

“It is the principle, a policy and a method of struggle. It is a principle because it is unchangeable under any circumstances, for example,

¹²⁴ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: ‘Background to official appointments and policy statement’, pp.3-4.

¹²⁵ K. Nyatumba: ‘AZAPO and the PAC: Revolutionary Watchdogs?’ in Glenn Moss and Ingrid Obery (eds.), *South African Review 6, From Red Friday to CODESA*, pp.24-38.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

during the liberation struggle it is applicable and after liberation it is a guiding principle in nation building".¹²⁷

The PAC, in terms of this document, was to develop its own strategies of survival in exile environment such that it did not entirely rely on foreign aid. Secondly, self-reliance was seen as a policy which might be modified depending on concrete conditions circumstantially applicable in the course of the struggle.¹²⁸ Thirdly, self-reliance was conceived of as a method to be used in the battle "*particularly when waging a people's war where survival*" literally depend on what freedom fighters did "*employing their own minds and utilizing their own hands*" in the countryside where "*they would have to survive tilling the land and living on wild fruits and other forms of sustenance from the forest*".¹²⁹ The strategy document on "Self-reliance" also introduced the concept of porojects intended to procure funds "*for a carefully designed scheme of self-reliance*".¹³⁰

An important aspect of the strategy document related to the methods to be followed in order to mobilise resources from within the PAC itself. One of these methods involved ensuring that regional heads of the PAC inside South Africa collect and audit monthly subscriptions by PAC members and a portion of the funds was sent to the headquarters in Maseru. The second approach was to set "targets of funds and resources" for each financial year. It was not deemed unreasonable, for example, "to state that PAC needs 150 million US Dollars and 100 tons of materials of all kinds every year to wage struggle".¹³¹ The principle which informed this method was that the minds of PAC members, friends and supporters needed to be conditioned to something definite and substantial. The self-reliance strategy of the PAC also talked to the importance of establishing departmental clusters which take collective responsibility in the acquisition and usage of resources. For example, the department of economic affairs, the national organiser and publicity and information were to be developed into a cluster for resource control and acquisition purposes. The document contained sound strategic proposals but the problem was that they were never implemented and there was no official mechanism or system to ensure their implementation. In other words, the strategy documents remained on paper hence the chaos which dominated the period of Leballo's leadership. At the same time there were efforts, even though limited, to implement some of the strategic proposals on self-reliance in Lesotho. This is enunciated in the section that follows.

¹²⁷ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: PAC/Tan/1/164/16: 'Self-reliance and the mobilization of resources in the PAC', n.d.p.2.

¹²⁸ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: PAC/Tan/1/164/16: 'Self-reliance and the mobilization of resources in the PAC', n.d.p.2.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ P. Mtshkulu: 'Mass Movement of the '70s and '80s and the Liberation Struggle' in Sipho Buthelezi (ed), South Africa: The Dynamics and Prospects of Transformation, 1900-1994, pp. 120-127.

¹³¹ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: PAC/Tan/1/164: Self-reliance and mobilisation of resources in the PAC, n.d. p.7.

Another policy document was known as “Guidelines on PAC cells abroad”.¹³² This document, conceptualized by PAC members in Lesotho, resulted in a set of official procedures later adopted as policy by the PAC at its new headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania after 1964. In terms of this document, PAC members in all parts of the globe, including countries neighbouring South Africa, were to organize themselves into cells consisting of not less than 10 members.¹³³ The cells were administered by a three person committee consisting of a co-ordinator w, a secretyarho acted as chairperson, a secretary and a treasurer.¹³⁴ The duties of PAC cells abroad were not dissimilar to the underground PAC cells in South Africa but only differed in terms of constitution and scope of activities. PAC cells inside South Africa tended to have more elaborated committee structures and the focus of their activities was on political mobilization and agitation.¹³⁵

On the other hand, the PAC cells abroad maintained a very slender constitution in terms of the numbers of people in each cell and the duties were focused on liaison activities with international solidarity groups, non-governmental organisations, embassies and donor organisations.¹³⁶ The cells outside South Africa were also intended to collect contributions from PAC members who were gainfully employed in the various host countries. According to the policy document, the organization intended to be self-funded through the utilization of internally generated funds and in the second instance, it also wanted to curtail dependence on donations from solidarity and support groups abroad. The extent to which the principles enshrined in these documents were translated into reality is difficult to assess, especially during the early period of exile, i.e. 1960-1962.

Mthimkhulu argues that there were limited attempts by the Lesotho group to realize the self-reliance principles of the organization. The Lesotho group started a *`courier system`* in order to link the exiles with internal underground PAC structures in order to raise funds needed to support the initiatives of the exile organization.¹³⁷ The *`courier system`* entailed the use of a PAC member/s to serve a liaison function and also to transfer messages and correspondence between Maseru and PAC underground branches in South Africa. Mr Diphu was the first

¹³² P. Mtimkhulu: ‘Mass Movement of the ‘70s and ‘80s and the Liberation Struggle’ in Siphso Buthelezi (ed), South Africa: The Dynamics and Prospects of Transformation, 1900-1994, pp. 120-127.

¹³³ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: J. Mkhwanazi: ‘Guidelines on PAC Cells Abroad’, undated.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵ P. Mtimkhulu: ‘Mass Movement of the ‘70s and ‘80s and the Liberation Struggle’ in Siphso Buthelezi (ed), South Africa: The Dynamics and Prospects of Transformation, 1900-1994, pp. 120-127.

¹³⁶ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: J. Mkhwanazi: ‘Guidelines on PAC cells abroad’ p.1.

¹³⁷ P. Mtimkhulu: ‘Mass Movement of the ‘70s and ‘80s and the Liberation Struggle’ in Siphso Buthelezi (ed), South Africa: The Dynamics and Prospects of Transformation, 1900-1994, pp. 120-127.

'courier' used by the main PAC exile communities in Lesotho to connect with underground structures in South Africa. Besides collecting money from the internal PAC structures, Diphu was used to urge PAC members in South Africa not flock into Lesotho due to logistical challenges and also the unfriendly attitude of the ruling regime there.

Some messages were written on the inside cover of his jacket and were coded in such a way that the police would find it difficult to understand, if they happened to arrest Diphu. To a limited extent the courier system helped to generate funds for the external PAC, but that was not enough to cover the cost of living in foreign lands. Diphu was later joined by Cynthia Lechaba and Patricia Lethalo as couriers, but were arrested in April 1963 at Caledon Bridge frontier. This happened following a meeting between P.K. Leballo, Z.B. Molete and a journalist. Leballo disclosed PAC plans to launch an armed offensive against the Apartheid Regime.¹³⁸

The PAC exiles in Maseru resolved to form a school for adult education as another attempt at generating funds for clandestine PAC activities in Lesotho and other parts of Africa. The school began at Seapoint (Maseru) bush with few Basotho nationals attending as students. Through BCP influence, the school grew to a point where a hall called 'Alexander Hall' was granted to exiles to conduct classes.¹³⁹ The exiles, though not funded by the Lesotho regime, were able to derive income from teaching at the school. This helped in the development of PAC infrastructure in the form of offices and covert military training of guerilla fighters in Lesotho.¹⁴⁰ The exiles eventually received funding for their initiative from the Lutheran Church in Geneva. This resulted in the purchasing of equipment for science classes and payment of salaries for teachers.¹⁴¹ In 1965 the school was recognized by the Lesotho authorities as a public school, thereby aligning its curriculum and examinations with other public schools. This later became known as Maseru Secondary Community School, specializing in adult education. It offered Mathematics, Physics, Biology, Agricultural Science and the two languages (i.e. English and SeSotho). Most teachers at the Maseru Secondary Community School were PAC exiles with a *coterie* of Basotho nationals from the BCP.

The funds generated by the school helped to support new exile arrivals and PAC militants training in Lesotho under the leadership of T.M. Ntantala who later became the Commander of APLA forces in Tanzania. Disguised as a rugby team, the forces were divided into three groups in Maseru, Butha-buthe and in Mafikeng. Other projects of a self-reliance nature bore fruit after the headquarters were moved from Maseru to dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania in 1964, thereby

¹³⁸ Tom Lodge: 'Resistance and Ideology in Settler societies', 1961-1968", pp. 179-222.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ B. Leeman, "Africanist Liberation Movement in Lesotho and Azania", p.180.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

leading to the building of a residential house and a shoe-making store.¹⁴² Attempts were also made to acquire land from Basuto Chiefs for planting food crops which helped PAC recruits who passed through Lesotho to Tanzania with accommodation and food.¹⁴³ PAC self-reliance initiatives in the areas of education and limited crop farming also solicited support from the United Nation's High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).¹⁴⁴ During this formative period in exile, PAC members in other parts of Africa and Europe engaged in various political initiatives. These uncoordinated initiatives laid the foundation for a functioning exiled liberation movement. Thus, the PAC was able to establish contact locations in London, Accra, Cairo, Francistown (Botswana), Dar-es-Salaam, Leopoldville (in Kinshasa), Algiers and Lagos in Nigeria.¹⁴⁵

In the face of hostile attitude of the Botswana government, the PAC clandestinely established itself there. It declared leading PAC officials, like Z.B. Molete, "*prohibited immigrants in Bechuanaland*" and harassed all foreigners suspected of being affiliated with the PAC.¹⁴⁶ The attitude of the Botswana government seemed to have persisted even after its independence from Britain in 1966. The PAC Chief Representative in Botswana found it difficult to operate because he was also declared a "*prohibited immigrant*".¹⁴⁷ The statement made by the PAC and published in its internal publication 'The Africanist' attests to the frustrations and difficulties the PAC had with the regime. The statement said:

"However, we wish to awaken the Bechuanaland government to the realities of Africa today. The Pan Africanist Congress has made an unequivocal declaration that there is nobody, worse of all a foreigner, who has the right to tell the African people where to go and where not to go in this continent of Africa, from Cape to Cairo, from Morocco to Malagasy".¹⁴⁸

The Botswana government was only prepared to recognize PAC exiles that had been officially granted refugee status but not willing to tolerate political activities intended to overthrow the regime in South Africa. This should be understood against the background of the relations of economic dependence on South Africa.

In Accra, the capital of Ghana, there was a group of PAC exiles led by Nana Mahomo, Raboroko and Molotsi. Other members of this group included Mampe, Siboto, Nongauza, Ndibongo and

¹⁴² PAC: Archives: PAC/Tan/1/164/16: Self-reliance and mobilization of resources in the PAC, p.3.

¹⁴³ T. Sellstrom: *Sweden and the National Liberation Movement in South Africa, Vol. 1, pp. 499-500.*

¹⁴⁴ PAC: Archives: PAC/Tan/1/164/16: Self-reliance and mobilization of resources in the PAC, p.3.

¹⁴⁵ T. Lodge: *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945*, p.306.

¹⁴⁶ PAC Archives: *The Africanist*, Maseru, 1965, p.11.

¹⁴⁷ PAC Archives: "Reviewing the State of the Party"; Undated, No author, PAC Tanzania, p.2.

¹⁴⁸ PAC Archives: *The Africanist*, Maseru, 1965, p.11.

Malomo.¹⁴⁹ Some of them had moved from Dar-es-Salaam to Accra at the beginning of 1962. It is not clear why they left Dar-es-Salaam for Accra. This group could not constitute a functioning structure because it was divided from the very outset. Ata Kgosana and Mgweba were accused by the Cairo PAC camp of disloyalty to the exile leadership of the PAC (headed by P.K. Leballo). The manner in which they left South Africa and went into exile was without instruction from the leadership of the party. In addition to that, Kgosana established personal contacts using the 'reputation' he earned when he led the marches in Cape Town in 1960. Thus when he left South Africa, he acted outside the established leadership structures of the PAC.¹⁵⁰ Hence Mahomo, Molotsi and Raboroko insisted on disciplining the two fellow exiles. This divided not only the Accra-based group of PAC exiles but the Dar-es-Salaam and Lesotho camps. As a result of this Ata Kgosana and Mgweba severed ties with the PAC and moved to Ethiopia.¹⁵¹

It could be said that from that date, Ata Kgosana, in particular, ceased to be politically active and lived the life of an independent refugee. He returned to active PAC politics during the period of Nyathi John Pokela's leadership and that of Johnson Mlambo on the eve of unbanning of liberation movements and return of exiles to South Africa in 1990. The PAC had a recognisable presence in Accra in 1962 and the attitude of the government of Ghana towards the PAC exiles was positive. This was illustrated by the fact that late in 1962, President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana:

*"...bought a Swedish freighter for the PAC and had loaded it with arms in Egypt. The ship sailed south in early 1963 to land the weapons on the Transkei coast to assist the Poqo rising. However it never arrived. Later it emerged that it had been sold. One high ranking PAC official came under suspicion, but the matter was never resolved".*¹⁵²

In Europe, the PAC commenced operations in London soon after the organization was banned in 1960. An office was opened in 1962. The London office functioned independently and sporadically in conflict with the PAC headquarters in Maseru. The tensions between the London office of the PAC and the external headquarters persisted throughout the existence of the PAC in exile.¹⁵³ The main issue was about the control and utilization of funds from the donors and solidarity groups in Britain. The UK mission only developed a fully-functioning and organized

¹⁴⁹ A.T. Kgosana: *Lest We Forget*, p.73.

¹⁵⁰ P. Mtshkulu: 'Mass Movement of the '70s and '80s and the Liberation Struggle' in Sipho Buthelezi (ed), *South Africa: The Dynamics and Prospects of Transformation, 1900-1994*, p. 145.

¹⁵¹ A.T. Kgosana: *Lest We Forget*, p.74.

¹⁵² B. Leeman: *Mail and Guardian*, 3-9 November, 2000, Harare, pp. 24-25.

¹⁵³ PAC Archives: 'London Mission Records'; in 'Reviewing the state of the Party, undated article, PAC Tanzania: The challenges with the PAC London Mission seem to have persisted to the 1980's, Cf. Minutes of the Plenary Session of the Central Committee, Dar-es-Salaam, 1982, p.12.

structure in 1977 with the appointment of Winston L. Mfusi as acting Chief Representative, reporting to the PAC headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam. Otherwise, before that date, the UK office was “*completely unco-ordinated, loosely organized and without a clear set of procedures which tallied with the Headquarters*”.¹⁵⁴

In Egypt, Algeria, Congo and Ethiopia, the PAC members operated more as individuals.¹⁵⁵ In Leopoldville (Kinshasa), the Dar-es-Salaam-based PAC leadership was only able to arrange for training of its guerillas, without much noticeable organizational presence. It could thus be argued that the PAC was an organization which was scattered all over the world and only with loose links to the center. This situation persisted up to the 1980s when desperate attempts by the PAC leadership under John Nyathi Pokela were made to develop procedures aimed at centralizing authority and activating the controlling powers of the Dar-es-Salaam-based headquarters.

One important initiative the exiled PAC became involved jointly with the ANC of South Africa, the South African Indian Congress and the South West Africa National Union (SWANU) of Namibia was the formation of the South African United Front in June 1960.¹⁵⁶ Leading members from the ANC (Oliver Tabo, ANC President), Yusuf Dadoo (President of the South African Indian Congress) and PAC leaders such as Nana Mahomo and Peter Molotsi met in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia to discuss and agree on the formation of the South African United Front in June 1960.¹⁵⁷ While it could not be disputed that the formation of the front of liberation movements from South Africa and Namibia occurred as a result of the insistence of African leaders like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, the liberation movements themselves foresaw tactical gains accruing from the initiative.¹⁵⁸ Thus, the South African United Front was formed in June 1960 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. While the South West African People Organisation (SWAPO) joined in January 1961 as a member of the co-ordinating body, it never participated actively and withdrew some months later.¹⁵⁹ The aims of the Front of Liberation Movements were to “*effectively isolate the*

¹⁵⁴ B. Leeman: Mail and Guardian, 3-9 November, 2000, Harare, pp. 24-25.

¹⁵⁵ P. Mtshkulu: ‘Mass Movement of the ‘70s and ‘80s and the Liberation Struggle’ in Sipho Buthelezi (ed), South Africa: The Dynamics and Prospects of Transformation, 1900-1994, p. 145.

¹⁵⁶ Tor Sellstrom: Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa, Vol.2, Solidarity and assistance, 1970-1994. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala, 2002, p.499.

¹⁵⁷ ANC (SA): ‘Statement of the African National Congress of South Africa on the question of unity with the Pan Africanist Congress, 31st Meeting of the Organisation of African Unity, Dar-es-Salaam, June 1978, p.13.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Tor Sellstrom: Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa, p. 499.

murderous regime of South Africa” and to project to the international community “*a united voice of all political opponents of Apartheid, irrespective of political affiliation*”.¹⁶⁰

From the very outset hostilities between the ANC and PAC surfaced. The PAC’s membership in the Front was an uncomfortable one, accusing the ANC of dominating the structure.¹⁶¹ At the June 1960 meeting of liberation movements held in Addis Ababa, it was unanimously agreed that the ANC should as a senior organization, lead the Front.¹⁶² Even if it was the case, challenges of ideology and power would obviously have cropped up. Sellstrom concurs that besides the issue of ANC ‘dominance’ in the structure, questions of an ideological nature arose. “PAC criticism was based on the same arguments that originally led to the breakaway, i.e. that the ANC was dominated by white communists and that it saw the struggle in class terms, not as a national struggle with the objective “Africa for Africans”.¹⁶³ The PAC thus raised questions about the ideological orientation of the Front which was dominated and led by the ANC. From the perspective of the ANC, the formation of the South African United Front (SAUF) was “*an historic step whose significance was hailed by all oppressed people of South Africa, Namibia and the progressive world*”.¹⁶⁴ On the other hand, the Front evoked fears and panic on the part of the Apartheid Regime and its allies. They could not disguise bitter fears of isolation through the worldwide impact of the United Front and the struggle of people at home. Panic measures were adopted, including a hurried knocking together of a South African Foundation which undertook to parry the impending isolation.¹⁶⁵

Rivalries between the ANC and the PAC rendered the South African United Front a short-lived initiative. “After a public attack in February 1962 by the PAC on the ANC at a conference in Addis Ababa – attended by Nelson Mandela – the SAUF collapsed. It was formally disbanded by the member organisations at a meeting in London the following month. From then on, the ANC and PAC embarked on separate and essentially antagonistic courses”.¹⁶⁶ Differing views abound about the failure of this initiative. One view is that the Front would not have worked given the personality and leadership style of P.K. Leballo who later became the Chairman of the PAC. In most instances he took critical organizational decisions alone and would influence and

¹⁶⁰ ANC (SA): Statement of the African National Congress of South Africa on the question of unity with the Pan Africanist Congress, p. 14.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² ANC Archives, Fort Hare: Statement of the African National Congress of South Africa on the question of unity with the Pan Africanist Congress, p. 14; ANC Archives, Fort Hare: The Pan Africanist Congress of South Africa; whom does it serve?, Morogoro, Tanzania, undated, p. 6.

¹⁶³ Tor Sellstrom: Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa, p. 499.

¹⁶⁴ ANC Archives, Fort Hare: Statement of the African National Congress of South Africa on the question of unity with the Pan Africanist Congress, p.14.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Tor Sellstrom: Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa, p. 499.

few people who he knew would obviously tow his line.¹⁶⁷ This corroborates J. Bolnick's description of the character and personality of Leballo, who he described as "controversial, *"an intelligent fabricator of information"* and *"a mesmerizing orator"* who skillfully concentrated powers in the PAC around himself.¹⁶⁸

Another narrative is that the PAC was compelled to walk out of the Front because it was being engulfed by the ANC.¹⁶⁹ It could not continue with its membership without losing face as an independent organization. The SAUF thus collapsed but during the short period of its existence, the PAC was able to derive few benefits from the international community. In October 1960, "only four months after the formation of the SAUF" Mahomo paid a visit to Sweden and addressed the Social Democratic Laboremus association in Uppsala, together with Oliver Tambo of the ANC and Jariretunda Kozonguizi of SWAPO. On that occasion, Mahomo established relations with the newly formed South African Committee (SAC) in Sweden and later with the Social Democratic Party".¹⁷⁰

It was through these connections that Mahomo, in 1963, was able to raise 100 Pounds Sterling from the Metalworkers Union of Sweden. The PAC was given the donation to help them *"meet the immediate needs of refugees"* and the same Union agreed to purchase a Land Rover "and ship it to the movement in Dar-es-Salaam".¹⁷¹ The donation from the Swedish trade Union was among the first donations received by the PAC from support organisations abroad. It went as far as providing basic needs for PAC exiles in Lesotho and Tanzania. The support received by the PAC from Sweden was, *"a once-off affair"* as it was never repeated despite numerous official representations by the PAC to request Swedish financial aid.¹⁷² The divisions and internal conflicts within the PAC detracted the Swedish from lending any further assistance to the organization.

3.4 The Manifesto as official Policy Document

A product of A.P. Mda and R.M. Sobukwe's endeavours, the Pan Africanist Manifesto was broadly formulated and could be interpreted in various ways. It delves on historical relations

¹⁶⁷ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: Letter from J.W. Ames to Nana Mahomo, Stockholm, January 1963; T. Sellstrom: Sweden and the National Liberation Movement in South Africa, Vol. 1, pp. 499-500.

¹⁶⁸ T. Sellstrom: Sweden and the National Liberation Movement in South Africa, Vol. 1, pp. 499-500.

¹⁶⁹ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: Letter from J.W. Ames to Nana Mahomo, Stockholm, January 1963; T. Sellstrom: Sweden and the National Liberation Movement in South Africa, Vol.1, pp. 499-500.

¹⁷⁰ T. Sellstrom: Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa, Vol.1, p. 157.

¹⁷¹ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: Letter from J.W. Ames to Nana Mahomo, Stockholm, January 1963; T. Sellstrom: Sweden and the National Liberation Movement in South Africa, Vol.1, pp. 499-500.

¹⁷² T. Sellstrom: Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa, Vol.2, p. 500.

between Africa and Europe, focusing mainly on imperialism, colonization, de-colonisation and independence in various parts of Africa. It provides a theoretical framework linking the conditions of oppression and exploitation in South Africa, with global socio-economic and political forces. Furthermore, it describes the situation in South Africa and portrays a picture of a racially polarized country, riddled with irreconcilable contradictions mainly between Blacks and Whites. Pan Africanist terminology such as “the white exploiters” and “African exploited”, “the foreign oppressor” and the “indigenous oppressed” appear frequently throughout the Manifesto.¹⁷³ The Manifesto describes Africans as “subject peoples who are criminally oppressed, ruthlessly exploited and inhumanly degraded” and their interests are depicted as “*in sharp conflict and in pointed contradiction with those of the White ruling class*”.¹⁷⁴ The Manifesto posits the final triumph of Africans over white domination in “the militant progressive forces of African nationalism” which are “bound to crush the reactionary forces of white domination”.¹⁷⁵

The Manifesto covered one crucial matter entailing PAC position on the issue of race as well as the “*historic task*” of the organization. On race, the Manifesto stated that:

*“African people are very much proud of their race – the human face. They recognize no inescapable fundamental differences among members of the three main branches of that race: the Caucasoids, Mongoloids and Afrinoids”.*¹⁷⁶

The PAC, in terms of this view, regarded itself as a non-racial movement, though it did not have whites as members of the organization. In its view, multi-racialism, which was what the ANC and Congress alliance were associated with, was “*racialism multiplied*”.¹⁷⁷

The Africanist position in the question of race was summed up in Sobukwe’s inaugural address. He stated that “in Africa the myth of race has been propounded and propagated by imperialists and colonialists from Europe, in order to facilitate and justify their inhuman exploitation of the indigenous people of the land. It is from this myth of race with its attendant claims of cultural superiority that the doctrine of white supremacy stems”.¹⁷⁸

Sobukwe’s emphasis on the oneness of mankind characterized the humanitarian aspect of South Africa’s Pan Africanism. His inaugural address at the launch of the PAC provided a body

¹⁷³ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: Letter from J.W. Ames to Nana Mahomo, Stockholm, January 1963; T. Sellstrom: Sweden and the National Liberation Movement in South Africa, Vol.1, pp. 499-500.

¹⁷⁴ Pan Africanist Congress of Azania: Pan Africanist Manifesto, in Speeches of Mangaliso Sobukwe, 1949-1959, p. 69

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁶ PAC: Pan Africanist Manifesto, in Speeches of Mangaliso Sobukwe, 1949-1959, p.71.

¹⁷⁷ R.M. Sobukwe: Opening Address – PAC Inaugural Conference, 1959, in Speeches of Mangaliso Sobukwe, 1949-1959, pp. 30-31.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

of thought which constituted the fundamental character of the ideology of the PAC. These ideas were further inscribed in the PAC Manifesto. The events which followed after the Sharpsville massacre and the incidence of 'Poqo', in particular, which resulted in the murder of white civilians and children, undermined the humanitarian expressions of the PAC's Manifesto.¹⁷⁹ As a result, the organization was faced with a challenge to prove in practical terms that it was not a 'racist' movement and that it had room for all South Africans "at the rendezvous of victory".¹⁸⁰ The Africanist outlook of the PAC as outlined in the Manifesto was not formulated in line with any broad strategy. Its theory of non-racialism was not matched by practice because the organization did not have white members, with the exception of Patrick Duncan, who joined the exile PAC in 1963. In addition to this, its avowed militancy alienated not only white South Africans, but the whole white world. Hence, the PAC did not enjoy the same financial support from the international community, as the ANC did.¹⁸¹

The Disciplinary Code was a statement of the code of conduct for PAC members. It was more specific and outlined policies and procedures to be followed to ensure order and discipline within the organization. Paradoxically, it provided the opportunity for leadership autocracy and abuse of power. Autocratic powers which the PAC acting President, Mr Potlake Leballo invoked in exile were in line with what the Disciplinary Code stipulated. It sought to ensure disciplined and co-ordinated goal-directed activity within the PAC. The Code was to be administered by a Disciplinary Tribunal of Justice which consisted of three members appointed by the National Executive Committee.

The task of enforcing the provisions of the Disciplinary Code fell on the Tribunal of Justice. Expression of ideas, spreading of ideas or release of certain information, especially to the media, acquisition of knowledge, personal habits and relations with other liberation movements were all to be governed by the Disciplinary Code. The last two sections of the Code related to "*Democratic Centralism*" and "*factionalism*". They were problematic in the sense that, they provided a loop-hole for the abuse of power. As a result the leadership invoked disciplinary procedures to deal with political power contestations and ideological dissent in the period 1962-1979. "*Democratic centralism*" was defined as follows:

"that the power of directing the Pan Africanist Congress is centralized in the National Executive Committee which acts through the President who wields unquestioned power as long as he acts within the grounds laid down by the decisions of the organization"

¹⁷⁹ T. Sellstrom: Sweden and the National Liberation Movement in South Africa, Vol.1, pp. 499-500.

¹⁸⁰ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: Letter from J.W. Ames to Nana Mahomo, Stockholm, January 1963.

¹⁸¹ H. Barrel: The Outlawed South African Liberation Movements, pp. 52-93.

*which must have been democratically arrived at. The President shall have emergency powers, which he may delegate, to suspend the entire Constitution of the Pan Africanist Congress so as to ensure that the movement emerges intact through a crisis. At that time he directs the Movement by decree, and is answerable for his action to the National Conference".*¹⁸²

The definition of crisis is not explicit in the Constitution. It could thus be argued that this clause was invoked rather opportunistically by the PAC leadership as a convenience to execute dictatorial and corrupt agendas.

On "*factionalism*" the Code stipulated that:

*"Where normal processes of free discussion fail to curb factional tendencies, then firm iron discipline should come into play, and factional elements, no matter how important, should be chopped off without ceremony".*¹⁸³

This was practiced frequently by the embattled PAC leadership, for the duration of conflictual epochs. The PAC Oath of Allegiance was a sworn statement which PAC members had to sign. It is not clear whether it was indeed sworn by all PAC members but the 'old guard' who joined in 1959 and 1960 before the organization was banned had to take an oath before joining the organization. Point 2 of the Oath stated that:

*"I will irrevocably obey and act upon the orders, commands, instructions and directions of the N.E.C. of the Pan Africanist Congress" and point 5 stated that "I accept the leadership of the Pan Africanist Congress. Should I fail to honour this Oath, I will accept death as Punishment."*¹⁸⁴

Unfortunately the PAC Constitution, before it was amended after the unbanning of the PAC, did not make the necessary provisions to guard against possible abuse of the Disciplinary Code and Oath of Allegiance. The Constitution dealt more with the structure of the organization, financial management and the levels of authority within the PAC bureaucracy. From the day the PAC was founded, there was a passionate pledge by its founders to, among other things, "*unite and rally the African people into one national front on the basis of African nationalism*", overthrow "*white, racist, settler colonial domination*" in order to establish and maintain "*the right of self-determination of African people for a unitary, non-racial democracy*".¹⁸⁵ According to Peter Raboroko (a member of the PAC), the ruling National Party, described the formation of the PAC as "*a hot-bed of the most dangerous and poisonous agitators in the country*".¹⁸⁶ To the Africanist,

¹⁸² Pan Africanist Congress: Disciplinary Code, in Speeches of Mangaliso Sobukwe. 1949-1959, p. 91.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ "The Pan Africanist Oath of Allegiance" in T.G. Karis, G.M. Carter and G.M. Gerhart, (eds): From Protest to Challenge, Vol.3 p. 537.

¹⁸⁵ Pan Africanist Congress: Constitution, p.2.

¹⁸⁶ P.N. Raboroko: Congress and the Africanists: The Africanist Case, p. 27.

this meant that they were noted by the Apartheid regime as a threat and were therefore more dangerous than the ANC.

An unfolding programme of action which would lead to '*total independence*' in 1963, decided at the All-African People's Congress in Ghana in 1958, was launched by the PAC and this resulted in the banishment of the organization and exile.¹⁸⁷ Arguably, it put the PAC and the South African struggle for liberation on the map of world politics. The activities of the PAC, during the short period of legal existence inside the country, especially the anti-pass campaign of 1960, led to the banishment of the PAC. The "Positive Action Campaign" of 21 March, 1960 which culminated in the Sharpeville massacre and the incidence of Poqo in 1961 were interrelated events. The former led to the banishment of the PAC hence the road to exile and the latter signaled the manifestations of underground PAC activity inside the country.

3.5 Conditions inside the Camps

An analysis of conditions inside PAC camps is important in that it offers a magnifying glass through which the exile experience of ordinary members of the organization could be viewed. The PAC had camps in various parts of Southern Africa, the most notable of which were in Maseru (Lesotho), Tanzania, Botswana and in Leopoldville, (Kinshasa in Zaire).¹⁸⁸ The Botswana camp was in fact a refugee camp, called Dukwe, about 130 km north-west of Francistown. The camp accommodated members of the ANC, PAC, South African Youth Revolutionary Council (SAYRCO) which was formed by Tsietsi Mashinini, the leader of the 1976 June 16 Soweto Uprisings, and a few members of ZAPU and ZANU. It was established in 1980 on the insistence of the Botswana government, under pressure from the Apartheid Regime to get rid of '*terrorists*' from within its borders, that all members of liberation movements not attending school and unemployed be moved to Dukwe.¹⁸⁹ The camp had previously accommodated Zimbabwean freedom fighters who were *en route* home in preparation for independence.

In the Chunya bush camp in Tanzania, residents complained of being ill-fed, loneliness, poor training facilities and worst of all, rotting in the camp without a program of action.¹⁹⁰ This led to a plethora of PAC cadres who had learnt to speak the local Swahili language to disappear to mingle with Tanzanian nationals for better livelihood. With the PAC embroiled in leadership wrangles and internal conflicts, no significant attention was given to expanding the Chunya

¹⁸⁷ B. Leeman: Lesotho and the Struggle for Azania, pp. 98-99.

¹⁸⁸ T. Lodge: Black Politics in South Africa since 1940, pp. 311-317.

¹⁸⁹ L. Mphahlele: Child of this Soil: My life as a freedom fighter, pp. 62-65.

¹⁹⁰ T. Lodge: Black Politics in South Africa since 1940, pp. 311-317.

bush camp into a significant military camp. The cadre population in this camp varied from time to time. It is estimated that at no single time did this camp accommodate more than a hundred PAC militants.¹⁹¹ Continuously aware of the temporary nature of the settlement and also the importance of secrecy, given the political conditions of Southern Africa as a whole, the residents of Chunya bush camp never established an organized community life. It could be argued that one of the reasons why early PAC camps never developed into full-scale settlements is that *“once a person establishes himself, he develops roots and this retards the home-going process”*.¹⁹² This could be the rationale behind the PAC leadership’s reluctance to fund development of infrastructure in this camp.

In the early 1970s the PAC developed camps such as Itumbi camp at Mbeya and Mgagao camp at Iringa in Tanzania. They were also small-scale PAC military settlements and could not develop any further than the Chunya bush camp. The Mgagao camp was slightly better than Chunya and Itumbi in terms of infrastructure and facilities. The small groups of cadres in these camps (between sixty to one hundred) changed constantly as recruits came and went for military training in other countries inside and outside Africa. In other words, the PAC camps were temporary in nature and the demands for secrecy made it difficult to record their composition and growth. Documentary sources therefore have scanty information in this regard. Compared to Itumbi in particular, Mgagao “was a city”.¹⁹³ Conditions at Itumbi camp in Mbeya, were extremely bad. As Mphahlele explains,

“Humans survived in Mbeya but the story was different for some animals. No matter how healthy dogs and domestic pigs were when they arrived, they would get sick and die within weeks. The dogs wailed hauntingly, as if communicating some evil message, before they die. But the dog loving cadres never tired of bringing the pet to the camp and to their miserable end. Only wild pigs thrived in this wild place”.¹⁹⁴

The camp was situated in the forest and consisted of a double-storey red-brick structure. The red-brick building was commonly known among the residents of the camp as ‘*Carlton Centre*’ named in memory of the Carlton Center in Johannesburg, South Africa.¹⁹⁵ Apart from the Carlton Center, there were leaders’ quarters called Shangai, on the edge of the forest about 200 meters from the Carlton Center. The leader’s quarters was used by the camp commander and his juniors in the army. Member of the Central Committee who visited the camp also stayed in

¹⁹¹ APLA Notes: Pretoria, 21 December 2002.

¹⁹² PAC Archives: PAC Transit Center Tanzania, 1982, p.3.

¹⁹³ L. Mphahlele: *Child of this Soil – My Life as Freedom Fighter*, 2002, p.100.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁵ APLA Notes: 21 December 2002, Pretoria.

Shangai.¹⁹⁶ There was also a kitchen separated from the Carlton Center by a water tap. A few steps from the fowl run stood what was called the 'Historic Tree' under which held meetings were held cadres learnt many disciplines.¹⁹⁷

It could be stated that a "*class differentiation*" of some kind existed within this camp in that some residents accommodated in the leadership block called Shangai, "*were better off*" compared to the rest of cadres in the camp. They always had better access to limited camp facilities and were hardly "cash strapped".¹⁹⁸ On the contrary, Mphahlele who also lived in this camp in the early 1980s painted a rather romantic picture in that:

*"There was no noticeable difference between the Shangai residents and the rest of us. We ate from the same pot, sometimes from the same dish with them. The cooking roster roped everyone in, including members of the High Command".*¹⁹⁹

At Mgagao camp conditions were better. The camp consisted of six spacious dormitories, a large administration complex, a big kitchen, storeroom, a shelter for firewood, flush toilets and showers (even though for most of the time, the toilets and showers were out of order).²⁰⁰ In this particular camp, discipline was strictly enforced. Previous incidents involving the murder of MPLA and ZANU cadres by the neighbouring villagers from the Wahehe tribe had taught members of the liberation movements a couple of lessons. These included controlling movements by cadres from the camps to the surrounding villages. This caused unhappiness among cadres in this camp because it meant that they were denied the chance of mingling with Tanzania nationals, especially local girls "*some of whom held South African guys in the highest esteem*".²⁰¹ Most PAC cadres who lived in Mgagao camp regarded it as resembling concentration camp, prison or solitary confinement".²⁰² The cadres continued to sneak out into the village, bought home-made beer and brought it to the camp. They also objected to decrees forbidding them from going to the villages, until they were revoked. Cadres were allowed to go to the villages only over week-ends. This resulted in disciplinary challenges with corporal punishment becoming rife. In fact, corporal punishment was used in all PAC camps and was among some of the issues which widened the rift between the leadership and the soldiers on the camps. The cadres felt that corporal punishment was arbitrarily applied and the "*favoured*

¹⁹⁶ L. Mphahlele: *Child of this Soil – My Life as Freedom Fighter*, p.92.

¹⁹⁷ L. Mphahlele: *Child of this Soil – My Life as Freedom Fighter*, p.92.

¹⁹⁸ T. Lodge: *Black Politics in South Africa since 1940*, pp. 311-317.

¹⁹⁹ L. Mphahlele: *Child of this Soil – My Life as Freedom Fighter*, p. 92.

²⁰⁰ T. Lodge: *Black Politics in South Africa since 1940*, pp. 311-317.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² L. Mphahlele: *Child of this Soil – My Life as Freedom Fighter*, p. 101.

few were absolved from it".²⁰³ In most instances the "*favoured few*" were defined along tribal lines.

Crop farming was doing well in Mgagoa camp. Mphahlele observed:

*"the garden thrived. We had abnormally large cabbages, beetroots, onions and carrots. The vast shamba, the ploughing field, was green with maize. We ploughed with a tractor, so our toughest manual work was weeding the fields. We called maize fields 'nguvu kazi' – Swahili for hard work. We reared a flock of pigs and slaughtered them for meat. Yugoslavia also sent us a large quantity of tinned food that drastically changed our diet. We shipped bags of cabbage to Iringa town to sell. We were already anticipating a time not far off when we would be liberated from handouts from OAU's Liberation Committee".*²⁰⁴

The most notable PAC camp was in Masuguru, in the Bagomoyo district of Tanzania. This camp is sometimes referred to as the 'Ruvu' settlement. The precarious conditions and transient nature, the limited size of the population of these three early PAC camps, as well as the range of activities and attention received from the donor community, was negligible compared to the Ruvu camp. The Ruvu camp was the first-well established and stable PAC settlement in exile. Hence in this chapter, Ruvu camp is explored as a case study to portray the internal conditions, the nature of life in the camps and relations among the inhabitants in order to explain the generation of strained intra-PAC relations during the period of exile. The Ruvu camp was started as a transit and rehabilitation camp in 1978, along similar lines as other PAC camps. Recruits from South Africa resided there in transit either to military training or education abroad. The Ruvu camp was initially established to serve as a "*rehabilitation camp*" similar to the ANC's Quatro camp in Angola, where the so-called enemy agents and comrades who had committed serious 'offences' and breaches of discipline, were "*re-educated*".²⁰⁵

With the demise of P.K. Leballo's leadership and the assumption of power by Maake and later Pokela, the development and purpose of the camp was redefined along the lines of the ANC's Mazimbu settlement near Morogoro and the Dakawa camp, 55 km north of Morogoro in Tanzania. The two ANC settlements were aimed at establishing a stable ANC exile community in Tanzania. They were both aimed at developing human resources for a future non-racial South Africa. Education was at the core of the Mazimbu camp which led to the establishment of the famous Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College.²⁰⁶ Ultimately the Ruvu camp grew into a

²⁰³ T. Lodge: *Black Politics in South Africa since 1940*, pp. 311-317.

²⁰⁴ L. Mphahlele: *Child of this Soil – My Life as Freedom Fighter*, p.102.

²⁰⁵ M. Twala and E.D. Benard: *Mbokodo; Inside MK: Mwezi Twala-A-Soldier's Story*, p.40.

²⁰⁶ B.B. Maaba: 'The Social Life of Students of Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College, 1978 to 1992', pp. 1-36.

settlement for PAC cadres who had families living with them. In other words, the settlement resembled efforts of the PAC to “*create a fuller human life*” for all members in exile, especially families, children and women.²⁰⁷

Exiles in this camp were taught technical skills previously denied to them in South Africa. These entailed skills in poultry, carpentry, sanitary engineering, plumbing, piggery, motor mechanics, electrification, etc.²⁰⁸ The Ruvu settlement started in 1978 and assumed an elaborate form in 1982 when the Tanzania government granted 440 hectares of land to the PAC.²⁰⁹ The aim was to help the organization to establish a settlement for “self-reliance and other developmental activities”.²¹⁰ As already indicated, the establishment of the Ruvu camp was a response by the exiled PAC to the 1976 June 16 uprisings. It was initially conceived by Leballo as similar to the ANC’s ‘June 16 Detachment’ which was initially based in the Novo Catengue camp in Benguela Province in Angola in 1978 and later moved to Fezenda situated further north across the Rio Donge in Angola.²¹¹ Initially the Ruvu camp was a small refugee camp for PAC members who fled the repression of the Apartheid Regime following to Soweto uprisings in 1976. It accommodated new recruits who were awaiting military training. It was referred to as a ‘*transit camp*’.²¹² From 1982 the camp was remodeled along similar lines as the ANC settlements in Mazimbu and Dakawa. Both accommodated the June 16 generation of exiles from South Africa. The initial population at the Ruvu camp counted 52 and increased by the end of February 1979, to more than 100 persons. By 1982 the figure had risen to close a thousand people. The population in Ruvu was small compared to both the Dakawa and Mazimbu settlements. Dakawa’s resident population in the late 1980’s was about 5,000 people whereas Mazimbu had a population of roughly 3,200 people.²¹³ A detailed analysis of the development of these two ANC settlements gives the impression that the ANC settlement projects were more robust both in terms of scale and organization than the PAC camps.

Accommodation in the PAC’s Ruvu camp consisted of dormitories which were later upgraded into houses. Each house consisted of five bedrooms and a separate communal dining hall with kitchen and were built as the settlement grew early in 1982. By 1984 about 67 houses were

²⁰⁷ PAC Archives: ‘Message from the Chairman of the PAC – Johnson Mlambo’, no date.

²⁰⁸ PAC Archives: ‘Short Memorandum on Manpower requirements for Masuguru/Kitonga (Ruvu), Tanzania, 3 November 1986.

²⁰⁹ PAC Archives: United Nations: ‘Women and Children Under Apartheid’, Special Committee against Apartheid: Mission to Angola, Zambia and Tanzania, 3-17 April 1985, p.5.

²¹⁰ PAC Archives: ‘A short Memorandum on Manpower requirements for Masuguru/Kitonga (Ruvu), 3 November, 1986.

²¹¹ M. Twala and E.D. Benard: Mbokodo: Inside MK: Mwezi Twala – A Soldier’s Story, 1994, p.42.

²¹² PAC Archives: ‘PAC Transit Center, Tanzania’, undated.

²¹³ Sean Morrow: Dakawa Development Center, pp. 499-501.

constructed on the site.²¹⁴ From 1982, the scope of activities at the camp developed beyond the provision of a sanctuary for activists, to the establishment of a self-sufficient community with a clinic, classrooms, mechanical and agricultural training centers where PAC members could acquire skills to be beneficial to the “liberated Azania of the future”.²¹⁵

Phase one of this settlement was built in 1978, entailing construction of 67 houses, a separate dining hall, kitchen and toilets, an administration block, one classroom and library, a store, roads and paths, water pumps, boundary fences and gates.²¹⁶ This was built on the initial land assigned by the Tanzanian government. Phase one consisted of one cement house, and one brick house as well as three smaller houses, one large brick building and two other uncompleted buildings, in which 67 PAC cadres were accommodated.²¹⁷ Support for the initial development of phase one of the settlement was received from various governments as well as non-governmental organisations.

The government of the Netherlands made a financial contribution to the costs of repairing the existing facilities and also contributed part of the finance for the construction of the first 67 houses. Similarly the government of Norway made a contribution in this regard. The Tanzanian Christian Refugee Service also made a financial contribution towards the purchase of clothes for the young men at the settlement, and also purchased urgently needed medical supplies.²¹⁸ In addition to these financial contributions, United Nations agencies such as the United Nations Development Program and United Nations High Commission for Refugees donated US \$233 000 and US \$350 000 respectively.²¹⁹

During the initial stages of the start-up of the settlement, significant proportions of donor funding were spent on attempts to defray the costs incurred in the maintenance of the centre. “Apart from the purchase of the furniture and cooking utensils” weekly costs were incurred to purchase food and fuel.²²⁰ Because the camp was situated approximately 170km from Dar-es-Salaam, along a very rough road, transport to and from the camp had to be provided and this increased the costs of maintaining the camp. Hence the weekly costs of administration and

²¹⁴ PAC Archives: ‘PAC Transit Center, Tanzania’, undated, pp. 1-10.

²¹⁵ PAC Archives: ‘PAC Transit Center, Tanzania’, undated, pp. 1-10.

²¹⁶ PAC Archives: Culham and Hunters (Charter Quantity Surveyors): ‘Transit and Rehabilitation Center, Bagomoyo district, Approximate Estimate No. 2’, October, 1978, p.1.

²¹⁷ PAC Archives: ‘PAC Transit Center, Tanzania’, undated, p.1.

²¹⁸ PAC Archives: Culham and Hunters (Charter Quantity Surveyors): ‘Transit and Rehabilitation Center, Bagomoyo district, Approximate Estimate No. 2’, October, 1978, p.1.

²¹⁹ PAC Archives: ‘PAC Transit Center, Tanzania’, undated, p.1.

²²⁰ Ibid, p.6.

maintenance were estimated to be around US \$2000, excluding the costs of medication, laundry and other incidental costs.

The master plan for the development of the Ruvu camp into a settlement involved the construction of a full-scale village within the settlement area, with accommodation for families and single persons. By 1985, approximately 1 500 people were accommodated in the settlement. A pre-school and a pre-vocational school, a dispensary and a community centre were developed during this period. Most importantly, the settlement had farm-land to ensure self-sufficiency in food production. Over 55 hectares of land had to be cleared of bushes before it was used for farming. During the initial period, there were difficulties with crop farming. Most of the PAC families and cadres in the settlement came from the townships of South Africa. They were not skilled enough to take advantage of the fertile land and use it for growing crops in the settlement area. They devoted their time to political issues and factional conflicts which tended to divide them according to regions from where they came in South Africa. Skills in agriculture were progressively developed among camp residents. Various agricultural training courses were organized by the PAC's Department of Education and Manpower development in order to equip its membership with agricultural skills.

The Ruvu settlement later developed into a full-scale settlement and a home of PAC members in exile. It provided a stable environment for children and women of the PAC. The "*habit of infiltrating babies back home*", prevalent among PAC exiles, stopped as the settlement became more homely and its facilities expanded and improved.²²¹ In other words, the habit of 'smuggling' children born in exile into South Africa was curbed. The settlement became an important source of income to the PAC and contributed towards lowering the costs of feeding the cadres. Between the years 1986 and 1988, for instance, enormous quantities of paddy rice, maize, sorghum, cowpea and fruit such as pineapple and pawpaw were produced from the settlement.²²²

The farming settlement also raised 1200 broilers and 12 beef cattle. Crop production in the settlement was made possible largely through irrigation schemes. The Ruvu river which supplied water to the city of Dar-es-Salaam, Bagomoyo and other towns in Tanzania, passed through the settlement, thereby making irrigation possible. In this way the settlement helped the PAC not to depend entirely on material handouts from international donors, especially on items such as food. The settlement continued to exist until 1993 when most of the assets were

²²¹ PAC Archives: Minutes of the Plenary Session of Central Committee Meeting at External Head Quarters, Dar-es-Salaam, December, 1-7, 1982, p. 16.

²²² PAC Archives: 'Memorandum – Ruvu Settlement', 3rd November 1986. This document details the quantities produced during this period.

sold and the residents of the settlement were relocated to South Africa in preparation for the April 1994 elections.

Poor production after 1988 determined continued PAC appeal to donors for funds to buy food for the residents. As a result of food shortages, diseases related to malnutrition, e.g. tuberculosis, diarrhoea, dysentris and helminthiasis, were common among residents. Between 1988 and 1990, the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) estimated an infant mortality rate of 121 (which was over 50%) for the area of the settlement including the neighbourhood Pivani region.²²³ This led to the development of an extensive medical facility within the settlement. It provided basic health services not only for inmates but also for a population over 10,000 people living in the neighbouring villages of Kidogozero, Kitonga, Milo and Mbwawa.²²⁴ With the development of agricultural and medical facilities in the Ruvu settlement, the following institutions and governments played a major role: the United Nation's Development Program which helped with agricultural lessons and donated funds for food; the United Nation's High Commission for Refugees supported with agricultural equipment, donated funds for the building of a workshop, garage, clearing of bushes and fencing; the Tanzanian Relief Services helped with the installation of a water system; the Tanzania government provided funds for road maintenance; the government of Norway provided funds for the construction of a 14km feeder road to the camp; the government of Nigeria provided funds for a health center and the government of the Netherlands funded the construction of an agricultural workshop.²²⁵

The PAC Women's section played a pivotal role in the development of the Ruvu settlement during the period after 1988. This time the Women's section had been granted the status of full department within the PAC and had budget of its own. The department took the initiative and responsibility for the construction of a Children's Home which houses more than 30 children of up to the ages of seven years in 1988. The children's home took full responsibility for all aspects of the children's lives including their feeding, clothing, education and shelter, while at the same time allowing full latitude for a healthy child-parent relationship. The women's section was also instrumental in moving the PAC Tailoring Unit from Dar-es-Salaam to the Ruvu settlement in Bagomoyo. The unit made clothes for members of the PAC and sold some of them on the market in order to raise funds for the activities of Women's section.²²⁶

²²³ PAC Archives: 'Message from the Chairman of the PAC, 1988', p.10.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, p.11.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*

The general programme of routine activities in the settlement consisted of the following: (i) Breakfast from 7 a.m. to 8 a.m., (ii) Ideological Studies from 8 a.m. to 9 a.m., which involved a series of lectures of Pan Africanism, Maoism, the formation of the PAC and the life and contributions of Mangaliso Sobukwe, the founding President of the PAC, to the liberation struggle in South Africa and from 9 a.m. to 12.30 a.m., residents would be engaged in various chores. Some would do gardening, fishing, carpentry and painting. Lunch was from 12:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. It usually consisted of rice/pap, vegetables and sometimes meat, if available. From 1:30 p.m. to 4 p.m. was the time for rest and recreation, and from 4 p.m. to 5 p.m. was the time for reading current events by someone who was responsible for the radio on a particular day and the analysis and discussion of these events would follow. From 6:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. was supper time which was usually the same as lunch. The early evening program, beginning at 7:30 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. was the cultural hour. New revolutionary songs would be composed and practiced and would be recorded for radio broadcast. Poems would also be practiced and a mood of free exchange and creativity was characteristic of this session which usually extended beyond 8:30 p.m. to about midnight.²²⁷

Plans for the further development of the settlement had already been made during the period of Johnson Mlambo. A rudimentary sewing industry started by the PAC Women's section in 1983, with five sewing machines, one table, a chair and a small bank was upgraded into a PAC garment factory in 1985 and was financed by the United Nations Development Program.²²⁸ The skills base at the Ruvu settlement was further developed with the arrival of 422 PAC exiles, removed from Lesotho in 1985. Besides the deteriorating relations between the Lesotho government and the PAC, the need to move recruits from the Lesotho PAC camps was also propelled by the fact that at the Ruvu camp, there was a lack of enthusiasm among the cadship towards manual work, especially, agricultural activities and gardening. This affected food production negatively, which was among the basic reasons behind the establishment of the camp.²²⁹

During the initial phase of settlement (1979-1982), its living conditions "would only do a disservice to animals".²³⁰ Overcrowding was frequent as the houses in the settlement were still under construction. Besides that, cadres from other PAC settlements would normally flock to the Ruvu camp especially over weekends, to visit their "*home boys and girls and sometimes they*

²²⁷ PAC Archives: 'PAC Transit Center, Tanzania' undated. P.2.

²²⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 1-3.

²²⁹ L. Doyal and I. Pennell: 'The Political Economy of Health', in C.G. Oliver (ed): 'Poverty, Health and Health Care in South Africa' in Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development in Southern Africa, London, 1979, p.3.

²³⁰ *Ibid*.

would throw wild parties in the camp".²³¹ Very often, children cut their feet on rusty tins and some received severe burns which became septic, after playing in small spaces near fire buckets. Gora Ebrahim appealed to the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid Mission to Angola, Zambia and Tanzania in April 1985 on the basis that there was '*need for a bigger place to stay, live and work*' for the women and children in the Ruvu camp.²³² In the small children's house, there were no chairs and they sat on blankets on the ground. Without a water pump for the settlement, it meant that residents depended on unpurified water which was drawn directly from the Ruvu River without being reticulated. "*The toilets were too near to the houses thus causing flies and malodours*".²³³ There were no disinfectants and residents used car oil to combat the fires and the smell. These conditions nourished the spread of diseases such as tuberculosis.

Futhermore, the Ruvu settlement was unwisely situated in the sense that it had a problem of flooding during rainy seasons. Hence the UN delegation sent to inspect conditions at the camp did not manage to get there because, besides the bad road, the Ruvu area as a whole tended to be a heap of mud and moist clay during rainy days.²³⁴ It was difficult for the residents to cope with the conditions that constituted a grave menace to the health of residents.

The physical conditions of the camp during this period were exacerbated by the fact that "there was not enough food, cereals, vegetables, fruit and eggs".²³⁵ Thus, money raised from donors for building houses and improving general conditions of the camp was used for food and medicines. Diseases such as tuberculosis, bronchitis, malaria, cholera, pneumonia, and gastro-enteritis were prevalent among residents only common among the ill-fed and badly housed in South Africa.²³⁶ The unhygienic conditions of the camp increased the need for medical attention, hence the lengthy list of medical requirements prepared for submission to the donors and to the UN World Health Organisation in 1982. This included such items as antibiotics injections, antispasmodics, analgesics, antihistamines, antirheumatics, antihelmintics, anaesthetics, anti-malaria, anti-leprosy, gastro-intestinal drugs and respiration system drugs.²³⁷ Most of the items requested were "very basic and were not luxurious items for a

²³¹ *Ibid.*

²³² PAC Archives: United Nations - 'Women and Children Under Apartheid', Special Committee against Apartheid Mission to Angola, Zambia and Tanzania, 3-17 April 1985, p.5.

²³³ PAC Archives: 'PAC Transit Center, Tanzania, p.3.

²³⁴ PAC Archives: United Nations: 'Women and Children Under Apartheid', Special Committee against Apartheid Mission to Angola, Zambia and Tanzania, 3-17 April 1985, p.1.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, p.5.

²³⁶ S. Judges: 'Poverty, Living Conditions and Social Relations – Aspects of Life in Cape Town in the 1830's, Unpublished MA Thesis, University of Cape Town, 1977.

²³⁷ PAC Archives: 'List of Medical Requirements', 1982.

community that affords a healthy living".²³⁸ Not one year passed without death amongst the residents.²³⁹ The medical facility which existed before 1985 was rudimentary. It lacked very basic equipment such as sterilizing instruments, bowls for washing hands after administering the treatment and even beds for very sick patients who could not sleep on the floor. It was frequent practice to have patients sleeping on mattresses on the floor, despite the fact that it was undesirable.

The concrete living conditions in this camp were one of the reasons which caused the divide between the PAC leadership as represented by the Central Committee and the general membership of the PAC. Since 1981, the Ruvu camp became the centre of most ideological debate and critique of the PAC leadership. The cadres in this camp demanded that the leadership derive its mandate to lead from the rank and file membership. They also questioned the use of funds and criticized the lavish life-style of the leadership and the entire Central Committee.²⁴⁰ The strong base of the two-way ideological split which occurred in the PAC was a Ruvu and Itumbi camps.²⁴¹ The ideological strength and confrontational stance of the residents of the Ruvu camp stemmed from what its residents perceived as neglect and deliberate delays on the part of the PAC leadership to improve conditions in the settlement. The ethnic divisions which emerged and developed as the settlement grew, also fed into the political discourse within the settlement.

On culture in the Ruvu community, it is imperative to note that the concept of culture is usually very controversial and often confusing, and some of the working definitions of culture in this context are that "culture comprises firstly the values, feelings, symbols, beliefs, mores and customs that give a subjective meaning to the material conditions in which a social group lives. Secondly, it refers to the social practices, the institutional and informal human activities that produce those patterns of meaning. The maps of meaning that are the product of cultural practices do not only exist subjectively, but acquire an objective existence as a totality of determined notions and concepts' that are lived by people as an integral part of their daily lives".²⁴² It is clear from this that culture is used to infer the making of meaning and is largely concerned with the interconnections of a society, group of people or community. The main objective is to identify the interconnections that made the residents of the Ruvu camp a

²³⁸ *Ibid.*

²³⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁰ PAC Archives: 'PAC Transit Center, Tanzania, p.3.

²⁴¹ PAC Archives: PAC/Tan/1/164/9: Meeting of the Administrative Committee of the PAC, 1979.

²⁴² E. Koch: 'Ideology and Class Structure – A Review and Critique of the Work of E P Thompson and L. Althusser. Unpublished Seminar paper, London, 1981, p.9.

community and demonstrate that the residents of this camp asserted their lives as valuable beyond the limits set by the condition of the camp and most of all the conditions of exile.

The settlement at Ruvu was described as somewhat in between “a township, a working class town and an African village”.²⁴³ The reason was that the way of life in the settlement had features of a township, given the fact that a considerable number of residents originated from the townships in South Africa. The settlement also exhibited features of a village because of the predominantly Xhosa-Zulu speaking elements from the villages of Natal and the Cape Province in South Africa. Most of them lived as though they were in their villages, using clan names as courteous greeting and also to instill a certain understanding among their kids as to who of their mates fell within the prohibited boundaries of marriage, on the basis of kinship ties.²⁴⁴ On the other hand, the kind of developments in small-scale modern enterprises, created the impression of an emerging modern working-class town. Many of the residents, including a few Tanzanian locals, were employed in the small scale industries which were emerging in the settlement. Thus, the Ruvu settlement was a melting pot, a point of intersection of people from diverse backgrounds and these features were blended together in the comradely way of life of the relatively small but growing community.

As the numbers of residents in the Ruvu settlement increased, the community began to relive several aspects of the ‘home’ experience. As one informant indicated, “we began to listen to ‘Mbhaqanga’, cooked the kinds of meals we would have enjoyed at home in South Africa”.²⁴⁵ As indicated earlier, some of the residents participated in producing ‘revolutionary’ songs and poetry which was used during commemoration ceremonies. The most notable of these were the Sharpeville day ceremonies on the 21st of March to commemorate the death of PAC led marchers shot by the South African Police during anti-pass law demonstration in Sharpeville, in 1960. The “Sobukwe Day” was also commemorated to mark the death of the founding President of the PAC Mr Mangaliso Sobukwe, in 1978. June 16, 1976 was also commemorated in the camp to mark the Soweto uprisings in Johannesburg, South Africa. These events were an important feature of life not only in this camp but also in other PAC camps. Music and dancing pervaded everyday life in this camp and were not performed only to mark cultural days or days of commemoration.²⁴⁶

All members of the National Executive lived in plush hotels and expensive flats in the upmarket suburbs of Dar-es-Salaam. Their suffering was, of course, different from that of the ordinary

²⁴³ APLA Notes: 20 December, 2002.

²⁴⁴ APLA Notes: 20 December, 2002.

²⁴⁵ A.T. Moleah: ‘Inaugural address: Principal and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Transkei’ October 15, 1994, p.1.

²⁴⁶ L. Mphahlele’s: *Child of this Soil*, p. 102.

PAC members who lived in the camps. As the song proceeds it indicated an expression of confidence by calling on Pokela to lead; "Lead Us, Pokela". The problem is that the Pokela who was called upon to lead, was Pokela, 'the individual' not Pokela as representative of the entire leadership of the PAC. Not all songs expressed underlying tensions between the leadership and the rank and file membership of the organization. Some were about F.W. de Klerk and the land dispossessed from Africans in South Africa. The latter category of songs was intended to keep "morale high, focus the boys on the home-going program, and keep the vision of a liberated Socialist Azania alive".²⁴⁷

It must be noted that in the camp there was more diversity in music than in any other aspect of the camp's cultural life. The diversity was reflected in the life-styles of various groups in the camp. The "bright boys" commonly referred to as "*Oolayita*", mostly from urban townships had vicarious taste for jazz, reggae, and pop music. Whereas the "pumkins" also referred to as "*imixhaka*" mostly from rural backgrounds in South Africa had a taste for more traditional music such as "*umbhaqanga*" and choral music.²⁴⁸ Revolutionary songs remained the point of convergence among all the groups, despite their musical tastes or preferences. Abdul Ibrahim captured the experiences in the world of music, succinctly when he stated "music gives expression to what is deepest in the heart of human beings and this is usually demonstrated by the accompanying style of dance".²⁴⁹ As already indicated above, music in the Ruvu camp disclosed implicitly and sometimes explicitly the conflicts and contradictions of the resident's world of experiences, as exiles and as members of the PAC.

The social life in the camp was also characterized by sports which included soccer and volley ball. These activities were a popular pass-time and provided an opportunity for expression of talent. As Mphahlele indicated, "soccer provided rare moments of joy and healing" and created a bond among the camp residents and the neighbouring Tanzanian communities.²⁵⁰ In fact, sport in Ruvu camp, in one way or the other, was "a great leveler" as all kinds of people came into contact with one another.²⁵¹ Over weekends the youth residents of Ruvu camp, grouped themselves into teams, sometimes on the basis of age, (e.g. under twenty ones versus over twenty ones) and regions from where people came in South Africa. Soccer matches played according to regions tended to expose the deep-seated divisions according to tribe or language

²⁴⁷ L. Mphahlele's: *Child of this Soil*, p. 102.

²⁴⁸ L. Ntsebeza: *Youth in Urban African Townships, 1945-1992*, Unpublished MA Thesis, University of Natal, Durban, 1993.

²⁴⁹ A. Ibrahim: 'Music is a healing force' in M. Motoatse (ed.): *Umhlaba Wethu*, Skotaville Publishers, Johannesburg, 1987, p.63.

²⁵⁰ L. Mphahlele: 'Child of this Soil', p.68.

²⁵¹ R. Botto: "Some aspects of leisure occupations of the African population in Cape Town", Unpublished M.Soc. Thesis, University of Cape Town, 1954, p.109.

which still existed behind the façade of ideological unity. As Dr Mantshontsho put it, “the Cape boys were leading in everything else but sport, especially soccer, the other non-Xhosa boys used to excel but to us as the leadership, this was a non-issue”.²⁵² Even though the divide among tastes cannot be firmly upheld as one of the major divisive factors in the camp community, it however reflected a developing sub-culture which cannot be discounted as a factor contributing to the heterogeneity of the Ruvu community.

There was also some form of schooling in the camp even though in terms of organization and scope it did not match the ANC’s Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College in Mazimbu camp. For the ANC, Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College was the centre around which the entire settlement in Mazimbu developed.²⁵³ It could be said that when funding was sought, education for exiles was the major motivation and the settlement developed as an add-on. In Ruvu, accommodation was a priority and education an add-on. Also the allocation of funds within the organization reflected that the development of an educational capacity within the PAC’s Ruvu settlement was not a priority. All party funds were divided as follows: 50% was allocated to Defense, 30% to Administration and 20% to Publicity and Information.²⁵⁴ There was no special budget for Education and Manpower Development in the PAC. Hence the development of the secondary school in Ruvu camp was not as robust as that of the ANC in Mazimbu. With the PAC’s leadership embroiled in quarrels, especially following the deposition of Leballo, the Education Department of the organization suffered. There was no one who could conceptualise in a comprehensive manner, the development of an education centre in Ruvu camp. Besides that, as Elliot Mfafa (tasked to lead the Education Department since 1982) indicated at the meeting of the PAC Central Committee, “his department needed competent staff”, as curriculum planners, curriculum co-ordinators, and administrators.²⁵⁵

In 1982, the PAC leadership decided to separate the Education Department from the Manpower Department. Planning towards the development of a school in Ruvu dragged on for a number of years. In 1985, two appointments in the field of Education were made by Johnson Mlambo when he became Chairman of the PAC. J. Vanda was appointed principal of a school which was to be built in Ruvu camp and B. Jordan was appointed as Curriculum Specialist. Elliot Mfafa remained the Head of the Department of Education. The inefficiency of the two appointees was

²⁵² S. Morrow: “Dakawa Development Center”, pp.497-521.

²⁵³ B.B. Maaba: *The Social Life of Students of Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College, 1978-1992*, pp. 1-36.

²⁵⁴ PAC Archives: *Decisions and Recommendations; Extra-ordinary Central Committee Meeting, Dar-es-Salaam, February, 1981*, p.3.

²⁵⁵ PAN Archives: PAC/Tan/1/159/5: Confidential Letter from Joe Mkhwanazi to PAC officials responsible for training in academic and technical development, n.d., pp. 2-3.

reflected by the fact that in 1988, the PAC still had no education policy and curriculum.²⁵⁶ As a result a three-man commission which included Elliot Mfafa, Bojana Jordan, and A.C. Nkomo was set up to develop the education policy and curriculum for the PAC and submit a report to the Administrative Committee by the end of June 1989. When the PAC was unbanned in 1990, the development of an education centre in Ruvu was still in the planning stage. However, a pre-school for young kids was established early in the settlement and was developed further in 1986. It was run by the PAC Women's department.

The Ruvu camp accommodated several youths who were relocated from Chunya camp because they were identified for graduate education. For this kind of education, the organization depended on fellowships and bursaries from the international community, including the United Nations. Hence in 1989 numerous 'entry clearances' were sent to the Tanzanian authorities for youths who were on the waiting list for scholarships to universities abroad and in other parts of Africa.²⁵⁷ The problem which faced the PAC was how to hold the students accountable and of service to the organization after completing their studies. Besides that, the indiscipline of some of the students in the camp, during the vacation periods, increased as their numbers grew. This became one of the challenges the PAC leadership had to deal with. Attempts to deal with this problem started during the era of Pokela and continued unabated to the era of Mlambo. A decision was taken by the PAC Central Committee towards the end of 1985 that "all PAC sponsored students must sign contracts binding them to return and serve the PAC after completion of their courses and that all PAC sponsored students must pay 5% of their stipends to the Department of Education for administrative purposes".²⁵⁸ In addition to this the PAC pledged to enter into agreements with funding agencies and donor organisations so that the sponsored students, would return to the PAC after completion of their studies. This grand plan improved the situation but not for a long time as some of the students continued to find lucrative opportunities elsewhere after completing their studies. The PAC had no tracking mechanism to identify where their students went after completion of their studies and besides that, there were no political issues of priority to the organisation during the preparations for a negotiated solution in South Africa in the late 1980's. The PAC's attempts to develop a viable school in the Ruvu camp "were not as successful or even viable" compared to the project started

²⁵⁶ PAC Archives: PAC/Tan/1/48/8 – Plenary Session of the PAC, December 1988, p.2.

²⁵⁷ PAC Archives: PAC/Tan/1/69/2: Letter from MK Nkula, PAC Chief Representative in Tanzania to the Principal Secretary in the office of the Prime Minister in Dar-es-Salaam, 1989; PAC/Tan/1/69/3: Entry Clearance to Ruvu Camp, 1989.

²⁵⁸ PAC Archives: PAC/Tan/1/159/5: Confidential Letter from Joe Mkhwanazi to PAC officials responsible for training in academic and technical development, n.d. p.1.

in the early 1960's by the PAC exiles in Maseru. This was due to a lack of vision and leadership.²⁵⁹

The underground and exile life of the PAC, particularly at Ruvu camp, was also implicitly and explicitly plagued by the pervasiveness of tribalism despite the 'revolutionary' denials. Between 1967 and 1969, the Frelimo of Mozambique experienced challenges with tribalism. The problem escalated due to leadership contestation which occurred after the death of its founder and President Dr Eduardo Mondlane.²⁶⁰ Similar tribal tendencies were manifested within ZANU after the death of its leader, Herbert Chitepho in 1971. Within the ANC of South Africa, the issue of Xhosa or predominantly Nguni (Xhosa and Zulu) leadership created tension in the camps, especially during the 1980s.²⁶¹ Tribal tendencies in the ANC camps in Angola reached a stage where in certain instances, if the National Anthem was sung in one of the Nguni languages, non-Nguni's would walk out and vice-versa.²⁶²

The concept 'tribalism' has fallen into increased disfavor due to its application during the colonial era, and its present relevance. John Saul argued for the use of the concept of "ethnicity" which hovers around such attributes of commonality as language, territory, political unit and common cultural values or symbols.²⁶³ Archie Mafeje has invoked, instead, the notion of "tribal sentiment" as the most relevant in the context of Africa and her politics of liberation. He argues that the term 'tribe' "has no scientific meaning when applied not to a relatively undifferential society, practicing a primitive subsistence economy and enjoying local autonomy but societies that have been effectively penetrated by European colonialism, that have been successfully drawn into a capitalist money economy and a World market".²⁶⁴

In the context of the PAC's Ruvu camp, it would be appropriate to adopt Mafeje's framework and therefore define tribalism as the expression of "tribal sentiments" by various residents of the camp. This is because there is no evidence which attests to the fact that the sentiments developed into a tribal ideology which found expression in coherent forms as one would find, for instance, in the case of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP). IN the case of the IFP, the concept of tribe has been overtly politicized in furtherance of a category of interests linked to the traditional elite.

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

²⁶⁰ M. Newitt: *A History of Mozambique*, p.525.

²⁶¹ L. Mphahlele: *Child of this Soil*, p.56.

²⁶² PAC Archives: Dan Mdluli: *Letter to the Chairman of the PAC, Johnson Mlambo*, 28 August 1985, p.2.

²⁶³ PAC Archives: *Dan Mdluli: Letter to the Chairman of the PAC, Johnson Mlambo*, 28 August 1985, p.2.

²⁶⁴ Archie Mafeje: 'The Ideology of "Tribalism"', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 9,2, 1971 quoted in John Saul: 'The Dialectic of Class and Tribe', p.350.

The utilization of tribal ploys to rally constituencies in order to engage successfully in competition for powerful positions in the Central Committee is what happened within the PAC in exile. The activation of tribal identities depended on various circumstances. Political prospects and considerations were usually an important factor. The power struggle and competition between P.K. Leballo and his deputy T.M. Ntantala in 1977 was based on the mobilization of tribal sentiments. Ntantala, a Xhosa speaking South African from the Eastern Cape had majority support from the APLA military command structures. Other Ngunis from within the leadership structures of the PAC also supported Ntantala (for instance, a certain Themba Maphalala from the PAC High Command openly canvassed support for Ntantala on an ethnic ticket). Leballo also mobilized support from the Sotho speaking groups within the PAC and also roped into PAC politics some Black Consciousness People (BCP) elements who were in Tanzania.²⁶⁵ Had it not been for the support given by the post-June 16 generation of exiles who, due to their innocence and political immaturity were manipulated by Leballo against Ntantala, Leballo's faction would have been unable to oust Ntantala and the entire military High Command of APLA in 1977.

In Ruvu camp, in particular, a wide number of elements stemming from the nature of life in the camp, coalesced situationally into an expression of tribal sentiment. The situations ranged from football matches in which Nguni were regarded as less competent, to the leadership of the army and the knowledge of PAC political ideology in which non-Ngunis were deemed incompetent.²⁶⁶ All these were generalisations or perceptions which divided the camp community along ethnic lines. These manifested themselves below the superficial pretences of unity in the struggle. Dan Mdluli, who responded to rank-and-file debates about Xhosa leadership in APLA, argued that "if forces from the Cape seem most prepared to come forward to fight for their land, it is not a fault".²⁶⁷ What is surprising is that the leadership of the PAC including the camp leaders whose power and role in enforcing discipline in the camp was so vital (as will be examined in the following section), were aware of the underlying tribal tensions among camp residents, but the matter was never openly addressed. The correspondence between Mdluli and the Chairman of the PAC (Johnson Mlambo) is a clear illustration of this. In all his correspondence with the Headquarters, Mdluli consistently raised questions about tribalism in the PAC in general. In August 1985, he wrote to the PAC Chairman again and indicated:

"I always hear unofficial reports of tribalism in the PAC. I have always dismissed reports of tribalism in the PAC, especially as the

²⁶⁵ Vusi Shange: 'With the PAC in exile' in Searchlight South Africa, Vol.3, No.2, April 1993, p.31.

²⁶⁶ PAC Archives: Letter from Dan Mdluli to the PAC Chairman, Johnson Mlambo, June, 1987.

²⁶⁷ PAC Archives: Letter from Dan Mdluli to the PAC Chairman, Johnson Mlambo, 28 August, 1985, p.2.

*Central Committee is very much non-tribally constituted: and I have always hated the use of the term 'tribalism' to explain divisions in Africa. Often regionalism is mistaken for tribalism".*²⁶⁸

Mlambo's responses to the questions from Mdluli tended to be irrelevant in that he gave Mdluli a long lecture on "Paul Baran and Sweezy reflecting on the crimes of Stalin" and later talked about the resurgence of interest in the PAC "at home and abroad".²⁶⁹ It could thus be concluded that the leadership of the PAC was either evasive or dismissive of the issue about the existence of tribal sentiments in their organization.

Another generation of recruits arrived in the PAC around 1988-1989 following the uprisings which swept through South Africa from late 1984 to 1987. By the beginning of 1990, the camp had three groups, each with its own tradition in the camp, i.e. the senior camp residents who lived there since the camp was established in 1978 (mostly those from the June 16, 1976 generation), the Lesotho group and youths relocated from other PAC camps, and lastly the 1988/89 new recruits. With the arrival of the latter, ethnic tensions escalated, but political developments and the intensification of the "home going program" left little space for petty tribal quarrels.²⁷⁰ From the nature of crimes which were committed in the camp and the group associations during social events or sporting events, it appears that there were emerging and growing "Zulu cliques" and sometimes mixed as "Xhosa-Zulu" cliques. The fights and occasional stabbings during parties over weekends, though not clearly showing a tribalist pattern, indicated that a new and youthful group had arrived in the camp. Fights were mostly over petty issues "like girls, liquor and gossip", things which mature people would hardly fight and stab each other about.²⁷¹ This kind of challenge seems to have manifested itself in more serious proportions within the ANC camp in Mazimbu and especially among the students in Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College. The violence displayed by the new arrivals (1988-1989 groups) was shocking. Some "*formed themselves into self-conscious Zulu groups and harassed non-Zulus*".²⁷²

The ANC was able to handle issues of ill-discipline in the camps and dealt with the concerns of inmates by introducing what was called "detachment conferences" in Angola.²⁷³ Its cadres were divided into three detachments, the Luthuli detachment (consisting mostly of the old guard), the June 16 detachment and the Moncada detachment and members of the National Executive,

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ PAC Archives: PAC/Tan/1/83/23: Letter from Johnson Mlambo to Dan Mdluli, October 1987.

²⁷⁰ APLA Notes: Umtata, 11 September 1994.

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² B.B. Maaba: The Social Life of the Students of Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College, 1978-1992, p.15.

²⁷³ M. Twala and E.D. Bernard: Mbokodo, p.47.

including the ANC President Oliver Tambo who belonged to the Luthuli detachment. “Open discussions centered on challenges and grievances of any aspect of the ANC soldier’s life. Finally, resolutions and agreements would be noted and drawn up as proposals to be put before the National Executive Committee.”²⁷⁴ With the PAC, there seems not to have been a systematic engagement with camp residents to address the grievances of camp inmates. The only notable efforts were those of Pokela who visited the camps frequently and always appealed for conciliation and peace among the camp residents. He is still remembered for his now famous Swahili saying “*Ntwa key a madula mmoho*” meaning “it is usually those who live together who quarrel”.²⁷⁵ Despite his good efforts, tribal sentiments remained as a source of underlying tensions in the PAC camps, especially in the Ruvu settlement.

As the camp community grew, challenges of ill-discipline also increased. Because of the relatively better conditions, the Ruvu settlement was regularly infiltrated by ill-disciplined people from the PAC army. This trend strengthened from 1981 onwards. This created serious challenges of ill-discipline within the camp community. When examining the issue of discipline in the Ruvu camp, it becomes important to note that the camp accommodated groups of people who differed not only in terms of background and language, but had developed a host of traditions and norms over the years in exile which had to squeeze into the relatively tight confines of regulations initially designed for a small camp community.

The authority of political leaders was important in maintaining order in the camps. Quite often there were quarrels among the inmates, some were of a petty nature, resulting from “drinking and womanizing over weekends” but others contained a serious political element.²⁷⁶ The nature of offences has been covered in the section above. This section examines the kinds of punishment meted out. Dating back to the pre-Pokela era, beatings were a common punishment in the camp and this involved sjamboking resulting in grievous bodily harm and sometimes death. This was administered under the supervision of the camp committee. “The critical period of this style led to the death of Mncedisi Sabatana, Mahoyi Mpondo and George Moletsane”.²⁷⁷ These people were labelled dissidents because it was believed they were advancing the political program of Ntantala’s APRP within the PAC. The leadership of the PAC denied these incidents in spite of the advice from overseas PAC members such as Dan Mdluli. This is illustrated in Mdluli’s letter to Mlambo where he stated “I know you have not personally

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁵ L. Mphahlele: *Child of this Soil*, pp. 103-105.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁷ PAC Archives: Dan Mdluli: Letter to the Chairman of the PAC, Johnson Mlambo, 1 June, 1987, p.2; L. Mphahlele: *Child of this Soil*, p.109; Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC): Draft Report on PAC/Pogo/APLA Human Rights Abuses (1960-1993), p.27.

issued an order to beat up someone. What I am saying is that you have an opportunity to correct this tendency among certain sections of the leadership not to adopt the Idi Amin style of solving disagreements".²⁷⁸ According to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission report, there were other "alleged cases of the elimination of "dissidents" and "undisciplined" APLA and PAC cadres including that of Chaka (real and full name not known) who was killed in the PAC camp at Chunya in Tanzania by High Command for "allegedly stealing and concealing" in his transitor radio a pistol used during his training in Conarky, Guinea and thereby "harming" PAC's relations with the government of Guinea".²⁷⁹ The manuscript of a book which was supposed to have been published in 1985 (written by Henry Isaacs) indicated that between June 1982 and January 1985 "at least six persons were murdered, their physical elimination sanctioned or condoned by the PAC leaders who accused them or suspected them of being 'dissidents'".²⁸⁰ Isaac's accounts are viewed with suspicion by some of the informants contacted during the research. They all emphasized that Isaac's relationship with the Party was strained and that he was extremely bitter, such that he would go to any length discredit the PAC. In the TRC report it was indicated that Isaacs confused in his account "cases of some PAC cadres who died in genuine accidents with cases of abuse of human rights".²⁸¹

Other forms of punishment which were meted out at the Ruvu camp in Bagomoyo included being ordered to do various exercises on the parade ground which were accompanied by floggings. Because of the arbitrary manner in which punishment was administered and dissatisfaction with the general conditions in the camp and the failure of the PAC's home-going programme, some of the cadres deserted to the ANC.²⁸² Corporal punishment of alleged 'dissidents', was administered through the ANC Security Department, which came to be known as 'Mbokodo', a Xhosa term which literally means 'the grinding stone'.²⁸³ Just as in the PAC camps, the ANC camps were characterized by bottom-down rigid instructions to cadres and refusal or failure to comply was enough to earn one the label of dissident. Dissidents were crushed brutally; hence a special camp called Quatro was set up in Angola, as a prison where all dissidents were kept. In Quatro, prisoners were beaten, subjected to hard labour and some would 'disappear' forever. "The camp remained highly secret within the ANC. Even among the NEC, the only ones who had access to Quatro were Mzwandile Piliso, Joe Modise and Andrew

²⁷⁸ PAC Archives: Dan Mdluli: Letter to the Chairman of the PAC, Johnson Mlambo, 1 June 1987, p.27.

²⁷⁹ TRC: Draft Report on PAC/Poqo/APLA Human Rights Abuses (1960-1993), p.27.

²⁸⁰ PAC Archives: H. Isaacs: 'South Africa's Pan Africanist Congress in the 80's: Chronic Instability and Revolutionary Ineffectiveness', no date.

²⁸¹ TRC: Draft Report on PAC/Poqo/APLA Human Rights Abuses (1960-1993), p.27.

²⁸² Vusi Shange in Search Light South Africa: Vol.3, No.2, April 1993, pp. 31-33.

²⁸³ M. Twala and E.D. Benard: Mbokodo: Inside MK.

Masondo”.²⁸⁴ This raises questions as to whether the entire leadership knew about this camp, sanctioned its establishment knew about the atrocities which were committed inside the camp or whether they had any control over treatment of inmates and how the camp itself was run.

In the case of the PAC the question which comes to mind is whether there was any policy on the administration of corporal punishment. Or were there any constitutional provisions in the PAC constitution, related to corporal punishment? The Disciplinary Code of the PAC was discussed in Chapter 2 as well as the loopholes which could lead to abuses by those in positions of power. What will be interesting to discuss in this instance is a draft policy position which was developed by the PAC in exile in order to deal with indiscipline among the ranks of its cadres. In December 1981, the Central Committee of the PAC took a decision authorizing the army (APLA) “to take requisite action it deems fit in enforcing discipline in the army within the spirit of the Constitution and the Disciplinary Code of the Party”.²⁸⁵ Consequently, the leadership of the PAC decided in February 1986 on policy guidelines on “Corporal Punishment in the PAC as a Disciplinary Measure”.²⁸⁶ The document laid down the following prescriptions with regard to punishment in the camps and within the ranks of the army:

“The breaking of PAC and army discipline shall be punishable by inflicting corporal punishment as a last resort after the following procedures have been followed:

- *The alleged offender shall be duly tried by a Tribunal of Justice as provided for in the Disciplinary Code of the PAC to determine his innocence or guilt.*
- *No corporal punishment shall be inflicted on first offenders, at any rate, not until other forms of punishment, short of expulsion have been tried.*
- *That corporal punishment is not repeated on any individual member of the PAC within a six month period.*
- *That the principle of justice is observed. No judgement may be passed without the accused answering for himself.*
- *That punishment is not humiliating to the individual member in front of his fellow members.*
- *A register of corporal punishment shall be kept and updated at all times.*

²⁸⁴ B. Ketelo, A. Maxongo, Z. Tshona, R. Massango and L. Mbengo: ‘A Miscarriage of Democracy: The ANC Security Department in the 1984 Mutiny in uMkhonto we Sizwe’, in Searchlight South Africa, Vol.2, No.1, July 1990, p.38.

²⁸⁵ PAC Archives: Minutes of the Plenary Session of the PAC Central Committee, Dar-es-Salaam, December, 1-7 1981, pp. 1-3.

²⁸⁶ PAC Archives: ‘Corporal Punishment in the PAC as a Disciplinary Measure’, 6 February, 1986.

- *No female member of the PAC shall under any circumstances undergo corporal punishment of any kind.*²⁸⁷

These guidelines seem reasonable, but from the incidences outlined in this section, the extent of gross brutality with which corporal punishment was administered, shows that the policy was not adhered to. Comrade Tekere, one of the interviewees of this research, argued “from experience that I have gone through no one can tell me that there was a policy followed when we were beaten by those guys. I lived in Bogomoyo before I went to China for training, those ‘Mecs’ were cruel and cold when it comes to corporal punishment and I was told how some people died in the process. Me, Broer I was traumatized, imagine I was young, having escaped from Unitra only to land in that kind of situation”.²⁸⁸

From a survey of PAC internal documents in the archives at Fort Hare, no reference could be found to PAC women who received corporal punishment. Hence has no grounds to relate the experiences of women in this regard. The examination of incidences of corporal punishment in the PAC discloses that there was no possibility of adherence to policy stipulations, and especially given the wider context within which offences were defined. Dissidents were usually major victims because their definition was arbitrary. A dissident was in many cases a deliberate construction which showed the meanness of outlook on the part of those who had power or were connected to powerful individuals in the organization. All one needed to do was to vilify the political opponent, “campaign for support against him and then he will be destroyed in the name of purging the organization of the enemies of the revolution”.²⁸⁹

3.6 Development of the Military Strategy

One pertinent issue in the underground and exile life of the PAC was the nature of its military strategy and the relationship between the army and the political leadership. It could be argued that during the formative period (1960-1967) the PAC hardly had a clearly defined military strategy. The conceptions of who the enemy was were also divergent and contradictory. After 1967, Leballo formalized the military strategy of the organization, even though it was not clearly understood by the majority of the members. From 1968 to 1978, the time of the expulsion of the APLA High Command led by T.M. Ntantala, there seemed to have been bipolarity of opinions about strategy²⁹⁰. The division was mainly between Ntantala and Leballo.

²⁸⁷ Ibid, pp.1-2.

²⁸⁸ PAC Archives: ‘Corporal Punishment in the PAC as a Disciplinary Measure’, 6 February, 1986.

²⁸⁹ PAC Archives: ‘T.M. Ntantala is Gone: But His Ideals Will Conquer’, undated.

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

The source of the schism was part ideological and part power related. The members of the army tended to see themselves as distinctly separate from the civilian members of the PAC and were loyal to their military leaders and less dependant on the political leadership. Leballo thus made attempt to win the support of the younger generation of militants to his side and also the 1977 attempt to topple the Military High Command.

He wanted to solve the problem of divided loyalties with the PAC. His approach unfortunately rattled the Tanzanian government hence he was eventually deposed in 1979 with the connivance of Tanzanian authorities. Unity between the army and the political leadership remained a problem until the unbanning of the PAC in 1990²⁹¹. The root of the problem was that PAC military leaders, unlike the situation in the ANC, were not prominent political leaders. As a result political leadership could not control military leadership without exerting strains on internal organizational relationships.

Generation gaps within the PAC army itself [e.g. the Poqo group (1960s), the post-1976 group and the post-1986 group] and the different military traditions emanating from the various areas where APLA members received training was another factor which resulted in the lack of unity in military strategic thinking within the PAC. Besides that the PAC had not established a system of monitoring military strategy implementation. As a result the military strategy of the PAC was only good on paper but never found its way into concrete application. This was because of the lack of leadership. The leadership of the organization was embroiled in political squabbles within itself and as a result lost strategic focus. Pokela's attempts to remodel the PAC, was concerned more about the restructuring of operations than long-term strategy²⁹².

3.7 Conclusion

Dealing with the living conditions within the PAC camps was unboutedly dominated by the PAC settlement in Ruvu. The development of PAC settlements in Tanzania was traced and an examination of living conditions inside the camps interrogated. An examination of health conditions within the Ruvu settlement, which was supposedly the well-developed of all the PAC camps in exile, was also made. The manner in which camp residents established livable conditions in spite of the precariousness of their circumstances was also discussed. The aspects of examined culture revealed how the residents used sporting activities, music and poetry to give meaning to their lives. Despite these cultural activities, there were simmering divisions

²⁹¹ PAC Archives: 'T.M. Ntantala is Gone: But His Ideals Will Conquer', undated.

²⁹² L. Mphahlele: *Child of this Soil*, p.109; Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC): *Draft Report on PAC/Poqo/APLA Human Rights Abuses (1960-1993)*, p.27.

along tribal and regional lines but these never received the attention of the PAC leadership until the unbanning of the organization in 1990. The issue of corporal punishment in the PAC was also discussed. The fact that there were policy guidelines on how to administer corporal punishment in the PAC was highlighted. Like other policy guidelines developed and ignored by the organization, such guidelines were never followed. Thus, persistent divisions and conflicts were a major feature of the PAC's existence in exile. Ordinary PAC cadres in the camps were victims of the unguided authority of camp commanders who administered corporal punishment willy-nilly, without regard for organizational procedures and policies. The hope that one day '*Azania*' will be liberated sustained the endeavours and loyalty of camp inmates. Some endured the camp conditions because they had no alternative. Others, who could not endure the situation anymore deserted the organization, and joined the ANC whilst a few others declared themselves refugees in various parts of Southern Africa.²⁹³ Nevertheless, the woes of the PAC in exile were not only attributed to its internal conflicts and rivalries, but also that the PAC did not have financial backing of the international community like the ANC.

²⁹³ PAC/Tan/146/23: Letter from Eddie Yethu Muendane to the Administration of the PAC, 1986.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE PAC LEADERSHIP DIVERSITY AND IMPACT ON THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE

"Lastly, of course, we who are Pan Africanist in outlook, do not subscribe to the doctrine of South African exceptionalism and are committed to Pan Africanism and a union of African states which we would like to see as a unitary, centrally controlled organic whole" -
Zephania "Uncle Zeph" Mothopeng

4.1 Introduction

An intelligible evaluation of the success and failures of the PAC during its struggle against apartheid in South Africa shall also be made by interrogating its leadership diversity, particularly the first four leadership styles and attributes. Leballo was born in Lesotho on 19th December 1922. He studied at Lovedale in the Eastern Cape where he was conscientised towards South African politics. Thereafter he taught at an Anglican mission school in Lady Selborne in Pretoria where he had bad blood with white Anglican ministers. This led to his expulsion from Lovedale in 1946 following a student uprising in which Leballo participated. The quality of his political leadership during this epoch left an indelible mark on the character of the PAC²⁹⁴. On the other hand, Vusumuzi Maake was relatively unknown within the circles of the traditional PAC constituency. Even during the time of serious conflict in the PAC in 1967-1968, his faction was small and relatively isolated. Maake was well-known for his tendency to save his skin and always played it safe in PAC crises and in the politics of the Azanian Revolution in general²⁹⁵.

John Nyathi Pokela, born in 1922 in Herschel in the former Transkei, was sentenced in 1966 to imprisonment on Robben Island. He was charged for his political activism in the Eastern Cape, especially for his role in the 1963 Poqo activities. On Robben Island he became well respected for his persuasive skills and efforts to unite PAC factions in the Island prison. Pokela assumed the leadership of the exiled PAC following widespread dissatisfaction within the entire organisation with the former chairman²⁹⁶, Vusumuzi Maake. The leadership of Vusumuzi Maake could be said to have been characterised by "*indecision, corruption and factionalism*" some of which were the relics of the Leballo reign. Johnson Phillip Mlambo, born in

²⁹⁴ J. Bolnick: Structure and Experience in the Making of Apartheid; Sefela Sa Letsamayanaha -The wartime experiences of Pottlake Kitchener Leballo, pp. 1-30.

²⁹⁵ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: TM Ntantala: 'Profiles of the Leballo Gang, 1978, p. 22.

²⁹⁶ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: Feature: South Africa, undated; South African Institute of Race Relations: Survey of Race Relations, SAIRR, Cape Town, 1966, pp. 1-63.

Johannesburg, was one of the founder members of the PAC. At an embryonic stage he became Chairperson of the PAC Daveyton branch (near Benoni). In 1963 he was incarcerated and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment on Robben Island for sabotage and plotting to overthrow the South African regime by violent means²⁹⁷. Mlambo inherited from Nyathi Pokela a party with structures and relationships, some of which were working well whilst others were staggering. Johnson Mlambo could be said to have lacked the political stature and admiration of African statesman which Pokela enjoyed.

4.2 The Leadership Attributes of Potlake Kitchener Leballo, 1962-1979.



PotlakoLeballo

Given his experiences in Lovedale and the often paternalistic manner in which Leballo was treated at the mission in Lady Selbourne, Joel Bolnick concluded that it was not surprising "that Leballo became an impassioned opponent of co-operation between African nationalists and white radicals"²⁹⁸. Leballo's attitude was hardened by his wartime experiences. "Forced to endure racial discrimination while enlisted in an army that was ostensibly fighting to rid the world of race hatred and oppression he had been sufficiently embittered to earn an early repatriation on the grounds of rebellious behaviour"²⁹⁹. In addition to his wartime experiences, role in the formation of the PAC, which has often been denigrated, contributed to his handling the organisation as his personal property³⁰⁰. He was a founder member of the PAC and was arrested with Sobukwe, the President of the PAC, on March 21, 1960. He served a two-year jail sentence after which he was granted permission to go to Maseru in Lesotho, in August 1962.

²⁹⁷ PAC: PAC/Tan/85/1 - Letter from Johnson Mlambo to Mengistu Haile Mariam, Chairman of the Provincial Military Administrative Council. Ethiopia. July 1987.

²⁹⁸ Bolnick: Double-cross: Potlake Leballo and 1946 Riots at Lovedale Missionary Institution, African Studies Seminar, paper No. 264, African Studies Institute, 1990, pp. 24-25.

²⁹⁹ J. Bolnick: Double-cross: Potlake Leballo and 1946 Riots at Lovedale Missionary Institution, p. 14.

³⁰⁰ D.A.B. Mahlangu: 'from South Africa to Azania', p. 80.

This particular section highlight the riddles of Leballo's leadership and shows how they were concretely reflected in the management, use of funds and other organisational resources, the composition and role of the leadership as represented by the Central Committee, and the internal enemy syndrome. To resolve the riddles of Leballo's leadership during his period as chairperson of the exiled PAC is an elusive goal hence the attempt to delimit the broad scope of issues through the identification of thematic categories in order to structure the analysis and concomitant narrative. However this section does not provide an examination of the mythology, both positive and negative, which surrounded Leballo, as a person and his period of leadership in the PAC³⁰¹. Bolnick covers this, even though not comprehensively. He fails to link his analysis with internal practices of the exiled PAC during Leballo's leadership period. Suffice to say that Leballo's personality and character contributed towards the discreditation of the PAC during the period 1962 to 1979. Leballo was an extremely controversial person. As Jack Halpern puts it, "but political jail sentences were not the only ones that Leballo served in South Africa; he had also been sentenced for fraud, forgery and uttering.

He has the reputation for personal instability which may account for his calling of the Maseru press conference in the first place, for the exaggerated claims which he made, and for the denials with which he followed them a few days later". The Johannesburg Sunday Express described Leballo as a "liar, fool, and braggart" ³⁰². The controversies around Leballo's personality and leadership style were raised again in the report to the OAU Liberation Committee, in November 1967. The report which was compiled by C.L. Lekaje testified that "truthfulness is not one of his attributes"³⁰³.

The report pointed out that "Leballo's lying and inconsistency go hand in hand, and this has embarrassed the PAC as a whole"³⁰⁴. However, B. Leeman, even though in a defensive tone, provides a different view about Leballo's personality and role in the PAC. Firstly, he engages Halpern's criticism and description of Leballo's personality. He argues that "Jack Halpern blamed the raid on Leballo's "personal instability" and his love for 'exaggerated claims". At the same time, Halpern studiously ignored the 8,000 arrests that resulted from Mandela's ultimatum in 1961, calling him "widely admired and even revered for his courageous underground leadership"³⁰⁵.

³⁰¹ B. Leeman: Lesotho and the Struggle for Azania, p. 181.

³⁰² Jack Halpern: South African Hostages. p.27.

³⁰³ Sunday Express, 31 March 1963; PAC Archives, Fort Hare: 'Confidential- A Statement concerning the disputes within the Pan Africanist Congress (SA), p. 7.

³⁰⁴ B. Leeman: Lesotho and the Struggle for Azania, p. 180.

³⁰⁵ J. Bolnick: Double-cross: Potlake Leballo and 1946 Riots at Lovedale Missionary Institution, p. 14.

Leeman develops his argument even further and points out that "Leballo's success in inflaming the most wretched, the most violent and the most 'ungrateful' sections of the African population brought him more hatred from the liberal-elitist establishment than it reserved for the system it ostensibly opposed. His tutor at Lovedale and comrade in arms in North Africa, Professor Macquarrie and Motsukoe Pheko (a PAC leader, and the then President of the PAC) both linked Leballo to the Nazis, while the South African liberal press, with its prejudice about who should be African leaders - graduates, army officers, ordained ministers or chiefs - derided his hopes for freedom, addressing him as "self-appointed" leader of the PAC"³⁰⁶. In other words, Leeman argues for and demonstrates that there was an ongoing smear campaign against Leballo, since April 1963. It involved myth-making exercises "put about by the PAC's most implacable opponents"³⁰⁷.

He then concluded that "'Leballo, despite his reputation for urgency and spontaneity, reoriented the party towards the idea of a lengthy struggle reliant on the same "illiterate" and "semi-illiterate" masses' (based on the Chinese model) "to whom Sobukwe had appealed. The crises within the PAC in exile thereafter were primarily caused by this radical shift in emphasis, which was not acceptable to the bulk of the personnel in the external missions" ³⁰⁸. Unfortunately, the evidential basis of Leeman's argument is remarkably slender.

Thus, the epoch 1962 to 1964 was utilized negatively, to lay the foundations for disorder. The Leballo period of administration is blamed for this. Leballo, who "most greedily" craved for "absolute personal power over both the whole Party and the entire army, as opposed to the PAC's founding principles of collective leadership, common responsibility and democratic centralism", failed to live up to the challenges of his leadership role³⁰⁹. During this era a few important documents setting out the basic organisational systems and procedures were generated. It needed a visionary leadership to manage their implementation. The Lesotho group, for instance, produced a concept document about "Self-reliance and the mobilisation of resources in the PAC"³¹⁰.

This particular document addressed a wide ranging number of issues regarding how the PAC should operate in a coordinated fashion in exile. It addressed issues such as the functions of the departments within the PAC and also identified common objectives and collective

³⁰⁶ J. Bolnick: Double-cross: Potlake Leballo and 1946 Riots at Lovedale Missionary Institution, p. 14.

³⁰⁷ J. Bolnick: Double-cross: Potlake Leballo and 1946 Riots at Lovedale Missionary Institution, p. 14.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

³⁰⁹ PAC Archives: "Confidential- A Statement concerning the disputes within the Pan Africanist Congress (SA) to the African Liberation Committee, p. 3.

³¹⁰ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: T.M. Ntantala (Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee): 'The Crisis in the PAC', 4 April, 1978, p. 12.

responsibilities of certain departments. By implication the document suggested the development of "departmental clusters" on the basis of identified common objectives. The National Organiser's department, the Foreign Affairs' department, the Publicity and Information department and the Economic Affairs Department, for instance, were among the departments that were recommended to collaborate closely in order to make the PAC viable in exile. In addition to this, "Guidelines on PAC Cells Abroad" were developed during this formative period (1962-1964) but only found their way to becoming official policy in the post-Leballo era³¹¹.

It was the absence or poor implementation of procedures, guidelines and policies, which created grounds for strained relations and conflict within the PAC. The turbulence, which occurred from 1965 onwards, was nurtured during this period. The early draft policy or procedure documents of the PAC are all remarkably thin on the issue of co-ordination and control of funds. The issue about the management and use of funds seem to have been the major bone of contention within the organisation during the epoch of exile. Except for the PAC constitution, the PAC needed to establish a set of guidelines on managing donor funding from various sources scattered all over the world, an issue not entailed in the PAC Constitution³¹².

Thus, the PAC leadership failed to develop and portray a positive political image of the organisation. This caused great discontent among rank and file PAC members, some of whom felt the organisation was losing the reputation it had under Sobukwe's leadership. What worsened the situation was that "in Maseru, Leballo made dubious friends who consequently became involved in PAC affairs". Hans Lombard, a South African white Afrikaner, "who carried British passport", was given a letter of credence by Leballo as a PAC roving representative. "Leballo let him into many Party secrets"³¹³. The role Hans Lombard played was controversial and it is alleged that he knew of the pending arrests which followed Leballo's press conference. The ANC, a political rival of the PAC dubbed Lombard "an Apartheid agent and informer" yet a friend of the PAC. Another incident which caused great discontent within the ranks of PAC members involved an academic from the United States who knew Leballo in Lesotho³¹⁴. The young American academic "used to help PAC refugees from Maseru to Botswana in his land rover. In 1966 this American academic came as far as Mbeya" (one of the PAC camps in Tanzania where trained cadres were accommodated). The PAC membership was disgruntled with the

³¹¹ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: M. Gqobose: 'Self-reliance' and the mobilization of resources in PAC', undated.

³¹² ANC Archives, Fort Hare: The African National Congress of South Africa: 'The Pan Africanist Congress of South Africa; Whom Does It Serve? pp. 1-24.

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ PAC Archives: 'Confidential- A Statement concerning the disputes within the Pan Africanist Congress (SAJ to the African Liberation Committee, p. 3.

incident, given that Leballo was known to have nothing to do with Americans, in the literal sense. Lekaje, an opponent of Leballo explained the incident as that "as far back as 1958"³¹⁵

Leballo worked for the American government in the Library of the US Consulate in Johannesburg. "So his continued allegations that persons are informers or CIA agents should be taken with a pinch of salt for it can easily be a ruse to cover up his own activities"³¹⁶. By implication Leballo was an informer himself. In this instance, a PAC member was corroborating a point made by the exile ANC about Leballo. Unfortunately, this assertion about Leballo is not verifiable from the documentary sources and oral information used in this research. These incidents did not only tarnish the political image of the PAC but depleted the morale of the PAC exile community. The ANC, in one of its propaganda documents, painted a worse picture of the PAC. The formation of the PAC was described in the following manner:

"At the end of 1958, a small band of disruptive adventurers that had for some time been active within the ranks of the African National Congress finally broke away. Early in 1959, after a lengthy meeting held in the luxurious premises of the library of the United States Information Service (USIS) in Johannesburg, they decided to form a 'revolutionary' political organization which they called the 'Pan Africanist Congress'. Thus the dark schemes of American imperialists' subversion of the successful development of the national liberation revolution against apartheid fascism were clearly exposed to the light of day".³¹⁷

At that point, the PAC's Information Department which was in charge of propaganda could not respond. The department was hardly functioning before 1982 when Nyathi Pokela made efforts to revitalise the PAC departments and re-organise the PAC. This meant that the PAC had no counter-propaganda of its own. In August 1964 another incident occurred which damaged the political stature and credibility of the PAC further and thus defined more clearly the lines of difference between the rank-and-file membership and the leadership. During this particular year,

"Leballo was granted passage through South Africa in a chartered aircraft. He made a stop in Johannesburg for about 30 minutes and his aircraft was heavily guarded by the South African regime, he being the only man who had ever threatened military action on South

³¹⁵ ANC Archives, Fort Hare: The African National Congress of South Africa: 'The Pan Africanist Congress of South Africa; Whom Does It Serve? pp. 1-24.

³¹⁶ Ibid.

³¹⁷ ANC Archives, Fort Hare: The African National Congress of South Africa: 'The Pan Africanist Congress of South Africa; Whom Does It Serve? p. 1.

Africa whilst in a neighbouring territory. The Apartheid Regime appeared to have been more than benevolent in his case".³¹⁸

This incident raised many political questions about Leballo and his leadership team. One of the questions was known it could be possible that a man who was so 'dangerous' and highly wanted by the Apartheid Regime be allowed by the same government not to only pass through South Africa but also stop over in Johannesburg. In general terms, this can be explained in terms of the conditions of the release granted to Leballo by the SA government. Leballo was released from banishment to Northern Zululand on the grounds that he was a Basutoland national and was therefore allowed to go back to his country³¹⁹. Whatever the nature of his political activities, the Apartheid Regime also had a political agenda to nurture which foregrounded the *detente* approach of the John Voster era. To the rank and file membership of the PAC, the incident raised suspicion; "their confidence in the revolutionary integrity of their leadership was shaken"³²⁰. What can be regarded, in broad terms, as the formative period of the PAC in exile ended without any consolidation of achievements made. Members of the PAC were still loosely scattered all over the world. Some of them had completed military training but were not deployed anywhere. "The upheavals in the PAC forced them to look elsewhere". Some decided to pursue academic careers but expressed their preparedness to return to the PAC once the party machinery was streamlined³²¹.

Among the early expulsions from the PAC in exile was that of J.D. Nyaoase. It took place on the 12th of August 1965. J.D. Nyaoase, a founding member of the PAC, was the national President of the Federation of Free African Trade Unions of South Africa (FOFATUSA), a position which he continued to occupy while in exile. FOFATUSA was a free and independent "national labour militant movement not affiliated into the PAC"³²². "The Trade Unions affiliated to the FOFATUSA have been engaged in the struggle since the early forties, described as National Trade Unionism in the country: they decided to come together in October, 1959, when they formed the Federation of Free African Trade Unions of South Africa"³²³. J.D. Nyaoase also held the position of chairman of all party conferences of the PAC and also Secretary for Labour as well as a member of the party's central committee. His expulsion on arbitrary grounds was the foretaste of things to come on the sense that it demonstrated how the centralisation of power

³¹⁸ ANC Archives, Fort Hare: The ANC of South Africa: 'The Pan Africanist Congress of South Africa; Whom Does It Serve? p. 11.

³¹⁹ Ibid.

³²⁰ PAC Archives: 'Confidential-A Statement concerning the disputes within the Pan Africanist Congress (SA) to the African Liberation Committee, p. 5.

³²¹ O. Geyser: *Detente Southern Africa*, p. 30.

³²² PAC Archives, Fort Hare: CJ Lekaje - Confidential: p. 7.

³²³ T. Lodge: *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945*. p, 309.

and authority in the hands of one person, i.e. P.K. Leballo, was used to victimise opponents, critics and sometimes innocent members of the Party³²⁴.

The main issue which led to Nyawose's expulsion from the party was his refusal to surrender the independence of FOFATUSA, to the PAC. He was not prepared to "surrender, even to allow discussions of FOFATUSA matters, property, offices and funds by leaders of the Party who were not members of the trade union themselves, not appointed officials, who were in fact anti-trade unionism"³²⁵. On August 1965, Nyawose and his group attended the Indonesian Independence celebrations to represent FOFATUSA. The following morning Leballo and P.N. Raboroko (a member of the Central Committee) met and decided to expel Nyawose and suspend all PAC members of FOFATUSA. Circular letters and cables signed by Leballo were circulated in Dar-es-Salaam and to the Africa Liberation Committee of the OAU announcing the situation. One circular to the department of Home Affairs in Tanzania requested the Tanzanian government not to allow FOFATUSA to open and operate a labour office in the country³²⁶. J.D. Nyawose responded by addressing the matter to the African Liberation Committee of the OAU. In his response, he emphasised the unconstitutionality of the decision taken by Leballo and Raboroko. He argued that "since the Acting-President Mr. Leballo's expulsion order signed by himself and Mr P.N. Raboroko, was not based on any order of decisions handed to the Central Committee (NEC) by three members of the Disciplinary Tribunal of Justice, in terms of the Pan Africanist Congress Disciplinary Code and relevant constitution, the expulsion letters and circulars and cables were in fact null and void. The basic documents of the PAC, are binding to members and leaders alike. I could not be expelled by Messrs. Leballo and Raboroko, including any other NEC member other than the Disciplinary Tribunal of Justice members"³²⁷.

In spite of this protest, Nyawose and his group could hardly win over the support of Tanzanian authorities because of the support Leballo enjoyed with the Tanzanian government with the help of the Home Affairs in Tanzania, Leballo was able to get some PAC trade unionists either imprisoned or declared illegal in Tanzania. 'The response from the African Liberation Committee (ALC) to Nyawose's submission was also not useful. The ALC dismissed the conflict between Nyawose's group and Leballo as an internal PAC matter which should be resolved internally by the PAC. This meant that Leballo could continue with the victimisation of party members who disagreed with him. Following the expulsion of J.D. Nyawose and the suspension

³²⁴ T. Lodge: *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945*. p, 309.

³²⁵ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: J. D. Nyawose: 'Circular Letter No. I: Pan Africanist Congress of South Africa at Home and Abroad', p.3.

³²⁶ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: JD Nyawose: Circular Letter No.1, p.1

³²⁷ Ibid; pp. 1-6.

of PAC trade unionists, a spate of suspensions and expulsions occurred within the PAC. Nyaose defied his expulsion order and refused to move away from the Party until he was officially reinstated and integrated into the new National Executive Committee at the Moshi unity conference in September 1967³²⁸.

The expulsion of the Botswana PAC group in 1965 occurred almost simultaneously with the Leballo - Nyaose feud. The PAC Botswana group was mostly comprised of people who were victims of arrests which followed the March 1963 Leballo press conference. This group requested, in a memorandum signed in July 1963, that a conference be summoned "where a postmortem of the Maseru debacle, the streamlining of the organisational machinery and the general revitalisation of the party" could be discussed³²⁹. The request for such a conference was not only rejected "but the signatories to that memorandum were subjected to continual persecution culminating in the suspension of the core of that group in 1965"³³⁰. Most of the members of the group fled and sought political asylum in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia. As the period 1965 to 1967 drew to a close, tensions within the PAC leadership had reached boiling point. No one within the ranks of the PAC National Executive was bold enough to call for unity within the ranks of the leadership in order to depose Leballo, in spite of the fact that there were rampant signs within the organisation that the PAC membership was "fed up with him"³³¹. "In July 1967 AB. Ngcobo and P.N. Raboroko attempted to assume control of the Dar-es-Salaam office, and the ensuing scuffle was followed by the temporary closure of the office by the OAU/ALC". All these events eventually led to the summoning of the leadership conference at Moshi in Tanzania in September 1967³³².

The Moshi conference, summoned with the support of the ALC of the OAU, was intended to be a treaty conference and to seal the longstanding grounds of contention within the ranks of the leadership of the PAC. Instead, it endorsed some of the expulsions Leballo had started. At that conference the expulsion of A.B. Ngcobo was confirmed. A new structure called the 'Revolutionary Command' was set up to replace the Presidential Council and its headquarters were established in Lusaka (Zambia) in December 1967³³³. Re-establishing the links with the internal struggle in South Africa became the reason for relocating the headquarters to Lusaka and establishing the Revolutionary Council. This arrangement, however, was short-lived because the PAC was expelled from Lusaka by the Zambian government in 1971 because of its

³²⁸ O. Geyser: *Detente Southern Africa*, p. 30.

³²⁹ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: CJ Lekaje - 'Confidential', p. 4.

³³⁰ *Ibid*', p. 6.

³³¹ T. Lodge: *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945*, p. 311.

³³² ANC Archives, Fort Hare: *The Pan Africanist Congress of South Africa; Whom Does It Serve?* pp. J -24

³³³ T. Lodge: *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945*, p. 311.

internal conflicts. The summoning of the Moshi conference generated tensions within the PAC. As expressed in C.J. Lekaje's submission to the ALC, *PAC* members "never expected that the leadership who had ample time of meeting would have to be brought together by the ALC"³³⁴.

What dismayed the general membership even further, was the fact that they were the ones who asked, four years ago, for a conference of the same nature as the Moshi conference and yet they were left out when the conference was held. The general membership also questioned the credentials of people who were invited to be part of the deliberations at the conference. Among the issues raised by PAC members was about "an ex-South African beauty queen" who "was flown from London at enormous cost to attend the Moshi meeting. She participated in the discussions. Yet one senior party official (whose name is not mentioned in the records) took all the trouble to be at Moshi but was refused participation in the conference. To make it worse, he was asked to refund the ALC Secretariat the costs of traveling to Moshi"³³⁵. In addition to this, the general membership also raised concerns about the fact that the PAC leadership did not seek a fresh mandate from them before attending the conference. The conclusion to which the general membership had come was that the Moshi conference created "greater doubts and a sense of uncertainty"³³⁶. It widened the rift between the leaders and the adherents.

Challenges regarding the composition and role of the PAC leadership remained unresolved over the period 1968 to 1979. The leadership of the PAC under Leballo never reached a stage where it functioned as a collective. Leballo's leadership style was divisive in the sense that he would select from the Executive Committee whoever he needed for a particular purpose, to work exclusively with him and ignore or sideline the entire Committee. This resulted in a situation in which the National Executive Committee was perpetually divided within itself. The Moshi conference provided no drastic solutions³³⁷. P.K. Leballo continued to rule the PAC even though there were signs that the Executive Committee and the general membership of the organisation were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with his leadership. Up to this point, the Tanzanian government and the African Liberation Committee of the OAU were still prepared to grant him the benefit of the doubt, provide support and advice to his leadership, but this did not continue for too long.

During the early days of the PAC inside South Africa, it was normal practice and the duty of each member to guard the organisation against infiltration by Apartheid spies and ensure strict

³³⁴ T. Lodge: *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945*, p. 311.

³³⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 305-314.

³³⁶ PAC Archives: C.J. Lekaje: 'Confidential', p. 6.

³³⁷ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: CJ Lekaje - 'Confidential', p. 4.

discipline among the membership. The Oath of Allegiance was an important reference in this regard. PAC members formed close-knit cell structures and general meetings served as a source of inspiration and guidance. In exile, these practices were weakened, firstly by the uncertainty of the exile environment, as well as the unclear future and direction of liberation struggle³³⁸. PAC members from different regions and backgrounds in South Africa found themselves thrown together in a single, but diverse, exiled political community. Without organisational policy or strategy on how to handle and accommodate 'differences' among themselves, disorders of an obsessive-compulsive nature were fermented.

Leballo perverted the sound principles of strict discipline and the commanding powers vested in the President of the PAC as indicated in the PAC Constitution and Disciplinary Code³³⁹. The tendency to label, tag and spread distorted impressions about critics, potential competitors for power, independent thinkers and people who did not fit with any faction, were the negative spin-offs resulting from a perverted interpretation, deliberate or not, of the PAC Disciplinary Code.³⁴⁰ During the exile period, this tendency assumed serious proportions. It was sown and germinated during the Leballo era and especially during the early formative period in Maseru. It soon crystallised into a subculture within the organisation. Even after Leballo was deposed, it remained a fatal weapon in the power struggles, which characterised the operations of the PAC until it was unbanned in 1990.

During the period 1962 to 1979, Leballo used the 'internal enemy' allegations as a bulwark against critics and possible attacks, given the kind of blunders he committed as head of the organisation which cost not only people's lives but damaged the reputation of the PAC as an organisation. The March 1963 "press conference" in Maseru, is an important starting point if one seeks to understand fully the birth of the internal enemy syndrome in the PAC and the divisive impact the syndrome had on the entire organisation³⁴¹. At the "press conference", Leballo revealed to the world that on a certain day in April he would command an army of 15000 men trained in Basutoland and would invade South Africa. He declared that the people of South Africa were ready for such an uprising. Leballo made all these statements on the eve of the release of Mangaliso Sobukwe, the founding President of the PAC, from prison.

The people of South Africa believe that the design of the press conference was to have Sobukwe further kept in prison as it happened soon after the fatal press conference despite the fact that he had

³³⁸ Pan Africanist Congress: Disciplinary Code, pp. 91-92.

³³⁹ Ibid.

³⁴⁰ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: CJ Lekaje - 'Confidential', p. 4.

³⁴¹ Pan Africanist Congress: Disciplinary Code, p. 91.

completed his prison term"³⁴². Many people inside and outside South Africa suffered when the Apartheid Regime, assisted by the Basutoland police arrested more than 10 000 PAC members or suspected PAC members throughout South Africa. These people were tried, convicted and the severity of their sentences was unprecedented in the history of South Africa. "These sentences ranged from 3 years, 5 years, 10 years, 15 years, 20 years, 25 years, 30 years and 33 years; also life imprisonment was imposed on some and death sentences on others. As a direct result of the outburst more than 74 men have since been hanged by racists in South Africa"³⁴³.

The people of South Africa believe that the design of the press conference was to have Sobukwe further kept in prison as it happened soon after the fatal press conference despite the fact that he had completed his prison term"³⁴⁴. Many people inside and outside South Africa suffered when the Apartheid Regime, assisted by the Basutoland police arrested more than 10 000 PAC members or suspected PAC members throughout South Africa. These people were tried, convicted and the severity of their sentences was unprecedented in the history of South Africa. "These sentences ranged from 3 years, 5 years, 10 years, 15 years, 20 years, 25 years, 30 years and 33 years; also life imprisonment was imposed on some and death sentences on others. As a direct result of the outburst more than 74 men have since been hanged by racists in South Africa"³⁴⁵. Against this background, it can be assumed that Leballo was insecure, firstly about his personal safety and secondly about his leadership, stature and power within the organisation. Inventing the myth about an internal enemy was critical not only as a necessary divisive offensive but as a weapon against opponents within the PAC. PAC members who were critical of the Leballo administration in Basutoland "never had their grievances and complaints attended to in a manner fitting any well-run administration. Instead, they were given labels and tags implying that they were collaborating with the fascist government in South Africa"³⁴⁶.

More often than not such members would "just disappear" and the Leballo administration would spread rumours that persons had deserted and had "gone back to their masters in South Africa"³⁴⁷, because they were "'political renegades who were South African police informers". Some of these members fled to other independent African states as refugees and others were alleged to have been 'liquidated' by Leballo and Templeton Ntantala³⁴⁸. However, certain members who incurred the disfavour of the Leballo administration because they were against the 'liquidation' of other members, knowing what would befall them, left Basutoland on their

³⁴² Pan Africanist Congress: Disciplinary Code, p. 91.

³⁴³ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: CJ Lekaje: 'Confidential', p. 2.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid*; p. 3.

³⁴⁵ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: CJ Lekaje: 'Confidential', p. 4.

³⁴⁶ PAC Archives: TM Ntantala: 'Crisis in the PAC', pp. 1-11.

³⁴⁷ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: CJ Lekaje: 'Confidential', p. 4.

³⁴⁸ *Ibid*, p. 4.

own for Botswana. Whilst in transit through South Africa some were arrested by the South African Police and were convicted and given severe sentences.

A case of one Qoba is singled out by C.J. Lekaje in his submission to the ALC of the OAU. This man, "on his arrival in Botswana he found that the Leballo clique in Maseru had already sent messages to the representative in Botswana" to the effect that the people who had ran away from the PAC campaign Dar-es-Salaam and Basutoland were South African informers and should not be given any kind of assistance. "The representative in Botswana also wrote to Dar-es-Salaam confirming receipt of the Maseru message. The Qoba group wrote to the National Executive in Dar-es-Salaam where they pointed out the atrocities that were being perpetrated in Maseru and requesting to be cleared"³⁴⁹. What precluded this to happen was that Qoba got incarcerated by the South African police while en-route to Swaziland in search of political asylum. In 1966, at a PAC camp in Mbeya, Tanzania, the PAC members raised their dissatisfaction with the leadership of the PAC. Instead of addressing the concerns raised at the meeting, Leballo once again emphasised how he would deal with the enemies of the revolution who had infiltrated the party. Shortly thereafter, "three members of the PAC, among them an expectant woman, were declared prohibited immigrants in Tanzania and no reason was given for this (but the general opinion was that the leadership must have made such a recommendation)"³⁵⁰

P.K. Leballo continued with his labelling and myth-making exercise even after he was deposed. The later section of this chapter will demonstrate how the internal enemy syndrome reached a climax and resulted in open physical clashes and shedding of blood amongst PAC members in what became known as the 'November 1977 Coup d'etat' an incident which precipitated the downfall of Leballo³⁵¹. In a press statement released from Libya, in August 1982, Leballo continued, even after he was deposed, to label PAC leaders who came after him, i.e. Vusi Maake and J.N. Pokela as either conniving with "US Imperialists" or were "imported from racist Apartheid South Africa"³⁵².

The legacy Leballo left behind was one of factionalism, cliquism and mutual political blackmail, particularly within the ranks of leadership and the army. The army itself was deeply divided to such an extent that during the post-Leballo era, it was very difficult to unite the cadres. There

³⁴⁹ Tor Sellstrom, *Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa* Vol.I, p. J 71; Tor Sellstrom: *Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa*, Vol. H, p. 500.

³⁵⁰ PAC Archives: Fort Hare: Pre8S Statement by PK Leballo, Libya, August 1982.

³⁵¹ T. Lodge: *Black politics in South Africa since 1945*, p. 309; Tro Sellstrom: *Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa*, Vol. II. p. 500.

³⁵² D.B.A. Mahlangu: 'From South Africa To Azania', p. 56.

were divisions within the PAC army between the new cadres mostly from the June 16 Soweto uprisings, and the old guard from the 1960's. This division worsened in 1977. In November 1977 Leballo instigated an uprising by new APLA recruits who lived at Itumbi camp in the district of Mbeya in Tanzania. The coup was against the APLA High Command headed by Templeton Ntantala, the Deputy Chairman of the PAC³⁵³. Apparently there was competition between Leballo and Ntantala over the control of the army. Ntantala enjoyed support of the old guard and well established sections of the army. On the other hand, Leballo had won the loyalty and support of the new recruits. This he did by frequently visiting the camp in Mbeya, making "inciting speeches there", telling the new cadres that "he was giving them the right to go to Dar or Mbeya without bothering to get appropriate authority and that nobody had the power or right to stop them or refuse them permission to leave the camp. He then in subsequent weeks began drawing a few cadres to Dar"³⁵⁴.

On a date specified in November 1977 at 2am, *"a whole gang of new recruits attacked the residences of all the other Central Committee and High Command members"*³⁵⁵. One member of the High Command was stabbed, others were manhandled and the keys to the High Command's cabinets and offices taken. The uproar which occurred during the uproar alerted the police, the Office of Julius Nyerere (Prime Minister) and the OAU Liberation Committee. The interference of the OAU Liberation Committee and the Tanzanian government helped restore order for a short while. At a PAC meeting which involved the mutineers, a discussion about the removal of the Ntantala's High Command and its replacement by a new one ensued. The PAC leadership present at the meeting resolved to retain the High Command but the cadres rejected such a move. The Central Committee met in December 1977³⁵⁶. The aim of the meeting was to mend the imminent split and develop a policy to handle cadres. It was resolved that a consultative conference should be summoned in April 1978. A special Central Committee meeting was held in January to prepare for the April Consultative conference. During that meeting Leballo surprised everyone by ruling that called for the final and total overthrow of the whole High Command that is Commanders both in Tanzania and out of the home front³⁵⁷.

This came as an injunction to the Central Committee. The decision was endorsed at the Arusha Consultative Conference in April 1978. T.M. Ntantala and a plethora of highly trained cadres were expelled from the PAC. They formed the Azanian People's Revolutionary Party (APRP) on

³⁵³ World Muslim News, 7 May 1982.

³⁵⁴ Archives, Fort Hare: 'Crisis in the PAC', p. 2.

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

³⁵⁶ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: 'Crisis in the PAC', p. 5; T. Lodge: Black Politics in South Africa since 1945, pp. 308-317.

³⁵⁷ World Muslim News, 2 May 1979; PAC Archives, Fort Hare: Press Statement by P.K. Leballo, Tripoli, Libya, 25 August, 1982; Tor Sellstrom: Sweden and National Liberation in Southern Africa, Vol. I, pp. 498-499.

the 29th August 1979. When Pokela arrived in 1981, he held a series of talks with the APRP assisted by Frontline States. He managed to persuade the APRP to dissolve as a structure and its members returned to the PAC in 1982³⁵⁸. In November 1977 Leballo's dictatorship in the PAC could not be tolerated any further and was ultimately deposed in May 1979. It must be pointed out that there were numerous achievements which could be counted and credited to the era of Leballo's leadership. The establishment of diplomatic relations with China was a result of Leballo's political maneuverings³⁵⁹. Long after Leballo had gone, the relationship with China proved beneficial to the PAC, especially in the arena of the PAC military training and ideological strategy³⁶⁰. Moreover, a limited number of PAC men were sent to various places for military training; i.e. about 30 in Nairobi, 20 in Addis Ababa, and another 15 scattered in about 4 or 5 African states. This does not include the more than 30 men in Botswana³⁶¹. Some were in Europe (approximately 20) and over 100 in the United States of America.

In November 1974, the PAC lobbied successfully and obtained the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations General Assembly. In July the following year, the OAU Kampala meeting adopted as official policy a lengthy document prepared by the PAC in which it argued for the illegality of South Africa's international status³⁶². Subsequently Libya and Ghana offered the PAC training facilities, hence 100 PAC cadres were flown to Libya for military training, the same year. In other words, even though things did not work well within the PAC, there was limited achievement in certain areas. On the 30th of April and 1st of May 1979, the Central Committee of the PAC held an extra-ordinary session in Dar-es-Salaam which led to the appointment of a Presidential Council. This was charged with the responsibility of fulfilling the duties of the Acting President³⁶³. This structure superceded the Revolutionary Council set up at Moshi in 1968. Other developmets entailed moving the PAC headquarters from Lusaka back to Dar-es-Salaam in 1971. Kenneth Kaunda expressed reluctance to host an organisation such as the PAC so deeply divided within itself, The appointment of the Presidential Council was ostensibly meant to cover the period when Leballo was going to be absent for medical treatment

³⁵⁸ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: 'New Road Of Revolution', pp. 1-2; PAC Archives, Fort Hare: C.J. Lekaje: 'Confidential', p. 7; Pan Africanist Congress: The Constitution of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, 1959, in Speeches of Mangaliso Sobukwe, 1949-1959; PAC Archives, F01i Hare: C.J. Lekaje - 'Confidential', 1967, p. 9.

³⁵⁹ PAC Archi ves, Fort Hare: CJ Lekaje: 'Confidential' p. 5; ANC archives, Fort Hare: The ANC of South Africa: 'The Pan Africanist Congress of South Africa; Whom Does It! Serve? p.111.

³⁶⁰ AB Ngcobo: Report of the Treas urer-General, Moshi Conference, September 1967.

³⁶¹ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: AB Ngcobo: Report of the Treasurer-General, Moshi Conference, 1967, p. 27; ANC Archives, Fort Hare: The ANC of South Africa: 'The Pan Africanist Congress of South Africa: Whom Does It Serve? pp. 1 -11.

³⁶² PAC Archives, Fort Hare: A.B. Ngcobo - Report of the Treasurer-General, 1967; PAC Archives, Fort Hare: CJ Lekaje: 'Confidential', p. 9.

³⁶³ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: CJ Lekaje: 'Confidential', p. 9.

abroad³⁶⁴. In reality it meant the overthrow of Leballo and the ushering in of a new epoch in the PAC leadership.

The Presidential Council consisted of Vusi Maake, David Sibeko and Ellias Ntloedibe, all of whom were members of the Central Committee. The triumvirate, which was to lead the PAC after Leballo's deposition, had backing from the Tanzanian government and the Tanzania-led OAU African Liberation Committee³⁶⁵. In 1979, the Tanzanian government and the ALC were fully convinced of the centrality of Leballo to the challenges of the organisation and they deemed it necessary to intervene in order to assist with the rehabilitation of the PAC. Consequently, the Tanzanian government announced in the press and over the radio that Mr Leballo had resigned from the leadership of the PAC on grounds of ill-health³⁶⁶. This was despite the fact that Leballo had not tendered his resignation letter. He made attempts to regain his position and indicated in a counter-statement that he never resigned from the leadership of the PAC to no avail³⁶⁷. The fact that he was already out of Tanzania the authorities there would not allow him back.

It could be argued that the intervention of the Tanzanian authorities in PAC affairs and the removal of Leballo from leadership widened rifts within the PAC. The majority of cadres within APLA was still loyal to Leballo and could not accept the interim leadership. They probably saw in the leadership of the triumvirate the usurpation of the party's constitutional leadership role, as the PAC constitution did not make provision for an executive presidency³⁶⁸. The epoch of the triumvirate was short-lived could hardly constitute a significant historical period. Within one month, starting from 1st May 1979 to 1st June 1979, the triumvirate's administration was already saddled with serious challenges which were epitomised in the assassination of David Sibeko, a member of the ruling triumvirate³⁶⁹. The murder of David Sibeko, a member of the Presidential Council which ruled the PAC and the trial which ensued, exacerbated tensions and widened rifts within the PAC. At this stage it appeared that the organisation had reached a climax in the long history of challenges it had experienced since its inception. As highlighted above, the murder of Sibeko occurred just after P.K. Leballo was forced to resign³⁷⁰. The African

³⁶⁴ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: A.B. Ngcobo: Report of the Treasurer-General, 1967.

³⁶⁵ Ibid.

³⁶⁶ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: A.B. Ngcobo - Report of the Treasurer-General, 1967; PAC Archives, Fort Hare: CJ Lekaje: 'Confidential', p. 9.

³⁶⁷ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: C.J. Lekaje: 'Confidential', p. 9.

³⁶⁸ AB Ngcobo: Report of the Treasurer-General, pp. 1-2; C.J. Lekaje: 'Confidential', pp. 8-10.

³⁶⁹ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: AB Ngcobo: Report of the Treasurer-General, Moshi Conference, 1967, p. 27; ANC Archives, Fort Hare: The ANC of South Africa: 'The Pan Africanist Congress of South Africa: Whom Does It Serve?' pp. 1 -11.

³⁷⁰ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: A.B. Ngcobo: Report of the Treasurer-General, 1967.

Liberation Committee literally had to intervene and take over the management of the PAC until Vusumzi Maake was formally appointed as the new Chairperson of the PAC in August 1979.

4.3 The Leadership Style of Vusumzi Maake, 1979-1981.



Vusumzi Maake (Source: A 1934.C12.2 ERAB, Tembisa, April, 1969.

Vusumzi Maake had been a member of the PAC since 1964 but left the movement during its crisis epoch in 1968. His opportunity to sneak back into the PAC's activities came when President Tolbert of Liberia permitted Vorster to visit that country in the 1974 'spirit of detente'³⁷¹. President Tolbert engaged the services of Maake, after 'Vorster's visit, to contact the PAC leadership and assured it that Liberia had not collaborated with the enemy, but would continue supplying the liberation movement with material support. Maake established contacts with Leballo and conveyed Tolbert's invitation and assurances of continued material support to the PAC³⁷².

Leballo, seeing the attractive financial prospects in the opportunity, immediately designated Maake his Special Envoy in Liberia. Thus, when Leballo finally met with President Tolbert, and consequently collected some \$10 000 from the Liberians, Maake was back in the center of PAC political activities³⁷³. What this meant was that there was satisfaction from President Tolbert in that at least the PAC had not regarded Vorster's visit to Liberia in a negative light. While Leballo was also contented with funding and other benefits from Liberia, Maake had derived out of the deal impeccable credentials for re-entry into the PAC. Ever since his re-entry into PAC politics³⁷⁴, Maake was well-known for his tendency to save his skin and always playing it safe in PAC crises and in the politics of the Azanian Revolution in general.

³⁷¹ Ibid.

³⁷² Ibid.

³⁷³ PAC in Perspective, Series No. 4, July 1978, p.33.

³⁷⁴ Daily News, Tanzania, 28/4/1984.

Maake, arguably so, was always careful to read the balance of forces and quickly determine where to stand. When he was appointed Chairman of the PAC with the backing of the ALC of the OAU, Maake started his one year and five months period of chairmanship beginning in August 1979 to January 1981 from a very low point³⁷⁵. He was implicated in the murder of David Sibeko. Ordinary PAC members doubted his credentials and asked why he was left out by the cadres from Itumbi camp, if their mission was to eliminate the post- Leballo Presidential Council, as Maake argued in his testimony during the trial³⁷⁶. Maake was not known among the cadres in the army camps. The latter point was to be the major source of many challenges he encountered during his short term of office. The army loyalty was vital in political leadership during exile epoch, particularly in the PAC, where force and fear had become important attributes for sustained leadership of the organisation³⁷⁷. Thus, Maake's short period of leadership was characterised by what could be convoked as indecision, corruption, factionalism and cliquism.

One of the first challenges Maake's leadership had to deal with was the army situation. Members of APLA who were still loyal to Leballo, some of whom were dismayed at the death of David Sibeko, refused to accept Maake's leadership of the National Executive Committee³⁷⁸. It could be argued that no major changes occurred in the constitution of the National Executive Committee during Maake's reign. At a plenary session held in April 1980, seven months after Maake was appointed chairman, a few additions to the executive committee were made. These entailed the inclusion of D.D.D. Mantshontsho, Count Petersen and Ellias Ntloedibe. Count Petersen became Secretary for Education and Manpower Development; Ellias Ntloedibe, Secretary for Publicity and Information and Mantshontsho became Administrative Secretary³⁷⁹.

However, the composition of the Central Committee became a source of conflict within 12 months of its assumption of duties. Maake was assured of loyalty and co-operation by the general membership of the PAC, through its committees and structures of representation. Surprisingly, when he addressed PAC members at Ilala party residence in Dar-es-Salaam, all secondary differences that were there in the Leballo era resurfaced³⁸⁰. Questions and demands

³⁷⁵ ANC Archives, Fort Hare (Howard Pim Library): Henry Isaacs: Memorandum: To all Representatives, Offices and Branches of the PAC, Re-Guideline of the Department of Foreign Affairs, New York, 17 February 1982, p. 4. (Box 2: File no. 22).

³⁷⁶ APLA' Notes, Pretoria, 21 December 2001.

³⁷⁷ Daily News, Tanzania, n.d. August 1979.

³⁷⁸ PAC Archives: PAC World, Journal of the Pan Africanist Congress, n.d. p. 1.

³⁷⁹ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: PAC/Tanzania/1/164/9: Minutes of the Administrative Committee of the PAC, 30 April 1979, p.1

³⁸⁰ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: PAC/Tanzania/1/164/9: Minutes of the Administrative Committee of the PAC, 30 April 1979, p.7.

were raised and put before his leadership team. The PAC membership argued that "the leadership alone as an element in the Party cannot be justified to arrogate to itself a decisive role in the institution of the alternative to Leballo"³⁸¹. The membership urged Maake and his executive committee to drop two new members of the National Executive Committee, Mantshontsho and Ntloedibe, because "*their role in the past twelve months was a manifestation of their miserable failures*"³⁸². They also demanded that they be involved in the future decisions about the appointment of people to positions of leadership in the Party.

The same kind of demand for democratic participation in the election of Central Committee members was made during the era of Leballo and it continued during the epochs of Pokela and Mlambo. It could be argued that the failures of Mantshontsho and Ntloedibe were not clearly spelt out, except that frequent reference was made to their historical roles and associations. The fact that Ellias Ntloedibe was once a close associate of Leballo was raised as an issue against him during what was supposedly the 'new era' of reconstruction in the PAC. Ntloedibe was portrayed as a person "who has a long history of opportunism" and that his outlook was based on personal ambitions and interests.

Maake had to sift through all these generalizations and make informed decision, something he failed to do. The criticisms were not only limited to the two members of the executive he recently appointed. They also involved Fezile Ntlapho, a PAC representative in Egypt. The membership demanded his immediate withdrawal as he failed to live up to his responsibilities in Egypt³⁸³. Criticisms were extended directly to Maake as Chairman of the party. The membership criticised him for not being fully resident where the headquarters of the movement were and his unavailability during crucial decision-making moments. Other issues raised were tacit criticism of his personal conduct and his failure to project a good image of the PAC in the media³⁸⁴.

The PAC leadership had to deal with matters that also entailed the coordination and management of various internal departments. Pertinent issues revolved around the Department of Defense in that its inefficiency was raised as a point of dissatisfaction. Besides the task of undoing the legacy and influence of Leballo in the army, training courses and military traditions brought to APLA by cadres trained in different parts of the world needed to be

³⁸¹ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: PAC/tan/ 1/164/9: Minutes of the Administrative Committee of the PAC, 30 April, 1979, p. 14.

³⁸² Ibid.

³⁸³ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: PAC/Tanzania/1/164/9: Minutes of the Administrative Committee of the PAC, 30 April 1979, p.4

³⁸⁴ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: PAC/Tanzania/1/164/9: Minutes of the Administrative Committee of the PAC, 30 April 1979, p.4

blended together into a uniform APLA tradition³⁸⁵. This could not be done without the intervention of the PAC National Executive Committee and it could be said that the PAC leadership under Maake also failed to revive diplomatic relations with countries of strategic significance to the PAC army such as Libya. All these factors added together, made the relationship between the army and the political leadership exceptionally difficult.

The other Department singled out for criticism was that of Foreign Affairs headed by Henry Isaacs. The PAC leadership was criticised for not assisting this department to develop a foreign-relations strategy in line with the ideology of the organisation. The strategy of the said department was said to be concentrating more on Western countries than on African countries. A request, though cast as a demand, was made that the office of Pan African Affairs be revived and more PAC missions be opened in Africa³⁸⁶. Even though this made ideological sense, in terms of improving the political image of the organisation, materially "it made little sense" as many African countries were too poor to provide the kind of financial support the PAC needed.

A long list of complaints and demands for immediate intervention were made with regard to the Department of Education and Manpower Development headed by Count Petersen. The main criticism and challenge brought to the attention of the leadership was about a lack of policies on Education and Manpower Development. The general membership of the PAC also criticised Maake's leadership for failing to step-up its activities in the Frontline States in order to recruit the kind of manpower needed by the PAC. Corrupt behaviour on the part of the leadership involving the chairperson himself was raised by PAC members as a point of concern. This involved incidents of "excessive drinking and womanizing" at the Khitonyama Residence which housed Central Committee members³⁸⁷.

Other issues which challenged Maake's leadership included conditions in the camps, lack of consultation and open discussion with members of the Central Committee. Most importantly, one of the points articulated in the document sent to the Central Committee to communicate dissatisfaction with Maake's leadership, referred to the Party's Constitution. The point made was that in 1959 when the Party was formed, a constitution was adopted which suited conditions inside the country of a mass organisation operating openly. No provision was made for the army since the conditions did not allow for that³⁸⁸. The responsibility was therefore placed on Maake's leadership to look into the issue of revising the constitution of the PAC in

³⁸⁵ APLA' Notes, Pretoria, 21 December 2001.

³⁸⁶ PAC in Perspective, Series No. 4, July 1978, p.37.

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

³⁸⁸ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: PAC/Tanzania/1/164/9: Minutes of the Administrative Committee of the PAC, 30 April 1979, p.6.

order to suit exile conditions. Coupled with the above- listed demands of the PAC general membership, was the demand for transparency within the organisation's leadership echelon.

The "secrets of the leadership" regarding the performance of its executive officials was challenged. There was a demand for clarity on the core functions of each and every position within the Central Committee and that performance measurement and evaluation be done so that all those leaders who could not live up to their responsibilities could be identified and removed from the leadership structure³⁸⁹. All these demands pointed to a need to develop a well- functioning administrative structure within the PAC, review the operations of various departments and create systems which allowed for transparency and access to information. The issues raised were of such critical significance, but there was surprisingly no documented response from Maake's Central Committee addressing them.

This kind of organisational schizophrenic tendencies badly labelled the leadership structure and further tainted relations between the leadership and rank-and-file membership. Elias Ntloedibe was not singled out for criticism ostensibly on the grounds of poor performance, but that he was viewed as "an enemy agent within the Party"³⁹⁰. Allegations that the Botswana PAC group was full of 'Enemy' agents were rife during this epoch, even though unsubstantiated. This divided opinions within the Party. Elias Ntloedibe was among the PAC leaders who flouted those claims to the point of irritating ordinary PAC membership who started demanding evidence and investigation of such allegations. What becomes apparent is that it was not his performance which was an issue but his involvement in the smear campaigns against members of the PAC who were not in the Executive Committee³⁹¹.

Maake did not use this age-old Leballo weapon against anyone during his term of office. Maybe he saw no need to do so as it was clearly pointed out in leadership caucuses that "*a new Son of the Soil has to be identified to lead the PAC out of the quagmire before it's too late*"³⁹². So he had little ambitions about his position as Chairman of the Party. He knew that the PAC was looking for a new leader whilst he was there. Undersandably so, he tended to involve himself in his 'own' businesses and was absent from Party meetings³⁹³. On several occasions he was away from the movement, making money for himself or acquiring more education in West Africa, Britain and United States. It is not clear who funded all his undertakings. What could be noted,

³⁸⁹ PAC Archives: PAC World, Journal of the Pan Africanist Congress, n.d. p. 3.

³⁹⁰ APLA' Notes, Pretoria, 21 December 2001.

³⁹¹ PAC Archives: Minutes of the Administrative Committee of the PAC, undated, p. 14.

³⁹² PAC Archives, Fort Hare: Minutes of the Plenary Session of the Central Committee meeting, Dar-es- Salaam, December, 1-7, 1982, p. 2.

³⁹³ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: Minutes of the Plenary Session of the Central Committee meeting, Dar-es- Salaam, December, 1-7, 1982, p. 2.

however, is that during the Pokela era, he was investigated for the misappropriation of PAC funds³⁹⁴.

During this era, the internal enemy syndrome manifested itself in the form of ideological differences within the PAC. These started during the Leballo epoch when the 'New Road of Revolution' was adopted by the Central Committee in 1975 as the new revolutionary outlook of the PAC. The 'New Road of Revolution' was basically a watered-down version of Marxism-Leninism and Maoism adapted for African conditions of the struggle for liberation in South Africa. It originated from the political education seminars held in the PAC military camps. T.M. Ntantala was instrumental in this initiative and the rationale for the 'New Road of Revolution' was that "the external mission was in political decay, ideological chaos and organisational disarray"³⁹⁵. Leballo was bound to pay lip-service to the 'New Road of Revolution' during his time and because of the divisions which predominated his period in power, split along ideological lines, could not surface the way they did during the Maake era.

There was a resurgence of divisions between the 'Marxist-Leninist-Maoists', Maoists and 'traditional Africanists' of the Sobukwe days. As a result, labeling and tagging depended on where one stood in the ideological divide. Some of the Marxist-Leninist-Maoists who were regarded as ultra- left broke away and forged ties with T.M. Ntantala to form the Azanian People's Revolutionary Party, whereas others remained within the PAC and were in many instances victims of persecution and disfavor. The dominant ideological tendency in the PAC was "Maoist in outlook but Africanist in content"³⁹⁶. The impact of these ideological strands was that by the time Maake handed over Chairmanship to Pokela in 1981, the entire organization had suffered a two-way ideological split. The notion of the "struggle of the Two-Lines, i.e. Revolutionaries versus Liberal Nationalists" emerged.³⁹⁷ Maake was not able to traverse the ideological divide in the PAC, rise above ideological labels and cast himself as a uniting figure. He was constantly criticised by the general membership for his failure to provide political and ideological leadership³⁹⁸. Unequivocally, these challenges stemmed from the chaos which dominated the Leballo era.

Factionalism, cliquism, mutual political blackmail and the formation of temporary alliances based on expediency dominated the ranks of leadership during the time of Maake. His political

³⁹⁴ PAC in Perspective, Series No. 4, July 1978, p.37.

³⁹⁵ Ibid.

³⁹⁶ T. Lodge: Black Politics in South Africa since 1945, pp. 295-317; PAC Archives, Fort Hare: PAC: T.M. Ntantala is Gone; But his ideas will conquer, Azanian People's Revolutionary Party, Zimbabwe, undated, p. 3.

³⁹⁷ PAC Archives. Fort Hare: Minutes of the Administrative Committee of the PAC, undated, p. 6.

³⁹⁸ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: Feature: South Africa, unnumbered and undated.

wit and his tendency to involve himself in his own private business away from the headquarters, created a chance for opportunists both within the ranks of the National Executive Committee and in the army³⁹⁹. Maake's weak leadership gave a chance for the pre-eminence of what was called "militarism" in the PAC. This referred to the initiatives of the cadre movement in the organisation. Some of the cadres saw the divisions within the leadership as an opportunity to gain positions of power within the organisation and the army⁴⁰⁰. Some of them tended to align themselves with one of the factions or cliques within leadership.

It could be argued that directionlessness on the Chairman of the Central Committee was the outstanding characteristic of the Maake era. The point of concern was that the cadre movement 'was not a homogenous movement'. Among them were very many opportunists who were exploiting the genuine grievances of the cadres and calling for the dismissal of the entire Central Committee in the hope that they would be given leadership positions⁴⁰¹. Underlying the superficially petty interpersonal relations were serious political agendas which involved scheming and jockeying for positions of power within the Central Committee.

Nevertheless, there were positive spin-offs for the PAC during the Maake era. He lacked the demagogue stature and the self-imposing dictatorial predisposition of his predecessor, which in one way or the other was an advantage. It meant that ordinary PAC members were free, for the first time, to criticise their leadership openly without fear of suspension. In fact it is during Maake's era, that longstanding grounds of dissatisfaction with the internal situation in the PAC were unearthed, confronted and propositions made for solutions⁴⁰². Maake's failures stemmed from his indecision and his preoccupation with interests other than those of the PAC. His 'failures' became the burden of the Nyathi Pokela epoch. The fact that the ordinary membership of the PAC had enough time to ponder over the challenges of the PAC during the Maake era meant that the burden of expectations about what should happen during the era of Pokela was high and somewhat materialistic.

³⁹⁹ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: Minute of the Administrative Committee of the PAC, undated, pp. 10-11.

⁴⁰⁰ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: PAC/1/164/9: Minute of the Administrative Committee of the PAC, 30 April, 1979, p, 15.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid.

⁴⁰² ANC Archives: Henry Isaacs: Memo -To All Representatives, Offices and Branches of the PAC, p. 4.

4.4 The Leadership Attributes of John Nyathi Pokela



John Nyathi Pokela (Source: South African Press Union Publication. Oct/Nov, 1985)

John Nyathi Pokela assumed the leadership of the PAC mission in exile following widespread dissatisfaction within the entire organisation with the former chairman, Vusumzi Maake. Pokela's advent in exile encouraged and inspired the majority of PAC members inside and outside South Africa⁴⁰³. Talks about revitalisation and reorganisation of the PAC became rife. His arrival raised the morale of the membership and motivated many PAC members, who had either resigned or had retreat into oblivion, to return to the organisation and be active again. It was, however a grave mistake to assume that the generalised enthusiasm and euphoria would by itself bring about reorganisation and reconstruction⁴⁰⁴.

The PAC with a past history of disorganisation, chaos, anarchy and ineffectiveness presented a formidable challenge to Pokela. He had not been thoroughly briefed about the status of the PAC mission in exile "where plots and intrigues, scheming and manoeuvring among and within the organisation's many factions" were the stock-in-trade⁴⁰⁵. The expectation that Pokela was going to be the "Messiah" of the PAC was not met, but the basis for order and a sense of direction about where the organisation was supposed to go was laid. Pokela's stature, dignity and charisma somewhat restored the respect the PAC had lost as an organisation.⁴⁰⁶ It could be argued, however, that a combined effort of the leadership and the membership was what was needed to bolster the initiatives and the vital role Pokela needed to play in reconstructing the PAC.

⁴⁰³ South African Institute of Race Relations: Survey of Race Relations, SAIRR, Cape Town, 1966, pp. 1-63.

⁴⁰⁴ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: Feature: South Africa, undated.

⁴⁰⁵ Sunday Mail: 'PAC Freedom Hero Mourned', June 1985.

⁴⁰⁶ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: World Muslim News, 7 May, 1982.

During the era of Pokela the notion of internal enemy surfaced in forms which led to violence amounting to human rights atrocities, especially within the ranks of the army and among the rank and file membership of the PAC. Internal enemies within the PAC were usually identified on the basis of their previous histories within the organisation, close association with Leballo (the first Chairman of the PAC), ideological trends and even disloyalty to the dominant faction in the leadership of the organisation⁴⁰⁷.

Ideological divisions within the PAC resulting from the 1975 adoption of the strategy document 'New Road for the Revolution' under Leballo's leadership, persisted during the era of John Pokela. The latter was able to traverse the ideological divide and earned the respect among the cadres for his ideological sharpness and his understanding of the Marxist-Leninist- Maoist political tenets⁴⁰⁸. Of course the political education sessions in Robben Island during his 12 year prison term played a major influential role. His ideological acumen could provide a central point of ideological convergence within the organisations. All the same, the divisions, labeling and name-tagging on grounds of perceived ideological orientation continued to form the basis of serious tensions and division within the ranks of the PAC⁴⁰⁹. The division between "traditional African nationalists" led by A.B. Ngcobo and the "revolutionary Socialists" led by the likes of Sabelo Phama, the Secretary for Defense continued. After the death of Pokela and during the era of Johnson Mlambo, the tension eventually led to the split by "African Nationalists" who formed a short-lived forum called the Sobukwe Forum⁴¹⁰.

The serious role played by ideology in dividing the PAC into camps was a major hindrance to organizational advancement. It was noted that the root source of the problem was an ideological and political one could summarily be said to be a question of "a bourgeois versus a proletarian ideology". The Hamilton Keke and Joe Mkwana's ideological standpoints illustrated that talking radical ideology outside power positions was different from operating in positions within the Central Committee where they changed their language. The point to be derived from this is that the PAC members did not trust one other. Thus, the idea of an 'internal enemy', real or imagined, was observed through all the various phases of the organization's existence in exile.

Henry Isaacs, for example, resigned from the PAC Central Committee on grounds which combined issues of principle, personal concern and power struggle. On personal grounds, what

⁴⁰⁷ PAC Archives: 'Proposal for Organization and reorganization of the PAC', Dar-es-Salaam, 8 July 1981, pp. 1 -6.

⁴⁰⁸ ANC Archives, Fort Hare: Henry Isaacs: Struggle within the Struggle: An inside view of the PAC of South Africa, unpublished Manuscript, London, 1986 (Box 4, File no. 75).

⁴⁰⁹ ANC Archives, Fort Hare: Henry Isaacs-Memo: To all representatives and branches of the PAC, p. 13

⁴¹⁰ Ibid; p.7.

can be deduced from his writings is a sense of bitterness and hurt based on the fact that he put a lot of effort towards profiling the PAC in the United Nations (UN) and also in some quarters of the black American community⁴¹¹. He wished to cling to the 'fame' which he established despite the reorganization which the PAC wanted to effect. Furthermore, being in the UN was a comfortable position and close to the real corridors of power, at an international level. As Director of Foreign Affairs, Henry Isaacs hoped to call the shots on all issues relating to the PAC and international relations, i. e. from appointments to the management of funds⁴¹². It could be argued that Isaacs did not regard himself as part of a collective leadership, guided by a chairman with superior prerogatives and decision-making powers. Moreover, Isaacs's decision to resign was based on principled grounds, arguing that he was not prepared to be part of the Central Committee until the organisation was restructured drastically and until a conference was called allowing for "a people's leadership" to emerge⁴¹³. He was labeled in many ways by PAC members. He was referred to as "a revolutionary turned into an American government spy", a "CIA agent whom history has exposed"⁴¹⁴ and an enemy of the revolution.

What is of critical importance is whether there was any substance to these allegations. The confidential letter written by Benny Bunsec to Henry Isaacs points to some of the relative merits of the allegations of an 'internal' enemy, particularly in Isaacs's case. Bunsec pointed out that reliable source within the PAC indicated that correspondence had been spotted from Henry Isaacs to the World Council of Churches, advising them not to support the PAC. In addition to that, Isaacs also 'gave evidence before a Select Committee in the US against the PAC. As Bunsec indicated "as far as I know the terms of reference of that Select Committee is to gather information about 'communist subversion' in Southern Africa ".

⁴¹¹ H. Isaacs: *Struggle within the struggle* An inside view of the PAC of South Africa, pp. 1 -36.

⁴¹² PAC Archives: PAC/Tan/1/77 /23: Letter from Benny Bunsec to Henry Isaacs, 1982.

⁴¹³ ANC Archives: H Isaacs: Memo - To all representatives, office and branches of the PAC, Re-Guideline for the Department of Foreign Affairs.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid.

These issues according to Bunsec were serious allegations which if true, could completely discredit Henry Isaacs and his entire political career. What is illustrated in this instance is that the internal enemy in the PAC was largely a figment of imagination built on isolated but limited elements of truth. It could be said that the main reason for Isaacs's resignation was "hunger for power. He wanted the "Chairperson to listen to him and act according to his plan. He wanted to manipulate Poks but Poks was firm and that hurt Isaacs' ego"⁴¹⁵.

The group which suffered most from the allegations of the internal enemy was that of the former members of the Azanian People's Revolutionary Party (APRP). Surveillance of the former members of the APRP became the order of the day⁴¹⁶. The process of the integration of the former expelled members of the APRP was hampered by suspicions among PAC members that the APRP had not really been dissolved and that its architects were simply adopting a low-profile, buying time to challenge the leadership. This was exacerbated by the rumours in Dar-es-Salaam in December 1981, about the discovery or the interception of a document outlining the APRP strategy "for the seizure of the strategic leadership positions" within the PAC Central Committee⁴¹⁷.

When attempts were made to verify the rumours, there were vigorous denials from members of the Central Committee in Dar-es-Salaam. The reality of the situation was that the former Chairperson of the APRP, Mokoena, was found in the PAC camp reading 'some very sensitive documents of the APRP which mapped out strategy and tactics of operation within the PAC and their home-going program objectives'⁴¹⁸. These were inflated within the PAC and resulted in witch-hunting and harassment of former APRP members and some of them ultimately resigned from the PAC. T.M. Ntantala, the founder and leader of the APRP who had been appointed Chief Representative of the PAC in Zimbabwe to utilise his contacts there and strengthen the PAC-ZANU relations, was removed from his position and ended up a refugee in Zimbabwe once more⁴¹⁹. He and a few APRP members who, out of volition decided to leave the PAC, managed to secure a piece of land in Zimbabwe for subsistence. It was not long before the matter was

⁴¹⁵ ANC Archives: Henry Isaacs: Memo -To all representatives, office and branches of the PAC.

⁴¹⁶ APLA Notes, Pretoria, 21 December 2002; PAC Archives: PAC/Tan/1177/23: Letter from Benny Bunsec to Henry Isaacs, 1982.

⁴¹⁷ PAC Archives: APRP: 'T.M. Ntantala is Gone; But His Ideals will Conquer', p. 3.

⁴¹⁸ PAC Archives: Minutes of the Plenary Session of the Central Committee, Da -es-Salaam, December 1-7, 1982, p.6.

⁴¹⁹ ANC Archives: H. Isaacs: 'memo': To all representatives, offices and branches of the PAC, Re-Guidelines for the Department of Foreign Affairs, February 1982.

resolved by Pokela's leadership that Ntantala was brought on board once again and was appointed PAC Chief Representative in Uganda⁴²⁰.

The work and outcome of the Commission of Inquiry into the irregularities and corruption during the era of Maake also provided grounds for the development of perceptions on internal enemies. Maake, the Deputy Chairperson of the PAC under Pokela's chairmanship, was also labeled an enemy agent. Reference was made to the way in which the PAC was bankrupted during the time of his Chairmanship but subsequently he emerged as a businessman. This generated hostilities against him, especially from the ranks of the general membership and cadres. They were not only dissatisfied with his leadership between 1979 and 1981 but had also suspected his complicity in the murder of David Sibeko⁴²¹. As a result of these rumours Maake, was for most of the time, absent from the meetings of the Central Committee. He deliberately chose to play a peripheral and almost invisible role because, as he argued, he wanted the Commission of Inquiry to complete its findings and get his name cleared⁴²².

In his communication with the Commission of Enquiry and correspondence to Central Committee, Maake indicated that he would like to put the record straight. This, however, did not materialize due to financial constraints under which the Commission operated.⁴²³ During the entire era of Pokela, Maake remained in the shadow of PAC operations and was alienated from his comrades and suffered vilifications. This led to violence and death of some people alleged to be enemies of the Party.

"More persons were murdered in factional strife in the PAC during the four years under Pokela than in 17 years under Leballo. Between June 1982 and January 1985 at least six persons were murdered, their physical elimination sanctioned or condoned by the PAC leaders who accused or suspected the victims of being "dissidents"⁴²⁴.

Ideological and political considerations were behind the alleged murders. One case referred to is that of a certain Mahoyi who was murdered in Dar-es-Salaam on suspicion of continuing with the

⁴²⁰ PAC Archives: John N Pokela: 'The Pan Africanist Congress pays its compliments to you', Letter to the H.E. High Commissioner, Zimbabwe High Commission, Dar-es-Salaam, 28, Feb. 1981.

⁴²¹ PAC Archives: V. Maake: Lette to: Commission of Enquiry and Central Committee of the PAC: for information, London. 5th August, 1982.

⁴²² ANC Archives, Fort Hare: Minutes of the Plenary Session of the Central Committee Meeting, External Headquarters, Dar-es-Salaam, December 17, 1982, pp. 1-3.

⁴²³ ANC Archives: H. Isaacs: The struggle within the Struggle: An inside view of the PAC of South Africa, p. 10; PAC Archives: Report of the meeting of USA chapter of PAC held in New York on November. 30, 1985.

⁴²⁴ ANC Archives: Henry Isaacs: Memo: To all representatives, offices and branches of the PAC, Re -Guidelines for the Department of Foreign Affairs, p. 7; PAC Archives: 'Minutes of the Extra-ordinary Central Committee meeting', February, 1981, p.2

agenda of the APRP⁴²⁵. A number of other PAC militants were threatened with death when they had political differences with the leaders of the organisation.

While Pokela made creative and honest efforts to bring stability and order to the PAC, personal envy, mindless vengeance and vindictiveness, undermined his efforts. This caused serious tension for Pokela, who shouldered huge expectations from the Frontline states, the OAU and the rank and file membership of the PAC⁴²⁶, inside and outside South Africa. He was expected to get things right within the organisation. Nevertheless, he succeeded in setting standards and procedures for the running of the affairs of the organisation but failed to bring about internal peace and stability⁴²⁷. Even during his time, the organisation remained in relative turmoil. What was remarkable about his leadership is that he was able to manage the turmoil much better than his predecessors.

4.5 The Leadership Style of Johnson Mlambo (1985-1990)



Johnson Mlambo (Source: University of the Witwatersrand Government Publications, Cillie, P. M.

During Mlambo's era a number of developments were taking place within South Africa. The PAC leadership, in its quest for relevance, had to respond to these developments. These included, among others, the Sebokeng, Sharpeville and Boipatong upsurges of October to November 1984 as well as the Uitenhage funeral march where a massacre occurred on the 21st of March 1985⁴²⁸.

⁴²⁵ PAC Archives: 'Minutes of the Plenary Session of the PAC Central Committee', Dar-es-Salaam, December, 1-7, 1981, pp. 1-3.

⁴²⁶ APLA Notes, 21 December 2001; PAC Archives: 'Minutes of the Plenary Session of the PAC Central Committee', Dar-es-Salaam, December, 1-7, 1981, pp.1-3; PAC Archives: "Minutes of the Plenary Session of the PAC Central Committee, Dar-es-Salaam, December, 1-7, 1981, p. 22.

⁴²⁷ ANC Archives: H. Isaacs: The Struggle within the Struggle: An inside view of the PAC of South Africa, pp 13-14; PAC Archives: PAC/Tanz/1/164/9: Minutes of the Administrative Committee of the PAC, 1979; PAC Archives: Work In Progress (WIPI (47): 'The Pan Africanist Congress', April 1987, p. 16.

⁴²⁸ PAC .Archives: PAC/Tan/1/85/8: Report of the PAC Chairman, Johnson Mlambo, 1985.

These events attracted political attention nationally and internationally and focused political initiatives on what was happening in South Africa. This marked the beginning of serious competition among exile liberation movements for visibility and popular support inside South Africa. The ANC had responded to the developments inside South Africa, since the 1983 tri-cameral elections, with the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF)⁴²⁹. The left wing political groups led by the Azanian People's Organization (a formation of the Black Consciousness Movement) formed the National Forum which the exiled PAC embraced as articulating the aspirations of the 'Azanian' masses and its ideological standpoints⁴³⁰.

Apart from developments within South Africa, Mlambo, decided to begin his term of office by consolidating relations with countries which have provided financial and material support to the PAC over the past years. Thus, a month after his appointment, Mlambo headed a PAC delegation to China on the 22nd September to the 4th of October 1985⁴³¹. After that he attended a UN conference in Paris and then proceeded to Belgrade to attend the Party Congress of the League of Yugoslav Communists. On his return he led PAC delegations to Uganda, Nigeria, Yugoslavia, Libya, Zimbabwe and Iran. He also undertook trips to West Germany and Sweden in response to invitations by support groups in those countries. Mlambo also headed a PAC delegation which met with the Group of Eminent Persons from the Commonwealth Secretariat, in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania in April 1986⁴³².

The Group of Eminent Persons had initially met with the Apartheid Regime with the purpose of exploring grounds for the possibility of a negotiated political solution to South Africa's challenges. Mlambo expressed the position of the PAC on political negotiations in South Africa and conditions which the broad liberation movement expected the apartheid regime to fulfil in line with the decisions of the Commonwealth Accord in the Bahamas the same year⁴³³. These entailed that apartheid regime should undertake to dismantle Apartheid, terminate the state of emergency, release political prisoners unconditionally, lift the ban on political parties and initiate the suspension of violence⁴³⁴. The PAC's position as articulated by its chairman was that it would support a peaceful transition on condition that the apartheid regime was prepared to

⁴²⁹ Truth and Reconciliation Commission Research Department: 'Regional Chronologies' - draft report, 1998; PAC: PAC/Tan/85/1 - Letter from Johnson Mlambo to Mengistu Haile Mariam, Chairman of the Provincial Military Administrative Council. Ethiopia. July 1987.

⁴³⁰ PAC Archives: PAC/Tan/1/85/1.: Letter from Johnson Mlambo to Mengistu Haile Mariam, 1987.

⁴³¹ Ibid.

⁴³² PAC Archives: PAC/Tan/1/85/1.: Letter from Johnson Mlambo to Mengistu Haile Mariam, 1987.

⁴³³ P.A.C Archives: PAC/Tan/1/82/34: Johnson Mlambo's address to the Group of Eminent Persons, Commonwealth Secretariat London, 1986.

⁴³⁴ Truth and Reconciliation Commission Research Department: 'Regional Chronologies' - draft report, 1998; PAC: PAC/Tan/85/1 - Letter from Johnson Mlambo to Mengistu Haile Mariam, Chairman of the Provincial Military Administrative Council. Ethiopia. July 1987.

meet all the conditions laid down by the Commonwealth Accord and that the basis for negotiations be the principle of majority rule.

After April 1986, Mlambo began to focus more on what was happening in the PAC, and especially at the leadership level. Most of the issues he had to deal with and decide on were the result of processes which were initiated by John Pokela⁴³⁵. One of these issues was the Commission of Inquiry into the mismanagement and misappropriation of funds during the Maake era. One of the persons under investigation was Maake himself, the Deputy Chairman of the PAC. Lack of funds, however, hampered investigation by the Commission. Its tentative findings implicated Maake in the mismanagement of PAC funds, thereby prompting Pokela to ask him to step down from the position of Vice Chairman, but remaining a member of the central committee⁴³⁶. Mlambo had to ensure that the decision was carried out and communicated to the general PAC membership who was at that point demanding that Maake be expelled from the PAC.

Mike Muendane, Edwin Makoti and Count Petersen were also implicated in PAC mismanagement of funds. They were requested to also step down. Muendane was later absolved, on the basis of new evidence which was brought to the Commission⁴³⁷. The outstanding problem Mlambo had to deal with and which divided his leadership team, was Maake's position in the PAC. The Central Committee decided to suspend Maake's membership of the Central Committee. Not only because it was demanded by the general membership but also because of his non-attendance of Central Committee meetings. "His failure to heed calls from the Headquarters and his activities which tarnished the image of the party"⁴³⁸ were raised as grounds for the suspension. Maake had been requested several times by the Central Committee to come to meetings so that the allegations made against him by the Office of the President of Botswana that he was involved in the selling of mandrax, could be discussed with him. He never came to Central Committee meetings and continued to dispute the fact that he was ever invited to Central Committee meetings⁴³⁹.

Mlambo and Secretary for Defense, Sabelo Phama, were tasked to meet with him and discuss his position within the Party and the allegations made against him. They were to recommend to the PAC Maake's future status. It is important to note that even though there seems to have been unanimity within the Central Committee about the suspension of Maake from the leadership,

⁴³⁵ PAC/Tan/1/117/2- Letter from Zolile Hamilton Keke (PAC Chief Representative in London to Johnson Mlambo, 1987.

⁴³⁶ Truth and Reconciliation Commission Research Department: 'Regional Chronologies' - draft report, 1998; PAC: PAC/Tan/85/1 - Letter from Johnson Mlambo to Mengistu Haile Mariam, Chairman of the Provincial Military Administrative Council. Ethiopia. July 1987.

⁴³⁷ PAC Archives: Letter from Dan Mdluli to the Chairman of the PAC. Johnson Mlambo, 1 June 1987.

⁴³⁸ APLA Notes: Pretoria, 21 December 2001.

⁴³⁹ PAC Archives: Letter from Dan Mdluli to the Chairman of the PAC. Johnson Mlambo, 1 June 1987.

there were some elements that were still committed to him and continued to feed him with information on whatever decisions were taken by the Central Committee⁴⁴⁰. Even though PAC members believed Maake was becoming an embarrassment to the PAC, some were still committed to him. Thus, in 1987 rumours abounded within the PAC of an "attempted coup to unseat the PAC leadership"⁴⁴¹. This was linked to a faction loyal to Maake within the PAC. Members of this faction were mostly "people with high educational qualifications, the so-called "professors of the organisation." Also purported to have been part of this was Peter Raboroko, the late PAC stalwart and intellectual⁴⁴². This rumour caused further rifts within the PAC, something which was not new to the organisation during its turbulent exile history. Unarguably, this implied that mutual mistrust within the PAC survived well into the Mlambo reign and that when the ban was lifted on the PAC in 1990, its internal power struggles and divisions had not been sorted out.

Mlambo's reign also witnessed new appointments and reshuffles in leadership. This happened against simmering discontent, first about his own appointment and about the summoning of a consultative congress which Pokela promised to organise, but never did. Some voices within PAC expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that the decision about who to appoint as the successor of Pokela was made the preserve of a select few within the Central Committee and was never discussed neither at the full sitting of the Central Committee nor at a general meeting of PAC members⁴⁴³. Thus, the fundamental flaw of not following democratic route of soliciting consensus from the majority was inherent in the PAC.

The leadership reshuffles and appointments made by Mlambo was such that J.R. Moabi was confirmed as Secretary for Finance and L.T. Mgweba, Chief Representative in Iraq was to replace K.M. Nkula who was appointed Chief Representative in the London office. During this period the Mission's name was changed to the United Kingdom and Ireland Mission⁴⁴⁴. Hamilton Keke was transferred from the London office to Libya as Chief Representative and retained his membership of the Central Committee. Immediately before Keke's transfer to Libya, the UK mission of the PAC was fraught with internal squabble over how much direct authority should the PAC headquarters have over its external missions⁴⁴⁵. Vusumzi Nomdolo was deployed to

⁴⁴⁰ PAC Archives: Letter from Dan Mdluli to the Chairman of the PAC. Johnson Mlambo, 1 June 1987

⁴⁴¹ PAC Archives: *Re-activation of Party Branches/Cells and Preparations for the Consultative Conference*, 21 February, 1989, p.2.

⁴⁴² Ibid.

⁴⁴³ PAC Archives: *Re-activation of Party Branches/Cells and Preparations for the Consultative Conference*, 21 February, 1989, p.2.

⁴⁴⁴ PAC Archives: Joe Mkhwanazi: 'The Liberation Struggle in the Light of Recent Developments in Southern Africa'. International Conference on Peace and Security in Southern Africa. Arusha, Tanzania. May 1985, pp.16-17.

⁴⁴⁵ PAC Archives: Letter from Ezekiel K Mothupi to the Chairman of the PAC. 27 January 1987

Lesotho as Chief Representative to replace Mpazamo Yonna who was recalled to the Headquarters. Ike Mafole was also recalled from the United States to the Headquarters to serve as Education Administrator and retained his membership in the Central Committee⁴⁴⁶.

Willie Nkonyeni was appointed as Assistant Chief Representative in East Africa, whereas Mike Diale was appointed Acting Chief Representative in France. Maud Jackson was appointed Chief Coordinator of Women Affairs with Joyce Sifuba as deputy. Zakes Mofokeng was appointed as Labour Coordinator in Switzerland and Sydney Mabusela was to be Chief Representative in Syria⁴⁴⁷. In the field of Education, two new appointments were made. J. Vanda was appointed Principal of a school which was to be built in Ruvu camp and B. Jordaan was appointed as Curriculum Specialist. Elliot Mfafa remained the Head of the Department of Education and Manpower Development. Walters Toboti was appointed the Chief Representative of the PAC in Zimbabwe.²³⁷ Ramudi Maphai was appointed Deputy Chief Representative in Zimbabwe only in May 1987. He was replaced in 1989 by Thobile Gola who continued to run the office until 1992. T.M. Ntantala (former leader of the APRP) was also appointed Chief Representative of the PAC in Uganda⁴⁴⁸. All other appointments in the Central Committee made under the leadership of Pokela remained unchanged during the first year of Mlambo's leadership. In 1987, however, Nomdolo was replaced as Chief Representative in Lesotho by Rodney Funeka. Besides the few publicly known reshuffles which were made, the composition of the leadership still remained unstable until 1990 when a new National Executive was constituted under the leadership of Zephania Mothopeng and Mlamuli Makwethu, all ex-Robben Island prisoners⁴⁴⁹. The two stalwarts spearheaded the formation of the Pan Africanist Movement inside South Africa in 1988⁴⁵⁰. It could be argued that the instability at the level of the Central Committee during Mlambo's era was the level of political blackmail and mutual mistrust within PAC which led to incessant resignations and reshuffles.

Having restructured the leadership committee of the PAC, Mlambo had to attend to the issue of the summoning of a Consultative Congress. This was also delayed and serious preparation only got underway in 1989, on the eve of the unbanning of liberation movements by the apartheid regime under Wihelm De Klerk⁴⁵¹. The Consultative congress was intended to derive a fresh perspective for the PAC given the fact that developments inside South Africa were pointing

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁷ PAC Archives: Joe Mkhwanazi: 'The Liberation Struggle in the Light of Recent Developments in Southern Africa'. International Conference on Peace and Security in Southern Africa. Arusha, Tanzania. May 1985, pp.16-17.

⁴⁴⁸ PAC Archives: Joe Mkhwanazi: 'The Liberation Struggle in the Light of Recent Developments in Southern Africa'. International Conference on Peace and Security in Southern Africa. Arusha, Tanzania. May 1985, pp.16-17.

⁴⁴⁹ APLA Notes: Pretoria. 21 December 2001.

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁵¹ PAC Archives: PAC/Tan/1/159/12: 'Brief History of the PAC Women's Section p.1.

towards the possibilities of political negotiations. It also intended to examine the constitution of the PAC as well as administrative guidelines. Furthermore, it was intended to heal the rift between the leadership and the army as well as the rank and file membership of the Party⁴⁵². The dispute between the leaders and adherents was rooted in the tradition and practices of the PAC. In 1980 the cadres and general membership wanted to be consulted on the appointment of a new leadership. This never happened even in the post-Mlambo era. This insistence on democratic participation continued to create an ever-widening rift within the ranks of the PAC general membership, thereby hence Mlambo's attempt to speed-up the summoning of a Consultative Conference⁴⁵³. An *ad hoc* committee consisting of Philip Kgosana, Sydney Mabusela, Ike Mafole and Moss Palweni was set up.

The conference was finally held in 1990, focusing the prospects of a negotiated settlement in South Africa. This question divided the PAC left and the centre, the latter group advocating a moderate to pragmatic stance and the former emphasising a revolutionary path. It is the revolutionary route advocated by the left within the Party which won majority support. The PAC's stance on negotiations thus reflected an element of hostility towards the very idea of a negotiated settlement⁴⁵⁴. Gora Ebrahim, the PAC's Secretary for Foreign Affairs indicated' that the PAC would not be found "even within the spitting distance of negotiations" The PAC's stance on negotiations was summed up by Joe Mkhwanazi, the PAC's Administrative Secretary in his address to the International Conference on Peace and Security in Southern Africa. He stated that:

"No ruling group or class in history has surrendered of its own accord. It has to be forced to surrender. Moreover, for the national liberation movement to seriously enter into any form of dialogue or negotiations with the Apartheid regime of South Africa, it must do so from a position of strength and not one of weakness".⁴⁵⁵

As a result the PAC never participated in talks about talks between the ANC and the De Klerk regime. The most important issue to draw attention to is that when the PAC was unbanned and participated in the 1994 elections, it had still not dealt with the turbulence of its past. Wrangles within its leadership were not settled hence it was decided at its 1990 conference to elect Mlamli Makwethu, a non-exile, to be its Deputy President and Zaphania Mothopeng (also a non-exile) as

⁴⁵² Cape Time, March 1990.

⁴⁵³ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁴ APLA Notes, Umtata, 20 December; 2002.

⁴⁵⁵ PAC Archives: Joe Mkhwanazi: 'The Liberation Struggle in the Light of Recent Developments in Southern Africa'. International Conference on Peace and Security in Southern Africa. Arusha, Tanzania. May 1985, pp.16-17.

its President⁴⁵⁶. Despite the dramatic developments of 1990, the organisation never reflected on its history and developed practical solutions to them.

In fact the Mlambo era can be described as the period when the PAC needed to prepare itself for "normal" politics and needed to confront its own shortcomings and become more self-critical. Instead, the leadership of the PAC misinterpreted the emotional appeal of its radical and militant language in some sections of the Black community and especially among the youth, as a sign of popular support or as easily translatable into a realistic support base for the organisation⁴⁵⁷. Thus, little effort was put into mending the leadership divisions in the organisation. The indecision of the leadership on whether or not to participate in negotiations despite clear indications from a casual assessment of the balance of forces, deterred sympathisers and when the PAC decided to join the negotiations in Kempton Park, it had already lost ground which would have probably enabled it to command a competitive edge over its adversaries.

The most important innovation during the time of Mlambo was the setting up of a full department on women's affairs. As far back as 1962, the PAC had a women's wing which was a marginal operation in the political affairs of the PAC in exile. This of course cannot be interpreted to mean that women were not actively involved in the politics of the PAC in exile. It was only in 1977 that the PAC women's wing seriously began to reorganise itself⁴⁵⁸. This began with a series of seminars, in Harare in 1978 and in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. "Both these seminars addressed the issue of women squarely and both came with recommendations"⁴⁵⁹. The most important seminar, of which the recommendations included those of the two preceding seminars, was held in 1988. It recommended that the PAC women's wing be upgraded to full department with full-time secretary as a member of the Central Committee. According to recommendations, a conference or seminar was to be held every three years to elect new office bearers⁴⁶⁰.

The recommendations were approved by the PAC Central Committee in 1989. A structure of the women's department consisting of 14 personnel was appointed by the secretary for women affairs and was ratified by the administrative committee of the Central Committee. The position of Chief Coordinator of Women's Affairs was upgraded to that of Secretary for Women Affairs and Maud Jackson was appointed to this position.

⁴⁵⁶ APLA Notes. Umtata, 20 December; 2002.

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁸ PAC Archives: PAC/Tan/1/48/7: 'The Iringa Communique' 1987. p.1

⁴⁵⁹ PAC Archives: Minutes of the Central Committee Meeting 18-24 September 1989, p.1

⁴⁶⁰ PAC Archives: *Re-activation of Party Branches/Cells and Preparations for the Consultative Conference*, 21 February, 1989, p.2.

Joyce Sifuba was appointed deputy chief coordinator for Women Affairs. These appointments followed the resignation of Fitho Ntantala, the wife of T.M. Ntantala, from the position of chief coordinator for women affairs. The activities of the PAC women's department were critical to the practical survival of PAC militants, especially during the late 1980, when APLA began to launch attacks, even though only sporadically, on the Apartheid Regime. The women's department played a leading role in facilitating the implementation of development projects in the PAC camps and also with the improvement of living conditions in the camps.

Despite this initiative, the overall performance of the PAC leadership during the era of Mlambo did not significantly improve. Improvements were only marginal on the military front, as will be demonstrated in chapter six and also on the diplomatic front, something which led to increased material support for the PAC⁴⁶¹. The PAC leadership under Mlambo failed to resuscitate the image of the PAC and keep pace with political developments inside South Africa. Hence, some members of the PAC felt that all Central Committee members "stand accused individually and collectively as leaders"⁴⁶². Opportunism and incompetence at the leadership level still prevailed. This was demonstrated by the way the PAC was slowly losing ground to the ANC as the favourite and ally of ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe. The attitude of the Zimbabwean government towards the PAC and the Black Consciousness Movement, was becoming unfavourable during the last half of the 1980s. According to Mothupi,

"the Zanu government seemed to have lost confidence in the PAC as a revolutionary movement capable of making a revolution and they appear to have been taken for a ride by the ANC's imperialist-sponsored publicity that they believe that the ANC is actually destined to take power in Azania"⁴⁶³.

This unequivocally indicates that the PAC's diplomatic relations were weak in Southern Africa and the PAC cells established during the Pokela era in the Frontline states had limited impact.

⁴⁶¹ PAC Archives: PAC/Tan/1/48/7: 'The Iringa Communique' 1987. p.1.

⁴⁶² PAC Archives: Letter from Ezekiel K Mothupi to the Chairman of the PAC 27 January 1987.

⁴⁶³ Ibid.

Another crisis occurred within the ranks of the leadership of the PAC on the eve of negotiations. The crisis germinated and started in the London and New York offices of the PAC. These offices had complained since the time of Pokela about what they saw as over centralisation of powers by the PAC headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam. This involved the decision to centralise all funding. This meant that funds were to be distributed from the headquarters⁴⁶⁴. Furthermore, some elements within the leadership detested the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist rhetoric which the leadership of the PAC and the majority of PAC members embraced as the ideology of the organisation. Some members of the PAC mission in London and New York as well as some longstanding African Nationalists in Tanzania, led by A.B. Ngcobo, formed themselves into a loose-knit organisation called the 'Sobukwe Forum'⁴⁶⁵.

The Forum demanded the reinstatement of Africanists and PAC leaders who were expelled from the Party and advocated the return to the basic doctrines of Pan Africanism as enunciated by A.P. Mda and Robert Sobukwe. Their leading exponent inside South Africa was the late Selby Ngendane. He was gunned down, allegedly by APLA militants outside his house in Umtata. The reason for the killing of Ngendane was the perception that he was very "dangerous because he was articulate, and if he had lived, the PAC would be upside down and the Forum would have taken over. The solution was to eliminate him"⁴⁶⁶. Thus, the leadership of the PAC during the era of Johnson Mlambo did not resolve the challenges of the PAC. The formation of the Sobukwe Forum on the eve of the unbanning of the PAC meant that the conflicts of the exile epoch were transferred into South Africa. The non-exile membership of the PAC found themselves caught in the middle and some made conscious choices to support one of the factions among former exiles. In that way disunity within the PAC reproduced conditions for its perpetuation.

4.6 Conclusion

Although Leballo's era left a shadow which continued to haunt the PAC after he was deposed, it cannot be concluded that for almost two decades, the history of the PAC revolved around the 'personal imbalances' of one individual. "For one thing we can be certain: almost before the ink was dry on the document signed in 1959 which created the formation of the Pan Africanist Congress, there were already signs of internal conflict". The number of expulsions from the organisation in the first month marked the beginning of a series of schisms as (elite) factions competed for control of the Party. From the thematic issues identified in this research, the

⁴⁶⁴ PAC Archives: Letter from Dan Mdluli to the Chairman of the PAC - Johnson Mlambo. 1 June 1987.

⁴⁶⁵ Truth and Reconciliation Commission Research Department: 'Regional Chronologies' - draft report, 1998; PAC: PAC/Tan/85/1 - Letter from Johnson Mlambo to Mengistu Haile Mariam, Chairman of the Provincial Military Administrative Council. Ethiopia. July 1987.

⁴⁶⁶ Truth and Reconciliation Commission Research Department: 'Regional Chronologies' - draft report, 1998; PAC: PAC/Tan/85/1 - Letter from Johnson Mlambo to Mengistu Haile Mariam, Chairman of the Provincial Military Administrative Council. Ethiopia. July 1987.


contribution of the 'Leballo factor' in damaging the PAC in exile is clearly exposed without however, absolving the entire leadership of the PAC and the ambiguous role of Tanzanian authorities. The failures of this period became the burden of the next phases of PAC leadership. Hence, when the PAC was unbanned in 1990, it was still recovering from deadly scars of the Leballo era.

Nevertheless, there were positive spin-offs for the PAC during the era of Vusumzi Maake. Firstly, he lacked the demagogue stature and the self-imposing dictatorial predisposition of his predecessor, which in one way or the other was an advantage. It meant that ordinary PAC members were free, for the first time, to criticise their leadership openly without fear of suspension. In fact it is during Maake's era, that longstanding grounds of dissatisfaction with the internal situation in the PAC were unearthed, confronted and propositions made for solutions. Maake's failures stemmed from his indecision and his preoccupation with interests other than those of the PAC. The 'failures' of Maake became the burden of the era of Nyathi Pokela. The fact that the ordinary membership of the PAC had enough time to ponder over the challenges of the PAC during the Maake era meant that the burden of expectations about what should happen during the era of Pokela was high and somewhat realistic. These issues will be examined in the following section.

The Pokela era was probably the most critical one during the exile period of the PAC. It marked the transition from the old way of doing things to the new; the conflict between entrenched leadership traditions and organisational culture and an ascendant but fragile outlook. On the whole the balance of forces between continuities and discontinuities favoured the former; hence it is sensible to describe the epoch of Pokela as symbolising a besieged transition to the new era. What is most important is that during this period, systems and processes necessary to run the organisation were put in place and for the first time the PAC developed a programme of action for each year. This became the tradition within the PAC leadership since 1982. The sudden death of Pokela in June 1985 disrupted interesting developmental processes within the PAC which he had initiated and led. It became the challenge of his successor, Johnson Mlambo to proceed with the program.

The epoch of Mlambo was one of political expediency. Unfortunately, the organisation was not ready for that. Internal conflicts in the PAC did not subside but continued, hence the formation of an organisation within an organisation in 1989, i.e. the Sobukwe Forum, led by A.B. Ngcobo in exile and Selby Ngendane inside South Africa. The case of the PAC under the leadership of Mlambo 'Was one instance in which the expression, 'learning to fly before acquiring the basic

walking skills'⁴⁶⁷, applied. Age-old questions about leadership accountability, management of organisational funds and resources, ideological rifts, intrigues and mutual mistrust remained unresolved. In spite of Mlambo's attempts to implement a programme of action intended to shift the organisational focus away from the stalemate within the organisation was not overcome. This resulted in dismal PAC performance during the 1994 democratic elections held in South Africa.



Nelson Mandela (Source: Robben Island Museum Mayibuye Archives Historical Papers Section)

(The above words of President Nelson Mandela were relevant to the PAC internal wrangles and organizational operations in struggle for liberation in South Africa)

⁴⁶⁷ D.A.B. Mahlangu: 'From South Africa to Azania', pp. 81-82.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE PAC RELATIONS WITH FRONTLINE STATES AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

“The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, has an historic task to mobilise the youth, peasants, and workers into an irresistible force that will eventually crush white domination in all its forms and manifestations” – Johnson Mlambo

5.1 Introduction

An analysis of the organisational operations and impact of the PAC in the struggle for liberation in South Africa, during the era in question, which ignores its relations with the Frontline States and International Community is incomplete and provides a distorted picture. The Frontline States and International Community were critical actors in Southern Africa and on the entire African continent during the period focused on by this study. The Organisation of Africa Unity, formed in 1963, was the umbrella organisation of all African states. The Frontline States emerged in the context of the broad mandate of the OAU as stated in the OAU Charter. The OAU Charter committed all member states to a fight for the eradication of colonialism in its different forms⁴⁶⁸. The role performed by International Community, particularly the superpowers, as a point of interaction with Southern Africa remains an aspect of Southern African political history which is ambiguous, inconsistent and sometimes difficult to comprehend. Their relation with the PAC was largely determined by the ideological dispositions of their ruling parties and the perceived threat to their interests in Southern Africa⁴⁶⁹. Thus, the nature and extent of PAC relations with the international community was largely determined by the ideological dispositions of the superpowers, i.e the US, China and Russia, and the perceived threat to their interests in Southern Africa.

5.2 The OAU and the Frontline States

The Frontline States (FLS) could be noted as a grouping of independent Southern African States such as Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and Botswana, which shared a common vision about the political and economic developments in Southern Africa and had common policies towards South Africa based on their adherence to the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969 and the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration of 1975⁴⁷⁰. They began as an informal consultation forum between the Tanzanian and Zambian Presidents, Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda in the mid- 1960s. Negotiations between them were necessitated by their concern about the *“institutional paralysis that characterised the formulation of African positions on Southern Africa by the OAU”*⁴⁷¹.

⁴⁶⁸ Charter to the Organization of African Unity. Preamble and Article II (1) (d); D. Venter: Africa and the Community of Nations. p.1.

⁴⁶⁹ T.M. Shaw: South Africa, Southern Africa and the World System, in T.M. Shaw and KZ Heard (eds.), Cooperation and Conflict in Southern Africa, p. 46.

⁴⁷⁰ D. Venter: South Africa and the African Comity of Nations. pp. 1-6.

⁴⁷¹ G.M. Khadiagala: Allies in Adversity: The Frontline States in Southern African Security. 1975-1993, pp. 4-25.

The OAU apparently had many voices with respect to Southern Africa. Achieving consensus on a specific course of action with forty-six member countries was almost impossible. Nyerere and Kaunda felt it necessary to evolve a regional framework addressing challenges relating to the PAC, other liberation movements and the future of Southern Africa. The OAU's most important contribution towards this end was to situate the Liberation Committee in Dar-es-Salaam⁴⁷². This essentially gave Tanzania a head-start in making significant contributions to the course of liberation. It also enabled Nyerere to weave an elaborate set of friendships with potential leaders of independent states in Southern Africa".²⁸ As Nyerere explained,

"Long before the armed struggle in Zimbabwe and Namibia started, the only real FLS were Tanzania and Zambia. Kaunda and I decided that we should invite representatives of liberation movements in Mozambique and Angola. The two of us should not be discussing strategies for liberation without them. This is how we began to invite the leaders of Mozambique and Angola to our meetings. At that stage Tanzania and Zambia provided guerrilla camps. We would receive recruits, train them and equip them with arms to go out and fight. I used to tell them that after independence we needed a liberated zone of independent states in Southern Africa. Once we had these independent countries stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic that would be a really powerful challenge to South Africa. We all agreed to this⁴⁷³.

Informal consultation between Nyerere and Kaunda gradually developed and broadened to include Zaire, Uganda and Botswana in 1966. The consultation forums later resulted in the formulation of the Lusaka Manifesto in 1969. Zaire, Kenya and Uganda were soon out of the process because of their ambivalent positions with regard to PAC support and their internal political challenges which made it difficult to commit to the Lusaka Manifesto. The consultation forum evolved into a larger close-knit group when Mozambique and Angola joined after 1975⁴⁷⁴. The perception of a distinct sub-regional system in Southern Africa began to be more and more attractive to the heads of states.

The context in which the FLS were born was characterised by the expansion of geographical and political boundaries of decolonisation following the liberation of Mozambique in 1975 and Angola in 1976. This provided an opportunity to establish a framework for collaboration in order to resolve regional conflicts. The independence of Angola "*bequeathed a legacy of extra-regional intervention in Southern Africa*" with significant impact on the post 1976 process of political change⁴⁷⁵. On the other hand, this was characterised by the threat and resistance to white minority ruled regimes in Southern Africa. The informal alliance which included South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia was arrayed against independent Africa. With the strong backing of South Africa,

⁴⁷² C. Legum: 'The Southern African Crisis, Darkness at the end of the tunnel' in C. Legum (ed.): Africa Contemporary Record-Annual Survey and Documents, 1981 – 1982, pp. A 41-42.

⁴⁷³ J. Nyerere: 'North-South Dialogue' in Third World Quarterly. 6, No.4, 1984, pp. 835-836.

⁴⁷⁴ G.M. Khadiagala: Allies in Adversity: The Frontline States in Southern African Security. 1975-1993, pp. 4-25.

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid; p. 20.

the informal tripartite alliance was instrumental in not only blunting the wave of decolonisation that was sweeping over much of Southern Africa, but also undermining the independence of liberated African states⁴⁷⁶. The perimeter of colonial redoubt was made more impregnable by the unwillingness of:

*“external powers to seek greater involvement in the region. Considerable stakes in economic arrangements with South Africa, Portuguese presence in NATO and a general ambivalence towards national liberation characterised Western attitudes towards the region”*⁴⁷⁷.

This provides clear analysis of why international community could not display a sense of urgency in supporting the PAC to alter the situation in South Africa. The involvement of the Soviet Union, China and Cuba in the Angolan war was the only instance which precipitated the superpowers to act promptly. It underlined the significance of the war in Southern Africa to global peace and the balance of power. The Frontline States were recognised by the OAU as champions of Southern African affairs in the OAU after 1976. One of the main tasks of the OAU, from its inception, was to formulate an “African strategy with regard to the challenges in Southern Africa”⁴⁷⁸. With the formation of the FLS, this activity became a shared one between the two organisations. Active opposition to minority rule in Southern Africa and support for the liberation movements became criteria used after 1975 to determine the eligibility of a state to be part of the Frontline States or not. The liberation of Southern Africa became the major reason for the existence of the Frontline States⁴⁷⁹.

Towards the end of the 1970's, the activities of the FLS went beyond the promotion of regional conflict resolution and began to encompass issues of regional economic development. This led to the emergence of the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference in 1980 as an offshoot of the various initiatives of the Frontline States to address issues of regional economic development⁴⁸⁰. Whereas the Frontline States facilitated political liberation through diplomatic initiatives and political support for the PAC, the SADCC's role was to support economic liberation ‘through coordinated development initiatives’. One of the major goals of the SADCC was to rebuild the shattered economies of member states (Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola and Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi and Zimbabwe) and reduce economic dependence, particularly on South Africa⁴⁸¹.

⁴⁷⁶ Barry Buzan: ‘A framework for regional Security analysis’ in B. Buzan, G. Rizvi and R. Foot (eds.): *South Asia: Insecurity and Great Powers*, pp. 3-36.

⁴⁷⁷ A.T. Mugomba: ‘Small Developing States and External Operational Environment’ in *Yearbook of World Affairs*, pp. 201-216.

⁴⁷⁸ D.Venter: *Africa and the Comity of Nations*. p. 2.

⁴⁷⁹ A.W. Neilsen: *The Great Powers in Africa*, pp. 350-363.

⁴⁸⁰ G. Kennan: ‘Harzadous Courses in Southern Africa’ in *Foreign Affairs*, 49, No.2, (1971), pp. 218-236.

⁴⁸¹ R.F. Weisfelder: ‘The Southern African Development Coordinating Conference: A New Factor in the Liberation Process’, in T.M. Callaghy (ed.): *South Africa in Southern Africa-The intensifying Vortex of Violence*, pp. 239-252.

The SADCC charter, unlike the association of Frontline States, was based on the international recognition of independent states within Southern Africa. Ideological difference, especially between Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi on the one hand (with Botswana sitting uncomfortably in the middle) and the Frontline States, was put aside and emphasis was placed on those issues which united them as Southern African states. It was realised that their economies needed to be liberated from excessive dependence on the Republic of South Africa. They needed to “overcome the imposed economic fragmentation”⁴⁸² and coordinate efforts towards regional and national economic development.

The SADCC relied on foreign donors for project funding and on collective efforts aimed at getting supplies of products from member states rather than from South Africa. The strategy of the new organisation emphasised the common ground among members and avoided tensions which might result in divisions⁴⁸³. What is important to note is that relationships, whether good or bad, generated among member states in these structures, were an issue to be dealt with carefully by the PAC in exile. It was important for the latter to do a balancing diplomatic exercise in order to preserve sanctuaries already acquired and maintain goodwill from all Southern African states. To the PAC and the ANC this was critical, not only for the material support they needed, but also for infiltration routes into South Africa⁴⁸⁴.

5.3 The PAC and Frontline States

It is imperative to look into categories of Frontline States and to give an explanation of why the PAC was afforded preferential treatment in some states and not in others. Tanzania and Zambia constitute one category because they were the first to obtain independence. They were founder members of the FLS movement and were home to PAC and other liberation movements such as the ANC, SWAPO, ZANU, and BCM⁴⁸⁵. The second group is the ‘BLS’ states (i.e. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) which were former British protectorates. The third category is the former Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique and lastly Zimbabwe.

Tanzania obtained her independence in 1961 and Zambia in 1964. Both economies were primarily producers of raw material during the colonial era. After independence they had to deal with the legacy of underdevelopment which increased their dependence on South Africa and foreign investment. Zambia was economically dependent on South Africa. In 1984 for instance, Zambia ran a trade deficit totalling over US\$100 million. Zambia’s dependency on South Africa was worsened by the fact that the country is land-locked without access to a port and

⁴⁸² J. Hanlon: *Brggar Your Neighbors*, p. 19.

⁴⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸⁴ A.W. Neilsen: *The Great Powers in Africa*, pp. 350-363.

⁴⁸⁵ D. Venter: *South Africa and the African Comity of Nations*, p. 10.

harbour facilities⁴⁸⁶. Her dependent economic status was aggravated by the decline in copper prices since 1975. Her economic challenges at that time stemmed from dependence on copper.

*"The high price of oil and the low price of copper had combined to throw a series of positive balance of payments into deficit; since 1975, Zambia has had a positive balance of payments except in 1979, when the value of copper and cobalt rose momentarily. Between 1974 and 1978, Zambia's terms of trade deteriorated by 52 percent. From a peak in 1974, copper prices fell by 40 percent in 1975, while import prices rose by an average 16 percent per year"*⁴⁸⁷.

The economic difficulties the country was facing provoked political discontent which resulted in two failed attempts to overthrow Kaunda in October 1980 and in June 1981. Trade Union strikes and political unrest in the townships resulted in a repressive and defensive stance by the government. Kaunda defended his one-party polity and would not tolerate criticism⁴⁸⁸. The economic and internal political pressures compelled Kaunda to enter into negotiations which sacrificed his stand as a member of the Frontline States and was constantly in conflict with other members who could not understand his departure from a principled position.

Just like Zambia, Tanzania placed itself in an equally dismal position. In October 1967 Nyerere announced at the Arusha Conference a policy for the reconstruction and development of Tanzania based on socialist principles. This came to be known as 'African Socialism'. The broad policy objectives of the new economic approach were social equity, self-reliance, and transformation in all spheres of life to eliminate poverty. The manner in which the new approach to socialism was implemented created hostilities among the rural population who were forced to abandon their villages to occupy the 'Ujamaa' villages⁴⁸⁹. By the early 1980's the total failure of Ujamaa prompted Tanzanians to be hostile to the government and revert back to lands they had left. The Tanzanian socialist policy served to isolate the country from Western countries, some of which were keen to support Tanzanian development. Besides that, the policy was forced upon rural people who were sceptical from the onset. Domestic challenges were not only limited to Nyerere's economic policies⁴⁹⁰.

*"There had been some Zanzibari discontent, especially since 1988, with the continuing union between Zanzibar and mainland Tanzania"*⁴⁹¹.

⁴⁸⁶ L.T. Kapungu: 'Southern Africa and the Role of SADCC in Sub-regional Development' in Y. El-Ayouty (ed.): The Organization of African Unity after Thirty Years, pp. 44-51.

⁴⁸⁷ World Bank: World Bank Report. Oxford University Press, London, 1981, p. 78; J. Hanlon: Beggar your neighbours. pp. 17-26.

⁴⁸⁸ T.M. Shaw: 'The Political-Economy of Zambia' in Current History, Vol. 81, No. 471, 1982, p. 126.

⁴⁸⁹ P Esterhuysen: Africa A-Z, Continental and Country Profiles, p. 343.

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁹¹ H.H. Patel: 'The SADCC states, the international environment and change in South Africa', in G.Maasdorp and A. Whiteside (eds.): Towards a Post Apartheid Future, Political and Economic Relations in Southern Africa, p.51.

In the light of developments in Eastern Europe, Tanzania went through debates around the viability of one-partyism and prospects for political pluralism. In both countries, a threat of domestic instability loomed due to a combination of economic and political factors outlined above. Internal political dissatisfaction was caused by the intolerance of the ruling parties to political pluralism. Nonetheless, the two countries never relented on their commitment and support for the PAC. Both Zambia and Tanzania continued until 1990 to provide a haven for the PAC and other elements of the liberation movement⁴⁹².

Botswana and Lesotho gained independence in 1966 while Swaziland became a sovereign kingdom in 1968. From the outset the three independent states had to deal with the reality of dependence on South Africa. Seretse Khama, the new Prime Minister of Botswana by that time said at his inaugural ceremony:

*'We fully appreciate that it is wholly in our interests to preserve neighbourly relations with the Republic of South Africa. Our economic links with South Africa are virtually indissoluble. We are tied directly to South Africa – communications, for markets, for our beef, for labour in the mines, and in many other respects'*⁴⁹³.

Leabua Jonathan echoed the same at Lesotho's independence celebrations in October 1966. He emphasized the importance of peaceful co-existence between South Africa and Lesotho because Lesotho could not grow and prosper in isolation. When Swaziland obtained her independence in September 1968, Mr Sukuti, the Deputy Prime Minister remarked that:

*"South Africa is most important to us and we realize that without its help and co-operation we would be in a difficult position – independence or no independence"*⁴⁹⁴.

Venter was not exaggerating the situation when he asserted that:

"At the most extreme were the BLS states which, as members of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), were firmly integrated into South Africa's trading orbit".⁴⁹⁵

Since their internal resources were underdeveloped, all BLS states had economic links with South Africa and were heavily dependent on them. They were merely exporters of raw material and labour to Europe and South Africa. This continued unabated after independence. By 1984 each one of the BLS countries ran a trade deficit in excess of US\$100 million with South Africa⁴⁹⁶.

The BLS countries' position was exacerbated by the fact that geographically they are land-locked and had no useable port and harbour facilities. They were entirely dependent on South Africa for both ports and efficiently

⁴⁹² PAC Archives: PAC/Tan/ I/27/ I: _Decisions of the Plenary Session of the Central Committee held in Iringa, Tanzania. 1985.

⁴⁹³ G.M. Cockram: Vorster's Foreign Policy, p. 124.

⁴⁹⁴ S.C. Nolutshungu: South Africa in Africa: A Study of Ideology and Foreign Policy, pp. 150-152.

⁴⁹⁵ D. Venter: South Africa and the Comity of Nations, p. 11.

⁴⁹⁶ Worl Bank: World Bank Report. Oxford University Press, 1981, p. 78; D. Venter: South Africa and the Comity of Nations, p. 11.

run railways. Furthermore, they also relied on South Africa for employment of the majority of their labour force. It was estimated that in 1984 Lesotho had 140 000, Swaziland 20 000 and Botswana 25 000 of their labour force working in South Africa⁴⁹⁷. In 1984, it was estimated that the remittances from Lesotho migrant workers amounted to M507 million as compared to a gross domestic product (GDP) of M401 million in Lesotho.

Besides economic dependence perpetuated by sabotage and military raids by the apartheid regime's defence force in the mid 1980's, the BLS countries had a history of dependence on South Africa. As a result of these circumstances, these countries were less overt supporting the PAC and condemning South Africa as members of the Frontline States.

*"It was readily accepted by all parties in Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland prior independence that they would have to play a very minor role in the Pan-African campaign of coercing South Africa to abandon apartheid by isolation, boycotts and even violence. Experience had also clearly indicated, in the run-up to independence, that South Africa would never allow them to harbour people suspected of revolutionary political activities in South Africa"*⁴⁹⁸.

Relations between the BLS countries and South Africa thus represented a delicate balancing act, indicating that geography and economic dependency made any confrontational stance unviable. Even though they supported the PAC and were members of SADCC and the Frontline States, they never allowed the PAC and other liberation movements to establish military bases in their countries or to use their territory as springboards for military offensive against the apartheid regime⁴⁹⁹.

At a meeting of non-aligned states in Lusaka, Seretse Khama of Botswana underscored this when he emphasised that:

*"There is a limit beyond which our contributions cannot go without endangering our very independence"*⁵⁰⁰

Botswana alone insisted that she would accommodate only PAC refugees recognised in terms of the country's law and international law. Lesotho and Swaziland followed suit and as a result, the PAC could not maintain guerrilla camps in these countries. Political refugees escaping apartheid regime's police networks had to leave the BLS countries, especially after the 1985 SADF raid into Maseru⁵⁰¹. Despite this situation, the PAC still enjoyed support in the BLS countries due to their full support for the struggles against colonialism and racism.

⁴⁹⁷ D. Venter: South Africa and the African Comity of Nations, p. 12.

⁴⁹⁸ T.M. Callaghy: South Africa in Southern Africa. p. 357; S.C. Nolutshungu: South Africa in Africa, p. 136.

⁴⁹⁹ S.C. Nolutshungu: South Africa in Africa, p. 136.

⁵⁰⁰ J. Halpern: 'Botswana' in Africa South of the Sahara, 1979-1980, p. 185.

⁵⁰¹ PAC Archives: 'Minutes of the Plenary Session of the PAC Central Committee, Dar-es-Salaam, December, 1-7, 1981, p. 21; PAC Archives: PAC/Tan/1/27/1: Decisions of the Plenary Session of the Central Committee held in Iringa. 1985.

Angola and Mozambique were liberated in 1975 and 1976 respectively whereas Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980. The three countries had more than half of their imports from South Africa. Besides, South Africa had invested in the physical infrastructure in those countries, e.g. the Cahora Bassa scheme in Mozambique and the Ruacana hydro-electric scheme in Angola⁵⁰². Zimbabwe's labour force employed in South Africa in 1984 was estimated at 7000 while the Mozambican labour force totalled 60 000. Zimbabwe had to reconcile her rejection of Apartheid South Africa with the realities of pragmatic economics⁵⁰³. Apartheid South Africa was Zimbabwe's largest trading partner and in 1980, over half of Zimbabwe's total capital stock was foreign owned, with South African interests holding about 25 per cent⁵⁰⁴. By late 1987, almost 90 per cent of Zimbabwe's external trade and fuel supplies depended on South African transportation networks.

In 1987 dependence on South Africa was exposed when she imposed selective oil and trade embargo as a retaliatory move on Zimbabwe for her involvement in the economic sanctions campaign against her. Zimbabwe was forced to extend a preferential trade agreement between South Africa and Zimbabwe and open a trade mission in Johannesburg in 1987⁵⁰⁵. Mozambique was ravaged by war against the apartheid regime-sponsored-RENAMO; while Angola did not have peace since independence due to civil war between Unita and the MPLA government. Nevertheless, Angola provided five military training camps to both PAC and the ANC. The question of hosting PAC had to be reconsidered following the peace agreements Angola signed with South Africa in order to end the involvement of outside forces⁵⁰⁶. The first of these agreements was the 1984 Lusaka Accord, committing both South Africa and Angola to a ceasefire agreement and withdrawal of South African troops from Angola. In 1988 another agreement was signed between Angola, Cuba and South Africa, in New York. This paved the way for the final withdrawal of South African troops and the finalisation of talks for the independence of Namibia. This had serious implications for the presence of some PAC guerrilla forces in Angola who had to be expelled from the country in 1989⁵⁰⁷.

Developments in Mozambique were also unfavourable to the PAC which had no camps in Mozambique but used the country for transit purposes into South Africa. Since independence Mozambique had suffered repeated military attacks from RENAMO. The 1980s witnessed the apartheid regime supplying military and other material support to RENAMO. The impact of attacks was so profound that Mozambique was pulverized into a condition of famine and destruction. These conditions compelled Mozambique to enter into a non-aggression pact with South

⁵⁰² D. Venter: South Africa and the African Comity of Nations. p. 11.

⁵⁰³ PAC Archives: :Minutes of the Plenary Session of the PAC Central Committee, Dar-es-Salaam, December, 1-7, 1981, p. 23.

⁵⁰⁴ E. Leistner: 'South Africa and Zimbabwe: Time for a rethink', in Africa Institute Bulletin, Vol.27, No. 4, 1987, p. 62.

⁵⁰⁵ D. Venter: South Africa and the African Comity of Nations. p. 23.

⁵⁰⁶ G. Mills and S. Baynham: 'Changing the Guard: South African Foreign Policy into the 1990s', in Africa Insight. Vol. 20, No. 3, 1990, p. 183.

⁵⁰⁷ D. Venter: South Africa and the African Community of Nations. p. 26.

Africa known as the Nkomati Accord⁵⁰⁸. This was designed to halt SADF support for RENAMO in exchange for Mozambique denying military bases to the PAC. This represented a major setback not only for the PAC, but also the ANC. The ANC's military activities were terminated and its cadres flown out of Mozambique as a sign of commitment by the Mozambican government to the signed peace accord⁵⁰⁹. Nevertheless, the Nkomati Accord was a *fiasco* due to covert operations by South African military intelligence which continued in total contravention of the agreement.

5.4 Apartheid Regime Offensives

During the period 1960 – 1990, South Africa's apartheid regime played a pivotal role in Southern African political conflicts. This was attributed to her pervasive military and economic prowess⁵¹⁰. Lack of will from anti-communist ideologically-orientated Western powers to support the PAC and other liberation movements in Southern Africa tipped the scales in favour of apartheid regime. South Africa adjusted her strategy regularly, but it nevertheless displayed some elements of continuity in the decades 1960 to 1990. The first decade was characterised by 'assertive incorporation' and dialogue whereas the latter was dominated by the 'carrot and a stick' approach in dealing with independent neighbouring Southern African states⁵¹¹.

The decade 1960-1971 saw attempts by South Africa to incorporate neighbouring states into a economic union "*a constellation of states*" dominated by her. She hoped to forge economic co-operation and dependent political co-existence with the Frontline States. When this failed the regime embarked on a multilateral strategy characterised by economic and technological support to co-operating governments and military attacks on those states suspected of harbouring PAC militants⁵¹². In the decade 1971 to 1981, following the independence of Mozambique, the geo-political and security scenario changed and apartheid regime felt more vulnerable to the perceived communist onslaught from the north. This led to the implementation of a new 'forward defence' strategy entailing military attacks across borders against PAC camps, individual and groups located within neighbouring states⁵¹³. On the one hand, it involved attempts to thwart hostilities in the neighbouring states by offering economic support, while destabilising them through economic and military pressure⁵¹⁴.

⁵⁰⁸ H Adams and K Moodley: *The Negotiated Revolution: Society and Politics in Post-Apartheid South Africa*, Ball, Johannesburg, 1993, p. 3.

⁵⁰⁹ D. Venter: *South Africa and the African Community of Nations*. p. 27.

⁵¹⁰ L. Kapungu: *Southern Africa and the role of SADCC*, pp. 43-51.

⁵¹¹ A. du Pisani: 'South Africa and SADCC: Into the 1990', in G. Maasdorp and A Whiteside: *Towards a Post-Apartheid Future; Political and Economic Relations in Southern Africa*. p. 175.

⁵¹² D. Venter: *South Africa and the African Community of Nations*. pp. 1-72.

⁵¹³ *Ibid*; 19.

⁵¹⁴ C. Legum (ed.): *Africa contemporary Record, 1981-1982*. p. A10.

It could be argued that apartheid regime's cross-border raids ostensibly targeted at PAC exiles had a negative effect on most states in Southern Africa. As Venter puts it,

*"First, given the economic situation of most states in Southern Africa, the diversion of scarce resources to military uses jeopardised, if not devastated, all efforts at economic development. Secondly, it also exacted a heavy political toll within those states by revealing them as defenceless in the face of foreign military attack and as unable to protect their own citizens. Pretoria's anti-ANC raids had the effect of undermining the credibility of Black African governments".*⁵¹⁵

Such destabilisation antics aggravated the economic challenges of independent African states in Southern Africa. Mozambique was supported by South Africa through the use of its under-utilised railways and ports. Zimbabwe borrowed locomotives for her railways and outlets to the sea provided for Zimbabwean exports. The Customs Union with the BLS was maintained. The Frontline States, in a bid to minimize dependence on South Africa, formed the SADCC in 1980 with BLS states, Angola, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Zambia and later Namibia in 1990 as its members. This created the potential to remove the attraction of the 'carrot' as more interdependence among the SADCC countries could potentially minimize their dependence on the apartheid regime. Thus, the regime stepped up its counter activities in the 1980's by withdrawing loaned locomotives to Zimbabwe⁵¹⁶. The Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (RENAMO), an opposition movement to the FRELIMO government, was allowed to have its headquarters in the Northern Transvaal, its clandestine 'freedom radio' was operated from South Africa and apartheid regime's military intelligence cooperated closely with Renamo. This led to escalated subversive RENAMO activities inside Mozambique during the 1980's⁵¹⁷. Regarding Zimbabwe, the apartheid regime maintained a training camp in the Northern Transvaal for adherents of Bishop Muzorewa, an opponent of Mugabe's government, and members of Rhodesia's Selous Scouts counter-insurgency military group which supported Ian Smith in the war against ZANU and ZAPU⁵¹⁸.

The last decade, which could also be discerned as an era of détente, saw moves by the apartheid regime to break from isolation and play a 'constructive' role in Africa. The regime's Prime Minister Mr Vorster coined the slogan *"friendly co-existence and co-operation with countries of Africa"*⁵¹⁹. The détente epoch, however, was thwarted by the involvement of the South African defence force in Angola. This effectively ended prospects of enduring co-operation between South Africa and the Frontline States. Furthermore, domestic events following the Soweto uprisings of 16 June 1976; death in detention of the Black Consciousness leader Steve Biko and strict internal

⁵¹⁵ D. Venter: South Africa and the African Community of Nations, pp. 19-20.

⁵¹⁶ C. Legum: Africa Contemporary Record, 1981-1982, pp. A11-A12.

⁵¹⁷ D. Venter: South Africa and the African Community of Nations, p. 7; PAC Archives: Letter from Johnson Mlambo to Dr Witness Mangwende - Minister of Foreign Affairs Zimbabwe, 17 December 1985.

⁵¹⁸ O. Geyser: Détente Southern Africa. p. 30; C. Legum: Africa Contemporary Record, 1981-1982. p. A12.

⁵¹⁹ J. Hanlon: Beggars Your Neighbours, p. 1.

security measures to quell the situation, marked the end of détente and ushered in a new dispensation in regional politics⁵²⁰.

P.W. Botha's presidency from 1978 adhered to the idea of economic co-operation inherited from his predecessor B.J. Vorster through the constellation of Southern African States. This was in fact not different from the idea of the Commonwealth of Southern African states of H.F. Verwoed in the 1960's. Botha's priority, however, was the military defence of South Africa against possible external invasion. Thus, his first step was to set up the State Security Council (SCC which later became BOSS) which in effect became the locus of foreign policy making and execution⁵²¹. It could be argued that attempts at enhancing South Africa's hegemonic position through constellation of states proved abortive. In fact, the idea of a constellation led by apartheid regime was rejected by BLS states and the formation of SADCC posed a direct alternative for them. South Africa was therefore left with the hard interventionist component of its policy⁵²². Joseph Hanlon summarised the aggressive initiatives of South Africa when he enunciated the following incidents:

"The hit and run strikes of three capitals (Lesotho, Botswana, Mozambique) and four other countries, (Angola, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Zambia).

Attempts to assassinate two Prime Ministers (Lesotho and Zimbabwe).

Backing of dissident groups that have brought chaos to two countries (Angola and Mozambique) and less serious disorder in two others (Lesotho and Zimbabwe).

Disruption of the oil supplies of six countries (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe) and

*Attacking the railways providing the normal import and export routes of seven countries (Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe"*⁵²³.

This situation impacted negatively on PAC and other liberation movements. This determined even more clandestine operations resulting to Botswana and Swaziland becoming firm in disallowing facilities to armed guerrillas. To the PAC this meant that they had no safe haven in most Southern African countries (except in Tanzania) and had to be even more vigilant because of the possibility that the enemy might be among them⁵²⁴.

⁵²⁰ K. van Wyk: Foreign Policy Orientations of the PW Botha Regime: Changing Perceptions of State Elites in South Africa', Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1991, pp. 45-46;

⁵²¹ PAC Archives: Minutes of the Plenary Session of the Central Committee Meeting at External Headquarters, Dar-es-Salaam, December 1-7, 1982.

⁵²² PAC Archives: PAC/Tan/1/27/1: Decisions of the Plenary Session of the Central Committee held in Iringa. Tanzania. 1985.

⁵²³ K. Van Wyk: Foreign Policy Orientations of the PW Botha Regime: Changing Perceptions of State Elites in South Africa', Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1991, pp. 45-46.

⁵²⁴ C. Legum: Africa Contemporary Record, p. A9.

5.5 China, the US and the Soviet Union

The interests and activities of dominant global actors like the China, the US and the USSR, shaped and conditioned the PAC's exile environment and eventually moulded the general experience of exile liberation movements in Southern Africa. As Larry Bowman observed:

*"For far too long, events in Southern Africa have been viewed in a discrete manner, with little consideration given to the interaction of the countries concerned"*⁵²⁵

The role performed by superpowers as a point of interaction with Southern Africa remains an ambiguous, inconsistent and sometimes difficult to comprehend aspect of Southern African political history. The involvement of superpowers was largely determined by ideological dispositions of their ruling parties and the perceived threat to their interests in Southern Africa. When Ronald Reagan assumed power in the United States of America, a new commitment to Southern Africa, was implemented. The Reagan administration embarked on a policy of constructive engagement, i.e. that the US would support UNITA rebels against the MPLA government in Angola and adopts a non-confrontational attitude towards South Africa⁵²⁶. This was contrary to the OAU's resolve to isolate South Africa and endorse international sanctions. The US policies were favourably received by South Africa's ruling apartheid regime. The Reagan's Republican administration, however, later modified this approach considering the realities of advancing independence and majority rule throughout the region. This US attitude to Southern Africa changed once again under the leadership of the Democratic Party.

Nevertheless, the superpowers played a meaningful role in the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. Before the PAC was banned in April 1960, two of its leaders, Nana Mahomo and Peter Molotsi were sent to the USA to mobilise political support and to raise funds in order to establish the PAC external mission⁵²⁷. The same was done by the ANC when O.R. Tambo was sent abroad to establish the ANC's external diplomatic mission and also raise funds. Both organisations approached the USA, Western European countries as well as the Soviet Union, in the case of the ANC, while the PAC also approached China⁵²⁸.

The superpowers were individually involved in the Southern African liberation struggle, initially by giving financial support, to finance the logistics of ANC and PAC exiles in Tanzania and Zambia. During the initial phase, 1961-1975, the support came largely from non-governmental organisations and other elements of civil society which supported the Apartheid movement and not from governments. The role of governments became

⁵²⁵ L.W. Bowman: 'The Subordinate State System of Southern Africa', in T.M. Shaw and KA Heard (eds.), *Cooperation and Conflict in Southern Africa: Papers on a regional subsystem*, p. 16.

⁵²⁶ K. Van Wyk: *Foreign Policy Orientations of the PW Botha Regime: Changing Perceptions of State Elites in South Africa*, *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1991, pp. 46-49.

⁵²⁷ T. Lodge: *Black politics in South Africa since 1945*, P. 96.

⁵²⁸ *Ibid.*

prominent beyond 1976. Support from non-governmental organisations was not unconditional and tended to superimpose ideological cleavages⁵²⁹. The Soviet sponsored liberation movements tended to be political allies, e.g. ANC, SWAPO, ZAPU and FRELIMO; on other hand the Chinese sponsored movements were also allies e.g. PAC, ZANU, and MPLA⁵³⁰.

Before 1976, the superpowers only exercised indirect, but significant, political influence on the developments in Southern Africa. As far back as 1964, the USA, Britain and France vetoed attempts to oust South Africa from the United Nations. Again in 1975, the same countries exercised their veto rights in the UN Security Council to prevent arms boycott of South Africa⁵³¹. Even though relations with South Africa were certainly 'undesirable' to some superpowers intergovernmental relations level, at transnational interactions level South Africa was still recognised and well-integrated into the world system. Corporate links, gold sales, diamond trading and uranium production were salient aspects of this external orientation and incorporation⁵³². This relationship changed in the decade 1970-1980 in that the independence of Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe convinced the USA and Britain about the importance of negotiated majority rule as a solution to the South African and the Namibian situations.

It could be argued that the war in Angola led to direct superpower involvement in the conflict in Southern Africa. The Angolan war resulted in the shaping of alliances and nearly threatened to internationalise the Southern African conflict where the US, Britain and France supported UNITA- (National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola) led opposition under Dr Jonas Savimbi⁵³³. Their aim was to overthrow the (MPLA) - Peoples Movement for the Liberation of Angola led socialist government. Moreover, the rich mineral resources of Angola concerned the US government. The Soviet Block and Cuban troops also intervened on the side of the MPLA and China supported the (FNLA) National Front for the Liberation of Angola. The FNLA led by Holden Roberto was the only liberation movement of Angola recognised by the OAU until 1971 on grounds of it being the most active⁵³⁴.

The war which ensued during the period 1975 to 1976 in Angola was the most sanguinary, following the Biafran and Algerian wars (1954-1962) on the continent of Africa. The guerrillas of the ANC of South Africa found themselves directly involved in the war in support of the MPLA, whereas the PAC, in line with its alliance with China supported UNITA⁵³⁵. The unfortunate choice of alliances during the Angolan war created grounds for

⁵²⁹ D.A.B. Mahlangu: 'From South Africa to Azania', p.51.

⁵³⁰ J. Marcum: 'Exile Conditions and Revolutionary Effectiveness' in Southern Africa in Perspective, p. 22.

⁵³¹ O. Geyser: *Détente Southern Africa*. p. 28.

⁵³² T.M. Shaw: *South Africa, Southern Africa and the World System*, pp. 49-50.

⁵³³ L.W. Bowman: 'The Subordinate State System of Southern Africa', in T.M. Shaw and KA Heard (eds.), *Cooperation and Conflict in Southern Africa: Papers on a regional subsystem*, p. 19.

⁵³⁴ P. Stiff: *The Silent War*, p. 97.

⁵³⁵ T. Lodge: *Black Politics in South Africa since 1945*, pp. 316-317.

mistrust among members of the liberation movement. The ANC, for instance, alleged that the exiled PAC of South Africa worked hand in glove with the CIA (United States Central Intelligence Agency) and apartheid regime. It added to the hostile perceptions and poor relations which already existed between the PAC and the ANC in exile⁵³⁶. The defeat of (UNITA) National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola and (FNLA) National for the Liberation of Angola by the (MPLA) People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola in 1976 resulted in talks which led to a peace settlement. The talks paved the way for possible a negotiated settlement on the Namibian question and the Botha-led apartheid regime accepted proposals for the envisioned settlement in 1982⁵³⁷.

5.6 Conclusion

It could be concluded that the Frontline States championed the OAU's mission in Southern African affairs. One of the main tasks of the OAU, from its inception, was to formulate strategy with regard to the challenges in Southern Africa. There was a need to evolve a regional framework addressing challenges relating to the PAC, other liberation movements and the future of Southern Africa. Relationships generated among Frontline States and the extent of their support for the liberation struggle in South Africa was an issue to be dealt with carefully by the PAC in exile. It was important for the latter to do a balancing diplomatic exercise in order to preserve sanctuaries already acquired and maintain goodwill from all Southern African states. This was critical to the PAC, not only for the material support they needed, but also for infiltration routes into South Africa.

It has been noted that after independence some African states in southern Africa had to deal with the legacy of underdevelopment which increased their dependence on apartheid regime and foreign investment. Nonetheless, they never relented on their commitment and support for the PAC. Some continued to provide a haven for the PAC and other elements of the liberation movement. This was temporarily thwarted by the Apartheid Regime when it embarked on a multilateral strategy characterised by economic and technological support to co-operating governments and military attacks on those states suspected of harbouring PAC militants. International community could not display a sense of urgency in supporting the PAC to alter the situation in South Africa. Needless to say, the involvement of China, the US and the Soviet Union and the extent of their support for the PAC and other liberation movements was largely determined by ideological dispositions of their ruling parties and the perceived threat to their interests in Southern Africa.

⁵³⁶ ANC Archives, Fort Hare: 'The Pan Africanist Congress: Whom does it serve?' no date.

⁵³⁷ Ibid.

CHAPTER SIX: POLICY POSITION ON KEY ISSUES AND TRANSITION TO MAJORITY RULE

“The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania has maintained since its inception, that the vehicle for genuine change can never be the regime, but rather the oppressed, exploited and dispossessed majoritys” – Zephania ‘Uncle’ Mothopeng

6.1 Introduction

The PAC fervently believed that the elimination of apartheid meant the removal from the statute books of racially – based discriminatory laws. It argued that the elimination of apartheid had, first and for most, to aim at restoration of the inalienable rights of the dispossessed people, because the introduction and subsequent development of apartheid had its roots in the colonial conquest of South Africa by European colonial powers⁵³⁸. Thus, this brief and conclusive chapter shall deal with the PAC’s policy position on transition to majority rule in South Africa. This shall be done in the light of PAC engagement of what it convoked as the ‘*racist settler regime*⁵³⁹’; the national question; economic sanctions; race and the issue of non-Africans in the Liberation Struggle; the Military Front and Mass Action; education policies and socio-economic impact. The chapter shall conclude with PAC stance and pronouncements on negotiations.

6.2 Engaging the “Racist settler” Regime

The PAC engaged the apartheid regime from a policy position that asserted that apartheid could not be reformed – it had to be totally enadicated; that the main vehicle of change was the oppressed majority and not the racist regime or the white minority. The PAC stood for unity and rallying the African people into one national front on the basis of African nationalism.⁵⁴⁰ It was committed to fighting for the overthrow of white domination and for the implementation and maintenance of the right to self-determination for the African people. In fact, the PAC undertook to work and strive for the establishment of an Africanist socialist democracy.

The PAC, however, first assailed the apartheid regime through the South Africa Act of 1910, passed by the British Parliament, which forged union of the British and Dutch against the Black majority. Pokela said:

“The South Africa Act of 1910 is to us, the dispossessed people, what the 1917 Balfour Declaration is to the Palestinian people, Jut as under the Balfour Declaration the British handed over mandated. Palestine, in Azania, too, the British, under the South Africa Act of 1910, entrenched a racist settler minority to the total exclusion of the indigenous majority”⁵⁴¹.

⁵³⁸ PAC Archives: Proposal for organization and re-organization of the PAC, Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, July, 1981.

⁵³⁹ D. Sibeko: The Impact of the PAC and Sobukwe- the defier of the undefiable, Azania News, Vol. 25 No. 6 & 7, pp1-60.

⁵⁴⁰ J.P. Mlambo: New Year Message to the People of Azania, Chairman of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, 1988.

⁵⁴¹ John Nyethi Pokela: Statement and Addresses at the United Nations, Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (1981 - 1985).

Pokela further argued that the struggle to eliminate apartheid would prove meaningless unless it was inextricably coupled with the restoration of the so blatantly usurped, inalienable rights of people⁵⁴². Moreover, the first major act of the all-white parliament established under the South African Act of 1910 was to pass the infamous land Act. Under this Act the apartheid regime expropriated African land in South Africa (Azania). Consequently, the white minority, constituting one fifth of the total population, effectively occupied 87.3 per cent of the total land area. On the other hand, the indigenous majority – the ‘rightful owners of the land’ – were declared, per racist legalization, “foreigners” in rich and fertile part of South Africa⁵⁴³. Under the policies pursued by the racist – colonial regime, the African people, who constituted four fifths of the total population, politically and otherwise “belonged” to the remaining 12.7 per cent of the total land area where the racists were establishing the so-called independent Bantustans.

According to the PAC, the establishment of Bantustans constituted the cornerstone of the apartheid policies of the ‘South African racists’. Internationally the apartheid regime claimed that they were granting “independence” to the African people in “territories which historically belong to them”⁵⁴⁴. It could be argued that internally the regime hoped that by creating the Bantustans they would succeed in dividing the African people along tribal lines and thereby, effectively control them under the colonial and imperialist maxim of divide and rule. Moreover, the Bantustans were nothing but reservoirs of cheap labour for the mines and multinational cooperations to fully exploit. It was due to the exploitation of the migrant labourers, the majority of whom were confined to the Bantustans, that investors reaped super profits in apartheid South Africa⁵⁴⁵. Profit returns were said to be highest in the world in apartheid South Africa. In terms of the PAC, the struggle to eliminate apartheid had to include total rejection of the policy to divide South Africa and the recognition of the right of African majority to the land. Any recognition or collaboration within the so- called “independent” Bantustans constituted support for apartheid and endorsed dispossession. Apartheid, consequently, could not be eliminated unless the right of African people was unconditionally recognized and fully restored and the United Nations was duty-bound, politically and morally, to ensure this⁵⁴⁶.

Having dealt, albeit briefly, with the status of apartheid South Africa and the all – important land question, the PAC focused on some of the political gimmicks perfumed by the apartheid regime to hoodwink international public opinion. During the 1980s there was talk and undue publicity about the constitutional plan to establish a

⁵⁴² Ibid.

⁵⁴³ J.P Mlambo: New Year message to the people of Azania, Chairman of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, 1988.

⁵⁴⁴ J.P Mlambo: New Year message to the people of Azania, Chairman of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania, 1988.

⁵⁴⁵ SADET, *The Road to Democracy: South Africans telling their stories*, Volume 1, 1950-1970, (2008), pp. 41, 43, 157, 286, 290.

⁵⁴⁶ Thami ka Plaajie, *The PAC's Internal Underground Activities 1960-1980*, in *The Road to Democracy*, Volume 2, [1970-1980], pp.696 & 700.

so-called triracial government in apartheid South Africa⁵⁴⁷. Some labeled it a “power sharing” plan. In reality what was this plan? Under proposals drawn by the regime there would be three parliamentary chambers, representing whites, so called Coloureds and people of Asian origin. It totally excluded the indigenous majority. The proposal envisaged the election of an executive president by an electoral college composed of 50 whites, 25 so-called Coloureds and 13 of Asian origin⁵⁴⁸. Members of the Electoral College would be elected by a proposed three-chamber parliament representing the whites, so-called Coloureds and Asian communities respectively. Election to each chamber would be on the basis of racially separate voters’ roles for the three communities. The majority in each chamber would elect the full *quota* of its racial representatives to the Electoral College, thus effectively eliminating any prospect of a minority of whites siding with so-called Coloureds and persons of Asian origin in the Electoral College to elect a Coloured or Asian President⁵⁴⁹.

Each of the three chambers would deal exclusively with its so-called own affairs. The country would then be run by the powerful President’s Council. The Council would consist of 20 whites, 10 so-called Coloureds and 5 persons of Asian origin, elected by each of the three parliamentary chambers, and 25 members nominated by the President⁵⁵⁰. However, what the PAC appreciated in the constitutional proposal was that it further enhanced and perpetuated white domination and white minority rule, rather than introducing any fundamental change. It could be argued that, in the guise of power-sharing, the proposals aimed at further dividing the oppressed, exploited and discriminated against people by enticing puppets from the so-called Coloured and Asian communities to give credence to that political farce. Under the terms of the proposals the President would always be the leader of the majority party in parliamentary chamber⁵⁵¹. The entire scheme, therefore, was to buttress white domination by selective recruitment from the so-called Coloured and Asians and to parade this internationally as a “step in the right direction”⁵⁵². The proposals, therefore, entrenched the divide and rule policy – a cornerstone of apartheid – and, consequentially, could in no way be called a “step in the direction”. The United Nations and the international community unequivocally condemned this racist man oeuvre.

In this respect, the PAC drew the attention of the international community to the reality that the overwhelming majority of the so-called Coloured people and people of Asian origin had categorically rejected the President’s Council plot put forward by P.W Botha and his all-white political party⁵⁵³. Already in the mid-1960s, the South

⁵⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁸ A. Drew: South Africa’s Radical Tradition, A documentary history, Volume Two, 1943-1964, pp.387-388, & 391-392.

⁵⁴⁹ A. Drew: South Africa’s Radical Tradition, A documentary history, Volume Two, 1943-1964, pp.387-388, & 391-392.

⁵⁵⁰ B.J. Liebenberg, & S.B. Spies: South Africa in the 20th Century, pp.388-398.

⁵⁵¹ K. Nkondo: In the Twilight of the Revolution, The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania 1959 to 1994, pp.78-84.

⁵⁵² S. Velaphi: APLA soldier buried in Centane, from the *New Age*, 4 April, [online] Available at www.thenewage.co.za [Accessed 23 August 2011]

⁵⁵³ Velaphi, S. (2011), APLA soldier buried in Centane, from the *New Age*, 4 April, [online] Available at www.thenewage.co.za [Accessed 23 August 2011].

African Coloured Peoples Congress was voluntarily dissolved and its members joined the PAC as oppressed and exploited South Africans fighting for the same cause. On 4 November 1981 the apartheid regime attempted to solicit the support of people of Asian origin to elect puppets into the South African Indian Council – a dummy institution – and only 10.3 per cent turned out to vote⁵⁵⁴. The massive boycott, therefore, was a decisive rebuff to the sinister attempt by the authorities to divide the oppressed and exploited people of South Africa. The PAC argued that the so-called Coloureds and the people of Asian origin decisively threw their lot with the indigenous majority and refused to be divided, bribed or cajoled into accepting crumbs from the table of the self-styled master race⁵⁵⁵.

The PAC was convinced that there existed international consensus that apartheid was a crime against humanity and had to be totally eliminated. The various resolutions of the United Nations and other international organizations all categorically called for this. However, what did not enjoy consensus was the method to be employed to ensure total elimination of apartheid. The major western powers fell into a category that claimed to see apartheid system “eliminated gradually and peacefully”⁵⁵⁶. The PAC believed that although they were often vocal in expressing this opinion, they were, at the same time, most reluctant to employ method that could peacefully solve the problem. The only way of peacefully solving South Africa’s political problem was the imposition of total and mandatory sanctions against the racist apartheid regime, but no advocate of peaceful change was prepared to fully and truthfully employ this method.

The reasons for this reluctance on the part of Western Powers were not difficult to find. True apartheid was abominable and also very profitable. Western investment, in defiance of international calls for sanctions against the apartheid regime, had been steadily growing. During the decade 1970-1980 American investment in South Africa grew from just under one billion US dollars to 2.63 billion dollars⁵⁵⁷. Such investments did not constitute pressures for change but were an active form of encouragement for apartheid. The United States in March 1977 came up with the Sullivan principles. These principles were supposed to “*climate racism at work places*”. Some even went as far as to say that the implementation of the Sullivan principles could be “*help end racism*” in South Africa. The European Economic Community, on the other hand, drew up a “*code of conduct*”⁵⁵⁸ for their multinationals operating inside South Africa. The PAC categorically stated that the Sullivan principles and the EEC’s code of conduct were not conceived as secret weapons or strategy to bring down apartheid, but rather to

⁵⁵⁴ Elizabeth Komikie Gumedé: *The Presidency*, p.59.

⁵⁵⁵ Thami ka Plaajie, *The PAC’s Internal Underground Activities 1960-1980*, in *The Road to Democracy*, Volume 2, [1970-1980, pp.696 & 700.

⁵⁵⁶ Thomas Scott: *The diplomacy of liberation: the foreign relations of the African National Congress*, pp.119-120.

⁵⁵⁷ B. Keller: *A Militant Black Group Calls Off 'Armed Struggle' in South Africa*, from the *New York Times*, 17 January, [online] Available at www.nytimes.com [Accessed 25 August 2011]

⁵⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

justify the continued presence in apartheid south Africa of Western multinational corporations in the face of mounting African and international pressures⁵⁵⁹.

What, then, were basic flaws in the Sullivan principles and the EEC's code of conduct and why the PAC believed they couldn't bring about peaceful elimination of apartheid? First and foremost the erroneous peaceful elimination of racism. Isolated factories inside South Africa displaying no apartheid signs were no compensation for the daily oppression and exploitation suffered by the African people. Second, there was erroneous belief that the struggle of the people of South Africa at that historical moment, was for "equal pay equal work"⁵⁶⁰. Of what use was the principles of "equal pay for equal work" if there existed national oppression and the opportunities were unequal?

For instance, only a few educational statistics were required to show disparities in educational opportunities between whites and blacks in apartheid South Africa. Although there were four and a half times as many Africans as whites in South Africa, there were only 1 400 African university graduates in 1970, compared with 104,500 white university graduates. In 1979 university enrollment on a full time, residential basis included 80, 000 whites and 7,000 Blacks⁵⁶¹. The Sunday Business Times of 5 August 1979 pointed out that there were not more than 10 African engineers and certified accountants (compared with several thousand whites), no African corporate lawyer and less than 100 Africans who could be described as managers⁵⁶². Thus, the Sullivan principles and the EEC's code of conduct were not designed to fight apartheid but to circumvent international criticism of the multinationals operating inside South Africa. The PAC stressed that the real dilemma for the Western imperialist countries was that they would like to have their cake and eat it. They would very much like to continue exploiting the riches of South Africa, but would not like to be seen to be condoning the inhuman and universally condemned system in South Africa⁵⁶³,

The PAC was of the view that the situation inside apartheid South Africa was not a static one. The apartheid regime was operating under a so-called "new constitution" and attempted, by introducing that so-called "new constitution", to give the impression that it was attempting to move away from its diabolical and universally discredited system. It became common knowledge that the so-called Coloureds and people of Indian origin, who were being co-opted into the white laager through separate parliaments, overwhelmingly rejected the so-called "new constitution"⁵⁶⁴. So did the international community. The General Assembly adopted resolution 39/2 on 28

⁵⁵⁹ Elizabeth Komikie Gumede (1921–), from *The Presidency*, [online] Available at www.thepresidency.gov.za [Accessed 23 August 2011]

⁵⁶⁰ K. Nkondo: In the Twilight of the Revolution, The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania 1959 to 1994, pp. 10-17.

⁵⁶¹ Ibid.

⁵⁶² K. Nkondo: In the Twilight of the Revolution, The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania 1959 to 1994, pp. 10-17.

⁵⁶³ A. Drew: South Africa's Radical Tradition, A documentary history, Volume Two, 1943-1964, pp.387-388, & 391-392.

⁵⁶⁴ K. Nkondo: In the Twilight of the Revolution, The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania 1959 to 1994, pp. 10-17.

September 1984, which categorically rejected the so-called “new constitution” as being “null and void”⁵⁶⁵. The Security Council, in its resolution 554 (1984), had also declared the so-called “new constitutional” “null and void”. The PAC had consistently and ‘correctly’ maintained that the racist regime was illegitimate and these two resolutions confirmed this.

However, there are two aspects with regard to the imposition of the so-called “new constitution” that the PAC reacted on. First, the racists had hoped that the dummy elections would not arouse strong opposition from the African masses as they were not directly involved in the bogus parliamentary exercise. But this was a false assumption. On 3 September, the day the so-called “new constitution” was imposed, once more the African masses revolted; and once again the lead was provided by the people of Sharpville. The London Times editorially commented as follows on 25 September 1984:

*“Sharpville is a name is a name etched in the hearts of the Afrikaner rulers of South Africa. In 1960 in this small Transvaal town police opened fire on a crowd of peaceful demonstrators and killed 69. the world reacted in horror. Things will never be the same, said one minister..... Twenty – four years later Sharpville is back in the world headlines. There are significant differences. The days of peaceful mass demonstration are past. The police fired on rioters this time, and Africans murdered African collaborators with the regime..... The message is more somber: Things cannot go on in the long term as they are in South Africa.”*⁵⁶⁶.

The PAC maintained that the Africans people of Sharpville, Soweto, Sebokeng and other townships put the decisive nail in the coffin of the so-called “new constitution”. Their timed uprisings delivered a decisive blow to the deceptive attempt by the Asian and Coloured people, demonstrated to the entire world that Azanians would accept nothing less than national liberation and majority rule. Second, the so-called “new constitution”, far from moving away from apartheid, not only entrenched the obnoxious inhuman system but had militarized the regime⁵⁶⁷. The PAC argued that Apartheid South Africa, as a result of the implementation of the so-called “new constitution”, was then ruled by a Fascist military junta. The new so-called State President was no longer accountable to parliament, but to a white Parliament. All powers were then vested in him. Thus, under the so called “New constitution” the regime deployed the army against the civilian population, carried out a house -to-house search for weapons and cards and arrested thousands, without having to account to anybody⁵⁶⁸. The militarization of the regime along Fascist lines was one of the aims of the drafters of the so-called “new constitution”. And this aim was being materialized.

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁶ Editor: London Times, 25 September 1984, pp.7-11.

⁵⁶⁷ B.J. Liebenberg & S.B. Spies: South Africa in the 20th Century, pp.388-398.

⁵⁶⁸ L. Mphahlele: Child of the Soil, My Life as a Freedom Fighter, p.17-21.

The PAC congratulated the General Assembly of the United Nations for declaring the so-called “new constitution” null and void and upholding the fundamental principles of the liberation movement⁵⁶⁹. Such fundamental principles entailed illegality of racial discrimination, the right of the people of South Africa to self-determination and the legitimacy of the liberation struggle waged by the oppressed, exploited and dispossessed people of South Africa⁵⁷⁰.

6.3 The National Question

The PAC noted desperate attempt by the apartheid regime to hoodwink the international community to believe that it had at long last come to its senses and was committed to power-sharing with Africans. The attempt came in the form of another political circus which, amid blazing headlines, became known as the National Party’s Five Year Plan. Among the points which rang out strongly and clearly in the so-called plan was that every South African had the right to participate in political decision-making on all levels of Government which affected his interest, subject to the principle of no domination of one group by another⁵⁷¹.

The other point noted by the PAC was that of the principle of self-determination regarding groups own affairs. On this point, the regime’s Minister of Information, Dr. Van de Merve made it clear that his party believed political rights could only be exercised in group context. The word “groups” was used to distinguish a white from an African or the so-called coloureds and people of Asian origin⁵⁷². The PAC doubted whether the plan as such sought to bring Africans to the negotiating table. It argued that even if the regime contemplated some sort of power-sharing, they simply could not make their longstanding aim of entrenching white supremacy to agree with any idea of sharing with the African majority.

In terms of the PAC, the oppressed people could not discern any meaningful power sharing being accommodated within structures of white supremacy⁵⁷³. Quite clearly, the two positions were mutually exclusive and antagonists. The PAC, however, argued that in order to maintain its exclusive grip on all power in South Africa, the apartheid regime had to deny any form of genuine non-racial democracy to the country. Essentially, and in everyday practice, this meant keeping the overwhelming majority perpetually underfoot. According to the PAC, non-racial democracy in South Africa could ultimately come only with African majority rule. But such majority rule could only be built up on the shouldering ruins of the fascist dictatorship of the white minority⁵⁷⁴. The PAC advanced a view that the coming into power of the indigenous Africans – through ballot box, or by force of arms

⁵⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁰ K. Nkondo: In the Twilight of the Revolution, The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania 1959 to 1994, pp. 10-17.

⁵⁷¹ Editor: London Times, 25 September 1984, pp.7-11.

⁵⁷² B.J. Liebenberg & S.B. Spies: South Africa in the 20th Century, pp.388-398.

⁵⁷³ Thomas Scott: The diplomacy of liberation: the foreign relations of the African National Congress, (New York), pp.119-120.

⁵⁷⁴ K. Nkondo: In the Twilight of the Revolution, The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania 1959 to 1994, pp. 17-23.

– pointed directly to two unavoidable events, i.e. the complete emancipation of the African, and the loss of all exclusive privilege by the white minority. There would begin the whole fundamental transformation of a tortured society. Unequivocally, the chieftains of white domination understood such future development so well that they rejected off-hand any idea of meaningful dialogue or negotiations with the subject majority⁵⁷⁵. And so, the conflict raged on, bringing nearer the final and complete overthrow of white domination. The demands and struggles of the oppressed majority, argued the PAC, revealed an equally strong, clear and comparable understanding of the problem, i.e. apartheid could not be reformed or accommodated in any manner⁵⁷⁶.

Thus, non-racial democracy or any kind of true power sharing for that matter, could not succeed if attempted within the confines of the same white domination that had stifled human development of the oppressed majority for so long and so intensively. The PAC asserted that apartheid had to be completely destroyed to create a totally new socio-political system of freedom and equality in all fields of human existence in South Africa⁵⁷⁷. Nothing short of that solution would bring much desired peace to the troubled land. All suggestions of negotiations between the apartheid regime and the oppressed people fell flat on the crucial question of the basic purpose of such an exercise. The PAC asked whether the principal aim of such negotiations be the complete dismantling of the racist political system, and the true exercise of the right of self determination by the African majority? Or would it be for racist high purpose of diffusing that majority's militant struggle and representing its legitimate demands?

The PAC's rejection of dialogue or negotiation rested on the unacceptability of any peaceful talks that could not centre on the total abandonment of the apartheid's political system, plus the full enjoyment of the inalienable right to self determination by the indigenous people. It was universally acknowledged that, to the PAC and the indigenous African people, the National Question was central and decisive. Thus, the struggle would not end until Black South Africans had in their hands the effective control of their own destiny and national wealth for the equal benefit of all⁵⁷⁸. Therefore, self determination, national liberation and independence in a unitary state, were simply not negotiable. The PAC emphasised that the oppressed South African people would continue to fight for the seizure of political power at all costs, by any means necessary and available. That was the surest way to their salvation and peace. There was even a technical objection to calls for "negotiations"⁵⁷⁹.

The PAC argued that the oppressed people in South Africa did not have the balance of forces sufficiently in their favour to enter any such negotiations from a position of strength. That is why it persisted in advocating and

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁶ Thami ka Plaajie, *The PAC's Internal Underground Activities 1960-1980*, in *The Road to Democracy*, Volume 2, [1970-1980, pp.696 & 700.

⁵⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁸ Thami ka Plaajie, *The PAC's Internal Underground Activities 1960-1980*, in *The Road to Democracy*, Volume 2, [1970-1980, pp.696 & 700.

⁵⁷⁹ Ibid.

striving for an all out people's war upon the 'settler regime'.⁵⁸⁰ To PAC, that was the crucial political task of the moment and it was the only way towards national emancipation, It strongly felt the necessity to tackle and solve all difficult challenges of logistics by every means that came its way.

6.4 Economic Sanctions

The PAC fervently believed that by imposing and effectively applying selective and comparatively small sanctions package, the UK, West Germany, France, Switzerland and Japan could exclude South Africa from the international economic system and cause apartheid to collapse. This was also the conclusion drawn in a 1998 report by the respected Starnberger Research Institute into Global Structures, Development and Crises⁵⁸¹. The study by the Munich-based institute was commissioned by the Protestant Church in West Germany. The analysis states that:

*"The South African economy is highly vulnerable to targeted sanctions; that by wielding effective sanctions; a small group of only six countries has the power to chop through one of apartheid's most vital supporters – its integration into the world economy; that, as far as these countries are concerned, effective sanctions would entail a fairly small package of measures with negligible overall effects on their own economies"*⁵⁸².

The PAC was of the view that whites would experience a deterioration of their former high standard of living, while for the black majority, the negative effects of sanctions would, taken as a whole, be very minimal indeed. In fact, by impeding the apartheid system and ultimately rendering it unworkable, sanctions would open the door to a much hopeful prospect for the black population⁵⁸³. The envisaged sanctions included a refusal to allow South Africa to roll over loans, banning new money and ensuring that this would push South Africa into international insolvency and provoke massive capital flight, leaving to a state fiscal crisis, a cessation of investment and an exodus of business people and experts – in all, to an irrevocable weakening of the apartheid regime⁵⁸⁴. Mlambo pointed out that by agreeing to reschedule South Africa's debts in 1986 and 1987, wittingly or unwittingly, foreign banks contributed to preventing South Africa's financial crisis. For this reason, the PAC proposed effective sanctions to include at least a ban on new loans and a refusal to allow rescheduling in future⁵⁸⁵.

The PAC urged the rich six to combine fiscal measures with "effective sanctions in the fields of foreign trade and foreign investments, primarily a ban on imports of South Africa mining products, capital goods and 'security' products. This was an endorsement of the report that stated:

⁵⁸⁰ K. Nkondo: In the Twilight of the Revolution, The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania 1959 to 1994, pp. 21-26.

⁵⁸¹ A. Drew: South Africa's Radical Tradition, A documentary history, Volume Two, 1943-1964, pp.387-388, & 391-392.

⁵⁸² J.P. Mlambo: Apartheid Cannot be Reformed, It must be Totally Eradicated, pp. 2-59.

⁵⁸³ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁴ A. Drew: South Africa's Radical Tradition, A documentary history, Volume Two, 1943-1964, pp.387-388, & 391-392.

⁵⁸⁵ J.P. Mlambo: Apartheid Cannot be Reformed, It must be Totally Eradicated, pp. 2-59.

“backed up by the mandatory cessation of operations by foreign firms in such key areas as mining, energy, capital good, and banking would soon bring about the complete economic collapse of the apartheid regime⁵⁸⁶”.

Such measures, indeed even the threat of such government sanctions, could cause a downtown of company activities in South Africa which would “shorten the period through which the apartheid regime could survive⁵⁸⁷. The PAC pointed out that the South African economy relied on foreign inputs, sources of finance and cheap labour. Sanctions could end the salient factors of inputs - capital goods, energy, technology and finance. Despite the conclusion that blacks would benefit in the long run from the end of apartheid, the PAC conceded that sanctions would mean job losses and unemployment⁵⁸⁸. However, it added that sanctions would also widen “alternative employment” and more important, pointed out that the economic structures of apartheid had been responsible for more unemployment in South Africa and would continue to create more unemployment than would be caused by any of the possible short-term effects of effective sanctions. The PAC argued that apartheid itself produced structural unemployment⁵⁸⁹.

The PAC stated categorically that sanctions could work. It quoted the example of the COCOM agreements which banned the export of ‘security’ related technologies from the West to Socialist countries. Another example given was the ban in the US anti-apartheid act on “import, export, loans, investment and air traffic⁵⁹⁰. The PAC minced no words when it stated that:

“If the six industrialised countries on which sanctions against South Africa ultimately depend had the political will to impose joint effective action against the apartheid regime and if they jointly monitored observation of sanctions and punished breaches, then sanctions would be effective”⁵⁹¹.

The PAC further pointed out that sanctions by the Frontline States were less effective. These “would politically” wish to impose them but they could not be effective and the frontline states “could not afford any abrupt break”⁵⁹² in the historical links.

For apartheid South Africa that trade was “insignificant” in term of size and if sanctions were imposed it would not seriously undermine the South African economy, as would be the case if the industrialised countries did so. The PAC emphasis was on the political will of those countries. If they choose they could pass laws to stop

⁵⁸⁶ P. Masemola: Fight or Capitulate? Azania News, Vol.26 No. 4 & 5, pp. 1-41.

⁵⁸⁷ J.P. Mlambo: Apartheid Cannot be Reformed, It must be Totally Eradicated, pp. 2-59.

⁵⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁹ A. Drew: South Africa's Radical Tradition, A documentary history, Volume Two, 1943-1964, pp.387-388, & 392-396.

⁵⁹⁰ J.P. Mlambo: Apartheid Cannot be Reformed, It must be Totally Eradicated, pp. 2-59.

⁵⁹¹ Ibid.

⁵⁹² A. Drew: South Africa's Radical Tradition, A documentary history, Volume Two, 1943-1964, pp.387-388, & 392-396.

multinationale from carrying on business in South Africa⁵⁹³. The PAC was of the view that a monitoring system could be introduced and effectively so. The “cautious approach” of the Western nations on sanctions was mentioned and the point made that “pinpricks” would not stop apartheid, whose end world opinion saw as long overdue⁵⁹⁴. In terms of the PAC, South Africa still depended on its strong international links but these were slowly weakening which had to be sharply accelerated in order to end the violent apartheid regime.

6.5 Race and non-Africans in the Liberation Struggle

Since inception, the PAC had been labelled “racist” by its detractors and for this reason, it is imperative to give treatment to this question. It could be argued that only the mischievous and the genuinely ignorant really misunderstand the PAC’s racial outlook. The Manifesto of the organisation as well as the Inaugural Address of its president which was adopted as an official policy document treated this question quite elaborately. The PAC manifesto stated that there is only one race, the human race. It also envisaged a non-racial society in a free South Africa (Azania)⁵⁹⁵.

Understandably, the confusion came when the PAC called such society an African society and asserted that Africa ‘is’ for the Africans. Leaders of the PAC asserted that the confusion was not of their own accord, but the fault of colonialism, which conceived of “African” in racial terms⁵⁹⁶. Thus, to minds influenced by the colonialist conception, African meant black in the racial sense. There were African with fair skins in places such as Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, i.e. most Arab-speaking countries in Africa, and the PAC did not exclude them from the definition of African. The call “Africa for Africans” did not have anything to do with race and if certain people felt excluded from a definition like that, it was because they did not regard themselves as Africans⁵⁹⁷.

The PAC stated that an African was anyone who paid his or her sole allegiance to Africa. This meant that he or she identified fully, intellectually and psychologically, with Africa and its indigenous people and embraced indigenous African values. For an indigenous African, there was no problem in this, of course; the question did not even arise. But for someone with ancestral links in other continents, there had to be a conscious effort, especially in the racial situation that had been created by colonialism in South Africa⁵⁹⁸. Such a person might have had a genuine desire to break with European or Asian consciousness. In the same way that anyone who wanted to become a German or Swiss was required to know the language, might be at home with the culture of the country, accept and be

⁵⁹³ J.P. Mlambo: *Apartheid Cannot be Reformed, It must be Totally Eradicated*, pp. 2-59.

⁵⁹⁴ *Ibid*.

⁵⁹⁵ B. Keller: *A Militant Black Group Calls Off 'Armed Struggle' in South Africa*, from the *New York Times*, 17 January, pp.7-11.

⁵⁹⁶ J.P. Mlambo: *Apartheid Cannot be Reformed, It must be Totally Eradicated*, pp. 2-59.

⁵⁹⁷ *Ibid*.

⁵⁹⁸ B. Keller: *A Militant Black Group Calls Off 'Armed Struggle' in South Africa*, from the *New York Times*, 17 January, pp.7-11.

accepted by the community, so was one who wished to become an African identified with African indigenous values⁵⁹⁹.

The PAC maintained that it did not make sense for someone to seek to maintain European values (and also consider that these values are right for everybody else even in the non-European countries; or indeed, as in South Africa, try to impose them on the African) and still claimed to be an African himself⁶⁰⁰. The PAC viewed such a person as a European and could not be called African. Another apparent misunderstanding about the PAC was the role in the liberation struggle that it envisaged for European 'settlers' in South Africa who sympathised with the African cause. The PAC emphasised that the oppressed were themselves to determine the direction of the liberation struggle⁶⁰¹. This meant that the leadership was to be in their hands completely; since no European settler in South Africa was nationally oppressed, it did not make sense for any of them to be involved in the struggle at leadership or planning level. The PAC's critics interpreted this in racist terms. The PAC fervently believed that Africans were oppressed by people who considered themselves organically linked to Europe and therefore non-African⁶⁰². That the oppressed were dark in pigmentation made it easier to identify their kind in terms of fighting against oppression. That is why it was becoming increasingly easier for people in South Africa who once regarded themselves as Indians to identify with the African majority; they were becoming Africans themselves in terms of their experience and growing consciousness⁶⁰³. Indigenous Africans had no difficulty with colour since their own albinos had exactly the same pigmentation as indigenous Europeans!

In PAC's view, it is one's experience that was crucial when it came to political leadership. It made no more sense for someone who had not experienced oppression to lead the oppressed or tell them how it felt to be oppressed, than it did for a man to pretend to lead a women's liberation organisation⁶⁰⁴. Such people could only play a supportive role, and indeed they were welcome to play this role in the liberation struggle. Many had done so and had paid the price in a remarkable way.

In terms of the PAC, one who experienced the pain of oppression directly identified more fully with the struggle than one who did not know this pain through his own experience or material conditions. Hence there was a greater chance that he would protect the liberation movement even with his life against the most extreme odds, and he was less likely to desert in times of great adversity⁶⁰⁵. Still less was likely to be used permanently to subvert the movement and if he did play this role, it was not out of moral commitment to protect the oppressor group, but

⁵⁹⁹ J.P. Mlambo: *Apartheid Cannot be Reformed, It must be Totally Eradicated*, pp. 2-59.

⁶⁰⁰ Elizabeth Komikie Gumedé: *The Presidency*, p. 58.

⁶⁰¹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰² B. Keller: A Militant Black Group Calls Off 'Armed Struggle' in South Africa, from the *New York Times*, 17 January, pp.7-11.

⁶⁰³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰⁴ Elizabeth Komikie Gumedé: *The Presidency*, p. 58.

⁶⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

rather out of fear, intimidation or from bribery. The PAC believed that these conditions were to be defeated by the force of conscience. Such force of conscience would normally arise when one believed he was offending against kith and kin, a very forceful motivation indeed. Many people of European origin who had subverted the liberation movement in South Africa had done so out of commitment toward their “kith and kin”, a classic involved example being Craig Williamson⁶⁰⁶; whereas Africans that had been involved in the subversive activities could never be said to have been motivated by the same objective.

The PAC’s position in regard to the involvement of people from the oppressor group arose, therefore, out of practical considerations rather than considerations of race. The Inaugural address of its founding president stated:

“The Africans are only people who, because of their material (note: not racial) position, can be interested in the complete overhaul of the present structure of society. We have admitted that there are Europeans who are intellectual convert to the African cause but because they benefit materially from the present set-up they cannot completely identify themselves with that cause. Thus it is, as South African history so ably illustrates, that whenever Europeans “co-operate” with African movements they keep on demanding checks and counter-checks, guarantees and the like, with the result that they stultify and retard the movement of the Africans and the reason is, of course that they are consciously or unconsciously protecting their sectional interest...”⁶⁰⁷

The supportive role that the PAC expected such people to play meant that they listened to the oppressed to tell them how they wanted to be assisted instead of telling them how they would go about liberating themselves. One area, for instance, in which they could play a meaningful role, was working to convert more “Whites” to the idea of destroying white racial supremacy⁶⁰⁸. What about the “Coloureds” and Indians? There was no such word as Coloured in the PAC dictionary in reference to a race or national group. People who were described in this way by the apartheid regime were in actual fact indigenous Africans. The PAC cited three groups only:

“In South Africa we recognise the existence of national groups (note: not racial group) which are a result of geographical origin within a certain area as well as a shared historical experience of these groups. The Europeans are a foreign minority group... the exploiting group. It came to the country not as imperialists but as indentured labourers, in the South African set-up today, this group is an oppressed minority...[they] can [because of this] identify themselves with the indigenous African majority... to overthrow white supremacy... The African constitute the indigenous group (this

⁶⁰⁶ P. Masemola: Fight or Capitulate? Azania News, Vol.26 No. 4 & 5, pp. 1-41

⁶⁰⁷ SG: Pan Africanist Congress of Azania: Know the PAC in a nutshell, pp.4-38; D. Sibeko: The Impact of the PAC and Sobukwe- the defier of the undefiable, Azania News, Vol. 25 No. 6 & 7, pp1-60.

⁶⁰⁸ Thami ka Plaajie, *The PAC’s Internal Underground Activities 1960-1980*, in *The Road to Democracy*, Volume 2, [1970-1980], pp.696 & 700.

includes the so-called Coloureds) and form the majority of the population. They are the most ruthlessly exploited and subjected to humiliation, degradation and insult...”⁶⁰⁹.

The PAC's contention was that only those whose consciousness was Indian and who paid their allegiance to India were Indians; likewise, all those who clung to their European-ness and refused to identify with the indigenous Africans were Europeans; the rest were Africans.

The PAC contended that after liberation, it would be easier not only for the erstwhile Europeans to identify as Africans, but easier to identify all those who would be willing to do so⁶¹⁰. This would be because the racial and racist structures shall have been brought down completely; the PAC would immediately embark on a programme of nation-building in terms of its objective of creating a non-racial African society where everyone who wanted to be an African and fulfilled all requirements would be going through the same material conditions created for new attitudes to arise⁶¹¹. As Sobukwe said:

“I have said before and say so now, that I see no reason why, in a free democratic Africa, a predominantly black electorate should not return a “White” man to parliament, for colour will count for nothing in a free Africa”⁶¹².

The PAC maintained that anybody who expressed and identified with African interests would be acceptable as a leader, given that he or she had other universal qualities.

6.6. The Military Front and Mass Action

A plethora of formations and institutions argued that the PAC was inactive on the military front. This depended on what they believed military action was in its completeness. Was it bombing or shooting? Any criminal could do that. Military scientists would argue that the most important element in military activity was preparation of the mind and mobilisation. No general in his right senses would take his army to war if it was not properly oriented and organised, unless he placed no values on the survival of his nation⁶¹³. The PAC believed that shooting a hundred people would take hundred rounds, assuming one shot straight, and it could take less than two minutes with the most modern hardware. Furthermore, any foolhardy criminal could do that. Thus, killing in a revolution

⁶⁰⁹ D. Sibeko: The Impact of the PAC and Sobukwe- the defier of the undefiable, Azania News, Vol. 25 No. 6 & 7, pp1-60.

⁶¹⁰ J.P. Mlambo: Apartheid Cannot be Reformed, It must be Totally Eradicated. PAC External Headquarters, Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, 1988, pp. 2-59.

⁶¹¹ Ibid.

⁶¹² D. Sibeko: The Impact of the PAC and Sobukwe- the defier of the undefiable, Azania News, Vol. 25 No. 6 & 7, pp1-60.

⁶¹³ J. Bolnick: Double-cross: Potlake Leballo and 1946 Riots at Lovedale Missionary Institution, p. 14.

could be said to be something backed by political conviction and have a moral base, placing value on life. According to the PAC, a revolutionary would kill to protect life⁶¹⁴.

The PAC argued that the process of building up organisational awareness and mobilizing people took longer than killing a hundred people; far from a matter of minutes, calculated in terms of years-not a few either. Adequacy in these processes would prompt, shooting to take place in a more self-protective, more responsible and most effective way⁶¹⁵. The PAC, as observed earlier, had been involved in developing mass consciousness and mobilisation since its inception, and the exercise had never stopped even in underground work; obviously, underground organisation was less easy and required more time.

The results of PAC effort became manifest in the thinking and conduct of the oppressed, in the mass actions and in the emergence of mass organisations. A climate was created for full involvement of the people when the actual shooting began. The PAC believed that it was not only the guerrilla's business to harass the enemy; the masses were to be involved in logistics and protection⁶¹⁶. The role by the masses was impossible if they were neither politically conscious nor mobilised. The fact that guerrillas of other organisations had been arrested with every target they had hit was an indication that the masses had not been involved in these actions; there had not been the organic link with the people described above. The guerrillas did not have protection.

The principle of mass orientation of people was central to the military strategy of the PAC. Of course, the military prowess of the PAC manifested itself in 1962 and 1963. A hand-picked group of twelve cadres led by the commander of APLA, Nkondlo, and Enoch Zulu in 1968 were intercepted on their way to South Africa by the Portuguese at Villa Peri in Mozambique⁶¹⁷. They put up a gallant fight, killing several Portuguese soldiers; of the twelve, four, including the commander were slain and four were captured alive. In spite of the departure of the Portuguese, they remained in the Mozambican gaols. Two managed to come back to base in Zambia and rejoined the PAC. One of the two was arrested operating inside South Africa and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment in November 1988⁶¹⁸.

In 1978 "Kenny" Mkhwanazi, a PAC guerrilla fighter, was killed in Soweto in an armed confrontation with soldiers of apartheid regime. Many other incidents demonstrated the PAC's military presence. The PAC argued that its teeth would be shown fully when it had determined that an armed struggle would be sustained and this was

⁶¹⁴ D.A.B. Mahlangu: 'from South Africa to Azania', p. 80.

⁶¹⁵ J. Bolnick: Structure and Experience in the Making of Apartheid; Sefela Sa Letsamayanaha -The wartime experiences of Potlake Kitchener Leballo, pp. 1-30.

⁶¹⁶ Ibid.

⁶¹⁷ J. Bolnick: Structure and Experience in the Making of Apartheid; Sefela Sa Letsamayanaha -The wartime experiences of Potlake Kitchener Leballo, pp. 1-30.

⁶¹⁸ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: 'Confidential- A Statement concerning the disputes within the Pan Africanist Congress (SA), p. 7.

predicated on the mass mobilisation of the people⁶¹⁹. From its very inception, the PAC stated that it had been associated with mass action. The positive Action Campaign was mass oriented and manifested itself as mass action; the events of 1960 were also mass oriented, as were the 1976 Soweto Uprisings, with which Zeph Mothopeng was associated, not by the PAC but by the enemy itself⁶²⁰.

Many other mass oriented actions took place in South Africa and were the PAC involved in them? The PAC asserted that it was not in the habit of claiming actions until the enemy did so for it. Before independence in Zimbabwe, most people predicted a ZANU loss in the elections. But when the people of Zimbabwe had to make a decision, some people wished they had never made a prediction. Those that made wrong predictions had underestimated the potency of mass grass-root action and mass support for a movement, built over long patient years, without glamour and fanfare. The PAC believed that the situation in South Africa and Namibia was not different⁶²¹. In an interview in London, Vekuii Rukoro of SWANU said of the Namibian situation and the role of SWANU:

*"...I've no doubt that... just like in case of Zimbabwe, some people may be surprised... we will be such a significant factor that, in conjunction with other parties, we will end up in government in Namibia"*⁶²².

Sam Mabe, Assistant News Editor of the Sowetan by the time, addressing the South African Institute of International Affairs, in April 1988, warned against people entertaining the belief *"that the ANC is going to win any one-man-on-vote elections that may be held in South Africa today"*⁶²³. In his book, Motlhabi asserted that the PAC was the most misunderstood of the three liberation organisations in South Africa. He also reflected that *"the ANC seems to have been studied the most"*⁶²⁴ by those interested in the South African liberation struggle. In both assessments he was correct. Thus, the PAC was convinced that Mass protest marches by the dispossessed needed a serious review if they were to remain an effective strategic and tactical weapon in the unfolding struggle in occupied South Africa.

Without dismissing them, PAC president Zephania Mothopeng warned marchers and organisers not to provide the Pretoria regime with the credibility it did not deserve when they sought permission to march and were granted it. As a result, 'settler' president F.W de Klerk appeared as a committed reformist in the eyes of the Western countries which were dead against sanctions on South Africa, thus strengthening their argument against them⁶²⁵. Another PAC point in the argument was whether marches were protest marches or not. If they were,

⁶¹⁹ Ibid.

⁶²⁰ B. Leeman: Lesotho and the Struggle for Azania, p. 178.

⁶²¹ PAC Archives, Fort Hare: 'Confidential- A Statement concerning the disputes within the Pan Africanist Congress (SA)', p. 7.

⁶²² B. Leeman: Lesotho and the Struggle for Azania, p. 182.

⁶²³ Sam Mabe: Sowetan, April 1988, pp.5-6.

⁶²⁴ M, Motlhabi: "The Theory and Practice of Black Resistance to Apartheid, pp. 69-71.

⁶²⁵ Sam Mabe: Sowetan, April 1988, pp.5-6.

what and who they were defying if for them to take place, permission had to be sought from those powers to be “defied”.

The PAC national leader, Zephania Mothopeng wrote thus to illustrate the above point:

“Demonstrations are a method used by liberation movements to achieve certain political goals. Their occurrence is independent of the will and wishes of the oppressor and subject only to the strategy and decision of the masses. Their purpose is to advance the struggle qualitatively. A typical example hereof is the positive action campaign against passes in 1960 launched by the PAC. It was independent of the permission of the authorities and advanced the struggle qualitatively by introducing a new epoch in that, inter alia:

- *The concept of passive resistance as the principal method of struggle was abandoned.*
- *A fight of capital brought the country to the brink of bankruptcy and a leading capitalist committed suicide.*
- *For the first time since 1910 the regime was panic-stricken.”⁶²⁶*

On account of a successful PAC-led boycott of about three million workers to demonstrate their rejection of the September 6 pseudo elections of the ‘racist colonialist’ regime, the ruthless police killed many people. This enraged both the South African people and the international community, voicing a prodigious outcry for mandatory economic sanctions against the apartheid regime⁶²⁷.

A request to register PAC outrage in the form of a march was made by Archbishop Desmond Emeritus Tutu and the mayor of Cape Town. The request was granted on condition that the march be peaceful and because of involvement of the mayor of Cape Town, not because of Archbishop Tutu. This was to appease de Klerk’s constituency. The PAC argued that the aim of the Cape Town march was to expose the evil de Klerk regime, to arm pro-sanctions governments before the Commonwealth summit and to demonstrate the anger of the masses to the point of defiance of the laws and wishes of the regime⁶²⁸. Consequently a spate of marches based on the permission of the authorities arose, each with its own objective, resulting in the drowning of the noble purpose of the original march in Cape Town.

This led to the Cape Town march failing in every respect in that De Klerk had been exposed as a good man who granted permission for protest; this armed the anti-sanctions governments which argued that he be encouraged with investments, e.g. Bush and Thatcher; the anger of the masses had been dampened through peace-

⁶²⁶ ANC Archives, Fort Hare: The African National Congress of South Africa: ‘The Pan Africanist Congress of South Africa; Whom Does It Serve? pp. 1-24.

⁶²⁷ B.J. Liebenberg & S.B. Spies: South Africa in the 20th Century, (Pretoria), pp.388-398.

⁶²⁸ Ibid.

agreements; the Cape Town massacre had become the fastest forgotten massacre in history; the defiance concept had been undermined through subjectivity to restrictions by magistrates⁶²⁹.

The PAC maintained a view that the total effect was that Mr. Vlok and Mr. De Klerk were bailed out of predicament and gained international accolades instead of condemnation. The pirates and masses acted with good intentions, but unfortunately the priests acted only from the goodness of their hearts and they were not political analysts⁶³⁰.

6.7. Education policies and socio-economic impact

According to the PAC, education policies in South Africa were a reflection of colonial structures that had been developed over time institutionally epitomised by apartheid. These policies were based on the principles and socio-economic visions of the funding fathers of Bantu education⁶³¹. In April 2nd 1945 during debates in the racist parliament J.M Le Roux said:

*"... we should not give the natives an academic education, as some people are too pr one to do. If we do this we shall later be burdened with a number of academically trained Europeans and non-Europeans, and who is going to do the, manual labour in the country? ..." I am in thorough agreement with the view that we should so conduct our schools that the native who attends those schools will know that to a greater extend he must be the labourer in the country"*⁶³².

Accordingly, in 1953, under the supervision of Dr Hendrick Verwoed the 'racist' Parliament passed the so-cal-led Black Education Act which transformed the whole educational system to ensure that Africans, in the land of their origin became labourers and Europeans, as colonial settlers became colonial masters⁶³³. The then Minister of "Native Affairs" when introducing the Bill said:

*"Education must train and teach people in accordance with their opportunities to the sphere in which they live... native education should be controlled in such a way that it should be in accordance with the policy of the state... racial relations cannot improve if the result of the native education is the creation of frustrated people"*⁶³⁴.

The PAC argued that African education was dealt with and for the most, controlled by the Department of Education and Training (DET; formerly Bantu Education) which ensured that education policies were in line with

⁶²⁹ Thami ka Plaajie, *The PAC's Internal Underground Activities 1960-1980*, in *The Road to Democracy*, Volume 2, [1970-1980], pp.696 & 700.

⁶³⁰ Ibid.

⁶³¹ P. Masemola: *Fight or Capitulate?* Azania News, Vol.26 No. 4 & 5, pp. 1-41.

⁶³² O. Geyser: *Detente Southern Africa*, p. 30.

⁶³³ O. Geyser: *Detente Southern Africa*, p. 30.

⁶³⁴ D. Sibeko: *The Impact of the PAC and Sobukwe- the defier of the undefiable*, Azania News, Vol. 25 No. 6 & 7, pp1-60.

apartheid government socio-economic policies. DET provide primary education for most African children but secondary education was controlled at all levels to guarantee the inferiority against white education⁶³⁵.

The pattern of financial education for the various population groups was interesting to the PAC in that Africans paid for education of their children through ever increasing school fees, expensive textbooks, uniforms etc. As a result, the cost of keeping a child at school determined whether or not a child might proceed to secondary school. The PAC argued that such constraint ensured that children from low income groups most of the time failed to go beyond primary school level⁶³⁶. In direct contrast education for white children was free and compulsory up to the age of 16. This meant that potential dropouts remained at school until they were 16 years of age. In most cases almost all of them successfully completed their secondary education. According to the PAC, disparities between black and white education systems kept the educational facilities for African very inadequate. Although R917 million was allocated for Black education in 1985/86, an increase for R200 million compared with spending for serious groups remained wide as illustrated in the following:

Table 3

Education Pre-Capita Spending by Racial Group

| GROUP | ANNUAL PER CAPITA SPENDING |
|-----------------|-----------------------------------|
| BLACK | R 234 |
| COLOURED | R 569 |
| INDIAN | R1 088 |
| WHITE | R1 654 |

The PAC believed that it was in the apartheid regime's interest to restrict the academic development of Africans. This was to ensure that the greater majority of the Africans qualified only for labouring jobs. The following table shows a restriction in the number of student matriculation rating since 1979⁶³⁷. The PAC noted that as access to technical colleges depended on attainment of secondary education, there were very few Africans "benefitting" from those inadequate and poorly equipped technical colleges. Under the law enacted in 1911, certain skilled jobs

⁶³⁵ Ibid.

⁶³⁶ P. Masemola: Fight or Capitulate? Azania News, Vol.26 No. 4 & 5, pp. 1-41.

⁶³⁷ Peter Dreyer, Simon and Schuster, Martyrs and Fanatics: South Africa and Human Destiny, pp. 130.

were reserved for a certain group or a percentage of a certain group be employed in particular industries. This meant that African colleges, therefore, provided those skills falling outside white reserved privileges⁶³⁸. The PAC lamented the fact that no African could be called a laboratory Technician-at most an African could be called a Laboratory Assistant. Economic expansion, however, had necessitated more skilled labour, and to reduce such challenge, the apartheid regime tried and continued to recruit whites from abroad at the expense of Africans who while representing about 70% of the economically active population remained confined to labouring production and service grades, and a large percentage remained unemployed⁶³⁹.

The Wiehahn Commission recommended that Africans were part of some economic system and therefore job reservations should be abolished. In the same year the government offered

The Matriculation Rate of Students

| <i>Year</i> | <i>No of Candidates Enrolling</i> | <i>no qualifying for university</i> | |
|-------------|---|---|--------------|
| 1979 | 14 574 | 4 136 | 28.4 |
| 1980 | 29 973 | 4 714 | 15.7 |
| 1981 | 48 571 | 6 069 | 12.5 |
| 1882 | 60 108 | 6 336 | 10.5 |
| 1983 | 72 168 | 7 108 | 09.8 |
| 1984 | 75 271 | 8 620 | 11.45 |

some concessions allowing some Black apprenticeship in certain areas. New legislation was introduced to emphasise on Black training and tax concessions to employers in respect of training on their premises⁶⁴⁰. The PAC noted, however, that the policy of segregation in education and technical training remained unchanged hence nullifying the very concession of Black advancement. Industries and employers, while offering apprenticeship on their premises, raised the educational requirements beyond the reach of the Africans, thereby ensuring that only

⁶³⁸ David Dube: The Rise of Azania, The Fall of South Africa, pp.33.

⁶³⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁰ D. Sibeko: The Impact of the PAC and Sobukwe- the defier of the undefiable, Azania News, Vol. 25 No. 6 & 7, pp1-60.

whites took up those opportunities. Industries further established separate training centres for Africans and whites, thereby offering training on different job categories for different groups⁶⁴¹. So job reservation remained untempered with.

The PAC argued that the whole system of education and technical training put obstacles on the advancement of Africans. The result was to relegate the African majority to the periphery of income distribution, while the rising cost of living, inflation, taxation and the whole economic environment made level wages a critical issue. For the PAC, wage disputes remained most common between workers and management. Within the public sector wage increases were generally ignored without major problem for the government⁶⁴². This was so because strikes were generally illegal and the notorious white unions complied fully with government policies as they served interest. While increases in African income were experienced over a decade, they were equally negated by inflation which spiralled close to 20 percent in 20 years⁶⁴³. The PAC noted that “the overall percentage increases in basic salary levels between 1 July 1984 and 1 July 1985 was 10.8 percent. This compared with an increase in inflation of 16.4 percent over the same period⁶⁴⁴.

The table, however, excluded important employing sectors of Africans, namely agriculture and domestic service, both of which were extremely low, and the Bantustans whose employment conditions were known to be extremely exploitative. If these factors were included, the Average African wages would have been significantly less than shown in the table. “Business consultants in apartheid South Africa predicted that actual pay cuts were even possible in certain companies in 1985/86⁶⁴⁵.

The PAC stated that changes in labour field were relatively of meagre benefit to Africans. While protectionism continued unabated, managerial, professional and administrative jobs continued to be dominated by whites. Of greater interest was to note that under the new constitutional dispensations, agriculture was designated a white “own affair”⁶⁴⁶. The PAC also noted that Training colleges for Africans did not exist and out of 40 Africans who applied to the existing colleges, none were accepted. The Minister of Agriculture said his department was only responsible for whites.

The PAC lamented the fact that as the apartheid regime’s economy encountered serious investment constraints due to the prevailing recession, the African labour force became vulnerable to retrenchment and consequently

⁶⁴¹ UNESCO: Apartheid, its effects on education, science and information, p.31.

⁶⁴² UNESCO: Apartheid, its effects on education, science and information, p.31.

⁶⁴³ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁴ J.P. Mlambo: Apartheid Cannot be Reformed; It must be Totally Eradicated, 1988, pp. 2-59.

⁶⁴⁵ P. Masemola: Fight or Capitulate? Azania News, Vol.26 No. 4 & 5, pp. 1-41.

⁶⁴⁶ J.P. Mlambo: Apartheid Cannot be Reformed; It must be Totally Eradicated, 1988, pp. 2-59.

heavy unemployment. Statistical evidence indicated that in 1978 two million Africans were unemployed, with unemployment increasing at a very fast rate since:

“The labour market could not absorb the 200 000 work seekers coming to the marked year”⁶⁴⁷.

African labour force in farming fell from 1.35 million in 1970 to 973 000 in 1980 and was expected to fall to 800 000 by the year 2000⁶⁴⁸. The overall picture of unemployment problem therefore clearly indicated the barriers that existed in African education, across which it was difficult if not impossible for the Africans to pass. The seriousness of unemployment was a clear testimony of the effects of poor education available to African people⁶⁴⁹,

The PAC deemed it necessary to emphasize that education policy in apartheid South Africa corresponded closely with race and exploitation. Manually labour with a bleak future was a “preserve” of the Africans, and therefore, “Native education” would forever be so conducted that the “Native” who received it would know that to a great extent he remained a manual labourer in the country⁶⁵⁰. The PAC detested the fact that Job reservation was achieved through no education and training, miseducation/training of the Africans plus legislative instruments⁶⁵¹. The latter could be scrapped with effect so long the former remained.

The following table shows the average monthly earning of each population group according to the major sectors in the decade 1974-1984:

Average Monthly Earning by Sector and Racial Group

| Sector | WHITE | | COLOURED | | ASIAN | | AFRICAN | |
|---------------------|-------|-------|----------|-----|-------|------|---------|------|
| | 1974 | 1984 | 1974 | 984 | 1974 | 1984 | 1974 | 1984 |
| Mining | 563 | 1 751 | 137 | 560 | 170 | 929 | 45 | 332 |
| Manufacture | 449 | 1 668 | 118 | 487 | 128 | 595 | 88 | 415 |
| Electricity | 494 | 532 | 132 | 491 | - | 843 | 100 | 429 |
| Construction | 445 | 1 657 | 160 | 573 | 214 | 946 | 84 | 333 |
| Trade | 290 | 1 121 | 98 | 386 | 136 | 611 | 66 | 285 |
| Transporting comm. | 407 | 1 581 | 118 | 447 | 164 | 854 | 82 | 388 |
| Financial insurance | 400 | 1 317 | 154 | 733 | 210 | 961 | 118 | 561 |
| Govt & pub. sector | 394 | 1 309 | 141 | 561 | 199 | 913 | 74 | 373 |

⁶⁴⁷ UNESCO: Apartheid, its effects on education, science and information, p.31; J.P. Mlambo: Apartheid Cannot be Reformed; It must be Totally Eradicated, 1988, pp. 2-59.

⁶⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁹ T. Lodge: Black Politics in South Africa, pp.305-317.

⁶⁵⁰ D. Sibeko: The Impact of the PAC and Sobukwe- the defier of the undefiable, Azania News, Vol. 25 No. 6 & 7, pp1-60; SG: Pan Africanist Congress of Azania: Know the PAC in a nutshell, pp.4-38.

⁶⁵¹ Ibid.

6.8 Negotiations and Post-Apartheid

The president of the PAC, Zephania “Uncle” Mothopeng ruled out the question of negotiations with the apartheid regime in South Africa until the balances of forces were in favour of the African people. Addressing the fourth session of the OAU Ad-Hoc Committee meeting on Southern Africa on behalf of the liberation movements, Mothopeng said it would be foolhardy to talk of negotiations when the ‘Pretoria’ regime still had an upper hand in the situation. The veteran nationalist and revolutionary leader said:

*“We still have an arrogant apartheid government which is determined to exploit the oppressed and dispossessed people of Azania... At present the question of negotiations is out”*⁶⁵²,

Mothopeng continued:

*“The answer is straight and simple but painful. It means, therefore, we must have the people of Azania on party with the oppressors so that they can negotiate on equal ground. It means the position of the oppressor must be brought to the level or even lower than that of the people of Azania”*⁶⁵³.

Earlier on arrival from London where he was receiving medical treatment, Mothopeng told a contingent of journalists at the Harare International Airport that the PAC would present firm position on the issue of a strategy on South Africa. He argued:

*“We are going to put our position firmly, sincerely and honestly without fear of anyone”, negotiations have actually been going on since 1910. Bantustans and the tri-cameral parliament are a result of talks between the boers and a section of the oppressed who always pushed for short-cut solutions for selfish reasons”*⁶⁵⁴.

Mothopeng told an attentive audience which gave him a thunderous applause at the end of his speech that:

*“Negotiations that will bring positive results will come when our people shall have increased their strength and the fire-power of the oppressor shall have been reduced significantly”*⁶⁵⁵.

The meeting attended by several heads of state and government from Africa was told that apartheid South Africa was still determined to destabilize Southern Africa. The PAC’s Mothopeng said that when the OAU formed the Liberation Committee in 1963, it pledged itself to ceaselessly fight against colonialism throughout Africa⁶⁵⁶. That most of Africa had been liberated, with Namibia on the verge of independence; Africa could be seen to be

⁶⁵² SADET, The Road to Democracy: South Africans telling their stories, Volume 1, 1950-1970, (2008), pp. 41, 43, 157, 286, 290.

⁶⁵³ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁴ SADET, The Road to Democracy: South Africans telling their stories, Volume 1, 1950-1970, (2008), pp. 41, 43, 157, 286, 290.

⁶⁵⁵ P. Masemola: Fight or Capitulate? Azania News, Vol.26 No. 4 & 5, pp. 1-41; D. Sibeko: The Impact of the PAC and Sobukwe- the defier of the undefiable, Azania News, Vol. 25 No. 6 & 7, pp1-60.

⁶⁵⁶ Ibid.

retreating on South Africa. The PAC urged the African continent, progressive nations and organisations to continue supporting all forms of struggle of the South African people and increase the campaign for economic sanctions on Pretoria⁶⁵⁷.

The PAC accused some western countries and Japan for bailing out the apartheid regime from its economic challenges. It warned Japan that the patience of the African people was running out and reminded her and her investments in South Africa were within reach of the struggling South Africans⁶⁵⁸. The PAC also appealed to superpowers to desist from dictating to the South African people how to conduct their struggle. It argued that support was welcome but rejected if it had some strings attached. Mothpeng retorted:

“There are those who want to negotiate. You are negotiating with a bully who will just say: “Sonny, wat se jy?” (Boy, what are you saying?) To negotiate with a bully, you must first go to the gym so that when he must find you can hit back even harder. Otherwise you are negotiating from a position of weakness”⁶⁵⁹.

Thus, the PAC was not for negotiations. Negotiations were out of its vocabulary. To the PAC negotiations were nothing else but appeasement. Appeasement, it argued, had never won the day.



Zephania Mothopeng (Source: South African Press Union Publication. Oct/Nov, 1985)

6.9 Conclusion

It could be said that the PAC took a policy position that asserted that apartheid could not be reformed, but totally eradicated; that the main vehicle of change was the oppressed majority and not the racist regime or the white minority. It stood for unity and rallying African people into one national front on the basis of African nationalism. It was committed to fighting for the overthrow of white domination and for the implementation and maintenance

⁶⁵⁷ K. Nkondo: In the Twilight of the Revolution, The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania 1959 to 1994, pp. 13-17.

⁶⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁹ Zephania 'Uncle' Mothopeng: OAU Ad-Hoc Committee meeting on Southern Africa, 20/8/89.

of the right to self-determination for the African people. In terms of the PAC, the oppressed people could not discern any meaningful power sharing being accommodated within structures of white supremacy. The two positions were mutually exclusive and antagonists. The PAC argued that in order to maintain its exclusive grip on all power in South Africa, the apartheid regime had to deny any form of genuine non-racial democracy to the country.

The PAC fervently believed that by imposing mandatory and comprehensive sanctions against the apartheid regime in South Africa, whites would experience a deterioration of their former high standard of living, while for the black majority, the negative effects of sanctions would, taken as a whole, be very minimal indeed. The envisaged sanctions included a refusal to allow South Africa to roll over loans, banning new money and ensuring that this would push South Africa into international insolvency and provoke massive capital flight, leaving to a state fiscal crisis, a cessation of investment and an exodus of business people and experts – in all, to an irrevocable weakening of the apartheid regime.

The PAC emphasised that the oppressed were themselves to determine the direction of the liberation struggle. This meant that the leadership was to be in their hands since no European settler in South Africa was nationally oppressed, it did not make sense for any of them to be involved in the struggle at leadership or planning level. The PAC maintained that it did not make sense for someone to seek to maintain European values and still claimed to be an African himself. Thus, the PAC viewed such a person as a European and could not be referred to as African. The principle of mass orientation of people was therefore central to the military strategy of the PAC. It believed that shooting a hundred people would take hundred rounds, and it could take less than two minutes with the most modern hardware. Any myopic criminal could do that. The PAC was therefore convinced that Mass protest marches by the oppressed required serious review if they were to remain an effective strategic and tactical weapon in the unfolding struggle in South Africa. According to the PAC, education policies in South Africa were a reflection of colonial structures that had been developed over time institutionally epitomised by apartheid.

The PAC believed that it was in the apartheid regime's interest to restrict the academic development of Africans. This was to ensure that the greater majority of the Africans qualified only for labouring jobs. The PAC argued that the whole system of education and technical training put obstacles on the advancement of Africans. The result was to relegate the African majority to the periphery of income distribution, while the rising cost of living, inflation, taxation and the whole economic environment made level wages a critical issue. The PAC remained diametrically opposed to discussions about a negotiated settlement in South Africa. It was convinced that such were not geared towards addressing the real issues affecting the oppressed and exploited in South Africa. A negotiated settlement would be in the white settler minority, and not from oppression and exploitation that African South Africans were subjected to in their own land.



PAC Emblem (Source: PAC Constitution Cover Page)

GENERAL CONCLUSION

This research study has demonstrated that the formation of PAC as liberation movement and its organisational operations and impact thereof in the struggle for liberation in South Africa was a long-drawn out process. The majority of PAC leaders, who constituted the first organizational structure, were either in detention inside South African prisons or serving jail sentences ranging from one to three years due to their role in the anti-pass demonstrations of 21 March 1960. Those who managed to escape were scattered in various parts of Africa, Europe and America. Thus, the PAC had no recognizable or active political existence outside South Africa until August 1962 when the first PAC Executive Committee was formalized under the leadership of P.K. Leballo.

From the very outset, the organisational operations of the PAC and impact thereof were characterized by disunity. Some of the organizational challenges within the PAC could have amicably been solved. These entailed misunderstandings due to poor communication, gossip, misinformation about the performance of leadership and associations among members of the PAC from the same regions in South Africa. These bred negative perceptions and resulted in conflicts which separated the leaders from general membership and adherents. Factors which determined and conditioned intra-PAC relations during the formative years have been noted to be largely internal and to a limited extent, external. They were largely internal in the sense that the level of organizational power was still under construction, given the gap created by the absence of incarcerated leadership.

External factors were also significant in shaping inter-PAC relations during all the leadership periods but the extent of their contribution is made less over or even thwarted to a certain extent, by the perpetual self-consumption by internal disunity which characterized the PAC exile existence. External factors related, first and foremost to the very nature of the exile environment. The material benefits the exile environment provided to the PAC were largely limited to the leadership and the few PAC members who happened to be within the corporate circles of the revolutionary aristocracy, either through kinship relations or were descendants of well-known families in the history of the struggle for liberation in South Africa. Secondly, an external factor in the form of mounting military attacks from the Apartheid Regime in the 1980's contributed to the development of a commandist authority and stiff disciplinary code within the PAC.

The styles of leadership in the PAC differed depending on who was the chairman of the organization during a particular period. The PAC in exile failed to start on a solid footing. Leballo sought to establish himself as the uncontested leader of the PAC in exile but in the minds of PAC members the sacrosanct character of Mangaliso Robert Sobukwe, the founding President of the PAC (who was in Robben Island prison), could not be removed. The era of Vusumzi Maahe showed signs of confusion because many aspects of organisational improvement

which were for the first time addressed through open discussions, were left unresolved because of his indecision. Pokela had all these qualities which earned him the respect of leaders of Frontline states and liberation organisations. His leadership boosted the morale within the PAC. However, challenges relating to the accountability of the leadership to the rank and file membership remained unresolved.

Mlambo's time as a leader was eventful only with respect to military activity. Mlambo only partly implemented the official PAC organisational systems and procedures, which contributed to the perpetuation of intra-PAC conflict until, and after, the organisation was unbanned. The life-styles and conditions of living of the leaders were radically different from those of the membership, yet the organization consistently pleaded poverty. Perceptions of favouritism, sometimes along tribal lines, uninvestigated allegations about internal enemies, all widened the internal rifts between the leadership and the general membership of the organization. The PAC did not have a leadership and management excellence model to inform and direct its leadership and management practices. The organization could hardly discern the dynamics of the liberation struggle in South Africa beyond the ideological spectacles framed by the particular social and historical conditions of the early 1960s.

This study has dealt with the PAC's international relations and the impact it had on the diplomatic profile of the organization during the struggle for liberation. Relationships generated among Frontline States and the extent of their support for the liberation struggle in South Africa was an issue to be dealt with carefully by the PAC in exile. It was important for the latter to do a balancing diplomatic exercise in order to preserve sanctuaries already acquired and maintain goodwill from all Southern African states. International community could not display a sense of urgency in supporting the PAC to alter the situation in South Africa. The involvement of China, the US and the Soviet Union and the extent of their support for the PAC and other liberation movements was largely determined by ideological dispositions of their ruling parties and the perceived threat to their interests in Southern Africa. the PAC took a policy position that asserted that apartheid could not be reformed, but totally eradicated; that the main vehicle of change was the oppressed majority and not the racist regime or the white minority. It stood for unity and rallying African people into one national front on the basis of African nationalism. It was committed to fighting for the overthrow of white domination and for the implementation and maintenance of the right to self-determination for the African people. The PAC did not take part in the negotiation process but contested the election in 1994 in which it dismally performed.

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INTERVIEW SHEET

(Former and active members of the PAC)

Interview initiated and completed at: _____

Interview with:

Interview Date:

This interview is in respect of a study whose purpose is to explore and analyse the organizational operations and the impact of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in the struggle for liberation in South Africa between 1959 and 1990, identify and evaluate policy positions, strategy and organizational operations of the PAC in coordinating and implementing the anti-Apartheid strategy during the period in question and evaluate the success and failures of the PAC during its struggle against apartheid in South Africa.

The study is to be conducted by Sphamandla S. Gumede of the History Department, Faculty of Arts at the University of Zululand. Mr. Gumede is conducting this study towards a Master of Arts Degree. Thus, responses to this interview will help in providing concrete information on the subject matter.

You are asked to complete this interview because you are a citizen /residence in the area of study (South Africa). Your participation in this research interview is voluntary but of great importance to its success. Your decision about whether or not to participate will not affect your current or future relations with the researcher. Answering these questions will help you identify some tedious issues besides giving you the opportunity to state your opinions.

Please treat all the questions objectively and to the best of your knowledge and be rest assured that all the information you give will be confidential. Note, however, that there are no rights or wrong answers. The study is only interested in your opinions.

Before we begin do you have any questions?

Section A:

1. Province of Origin _____
2. Province of Residence _____
3. Area of Residence _____



-
4. Sex : Male Female
5. How old are you? _____
6. What is your highest formal education attained?
- a) Primary School
- b) High School
- c) Collage
- d) University
- e) Others specify _____
7. What is your present occupation?
- a. Farming
- b. Civil servant
- c. Trading
- d. Business men/women
- e. Others Specify _____
8. What is your marital status?
- a. Married
- b. Single
- c. Divorce
- d. Widow

Section B:

1. Who are the Africanists?

Answer:

2. How long has the PAC been in existence?

Answer:

3. But are you anti-white or not?

Answer:

4. Did you regard all whites as oppressors?

Answer:

5. Who did you include? Did you include leftists in your indictment?

Answer:

6. Do you think the Africanist movement will last?

Answer:

7. Why couldn't the PAC cope with the demand of the struggle in South Africa?

Answer:

8. Do you think the African people in South Africa still adhere to the PAC philosophy and political standpoint?

Answer:

9. What is your attitude to the ANC and its Alliance partners?

Answer:

10. Given the political dynamics in South Africa in the post-apartheid era, do you still regard the PAC as an alternative to the ANC?

Answer:

11. How did the PAC re-organize itself as an organisation in exile and what was the nature of intra-PAC relations thereof?

Answer:

12. Briefly share with me the forces or factors that determined or conditioned these relationships.

Answer:

13. What was the nature of intra-PAC relations during the various leadership phases up to 1990 when the organisation was unbanned?

Answer:

14. What was the nature of living conditions in the PAC camps?

Answer:

15. Were there any external forces impacting on these relationships?

Answer:

16. Could the intra-PAC relations be compared to any of the other liberation movements in Southern Africa?

Answer:

17. Did the PAC have a military strategy and how did it evolve?

Answer:

18. What was the nature of the relationship between the army and the political leadership in the PAC?

Answer:

19. What comparisons can be drawn between the PAC's military strategy and the strategies of other liberation movements in Southern Africa?

Thank you

Sphamandla S. Gumede

Date:

QUESTIONNAIRE

Questionnaire initiated at: _____

Questionnaire completed at: _____

INTRODUCTION

This questionnaire is in respect of a study whose purpose is to explore and analyse the organizational operations and the impact of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in the struggle for liberation in South Africa between 1959 and 1990, identify and evaluate policy positions, strategy and organizational operations of the PAC in coordinating and implementing the anti-Apartheid strategy during the period in question and evaluate the success and failures of the PAC during its struggle against apartheid in South Africa.

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Please treat all the questions objectively and to the best of your knowledge and be rest assured that all the information you give will be confidential. Note, however, that there are no rights or wrong answers. The study is only interested in your opinions.

Section A:

9. Province of Origin _____

10. Province of Residence _____

11. Area of Residence _____

12. Sex : Male ☐ Female ☐

13. How old are you? _____

14. What is your highest formal education attained?

- a) Primary School
- b) High School
- c) Collage
- d) University
- e) Others specify _____

15. What is your present occupation?

- f. Farming
- g. Civil servant
- h. Trading
- i. Business men/women
- j. Others Specify _____

16. What is your marital status?

- e. Married
- f. Single
- g. Divorce
- h. Widow

Section B:

20. What do you think were the reason(s) behind the formation of the Pan Africanist Congress in 1959?

- a. maintenance of African supremacy over the other races
- b. Return land which the white "settlers" had "stolen" from the indigenous people of South Africa.
- c. Mobilize African people behind the PAC
- d. Not so sure
- e. Others

21. If your answer is (E) please specify below

22. Do you think that the Africanists were frustrated with the ANC's political approach to the struggle for liberation in South Africa?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure

d. Not at all

23. Would you agree that Freedom Charter really guaranteed minority rights as per the complaint of the PAC

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure
- d. Not at all

24. Do you think that the inclusion of white liberals in the struggle had diluted the traditional Black Nationalist position of the ANC as alleged by the PAC?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure
- d. Not at all
- e.

25. To what extent did the PAC influence the course of the struggle against apartheid in the early 1960s?

- a. High
- b. low
- c. Not so sure
- d. Not at all

26. Were the strategies of the PAC 'Africanist' at all?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure
- d. Not at all

27. Do you think that the PAC enjoyed more support than other liberation movements in the 1960s?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure
- d. Not at all

28. What do you think were the instrument(s) used by the PAC in executing its strategies?

- a. Sabotage
- b. Burning with 'necklace' tyres
- c. Toy-toying in the streets
- d. Stay-away
- e. All of the above
- f. Non of the above

29. If your answer is 'F' please state your reasons for the above?

30. Were you an activist or part of the liberation struggle during the days of the PAC operation within the country, before exile?

- a. Yes
- b. No

31. If yes, please specify the role you played as an activist

32. How do you rate the condition/nature of your political activism?

- a. Excellent
- b. Good
- c. Fair
- d. Not sure
- e. Not at all

33. Would you agree with the PAC's statement that ANC had made too many concessions in respect of oppression and was incapable of promoting black liberation?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure
- d. Not at all

34. Do you think that the PAC's rejection of the Freedom Charter was justified?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure
- d. Not at all

35. If **yes** what do you think were the reason(s) behind?

36. Did South Africa experience a 'Black- on-Black' violence during the formation of the PAC in 1959?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure
- d. Not at all

37. Do you think that we need to generalise about the exile experience in Southern Africa and how it impacted on the functioning of liberation movements, especially during the period 1959-1990?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure
- d. Not at all

38. Do you think that the PAC never experience any leadership wrangle while in exile in different countries?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure
- d. Not at all

39. Did you or any of your relative(s) become a direct victim of the PAC's negative internal squabbles in exile?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure
- d. Not at all

40. Were you or any of your relative(s) imprisoned in the PAC camps in exile?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure
- d. Not at all

41. If 'yes' pleas specify the reason(s) for this.

42. Other than the PAC, were you involved in any of the liberation movements against apartheid?

-
- a. Yes
 - b. No

43. If 'yes' at what capacity?

44. If 'No' why?

45. Do you agree that few scholars have undertaken in-depth research about the role of the PAC in the struggle for liberation?

- a. Yes
- b. No

46. If 'yes' pleas specify the names of scholars and their works in South Africa.

47. If 'No' pleas state your reason(s) for this.

48. Were you involved in any PAC's act of sabotage against the Apartheid government?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not sure
- d. Not at all

49. If 'yes' pleas provide an example(s)

50. Do you believe that the PAC violated civil liberties in South Africa during its struggle against apartheid?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure
- d. Not at all

51. If 'yes' can you please give examples of such violation(s)

52. Do you think that Black South African students also participated in the PAC's struggle for liberation?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure
- d. Not at all

53. How do you rate the level of students' participation in that struggle?

- a. Excellent
- b. Good
- c. Average
- d. Not so sure

54. Do you think that there are Whites, Indians or Coloureds who joined the PAC's struggle for liberation in South Africa?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not so sure
- d. Not at all

55. From experience or what you heard from former exiles, how do you rate the condition of life in exile during the struggle for liberation?

- a. Excellent
- b. Good
- c. Average
- d. Bad
- e. Worst

56. Do you think that there were internal freedom of speech and expression in the PAC during the struggle years?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not sure
- d. Not at all

57. Do you think that the PAC's armed struggle was known inside South Africa between 1960 and 1990?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not sure
- d. Not at all

58. How do you rate the activities/sacrifice of various PAC leaders?

- a. High
- b. Low
- c. average
- d. Not sure

59. Do you think that the year 1994 marked the advent of real/true democracy in South Africa for the PAC to engage the 'racist regime'?

- a. yes
- b. no
- c. Not sure
- d. Not at all

60. Do you think that the incipient collapse of apartheid in 1990 was attributed to the PAC's pressure?

- a. Yes
- b. No
- c. Not sure
- d. Not at all

61. If 'yes' to what extent?

62. If 'No' why?

63. How would you evaluate the PAC Policy position on negotiations in South Africa during transition to majority rule?

Thank you.

Gumede

ORIGINALITY REPORT

12%

SIMILARITY INDEX

11%

INTERNET SOURCES

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ETHICAL CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE

| | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|---|--|----------|---|----------|--|------------|
| Certificate Number | UZREC 171110-030 PGM 2016/293 | | | | | | |
| Project Title | The organizational operation and impact of the PAN Africanist C in the struggle for liberation in South Africa, 1959-1990 | | | | | | |
| Principal Researcher/ Investigator | SS Gumede | | | | | | |
| Supervisor and Co-supervisor | Dr. MZ Shamase | | | | | | |
| Department | History | | | | | | |
| Nature of Project | Honours/4 th Year | | Master's | x | Doctoral | | Department |

The University of Zululand's Research Ethics Committee (UZREC) hereby gives ethical approval of the undertakings contained in the above-mentioned project proposal and the documents listed on page 2 of this Certificate.

Special conditions:

- (1) This certificate is valid for 2 years from the date of issue.
- (2) Principal researcher must provide an annual report to the UZREC in the prescribed format [due date-31 August 2017]
- (3) Principal researcher must submit a report at the end of project to the UZREC in respect of ethical compliance.

The Researcher may therefore commence with the research as from the date of this Certificate using the reference number indicated above, but may not conduct any data collection using research instruments that are yet to be approved.

Please note that the UZREC must be informed immediately of

- Any material change in the conditions or undertakings mentioned in the documents were presented to the UZREC
- Any material breaches of ethical undertakings or events that impact upon the conduct of the research

Classification:

| Data collection | Animals | Human Health | Children | Vulnerable pp. | Other |
|-----------------|---------|--------------|----------|----------------|-------|
| X | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| Low Risk | | Medium Risk | | High Risk | |
| | | X | | | |

The table below indicates which documents the UZREC considered in granting this Certificate and which documents, if any, still require ethical clearance. (Please note that this is not a closed list and should new instruments be developed, these would require approval.)

| Documents | Considered | To be submitted | Not required |
|---|------------|-------------------|--------------|
| Faculty Research Ethics Committee recommendation | X | | |
| Animal Research Ethics Committee recommendation | | | X |
| Health Research Ethics Committee recommendation | | | X |
| Ethical clearance application form | X | | |
| Project registration proposal | X | | |
| Informed consent from participants | X | | |
| Informed consent from parent/guardian | | | X |
| Permission for access to sites/information/participants | X | | |
| Permission to use documents/copyright clearance | | | X |
| Data collection/survey instrument/questionnaire | X | | |
| Data collection instrument in appropriate language | | Only if necessary | |
| Other data collection instruments | | Only if used | |

The UZREC retains the right to

- Withdraw or amend this Certificate if
 - Any unethical principles or practices are revealed or suspected
 - Relevant information has been withheld or misrepresented
 - Regulatory changes of whatsoever nature so require
 - The conditions contained in this Certificate have not been adhered to
- Request access to any information or data at any time during the course or after completion of the project

The UZREC wishes the researcher well in conducting the research


 Professor Gideon De Wet
 Chairperson: University Research Ethics Committee
 Deputy Vice-Chancellor: Research & Innovation
 31 August 2016
 SS Gumede - PGM 2016/293

